Chapter 1
Planning Singapore: Challenges and Choices
Stephen Hamnett and Belinda Yuen
This book is being published two hundred years after Sir Stamford Raffles envisaged the development of Singapore as āa great commercial emporium and fulcrumā (Home, 1997, p. 64) and negotiated its cession from the Malay Sultan of Johore on behalf of the British East India Company.
Singaporeās settlement history did not begin with Raffles. It is now conventionally traced back to at least the fourteenth century and Singapore in 1819 was certainly not the terra nullius that the British claimed it to be (Kwa et al., 2009; Imran, 2016). While the population at the time of Rafflesās landing has been estimated at less than a thousand (Saw, 1969), the island was already an important and well-established location in the complex commercial activities of European powers and indigenous Malay, Sumatran, Javanese, Bugis and other regional traders (Kwa et al., 2009; Imran, 2016).
Nevertheless, the assumption of control by the British in 1819 gave significant impetus to Singaporeās growth. Its population increased rapidly, driven particularly by an influx of Chinese and Indian immigrants, and by 1824 there were more than 10,000 people in Singapore (Saw, 1969). Raffles also ordered the preparation by Lieutenant Jackson of Singaporeās first formal Town Plan in 1822. Under this plan, in accord with the British āGrand Modellā of colonial settlement (Home, 1997), the best land was set aside for government buildings, a padang and a āEuropean Townā, with separate areas allocated to diverse communities including the Chinese, Chulia (Tamil), Bugis, Arabs and Malays (see Teo, 1992; Imran, 2016).
Clearly, the anniversary of the arrival of Raffles, ushering in a long and eventful period of colonial rule for Singapore, is a momentous event to be observed and it will be the focus of bicentennial commemorations in 2019. These are unlikely, however, to match the celebrations which accompanied another recent historical milestone, the fiftieth anniversary of the establishment in 1965 of an independent Singapore. A few years earlier, in 1959, internal self-government had been achieved, at a time of daunting challenges:
In 1959 conditions in Singapore were dismal. There were not enough jobs for a rapidly exploding population. Living conditions were deplorable. Overcrowding was severe. There was an air of instability and uncertainty. (Lee, 1984)
The Singapore of today is a city which has been remarkably and dramatically transformed from these desperate conditions of the mid-twentieth century. Professor Sir Peter Hall, the great British urbanist, has described this transformation as āperhaps the most extraordinary case of economic development in the history of the worldā (1998, p. 982). Edward Glaeser has expressed admiration of Singaporeās urban development and management in his book Triumph of the City (2011), which makes the economic and environmental case for dense cities, while another Harvard professor, Stephen Walt, regards it as an āover-achieverā (Walt, 2009). This theme of a city āpunching above its weightā is picked up by others (see, for example, Wilson, 2014; Chuang, 2015). In 2018, Singapore retained its ranking in the annual Mercer quality of life rankings as the āmost liveableā city in Asia.1
There is no better place to observe the accomplishments of the island-state2 since independence than from the lushly vegetated rooftop deck of the Pinnacle, an award-winning 50-storey public housing development of seven connected towers close to the cityās centre. Nearby is a dense cluster of tall commercial office buildings, occupied by the giants of global capital, interspersed with hotels from the worldās major hotel chains, indicative of Singaporeās importance as a major Asian tourist destination and a hub for international finance and trade. The observer also looks out over the rooftops of the shop houses and historic residences of the Tanjong Pagar conservation area. Since the 1980s, Singapore has moved away from an earlier post-independence preoccupation with creating a āclean, orderly, if somewhat antiseptic environmentā (Yeoh, 2005, p. 950) towards an emphasis on providing the sort of culturally interesting and vibrant landscape held to be necessary to attract visitors and knowledge workers. As part of this, a great deal of effort and investment has gone into preserving Singaporeās remaining and once undervalued heritage quarters (Yeoh, 2005; Kong, 2017), as well as into iconic architecture and extraordinary gardens.
To the south of the Pinnacle is the 80-hectare site of the Tanjong Pagar container port, Southeast Asiaās first such port when it opened in 1972 but now being prepared for redevelopment with its activities relocated to a newer terminal at Pasir Panjang. This is itself an interim development en route to the expansion of port operations at the Tuas megaport at the western end of the island, which is scheduled to be fully operational by 2040, a striking example of the sort of purposeful long-term strategic planning at which Singapore excels. Also visible to the west are the chimneys of huge petrochemical complexes which, together with the container ports, serve the ever-present queues of ships and tankers offshore, bearing witness to the continuation of Singaporeās historic importance as a major trading port.
In a broad arc out to the north are the tall apartment blocks of Singaporeās twenty-three new towns and housing estates ā the āHeartlandā (see Kong and Yeoh, 2003; Yeoh, 2004; Soh and Yuen, 2011; Cheong, 2018; Chua, 2018) where most Singaporeans live, linked to the downtown area by an extensive and constantly expanding network of mass rapid transit (MRT) rail lines. And away to the east is Changi International Airport, one of the most important aviation hubs in Asia and voted the worldās best airport for the sixth year in a row in 2018.3
More than 5 million people live at high density in Singapore, which had a land area of only a little over 700 square kilometres in 2018.4 This population figure is currently projected to exceed 6.5 million by 2030. Yet a striking feature of the view from the Pinnacle is the extensive greenery, which encompasses the large protected water catchments in the centre of the island, the many parks, densely planted links and connecting corridors between the towns, and the recent proliferation of āvertical landscapingā on tall buildings, including the stunning Oasia Hotel immediately to the east.
The Focus and Structure of the Book
The remarkable story of how Singapore was transformed āFrom Third World to Firstā in a few decades has been told many times in recent years and particularly in an outpouring of works5 published around 2015 to commemorate the fifty years since Singapore became an independent nation in 1965. This book makes due acknowledgment of this history but its primary purpose is to look forward.
The book contains a series of chapters by authoritative commentators on aspects of Singaporeās current planning aspirations and challenges. Some authors are based in Singapore and cast a critical and informed eye over the city in which they are engaged as both scholars and citizens. Others look at Singapore from outside, combining their expertise with a knowledge gained from regular visits to a city with which they have a strong and personal relationship. The chapters differ in their style, but they are united by their focus on what might come next in the unfolding narrative of Singaporeās planned development.
This introductory chapter, after sketching the overall structure and purpose of the book, provides an overview of Singaporeās distinctive model of governance and long-term planning before outlining and exploring the main themes discussed in the contributed essays. Singaporeās successful development over the past half century has been underpinned by a capacity to adapt purposefully and pragmatically to changing circumstances and this ability to adapt will be tested again in responding to the contemporary challenges identified in this book. The collection ends with a forward-looking essay, which explores the most important of these challenges in more detail and considers how Singapore might respond.
Governance and Politics in Singapore: Vulnerability and Exceptionalism
Chua Beng Huat, professor of sociology at the National University of Singapore, is an authoritative researcher on Singaporeās public housing and an insightful analyst of its governance and post-independence history. In his most recent book, Liberalism Disavowed (2017), Chua acknowledged that all Singaporeans understand how much the material life of the nation has improved under more than half a century of rule by the Peopleās Action Party (PAP) since 1959. He also recognized:
ā¦ the equally undeniable fact that this improvement has been paid for with a significant quantum of social, cultural and political repression, strewn across the political history of the island nation, particularly in the first 30 years under Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew. (Chua, 2017, p. vii)
The adoption of authoritarian policies was a common feature of the post-war ādevelopmental stateā in Asia:
the implicit social contract between government and citizens was the promise of economic growth and material benefit in exchange for curtailment of democratic rights, including freedom of speech and assembly, for the citizenry. (Douglass et al., 2008, p. 1)
Singapore was and remains distinct from most other decolonized states established in the second half of the twentieth century in its fervent anti-corruption policies, adopted and strictly enforced by the PAP as a necessary condition for its legitimacy. Authoritarianism was justified by its rulers on the basis of its extreme vulnerability as a small, newly-independent nation with no natural resources and heavily reliant on imports and trade. This led in turn to the central notion of āexceptionalismā in its political arrangements ā the argument that, because Singapore is so uniquely vulnerable, it requires āa degree of political consensus that ordinary democratic arrangements cannot produceā (Low6 and Vadaketh, 2014, pp. xiāxii; and see also Chan, 1971).
Chua has suggested that this concern about Singaporeās vulnerability has produced in the majority of Singaporeans a degree of anxiety about the future and:
a political conservatism that is highly protective of the hard-earned material gains, a conservatism that dovetails with the governmentās emphasis on the need to maintain social and political stability. (Chua, 2017, p. 33; and see also Hong and Huang, 2008)
There is a substantial library of books and other publications from influential Singaporean opinion leaders who continue to express concern at the island-stateās vulnerability.7 But the model of development of the early post-independence years has undergone some subtle changes over time and many aspects of social and cultural life have been progressively liberalized, especially since the 1990s when a second generation of PAP ministers under Goh Chok Tong came to power. This has continued under the present prime minister, Lee Hsien Loong,8 and there are expectations of further evolution when a fourth generation of PAP leaders takes over the direction of the party.
The cultural liberalization, which has occurred since the 1990s, has not been matched to the same extent, however, by the parallel development of political pluralism and individualism. Chua Mui Hoong, a well-regarded social commentator who writes regularly in The Straits Times, has described the contemporary pace of political reform as āglacialā (2018, p. 18). As a result, there remain those in Singapore who believe that the country still needs to become more open, liberal and democratic, in part on the argument that the persistence of topdown, single party government is at odds with Singaporeās status as an international trading nation and global economic power, and also on the grounds that this style of governance risks stifling innovation and creativity ā āthe lesson of history is clear: only democracy, dissent and diversity can offer the leaders and ideas required to meet Singaporeās challengesā (Thum, 2014, p. 163).
Perhaps paradoxically, the very success of the PAP in improving the quality of life and material security of Singaporeās citizens has led to pressures for change. The majority of Singaporeans today are prosperous, well-educated, digitally literate, middle-class homeowners who are less inhibited than previous generations in challenging the PAP government. They showed this, in particular, in the 2011 general election, which was conducted against a backdrop of growing evidence of public transport breakdowns and congestion, high housing prices, concerns about immigration, widening inequality and perceived threats to the aspiration to provide a comfortable lifestyle for the growing older population. At the 2011 election the PAP secured only 60 per cent of the popular vote, its worst election result in all its years in power. According to several observers, this demonstrated a āfraying consensusā (Chua, 2018, p. 12), an increasing challenge to top-down rule by establishment elites, which also reflected the way in which:
government-controlled media channels have seen their influence wane in the face of a mushrooming blogosphere. Citizensā views are spread and amplified through the densely-connected networks of social media, producing information cascades and shaping mass perceptions far more quickly than traditional media channels can. (Low and Vadaketh, 2014, p. 2)
The PAP responded to the 2011 election result with increased welfare expenditure for low-income workers and older people, additional grants for new home purchasers, curbs on immigration, additional investments in public transport and a range of other policies that led to a recovery in its vote in 2015. This led some commentators to conclude that pronouncements of the end of an era in Singapore had been somewhat premature. Others suggested, however, that, while recent years may have demonstrated the governmentās ability to adapt its policies in response to populist concerns in the short-term, fundamental reforms to under...