The South China Sea

From a Regional Maritime Dispute to Geo-Strategic Competition

Leszek Buszynski, Do Thanh Hai

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2019
• ISBN:
  9781000762501
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: International Relations
• Index: Politics & International Relations

This book explores the very latest developments in the South China Sea maritime dispute. It examines the South China Sea as an arena for geostrategic competition between China and the United States and why the dispute is so important for regional and global geopolitics. It outlines the most recent developments in the sea itself and assesses the role of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the current views of the contesting claimants. It considers the position of countries from outside the region, India as well as Japan; surveys military and naval developments; and examines confidence building, preventive diplomacy, and dispute resolution measures. The book concludes by highlighting the points of greatest risk and by discussing how the situation is likely to develop going forward.

1 Four aspects of the crisis in the South China Sea

Stein Tønnesson

Introduction

In the South China Sea, the period since 2009 has been tumultuous. It may be counted as the eighth crisis in the modern history of this contested, semi-enclosed sea. The first crisis occurred in 1909, when Japan occupied Pratas Island (Zhongsha). This provoked strong reactions in China leading to the production of modern-style sovereignty claims to Pratas and the Paracels.¹ The second came in 1931, when France claimed sovereignty over the Paracels on behalf of its protectorate Annam (Vietnam), and in 1933 claimed sovereignty over nine islands in the Spratlys on behalf of itself. After the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war and Japan’s occupation of Hainan in 1939, Japan established a presence both in the Paracels and Spratlys, leading to a Franco-Japanese condominium there during 1940–1945. In January 1947, the third crisis occurred as a standoff between French and Chinese expeditionary forces at Woody Island in the northern Paracels. The French backed off and settled for a division into a Franco-Vietnamese domain in the south (the Crescent group) and a Chinese in the north (the Amphitrite Group).² The fourth came in 1956, when Thomas Cloma, a Philippines citizen, claimed much of the Spratlys as a Philippine Freedomland (Kalayaan). This provoked protests and countermoves from other claimants. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) established a permanent presence in the northern Paracels. The Republic of China (Taiwan) established a permanent presence in Itu Aba (Taiping Dao), the largest of the Spratly Islands, and South Vietnam took over the French installations in the southern Paracels (the Crescent group).

The fifth crisis took place in 1973–1974, when oil had been discovered off the coast of Vietnam and the UN opened its Third Convention on the Law of the Sea, UNCLOS III (1973–1982). This prompted a global race among coastal states to declare vast fishing zones, territorial seas, and continental shelfs. In January 1974, China took the Crescent group in the Paracels by force from South Vietnam. This prompted South Vietnam and the Philippines to quickly occupy a number of islands in the Spratlys. The sixth crisis followed in 1987–1988, when the PRC established itself on reefs in the Spratly area, and in March 1988 engaged in a firefight with Vietnamese forces when occupying Johnson Reef. The seventh crisis began in 1995, this time pitting China against the Philippines. Manila discovered that China was building installations on Mischief Reef, a low-tide elevation on the Philippines’ continental shelf. ASEAN backed up the Philippines’ protests. China maintained its presence but applied a policy of reassuring its Southeast Asian neighbours through a “good neighbour policy.” In 1999, after lengthy negotiations, China and Vietnam signed a land border treaty, and in the following year they concluded a treaty on the delimitation of maritime zones in the Tonkin Gulf. In spite of its construction work on Mischief Reef, China gained much goodwill in Southeast Asia at the time.

After the adoption of a China-ASEAN Declaration on the Conduct of Parties (DoC) in 2002, the South China Sea remained calm for six years. No new important initiatives were taken in either the direction of conflict or conflict resolution. The parties had agreed that they would proceed to negotiate a Code of Conduct (CoC), but although talks were held, little progress was made. The only result was a draft guideline for implementation of the DoC (formally adopted only in 2011). In the 2000s, the rest of the world more or less forgot about the South China Sea, and the claimant states lost an opportunity to resolve their differences. Something changed in 2009, ushering in the eighth crisis, which is still with us. The successful Beijing Olympics of the previous year had boosted China’s self-confidence. So did the global financial crisis, which mainly hit the West. Suddenly the global media realized that China was on its way to bypass the US as the world’s largest economy. Western worries over China’s growing power motivated President Barack Obama to launch a “pivot” to Asia, which was largely diplomatic and rhetorical, although it also included some reorganization of US military deployments. One US aim was to bolster faith in US leadership among China’s neighbour states.

A key reason why the new crisis became focussed on the South China Sea was the UN deadline on 13 May 2009 for submitting information concerning the outer limits of national continental shelves beyond 200 nautical miles. Vietnam and Malaysia made a joint submission for the southern part of the South China Sea, and Vietnam made a separate submission for the northern part. Such information amounts in fact to claims for sovereign rights to the resources under the seabed. The joint submission by Vietnam and Malaysia led to protests from China and the Philippines, who did not make any submissions of their own for the South China Sea. Together with its protest letter, China for the first time submitted its map with a U-shaped line to the UN. The map seemed to indicate that China claimed 80%–90% of the South China Sea as “maritime territory.” This appalled the Southeast Asian claimants and led them to welcome US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s statement at the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in Hanoi 2010 that the US, although it did not have any opinion on sovereignty disputes, was directly interested in three issues: the freedom of navigation, no use of force, and respect for the principle of defining maritime zones on the basis on distance from coasts, not on historic rights. This statement was popular in Southeast Asia but did not go down well in China.

Increased tension and militarisation

The crisis in the South China Sea since 2009 has been characterized by many clashes between maritime surveillance vessels and fishing boats, the cutting of seismic cables from oil exploration vessels, and diplomatic quarrels at summits of various kinds. The most serious incidents between the South China Sea claimants were the following:

• May–June 2011: A clash occurred on 26 May between a Vietnamese seismic survey ship and three Chinese maritime surveillance vessels some 120 kilometres off the coast of Vietnam. On 29 and 31 May and again on 9 June, another seismic survey ship had its seismic cables cut. Vietnam went public with its protests.
• April 2012: A Philippines naval ship intervened to prevent the use of illegal fishing methods at Scarborough Shoal, which was considered to be under the Philippines control. China sent two maritime surveillance vessels who engaged in a standoff with the Philippines naval ship. When the typhoon season approached, the Philippines struck a deal with China to institute a joint fishing ban and have both sides withdraw. Soon after the Chinese were back. They closed off the lagoon and have remained there since. This prompted the Philippines to seek compulsory international arbitration between itself and China under Chapter VII of the Law of the Sea Convention (UNCLOS), leading to the establishment of an Arbitral Tribunal.
• March 2014: A Chinese deep-sea drilling platform was towed to a location south of the Paracels, within Vietnam’s claimed exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and continental shelf. Vietnam sent fishing boats and coast guard vessels to disrupt the platform’s drilling while Vietnamese activists carried out demonstrations against Chinese and other foreign-owned companies in Vietnam. The demonstrations soon turned violent, with several people killed. China assembled an armada of fishing boats and coast guard vessels to ward off the Vietnamese maritime force. Talks were held, and China declared the mission fulfilled, so the platform could leave the area ahead of plan.
• July 2017: During a visit to Hanoi by General Fan Chanlong, Vice Chair of China’s Central Military Commission, he allegedly threatened Vietnam with using force to take over the islands Vietnam occupies in the Spratlys if Vietnam did not interrupt ongoing gas exploration activities in a part of the Nam Con Son basin. This is an area that Vietnam has good reason to consider part of its continental shelf. The exploration was reportedly suspended.

During 2015–2017, when China reclaimed land and constructed military facilities on the seven Spratly features Subi Reef, Mischief Reef, Johnson Reef, Hughes Reef, Gaven Reef, Fiery Cross Reef, and Cuarteron Reef,³ no one did anything to prevent it, so the construction did not provoke any incidents, just protests. Although China’s behaviour in the South China Sea during the crisis since 2009 has been assertive, it is noticeable that China shows some restraint. It pursues a strategy seeking to constantly advance its military presence without giving up any of its legal claims. At the same time, it avoids armed clashes. China seems to manage its relations with the Southeast Asian states as well as the US in ways allowing it to maximize power while avoiding confrontation. In those instances where a clash could escalate, China deploys multiple armed fishing boats and coastguard vessels to the frontline and overwhelms its adversaries. Water cannons are used instead of firearms, and the navy stays at a distance. This serves to prevent US intervention and ward off any claim that China violates the UN Charter’s prohibition against aggression.

In the last two decades, China has made a huge leap in its power projection capability. It has constructed and deployed a great number of naval ships and submarines, backed up by land-based precision-guided missiles and by an increasing number of fighter aircraft. At the same time, it has built heavily armed maritime surveillance vessels. In addition, China has expanded its use of maritime auxiliary forces: Armed fishing vessels with crews trained to double as fishermen and paid militias. Although other powers have also increased their capabilities, the combined build-up by the ASEAN member states is dwarfed by the growth in China’s capabilities. Although Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Taiwan occupy all those islands in the Spratlys that are bigger than a tiny rock or reef, and have undertaken measures to strengthen their military presence and installations on these islands, China has dominated the recent militarization with its land reclamation and deployment of weapons. At first China declared that its aims were purely civilian, and that no militarization would occur. Yet it has since constructed airfields and hangars, which are used by military aircraft, has installed radar and other surveillance systems, and has deployed cruise missiles and anti-aircraft missiles on Fiery Cross Reef, Subi Reef, and Mischief Reef in the Spratlys, as well as in the Paracels, which is now a forward Chinese military base. This allows China to keep a constant military presence on both sides of the sea lanes through the South China Sea.

A divided ASEAN

China’s new power projection capabilities cannot but have an effect on the Southeast Asian governments, who may at some point be forced to choose between compliance with China’s demands and efforts to balance against it. Policies pointing in both of these directions are already evident. Yet, as is widely recognized, most of the Southeast Asian governments seek to hedge against threats by moving closer to China, the US, Japan, and India—all at the same time. While Brunei, Malaysia, and Vietnam have been consistent in their hedging policies, the Philippines has been vacillating between a pro-Chinese and a pro-American stance, while Indonesia keeps a certain distance from both China and the US.⁴ In 1998, there was already disagreement among the ASEAN member states over whether or not to back up the Philippines’ protests against China’s construction work on Mischief Reef. Malaysia, in particular, was keen to not alienate China. In the following years, ASEAN was able to agree with China on a DoC. It was signed in 2002 and calmed the waters for several years. Since 2009, when the current crisis began, ASEAN has been divided between those that claim islands or maritime zones in the South China Sea (the Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia, Vietnam, and Indonesia) and those that do not (Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand), with Singapore in a mediating role. The division came out in the open in July 2012 at an ASEAN Foreign Ministers meeting in Phnom Penh, when Cambodia refused to agree to a statement that could be seen as critical of China. Since then, at every ASEAN meeting, there have been difficulties whenever the Philippines or Vietnam has tried to get the other ASEAN members to back it up vis-à-vis China. The divisions did not, however, prevent ASEAN from agreeing with China on a Framework for a CoC in August 2017, and a “single draft” in August 2018 (a compilation of often contradictory proposals from the various states), which will hopefully form the basis for a treaty at some point in the future.

Which are the main factors determining the position taken by the ten ASEAN member states? The first and most important is their own maritime interests: As mentioned, the Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia, and Vietnam are directly engaged in the disputes, the Philippines and Vietnam at the frontline, Brunei and Malaysia a little behind, and Indonesia further back. All of them have an active interest in seeing UNCLOS being loyally applied. Myanmar and the landlocked Laos have little such interest, since they cannot make maritime claims in the South China Sea. They are, however, heavily exposed to China’s influence over land, and may see a need for ASEAN to back up their independence, should disputes evolve with the big northern neighbour. Thailand does not share a border with China and has no claims in the South China Sea. In the Gulf of Thailand, it has resolved its disputes with Malaysia and Vietnam, but has an unresolved dispute with Cambodia. Cambodia has interests at sea that tend to converge with China’s. It feels disadvantaged by UNCLOS, which gives it a very small EEZ since the Thai and Vietnamese coasts and coastal islands creep in from both sides to reduce the length and weight of Cambodia’s relevant coast line. Cambodia needs a settlement that takes greater account of equity and precolonial history—just like China. Any Cambodian government is therefore likely to seek China’s help to get something better than what Thailand, Vietnam, and UNCLOS have to offer. This makes it understandable that Cambodia has been the least inclined to back up Vietnam and the Philippines. Laos, Myanmar, and Thailand navigate between a desire to contribute to ASEAN solidarity and a need to accommodate China. Singapore is special. With its minuscule coast, huge harbour, and a foreign trade that exceeds its GDP, it is strongly interested in the freedom of navigation. This makes it a natural US ally and a determined supporter of UNCLOS. On the other hand, its huge investments in and trade with China, and also its domestic dependence on co-operation among the ethnic Chinese, Malay, and Indian communities draw Singapore in the direction of seeking stability and cooperation among the world’s major powers. Any rift between China on the one hand and the “Indo-Pacific” countries on the other—would threaten Singapore’s cohesion, security, and prosperity.

The odd nation out in ASEAN is the Philippines, with its unpredictable political system, its heritage as a former US colony, and its influential ethnic Chinese business community. One presidential administration (Gloria Macapagal Arroyo) signed up in 2004 on a Joint Marine Seismic Undertaking (JMSU) with China (and Vietnam) in an area that was mostly on the Philippines’ own continental shelf. Then the JMSU was accused of being unconstitutional and gave rise to a political scandal so the agreement fell by the wayside. The next administration (Benigno Aquino III) went to a legal attack on China by requesting the setup of an Arbitral Tribunal—and won. Then the win was more or less annulled by Rodrigo Duterte, who moved closer to China in the hope of getting aid and investments. Manila has since talked with Beijing about joint development of gas on the Philippines’ continental shelf—without any prior recognition of the Philippines’ sovereign rights.

As the leading country in ASEAN, Indonesia has long sought to facilitate consultation processes among the claimants (including Taiwan). Indonesia does not have any stakes in the sovereignty disputes over the Spratlys, Paracels, or Scarborough Shoal, but it has become directly involved in the dispute over China’s U-shaped line since Chinese maritime surveillance vessels have protected Chinese fishing boats from Indonesian fishing patrol ships in the outermost southw...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Series Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• Tables
• Acknowledgements
• Contributors
• Acronyms
• Maps
• Introduction: the development of the South China Sea dispute
• 1 Four aspects of the crisis in the South China Sea
• 2 ASEAN and the South China Sea
• 3 ASEAN, China, and the Code of Conduct
• 4 China and the South China Sea: continuities and adaptions
• 5 Vietnam and the South China Sea
• 6 The Philippines–China joint development
• 7 Japan and the South China Sea
• 8 The US and the South China Sea
• 9 South China Sea: geopolitical connectedness to the Indian Ocean
• 10 European powers and the South China Sea
• 11 International law, force, and coercion in the South China Sea
• 12 Military build-up in the South China Sea
• 13 Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance in the South China Sea
• 14 US employment of marine unmanned vehicles in the South China Sea
• Conclusion
• Index