Part I
The return of the sacred
1 What can the paranormal in popular culture tell us about our relationship with the sacred in contemporary society?
Madeleine Castro
Articles discussing the paranormal often begin with an adage about how fascination with the mysterious is timeless. But what forms do this āfascinationā take and what does it signify? A survey conducted across Great Britain in 2009 determined that 36.8% of the population reported having at least one paranormal experience (Castro, Burrows, and Wooffitt 2014). A fairly recent survey of paranormal belief suggests that over half the population report a belief in ghosts (Copping 2013). What does this say about us psychologically or as a society, and do the results provide indications about the role of the paranormal in popular culture?
Attempts to understand paranormal experiences sociologically have looked to broad sociocultural variables for explanations, while psychology focused on individual differences between people. These ideas will be reviewed before considering the questions in relation to empirical findings from my doctoral research. In revisiting the accounts, I contemplate my findings as possible evidence of engagement with forms of āspiritualityā that appear to indicate a Western phase of reenchantment (see, for instance, Partridge 2004). Principally, I argue that this points to:
- identification with a contemporary worldview of rationality and/or critical thinking;
- engagement with so-called paranormal and āNew Ageā ideas; and
- syntheses of secular and sacred ideas, reflective of a complex and nuanced āpostsecularā1 period in wider society
I conclude by reflecting on and bolstering a call for further research into the paranormal and the sacred in popular culture.
Social scientific explanations for the paranormal
Paranormal experiences are usually placed outside of the purview of modern science. That is, if true, they cannot be explained by our current scientific understandings of the world. Such experiences include apparitions, telepathy, precognition, contact with the dead, mysticism, out-of-body experiences, and near-death experiences.
Various disciplines seek to understand why people report paranormal experiences, but approaches differ. Within the social sciences, there is an emphasis on culture, social structural variables, and demographics. The deprivation theory posits that marginalized individuals are more likely to hold paranormal beliefs for comfort or escapism (Bainbridge 1978; Connor 1984; Warren 1970; Wuthnow 1976). However, the concept of marginalization is inconsistently applied, and it is a patronizing and ineffective elucidation of reported belief or experience (Castro 2009).
The cultural-source hypothesis was the oft-implied default explanation for reported paranormal phenomena (McClenon 1994). This theory upheld that all phenomena had a ācultural source,ā whether through folk tales that are orally transmitted (e.g., black dog sightings); the misinterpretation of ordinary events through cultural tradition (e.g., ghosts); or influenced by āavailableā cultural expectations or ideas (Hufford 1982, 13ā14). However, while culture is, via language, embedded within and woven into any reported experience, it is impossible to straightforwardly sever culture and experience.
Culture has been of less importance than the individual to psychology for understanding the paranormal. Notably, this is often conceptualized in terms of deficiencies or flaws. One prominent approach is the cognitive deficits model (CDM), in which flawed memory (Richards, Hellgren, and French 2014), a style of thinking which lacks analytic skills (Ross, Hartig, and McKay 2017), misperception and/or flawed reasoning (Rogers 2015) are afforded explanatory power for reported paranormal beliefs. French and Wilson (2007) provide a concise summary of CDMās position:
Thus believers in the paranormal tend to be poorer at syllogistic reasoning, have a more distorted concept of randomness leading them to see meaning where there is none, are more susceptible to experiencing anomalous sensations and are, in certain circumstances, more suggestible. Memory biases in the accuracy of eyewitness testimony for ostensibly paranormal events have also often been reported, and evidence is beginning to accumulate that believers may be more prone to false memories. Believers may also show a tendency to interpret the products of non-conscious processing as evidence of paranormal activity.
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Let us unpack this a little. First, syllogistic reasoning is formal logic that involves deducing the validity of a conclusion based on two propositions. For instance, āall beekeepers are artists. All chemists are beekeepers. Therefore, all chemists are artistsā (Chater and Oaksford 1999, 194). However, research suggests that this is not straightforward for many people: āpeople do not seem to find drawing deductively valid conclusions particularly naturalā (Tessler and Goodman 2014, 1574). Furthermore, there are potential issues with using syllogisms experimentally, as experimenters rarely consider that they are always a fragment of ongoing arguments (out of context in experiments) and that some participants will appear to āsolveā them without actually having done so (Wetherick 1989). Thus it is difficult to determine what this can really tell us about those who report paranormal belief.
Second, while a purported inability to recognize randomness equals a bias here, it is something that humans are notoriously ābadā at. Williams and Griffiths suggest there are two concerns. One ā all random material is inherently ambiguous (Williams and Griffiths 2013), and two ā āerrors in detecting randomness are not necessarily evidence that people simply reason poorly about chanceā (Williams and Griffiths 2008, 1158) but instead indicate that ājudgments about randomness are inherently difficult, even with optimal statistical knowledge and extensive computational resources, and errors in judging randomness may reflect the difficulty of the problem rather than misleading intuitions about chance eventsā (Ibid., 1163). Further, meaning making is a subjective process that occurs in a rich and complex ārealā world. Experients are effectively reporting that they experience the world as a highly patterned place, imbued with meaning.
The CDM maintains predominantly negative associations with the paranormal. To ascribe flaws in cognition requires adopting particular assumptions and a particular worldview. This view advocates an (albeit abstract) perfect model of human reasoning and cognition supported by a mechanistic view of the mind (e.g., memory as a store with human recall as āfaulty,ā rather than memory being socially reconstructive and embedded in all situations).2 It endorses the psychologistās expertise and the participantās āgullibilityā (whose perception, cognition, or judgment cannot be trusted). The problem is that this continues to pathologize and reveals more about underlying (skeptical) assumptions than it helps us to understand.
There are alternative views. For instance, individuals who report paranormal experiences are more likely to be artistic or creative (see Holt, Delanoy, and Roe 2004). Experients also exhibit differences in how they comprehend and interact with the world, being transliminal (Thalbourne and Delin 1994) or having thinner boundaries (Hartmann 1991). These labels refer to a blurry delineation between states of consciousness and a tendency to either conflate āmaterialā between the conscious and unconscious, or allow easy migration between them. Nonetheless, even studies presenting more positive depictions (e.g., creativity) are highlighting distinguishing qualities. The idea that people reporting paranormal experiences are damaged, deficient, or even āspecialā in some way constructs them as necessarily different from ordinary people.
There is evidence, however, that offers an opportunity to reconceptualize our understanding. In 2009, a survey was conducted with more than 4000 adults in Great Britain (Castro, Burrows, and Wooffitt 2014). More than a third of the population (36.8%) reported at least one paranormal experience. This is higher than most people assume (though it is slightly lower than previous surveys e.g., Haraldsson 1985; Haraldsson and Houtkooper 1991) suggesting that experiences are reported by a significant minority. There was some variation in gender, region, and age, but this was not significant enough to suggest any simplistic conclusions about these demographics. Essentially, the results demonstrated, akin to Greeleyās (1975, 1991) evidential reviews, that those reporting these experiences are normal.
But if the paranormal is normal, what does this mean? The paranormal is a visible aspect of popular culture, e.g., as entertainment. This is demonstrated by paranormal media (e.g., books, films, web content) or via paranormal services (e.g., ghost tourism). As Hill (2011, 52) attests, engaging with the paranormal is a popular cultural pastime, and āhauntedā locations combine the British love of history ā āvisiting historic places (the second most popular pastime in Britain after gardening)ā ā and ghosts. The paranormal has a lucrative commercial side, offering healthy financial reward from film and television profits (e.g., The Blair Witch Projectās $250 million revenue), paid services (psychic, tarot, or clairvoyant consultations via premium phone lines), and the mind, body, spirit (MBS)/self-help genre (Hill 2011). This is a side of the paranormal that often draws the most criticism (e.g., Carrette and King 2005). Critics maintain that the paranormal is a predominantly commercial phenomenon, providing both entertainment and various consumptive practices and services. However, this disregards other facets. Some scholars argue that engagement with paranormal phenomena is representative of a relationship with the sacred (e.g., Partridge 2004; Campbell 2007). These ideas will be discussed after reviewing several extracts from (doctoral research) interviews collected between 2005 and 2007.
Showing rationality and demonstrating profundity
Several of these accounts have been discussed elsewhere (Castro 2015) and were originally analyzed using a technical discursive methodological approach.3 However, here I treat the accounts as illustrative moments embedded in the social world, which offer tentative insights into the paranormal (and sacred) in popular culture. The excerpts are taken from interviews with James, John, George, and Duck.
One interesting feature is that rationality is often foregrounded or oriented to by the experients. The form varies (e.g., demonstrating critical capacities or displaying the ability to question and be skeptical), and its inclusion exhibits awareness of rational explanations while subsequently rejecting them, presenting an extraordinary explanation as the preferred alternative. In the first extract, James talks about an experience in a bookshop ā when scanning a book from the MBS section, he becomes completely engrossed. The extract begins with a report about the āthird eyeā:
ā¦ there was one section in this book where the guy said he started seeing eyes everywhere and he talked about the third eye opening the the psychic inner vision and er I closed my eyes at that point and I saw a vision of a big purple violet eye blinking with these long lashes (laughter) yeah and I suddenly opened my eyes and thought ādid I just imagine thatā (tap/clap) ācause Iām quite a yeah well previously was quite a artistic imaginative type person in that way but it it seemed to be something that I couldnāt āave come up with it just seemed to be independent of my mind and it was like staring at me kind of blinking long lashes I remember it I can still see it (taps legs) and er I went completely tingly and something kind of clicked into place it was like it was a door that opened and I walked through it and from thereon in things got really buzzy I got really high and started to feel like erm bliss just sort of flooding me and life had this kind suddenly took on this kind of vibrancy that Iād never experienced before and I felt like this love open up in me which I hadnāt felt before a kind of connection to everything and everything felt really erm I felt love for life in general it wasnāt personal it wasnāt like erm everything seemed to ā¦ āave some kind of purpose to it and meaning and I felt that and I felt for the first time ever in my life that ā¦ there was some purpose to me existing.
James
By reporting his thought at the time ā ādid I just imagine thatā ā James shows that his experience was unexpected: it surprised him. This spontaneous experience was something that happened to James. He positions himself as a passive recipient of unfolding events with no responsibility for it. He acknowledges a potentially mundane explanation for his experience ā that it was caused by his artistic imagination ā but also dismisses this as insufficient. Indicating that this surpassed a mere imaginative encounter, he suggests the experienceās source was āindependentā of him. This demonstrates his awareness of a rational explanation while distancing himself from it. He also shows his ability to distinguish between an āimaginedā experience and this one ā the difference between ordinary and extraordinary mental phenomena (Castro 2009, 166). His rejection of this explanation indicates both the involuntary intrusion (the agency) of the experience and hints at the profundity of it. Showing this level of cultural competence is important for being seen as a credible and trusted witness: it matters to be believed.
When an experient positions themselves as an observer, it allows them to locate agency for their experience elsewhere. One of Johnās experiences happens while convalescing in hospital after a major operation. Earlier he mentions being in a hazy state between sleep and wakefulness:
ā¦ and erm, I was just laid there with my eyes closed, and then I had this vision, there was this female face with er golden hair, like that you see, just there looking straight at me, and erm, this, this apparition, whatever it was, this image, said erm, itās alright John, and that was it, and then it just faded away. So I thought, erm, wow, at first when it was happening I didnāt think anything of it because it seemed so natural, and there didnāt seem anything untoward about it, but after it had sort of faded and gone, I knew straight away that it wasnāt a dream, there was no way I concocted that, thereās something, thereās a qualitative difference between a dream and something like that, you know you just instinctively know that itās different, itās a different experience completely.
John
Similarly to James, John reports his thoughts to communicate the surprising nature of his experience, as unexpected and uninvited. Again, John insists on the experienceās independence and agency. He identifies a rational explanation (dreaming) and summarily dismisses it, concluding that he could not have produced this vision. He demonstrates his ability to distinguish between these phenomena and thus (combined with his surprised reported thought) stakes a claim for the significance of the events.
These two accounts show striking similarities in how rationality, agency, and surprise are oriented to and constructed. But there are comparable capacities and features in other accounts. The next extract details one of Georgeās experiences. Previously he reports a dream where he experiences a āsignificantā light, a āfemale goddess,ā and some meaningful colors. Georgeās account is explicitly oriented to the difficulty he has talking about these experiences. This extract starts with George in his bathroom.
ā¦ and I was standing in the bathroom and I was looking up at this light and I thought this is well I was looking at the back of my eyelids I thought oh the pr-colors I can see are pretty much the colors I can see when I was having the dream it was this golden color I thought what would happen if I just sort of allowed myself to think about the dream at the same time and the second I did (.) I was comp- white light everywhere it was just like bang ((clicks fingers)) and there was no presence there wasnāt I didnāt get the sense of a person there it was just light everywhere and I felt Iāve never had cocaine but Iām sure it was quite like ...