Chinese Maritime Power in the 21st Century

Strategic Planning, Policy and Predictions

Hu Bo

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2019
• ISBN:
  9781000576603
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Historia
• Subtopic: Historia militar y marítima

This book analyses China's maritime strategy for the 21st century, integrating strategic planning, policy thinking and strategic prediction.

This book explains the construction and application of China's military, political, economic and diplomatic means for building maritime power, and predicts the future of China's maritime power by 2049, as well as development trends in global maritime politics. It explores both the strengths and the limitations of President Xi's 'Maritime Dream' and provides a candid assessment of the likely future balance at sea between China and the United States. This volume explains and discusses China's claims and intentions in the East and South China Seas and makes some recommendations for China's future policy that will lessen the chance of conflict with the United States and its closer neighbors.

This book will be of much interest to students of maritime strategy, naval studies, Chinese politics and International Relations in general.

1 Three major systematic objectives of Chinese maritime power¹

From 1840 onward, becoming a maritime power has been the dream and pursuit of generations of Chinese elites. Since the turn of the 21st century, China has extensively accelerated its maritime focus and efforts for the construction of maritime power. Official maritime policies and plans also continue to be introduced. In May 2003, the State Council’s National Maritime Economic Development Program announced unequivocally for the first time the strategic goal of ‘the gradual construction of China into a maritime power.’ In November 2012, it was formally declared in the report of the 18th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party to ‘increase development in marine resource potential, develop the marine economy, protect the marine ecosystems and the ocean environment, resolutely safeguard national maritime interests, and construct a maritime power.’²

The topic of maritime power has since then officially risen as an important part of China’s national strategy. However, this strategy remains highly theoretical and abstract, especially without a clear systematic objective.

On China’s goals as a maritime power, domestic academic debates have in fact continued for more than ten years. The former director of the State Oceanic Administration, Wang Shuguang, once pointed out that China’s aims as a maritime power ought to be

an advanced marine economy with output value equivalent to above 10 per cent of GDP; strong offshore defense forces, capable of effectively safeguarding national maritime interests; distinct status as a major maritime nation, able to play an important role in terms of international maritime affairs.³

Liu Zhongmin believes the wider strategy of China’s maritime development should be grasped from these three levels. First, it should include both international and domestic strategic levels. On the international level, China’s grand maritime strategy needs to build and peacefully develop an international environment. Domestically, it should serve sustainable development and the establishment of a harmonious society. Second, it is a systematic strategic entity that includes the marine economy, maritime politics, oceanic management, maritime law and other sub-strategies. Third, it needs to echo the three main requirements of China’s over-arching strategy, namely development needs, sovereignty needs and responsibility requirements.⁴ These are two very comprehensive frameworks for the development of maritime strategies which cover maritime development, the expansion of sea power and other elements. Although these assertions stem from a strategically advantageous position, they nevertheless appear too macroscopic and abstract.

Many officials and scholars have also proposed China’s specific objectives as a maritime power. Admiral Liu Huaqing had once suggested a coastal defense strategy for the Chinese PLA Navy, defining the boundaries of Chinese naval defense.⁵ Zhang Wenmu pointed out that the Chinese Navy ‘is a naval force that can cover territorial waters 120 to 125 degrees longitude East … China’s sea power is merely a limited power as yet. Its coverage scope is mainly limited to Taiwan, the Nansha (Spratly) Islands, and other sea areas within Chinese sovereignty and jurisdiction.’⁶

These propositions and research findings from their respective professional fields, such as the military and economic development, propose aims and directions. They present important reference value in China’s construction of a maritime power, but they generally tend to lack considerations on strategy as a whole. Ideas and plans concerning the road to a maritime power have gradually evolved into two polarized extremes: either to overemphasize the building of sea power and sea control, in pursuit of Mahan-style sea power; or to overstress the unique nature of China’s maritime experiences, while sparing no effort to avoid ‘power,’ declaring that ‘China’s experience as a maritime power is one of peaceful development and win-win cooperation.’⁷ It appears from this second perspective that China’s maritime claims concern only issues of just deserved rights and national maritime security, and it seems as if China in fact harbors no interest whatsoever in the expansion of power.

At its most fundamental, the question of maritime power concerns how much power is wielded in the field of international maritime politics, that is to say, maritime power has always been a relative concept, a point long neglected by most Chinese scholars. When evaluating a maritime power, not only is it essential to compare with oneself, it is of even greater necessity to contrast with other countries, because there are no strong without the weak. When discussing maritime powers, it is impossible to avoid the issue of power distribution. This is because regardless of how China develops in its own strength, one must also take into account power dynamics and relationships with other maritime nations. Evidently, defining China’s maritime power objectives from a perspective of power has more rational and pragmatic values. Power objectives are among the first severe problems to be encountered in China’s path to becoming a maritime power and ought to be cautiously prepared for. Moreover, we cannot only discuss ‘rights’ while shunning the subject of ‘power.’⁸ When defining the concept of maritime power, it is necessary to contemplate the impacts of the qualities of time and space, appreciating that maritime power encompasses not only military might, political power, economic power, etc., but it is also necessary to confront the essence of ‘power,’ and not to use concepts like ‘rights,’ ‘interests’ and other concepts in international law to replace power politics itself.

As to the objectives, China should not only take into account its own needs but also consider the rationality and feasibility of its targets, and international maritime patterns. Based on the above considerations, and comprehensively taking into account trends in Chinese interests, China’s geographic characteristics, its own strengths and its overall development requirements together with its international environment, China’s objectives as a maritime power in my view should and could be categorized into three aspects as following.

The No. 2 world sea power

Sea power and sea control had been criticized for a long time in China as tools of imperialism and hegemonism, which makes it a little difficult for Chinese elites to understand the basic points of sea power and sea control. Even now, some Chinese officers and scholars still take this conception for granted and deem that China should neither mention nor pursue sea power. Besides, though the study of sea power has risen as a prominent discipline in China over the past two decades, many of these studies are missing the core points of sea power, while paying too much attention in the pursuit of Chinese characteristics like the rights mode of sea power.⁹

However, the practice of sea power and sea control can be dated back to the beginning of human civilization, which in fact has nothing to do with Alfred Thayer Mahan and imperialism. The most basic function of international politics is to influence or direct the distribution of land power through the control of the seas. Of course, no one can occupy the seas, even a small piece. In Mahan’s times and before, sea control mainly meant command of critical sea access, while when we talk about sea power and sea control in the current times, it just means relative influence and comparative advantage in some maritime areas, because today’s sea power is definitely an inclusive system rather than exclusive one.¹⁰

Therefore, China needs to pursue sea control in some certain sea area and needs to gain a strategic advantage in areas where core interests are at stake. In this respect, there are no fundamental differences when compared to other maritime powers in the world. The planning and practice of military strategies still remain the foremost important issues to focus on when building a maritime power.

From the perspective of sea control, the world’s sea powers can be broadly divided into three categories: coastal navies, regional sea powers and global maritime hegemonies. Coastal navies indicate that the scope of a military force’s activities is mainly limited to the offshore. They lack large-scale power projection platforms for the open seas and are unable to carry out substantial oceangoing combat missions. The vast majority of the world’s national navies belongs to this category. Regional sea powers signify those whose effective control and activity zone far exceeds beyond the near seas, to the extent of the distant seas and oceans. They possess a certain degree of oceangoing combat capability, normally with a focused regional deployment as its trademark, which are different from coastal naval varieties, as well as worldwide naval varieties distributed globally. Classic examples of regional sea powers include the British, French and Russian navies. Global maritime hegemony indicates a military force’s global distribution and global reach, with the goal of influencing all of the world’s key channel waters, as well as directing the international maritime order. Until now, only the US Navy has achieved this feat.

As to the Chinese sea power, China’s domestic experts ordinarily tend to highlight China’s maritime military strategy of ‘coastal defense, open sea protection.’ In contrast, foreign observers are more specific in their analysis. Many hold positions that China’s objective as a maritime power is to establish some kind of hegemonic power, or at least regional advantage. In particular, the eminent American bestseller Robert Kaplan foresees that ‘the South and East China Seas can unlock a vast naval footprint for China in the navigable, southern Rimland of Eurasia – from the Horn of Africa to the Sea of Japan.’¹¹ Toshi Yoshihara and James Holmes contend that China will not be able to develop a naval force comparable in might to that of the United States. The use of onshore ‘Anti-Access’ technology requires the US Navy to stay far away from China’s coastal waters. However, China will nevertheless rely on an ever-strengthening comprehensive range of powers to constantly seek to erode the US maritime advantage, first of all in the First Island Chain and then the Second.¹² From a US standpoint, some strategy analysts who follow a realist zero-sum game doctrine believe that China’s long-term goal of maritime power is to in fact challenge the United States and seize the leading position in the Pacific region. Those who uphold these viewpoints include Aaron L. Friedberg, Robert J. Art, and John J. Mearsheimer, among other renowned scholars.

In fact, none of these arguments are novel. Realist theories in international relations are often based on the fact that intentions are unreliable. A country’s foreign strategic objectives are mainly determined by strength and power structures. The so-called power determines interests. The greater the power, the grander the objectives. I do not deny that this view has some explanatory power. The problem is that in the current international system, absolute power is almost nonexistent. Almost all exercise of power is limited, and a pure law of the jungle era has not existed for a long while. Even for a superpower like the United States, its authority cannot be compared to that of Genghis Khan and similar conquerors of the ancient world. In other words, in the existing international system, the powers of every major nation are insufficiently great, to completely divorce them from the constraining effects of the international system and to fully overcome geographic circumstances, natural endowments, the international environment, and other conditions and limitations. Moreover, the role of technology in military strategy is increasingly important, while any sophisticated weapons technology would soon spread internationally. This would cause the success of any major nation to be easily susceptible to duplication and hedging by other powers. By contrast, the success of the Mongols depends on their distinctive ethnic characteristics and advantages as horsemen. This type of success was often difficult to mimic since the Mongols had maintained military hegemonic power for a very long period of time.

Thus, when we plan China’s maritime military strategic objectives, we ought to consider that there will be certain shifts in China’s interests along with increases in its power. To a certain extent, it is rational that power determines interests. At the same time, it is necessary to consider restrictions on the expansion of power, because there always exist certain boundaries on power expansion. Interests cannot grow unchecked. Successful strategies are often always constrained strategies.

What type of sea power China ought to pursue largely depends on China’s interests. What kind of sea power China can seek is determined accordingly by geographical conditions, natural endowments, the international environment and other factors. According to spatial distances, from the near to the remote, the duties of China’ sea power varied.

Offshore control

Sovereignty, security, political and economic interests mean that China must gain a strategic advantage in the seas of East Asia, which can be regarded as the strategic bottom line of China’s maritime power.

Regarding the definition of near-sea boundaries, China officially has two popular explanations: Admiral Liu Huaqing once noted that the main realms of China’s near seas consist of ‘the Yellow Sea, East China Sea, the South China Sea, waters surrounding the Spratly Islands, Taiwan, and Okinawa island chain, as well as waters of the northern Pacific’¹³; the 1997 edition of China People’s Liberation Army Military Terms says: ‘The People’s Republic of China’s near seas include Bohai, the Yellow Sea, the East China Sea, the South China Sea, and partial waters east of Taiwan.’¹⁴

According to these two interpretations, China’s near seas cover the four major continental marginal seas in addition to some parts of the Northern Pacific Ocean. It is not a legal concept such as an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), but instead a geographic theory. The range is larger: a region of 3 million square kilometers is claimed by China to be within its jurisdiction based on the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and other international law.

All world powers are first and foremost regional powers, and their periphery frequently does not easily allow others to meddle with the limits of their strategic advantage. The role of the Americas to the United States, and the Commonwealth of Independent States to Russia are examples of this. It is not difficult to accept, by taking just a fleeting look at the map or by relying on general knowledge, that the coastal strategic situation affects China’s strategic safety and development security. Most of China’s core and major maritime interests are concentrated in the offshore areas, and the importance of the East China Sea offshore to China is self-evident.

First, only through gaining a strategic advantage in coastal areas, can China defend the reunification of Taiwan and Mainland China, sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands and Spratly Islands, and other core and crucial interests. For China, the current situation of the Taiwan Strait, the Diaoyu Islands dispute and the South China Sea issue are largely related to the loss of control and voice over the East Asian coastal waters since modern times.

Taiwan’s role in China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity is related to China’s reunification and involves China’s major political interests. Unification of Taiwan is a major factor in the development of China’s sea power, no matter how highly advanced China’s sea power and how strong its maritime power, but if China still cannot decide Taiwan’s future, then any sea power ambitions eventually amount to foam. In the future, whether Taiwan can reunify with Mainland China according to China’s own wishes is also an indication of whether China can ultimately become a maritime power.

As for China, Taiwan forms a natural barrier to shield the mainland coastline and is an ideal focal point for the protection of maritime transportation lanes. It represents a key for the Chinese Navy to breach the island chain blockade and expand into the Pacific and Indian Oceans. Its strategic position is therefore extremely important. Onc...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Series Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• List of figures
• List of tables
• Preface
• Acknowledgments
• 1 Three major systematic objectives of Chinese maritime power
• 2 The connotation and characteristics of Chinese maritime power
• 3 China’s coastal geostrategy
• 4 China’s exterior line strategy at sea
• 5 Disputes over the Diaoyu Islands and the Demarcation of the East China Sea
• 6 A solution to tensions in the South China Sea
• 7 Promoting peaceful power transition between China and the United States
• 8 Maritime relations with Japan, ASEAN, India, Australia and Russia
• 9 Deterrence is preferable to fighting
• 10 Tridents beyond armed force
• 11 Conclusion and expectation: China’s maritime power in the year 2049
• Index