The Taiwan Issue: Problems and Prospects

Benjamin Schreer, Andrew T. H. Tan

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2019
• ISBN:
  9781000300772
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Asian Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

While global attention has been focused on other regional issues, such as China-US tensions and North Korea's nuclear ambitions, little attention has been paid to Taiwan. Yet the so-called Taiwan issue, namely the continued separation of the island from mainland China, remains a major regional security challenge that could potentially spark direct conflict involving the USA, China and Japan, the three largest economies in the world, two of which are nuclear powers. Although Taiwan has continued to find opportunities to maintain the current status quo despite a deteriorating geo-strategic environment as a result of the rise of China and the uncertainties of the Trump Administration, its room for manoeuvre continues to narrow. This volume examines the challenges and evaluates the prospects for preventing conflict on the Taiwan Strait, by focusing on the political conditions that Taiwan faces internally and externally.

1 Reconsidering Taiwan’s future in a more contested East Asia

Benjamin Schreer and Andrew T. H. Tan

The strategic situation in the Taiwan Strait is back in the international spotlight given the deteriorating relationship between the People’s Republic of China (PRC, or China) and the Republic of China (ROC, or Taiwan), as well as a growing United States–China rivalry. Assessments that cross-Strait rapprochement during the previous Taiwanese Kuomintang (KMT—Nationalist Party)-led government of President Ma Ying-jeou between 2008 and 2016 had made serious conflict rather unlikely (Kastner 2015/16) were too optimistic from the start as China kept upgrading its military posture to threaten Taiwan while Taiwanese voters made it clear that there was no support for a ‘one country, two systems’ solution akin to Hong Kong or Macau (Lee 2015: 116–18). However, since President Tsai Ing-wen’s victory in the 2016 Taiwan general election, Taiwan-China relations have sunk to a new low. Accusing her Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) of promoting Taiwan’s de jure independence, China’s President Xi Jinping put all formal diplomatic exchanges on hold and intensified his threat that the unification issue should not be postponed indefinitely. In a January 2019 address commemorating the 40th anniversary of the ‘Message to Compatriots in Taiwan’ in 1979, Xi stated that unification was ‘inevitable’ and made it clear that resort to the use of force remained a serious option for Beijing (SBS News 2019). In a swift rebuke, Tsai categorically rejected the ‘one country, two systems’ principle as a basis for cross-Strait relations, a position that was overwhelmingly supported by Taiwanese voters (Associated Press 2019).

The Taiwan issue has thus entered a new period of uncertainty in a more contested East Asia. Taiwan is confronted by an increasingly assertive China. While Xi’s statements echo previous Chinese pronouncements, there are indicators that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has assigned greater urgency to ‘solving’ the issue of unification with Taiwan sooner rather than later. In the context of China’s growing power and influence, Xi at the 19th Party Congress in October 2017 explicitly tied the Taiwan question to his central foreign policy objective of the ‘great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation’, emphasizing that his country had ‘the resolve, the confidence, and the ability to defeat separatist attempts for ‘Taiwan independence’ in any form’ (Xi 2017).

It stands to reason that China’s political and military leaders could feel emboldened by their country’s growing political, economic and military means to possibly coerce Taiwan into unification. Beijing’s remarkable economic growth has turned it into a global economic player. Economically, China now towers over Taiwan. In 2017 Taiwan’s gross domestic product (GDP) stood at around US $571 billion, compared to China’s $11,900 billion. Indeed, by some measures China has surpassed the United States as the world’s largest economy: in 2014 the International Monetary Fund (IMF) reported that China’s purchasing power parity (PPP) was higher than America’s (IMF 2014). While there is much debate about the real growth of China’s economy and the associated risks China has used some of its new wealth to invest in a much more capable People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and to incrementally close the gap to America’s heretofore undisputed military primacy in the Western Pacific, particularly over the Taiwan Strait. In 2017 China’s official defense budget totalled some $150 billion, the second largest in the world after the United States (IISS 2018: 249).

Critically, China has changed the military balance with Taiwan in its favour when it comes to major air and naval platforms. Its growing arsenal of land-based cruise and ballistic missiles, also pose a major threat to Taiwanese airfields, command and control systems, and other critical infrastructure. In contrast, Taiwan’s defense budget in 2017 stood at only US $10.4 billion, well below the 3 per cent of GDP promised by successive governments (IISS 2018: 249, 302). Moreover, many of its major air combat aircraft, principal surface warships and submarines face obsolescence, compounded by the challenge of limited access to major arms suppliers due to China’s opposition. And Taiwan has faced serious difficulties in adjusting its defense strategy towards an asymmetric approach designed to exploit the PLA’s weaknesses. More than ever, Taiwan thus critically relies on the United States to provide military support. Yet, as a 2015 RAND study concluded, the US military might find itself hard-pressed if it had to confront China militarily over the Taiwan Strait. Indeed, the report warned that China’s armed forces could, in fact, be able to achieve at least temporary, local superiority that would enable it to achieve limited regional objectives (RAND Corporation 2015). Whether that is true or not, China has displayed greater public confidence in its military options vis-à-vis Taiwan. For instance, in 2018 China’s Minister of National Defence Lt-Gen. Wei Fenghe declared that ‘if anyone tries to separate Taiwan from China, China’s military will take action at all costs’ (Straits Times 2018), a thinly veiled threat against the United States. In early 2019 US defence officials warned that Chinese military leaders had become increasingly confident in their ability to invade Taiwan (Seligman 2019).

However, while Chinese leaders might think that time is on their side, Beijing’s scope for pressuring Taiwan to peacefully accept unification on its terms has actually diminished in recent years. Indeed, often overlooked in current debate about East Asia’s political order, Taiwan has undergone a remarkable transformation from an authoritarian regime to a consolidated democracy. It is this fundamental divergence in political systems and way of life – as opposed to Beijing’s repeated allegations that the DPP seeks Taiwan’s de jure independence – which makes a cross-Strait political rapprochement to China’s liking increasingly difficult. Successive opinion polls have demonstrated that a majority of Taiwanese voters prefer the status quo, perceive themselves as ‘solely Taiwanese’ and reject China’s ‘one party, two systems’ mantra. However, they are also opposed to de jure independence, knowing that this might well lead to a devastating war with China (Election Study Centre 2018a, 2018b).

Consequently, current President Tsai Ing-wen has steered clear of pro-independence statements and policies, in contrast to her DPP predecessor Chen Shui-bian (2000–08) who moved from a One China narrative to a two sovereign states position (Dittmer 2005: 86), in the process not only annoying Beijing but also complicating Taiwan’s relationship with Washington. Tsai is conscious of the need to avoid major provocation of Beijing by adopting a formal pro-independence policy. At the same time, however, any major Taiwanese party has to campaign on a platform that recognizes the country’s democratic consolidation and voters’ rejection of moving towards China’s ‘one country, two systems’ approach, thereby surrendering Taiwan’s sovereignty. This also applies to the KMT, which, under President Ma, concluded a series of political and economic agreements with China, including the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement in 2010, which was to further smooth the path towards greater integration of both economies. However, in 2014 his policies sparked widespread protests in Taiwan over a proposed services agreement with China, which would have enabled China to penetrate the services sector in Taiwan. This fuelled fears over a Chinese political takeover of Taiwan and served as the catalyst for the grassroots Sunflower Movement led by Taiwanese students and driven by opposition to an erosion of the nation’s prospering democracy.

In the process, the KMT suffered a crashing electoral defeat in 2016 and a key lesson learned from this for future KMT leaders is the need to avoid a cross-Strait policy which is regarded by a majority of voters as trading away Taiwan’s way of life. Importantly, developments in Hong Kong and Macau, where Chinese authoritarianism has hollowed out any promise of their special provincial status, have been closely watched in Taiwan, further reducing the attractiveness of the ‘China model’. However, these socio-political dynamics in Taiwan have not gone unnoticed by China which fears that the island is on its way to permanent de facto independence. The CCP’s hopes for a peaceful unification on its terms are fading. China’s response has been to increase pressure on Taiwan. This included the suspension of official communications with Taipei in June 2016 and unofficial economic sanctions in the form of reduced Chinese tourist numbers. Beijing also stepped up efforts to convince the small and dwindling number of states that recognize Taipei to switch recognition over to China, thereby further narrowing Taipei’s formal diplomatic space. Indeed, since 2016 Taiwan has lost five diplomatic allies, thus reducing its total number at the start of 2019 to only 16 countries plus the Vatican.

China also blocked Taiwan from participating in a number of international organizations that it had previously attended as an observer, such as the International Civil Aviation Organization, the World Health Assembly and the International Labour Conference, thus obstructing Taiwan from carrying out functional cooperation with the international community. Furthermore, the PLA increased its operations in the vicinity of Taiwan, including sailing its warships close to Taiwanese shores, and flying bombers to circle the island. China also opened new civil air corridors along China’s east coast without first consulting with Taiwan (Denmark 2018). Moreover, China’s Civil Aviation Agency demanded that foreign airlines remove from their websites any reference to Taiwan as a country. Disturbingly, most airlines complied with China’s demands, with some even offering up abject apologies (Chan 2018).

Nevertheless, Taiwan has remained firm in the face of China’s pressure. Part of its strategy to maintain its de facto independence and to broaden its breathing space is to intensify its political, economic and strategic ties with key regional players. This includes enhancing links with Japan, India and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Of particular importance for its survival is to maintain close relations with the USA, its informal security ally. Ever since the US Congress passed the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) in 1979, which commits Washington to maintaining the capacity ‘to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan’ (Taiwan Relations Act 1979), successive US governments have made it clear to both Beijing and Taipei that they prefer to maintain the status quo in the Strait. ‘Strategic ambiguity’ of whether the USA would defend Taiwan militarily in the event of a Chinese attack became the guiding principle for Washington’s policy towards Taiwan. Washington has also supplied Taiwan with ‘defensive arms’, though it has not provided the island with much needed replacements for some major combat systems, such as advanced combat aircraft.

Still, the TRA does not constitute a formal military alliance between the USA and Taiwan, and China has lobbied extensively in recent years with a view to weakening congressional support for Taiwan’s status (Mitchell 2017).There is no guarantee for Taiwan that the USA would come to its support in the event of major hostilities with China. A central issue for Taipei and future cross-Strait stability is therefore whether US commitment to the status quo increases or weakens in the context of China’s growing ability to put US forces at risk. Much will depend on Taiwan’s value for the USA in the context of its emerging strategic competition with China. Taiwan has resurfaced as a major issue in US-China relations with the arrival of the Trump presidency. Supported by a bipartisan consensus in Washington about the need to push back against China, the Trump administration appears to have embarked on a more competitive course of action (Shambaugh 2018; Sutter 2018). Owing to Taiwan’s geostrategic location and its importance as a liberal democracy in East Asia, US support for Taiwan could therefore intensify in a prolonged era of US-Chinese rivalry.

Yet at present this scenario is far from assured. Trump’s Asia ‘strategy’ during his first two years has been full of inconsistencies and unpredictability, and the implications for US-Taiwan relations remain unclear. On the one hand, the USA has provided stronger official support for Taiwan’s position. This included the passing of the Taiwan Travel Act in 2018, enabling senior US officials to visit Taiwan, the opening of a new unofficial US embassy in Taipei, and increased passage of US warships through the Taiwan Strait, prompting angry protests from China (Straits Times 2018). The US Congress also appeared to assume a more active role as a driving force behind strong US-Taiwan ties. On the other hand, however, President Trump has proven erratic and unpredictable in his dealings with Asia-Pacific allies, partners and potential adversaries alike. This has included flip-flopping on the Taiwan issue, alternating between publicly questioning America’s One China policy while seemingly providing China with a veto over closer US-Taiwan relations (Huxley and Schreer 2017). Indeed, Trump reportedly has questioned the benefits of closer ties to Taiwan for the USA and appears critical of any security commitment to the island’s defence, a stance that is in keeping with his general distaste for US alliances (Bush 2019). While the Trump administration appears to be broadly supportive of Taiwan, its transactional ‘America first’ approach holds dangers for Taiwan as well, since it might eventually end up as an expendable bargaining chip for Washington in its dealings with Beijing.

Objectives of volume

It is therefore timely to revisit the Taiwan issue in the context of Taiwan’s evolving domestic and external dynamics. While Taiwan could indeed succeed in navigating a more contested regional strategic environment, thereby maintaining its de facto independence from mainland China, its room for manoeuvre could also narrow in future. Over the coming years, cross-Strait affairs will thus re-emerge as one of the Asia-Pacific ‘flashpoints’ with potentially serious consequences for regional stability and security. Yet it is important to analyse Taiwan’s future not simply as the result of strategic choices made in Beijing or Washington but rather to consider Taiwan as an independent foreign policy actor in its own right, influenced by domestic and external factors.

This book therefore seeks to advance our understanding as scholars and practitioners of the contemporary challenges facing Taiwan’s future and cross-Strait stability. The main focus is on evaluating the prospects for enhancing Taiwan’s resilience against attempts to undermine and ultimately dissolve its democratic system, not least given that President Tsai has identified ‘resilience’ as the key attribute to describing her country (Office of the President 2018). Consequently, the book predominantly focuses on the political conditions that Taiwan under President Tsai faces internally and externally, asking how the country seeks to respond effectively to a much more uncertain environment. Specifically, it analyses the challenges and prospects of Taiwan’s relationships with the key regional powers, particularly China, Japan and the USA; Taiwan’s foreign and defence policy constraints and opportunities; its options in the face of China’s threat to use military force; and an assessment of Taiwan’s future prospects as well as possible strategies to ensure stability in the Taiwan Strait. Importantly, the book puts forward divergent perspectives on Taiwan’s future with a view to enriching the contemporary debate on this important issue for East Asia stability.

Structure of the volume

This chapter sets the stage for the following 12 chapters that provide an in-depth discussion of various aspects of the Taiwan issue. Chapter 2, Andrew Tan’s review of Taiwan as a case study for ‘small state survival’, provides a useful conceptual lens. It builds on frameworks developed by Efraim Inbar and Gabriel Sheffer in The National Security of Small States in a Changing World (London: Frank Cass, 1997) and by Michael Handel in Weak States in the International System (London: Frank Cass, 1990) to examine how the Cold War and post-Cold War literature concerning small state survival m...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Series Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• List of tables
• Acknowledgements
• List of contributors
• 1. Reconsidering Taiwan’s future in a more contested East Asia
• 2. The Taiwan issue and small state survival
• 3. Taiwan’s domestic dynamics and foreign policy
• 4. Taiwan and the great powers
• 5. The Taiwan issue: tracing 70 years of Taiwan-China relations
• 6. Taiwan-China relations: asymmetric trust and Innenpolitik
• 7. Preventing independence, striving for unification: Chinese perspectives on Taiwan
• 8. Taiwan and the United States
• 9. New dynamics in Taiwan-Japan relations
• 10. Taiwan’s foreign policy
• 11. Taiwan’s armed forces: development and prospects
• 12. Defending Taiwan against China
• 13. Thinking about how to forge lasting peace in the Taiwan Strait
• 14. Reassessing Taiwan’s strategic future
• Index