Anglo-European Intelligence Cooperation

Britain in Europe, Europe in Britain

Hager Ben Jaffel

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2019
• ISBN:
  9780429509261
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politica e relazioni internazionali
• Subtopic: Intelligence e spionaggio

This book investigates everyday practices of intelligence cooperation in anti-terrorism matters, with a specific focus on the relationship between Europe and Britain.

The volume examines the effective involvement of British anti-terrorism efforts in European cooperation arrangements, which until now have been overshadowed by the UK-US 'special relationship' and by political debates that overstate the divide between Britain and continental Europe. In arguing that British intelligence has always had a European dimension, it provides a distinct perspective to the study of intelligence cooperation and the role of British intelligence therein. Mobilizing a 'field theory' approach, the book provides an original contribution to the understanding of intelligence cooperation by investigating everyday bureaucratic practices of 'ground-level' security professionals and police forces, embedded in a European 'field' structured around the exchange of anti-terror intelligence. It also accounts for the drivers behind cooperation by using 'field analysis, ' which explains the trajectory and positioning of actors according to their 'capitals' rather than necessities dictated by threats or state decisions.

This book will be of much interest to students of Security Studies, International Political Sociology, Intelligence Studies, and International Relations in general.

1 Introduction

Against all expectations, and while the British political decision to leave the European Union (EU) generates much debate and concern about Britain’s future in the EU, Brexit is an expected indicator of the tie between Britain and Europe¹ in intelligence cooperation for anti-terrorism matters. More than ever, Britain is bound to Europe. This is perceptible in the persistent efforts on the part of the executive branch of the British government and security professionals to maintain relationships with the EU. This is also visible in Britain’s latest strategy for combatting terrorism, which, released after the outcome of the referendum on EU membership, gives an indication of past and future commitments in terms of European cooperation:

We have also built stronger security and intelligence sharing relationships with European allies to respond to the increased, shared threat we have faced. This activity, at an unprecedented pace and scale of collaboration, is disrupting attack planning within Europe and the UK. We will continue to expand and strengthen this collaboration as we negotiate the UK’s exit from the EU and thereafter.²

Countering terrorism is thus a major stake for British elected politicians and security professionals and the interest in the fight against terrorism is also reflected in academic scholarship. In recent years, anti-terrorism along with intelligence cooperation have received considerable attention from scholars, in this regard (Anagnostákis, 2017; Byman, 2014; Guttmann, 2018; Fägestern, 2008; Reveron, 2006; Rudner, 2004a; Salter, 2010; Svendsen, 2011). Likewise, Britain’s commitment in international efforts to combat terrorism has also been extensively researched (Donohue, 2008; Foley, 2009; Hewitt, 2008; Moran and Phythian, 2008; Angharad Closs and Vaughan-Williams, 2008; Svendsen, 2011).

However, notwithstanding the effective engagement of British security services in European cooperation arrangements for combatting terrorism, Britain’s European connection has remained in the shadows of academic scholarship. To fill this gap, the present book investigates Anglo-European relationships in the field of anti-terror intelligence cooperation. In spite of past and present political decisions to withdraw from the EU’s Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) in 2014 and now from the EU, British police and intelligence services engaged in the fight against terrorism, it is argued, are, and always have been, European. The absence of interest in Britain’s European trajectory does not make it a new or even a marginal phenomenon. Britain and the EU have made intelligence cooperation one of the major tools in tackling terrorism and other security threats. The formation of intelligence cooperation precedes the United Kingdom’s membership in the EU and has been first structured around state-led mechanisms, which operate largely outside EU frameworks but have more recently intensely involved EU-led cooperation mechanisms. Alliances with European services have only evolved since then, as evidenced by cooperation between intelligence services since World War One (Debruyne, 2013; Haire, 2014) and the network of police liaison officers deployed in European capital cities (Bigo, 1996; Block, 2010; Swallow, 2013) and Europol, among others. There has thus long been a whole generation of security professionals who have committed themselves in making European cooperation. As such, a political process like Brexit only reinforces efforts to preserve what has been constructed, not so much because intelligence cooperation is threat-driven, but because cooperation is rooted in the progressive incorporation of ways of doing, and understanding, cooperation that make cooperation a self-evident practice that must continue. The strength of the tie with Europe derives from longstanding daily practices of, and relationships among, security professionals who have gradually embedded British intelligence into European cooperation structures. The disinterest in Anglo-European relationships in extant literature is thus more a reflection of dominant disciplinary assumptions than actual practices on the ground.

The discordance among ground-level practices and the silence over Britain’s European connection in existing scholarship provides grounds for contesting commonly held views that distort the understanding of Anglo-European intelligence cooperation. Stated differently, arguing that Britain shares a history with, and is part of, Europe is essential for departing from dominant conceptions about intelligence cooperation. In claiming that British services have a European dimension, it becomes possible to call into question assumptions that build a common sense around Anglo-European intelligence cooperation. The first assumption pertains to the classical history of intelligence services that are usually associated with sovereignty, national security, and secrecy (Aldrich, 2009; Andrew, 2004). Anti-terrorism and intelligence thus appear to be inconsistent with the exercise of transnational cooperation in this regard, because they are interpreted as state competences and the bedrock of national security. The second assumption pertains to Britain’s posture in relation to Europe. Highly visible cases such as the rejection of the single European currency or the partial participation in the Schengen Area are understood as a sign of Britain’s “awkward” attitude towards the EU (George, 1992; 1994; 2000; Wilks, 1996). The third assumption touches upon Britain’s relations with the United States and Europe. The overrepresentation and exaggerated weight of the United States in intelligence relations have affected the reading of intelligence cooperation among European countries, on the one hand, and the relationship between the United Kingdom and Europe, on the other hand. According to the dominant thesis of the ‘UK-US special relationship’ defended by Intelligence Studies, the United Kingdom and the United States are close partners (Aldrich, 1998; Andrew, 2004; Bamford, 1983; Svendsen, 2011). Britain is thus bound to the United States, thereby being loosely connected with Europe. While ties with the United States are indeed existent, the attractiveness of the Old Continent for intelligence cooperation is placed at a lower level, as if the continent were overly insignificant to represent a relevant operational framework for British services to engage in. British services have accordingly an attitude of allegiance to the American ‘friend,’ although the strength of UK-US ties has been subsequently contested by a handful of scholars who, conversely, suggested that the ‘special relationship’ is no longer the exclusive framework for intelligence cooperation for Britain and the United States (Aldrich and Kasuku, 2012; Jeffrey-Jones, 2012), particularly with the EU’s entry into play. While the EU represents a new horizon for cooperation for British services by embodying the contender to the so-called British loyalty to the United States, the UK-US reliance is not called into question. There is no rupture with the Anglo-American framework of thought. This, in turn, creates a situation whereby British services are facing a dilemma in deciding whether to collaborate with either American or European counterparts. At the other side of the spectrum, it is equally assumed that the European Union is dependent on the United States for the provision of intelligence (Nomikos, 2005; Villadsen, 2000). There is a failure to conceive Britain as being effectively involved in Europe for these reasons, notwithstanding concrete practices on the ground investigated by the present book. Even if some British elected politicians and operatives see in Brexit the strengthening of ties with the United States as a possible way out, this does not mean cutting relationships with Europe.

The book’s perspective goes against these narratives and instead asserts that Britain is in Europe, and vice versa. Everyday, bread-and-butter intelligence cooperation provides a more nuanced picture and indicates the effective participation of Britain in European security cooperation arrangements. The interlacing of British and mainland services, let alone the European Union’s agencies, is a relevant indicator of Britain’s effective participation in a European space of anti-terror intelligence cooperation. The idea of a Europe of anti-terror intelligence cooperation suggests that Britain and Europe are, in fact, mutually inclusive and are equally partners and contenders to the United States (and the reasoning works in reverse). Claiming that US-UK and US-EU dependencies subsist is difficult to sustain. The United Kingdom is not in a quandary to pick one partner at the expense of the other. The UK-US special relationship is no longer the exclusive frame of reference for British services as they engage simultaneously with their European counterparts. The so-called special relationship operates in a vacuum and does not reflect developments since World War Two, such as parallel construction of relationships with Europe, Britain’s membership to the EU, or the bureaucratisation of anti-terror intelligence in services other than intelligence services. The special relationship simply does not reflect relationships, e.g., intelligence relationships have been built outside its framework as well as within, and between, services. Brexit indicates that Britain is not turning its back on the European Union and Europe more broadly to continue to honour the special relationship with the United States, in this regard. British security services are not closing the door to EU cooperation, although Brexit may lead to a possible strengthening of the links among the Five Eyes intelligence alliance of which Britain and the United States are part. Britain does not have to choose between the European Union and the United States; it does, and plays, with both.

British services’ European dimension finds particular resonance in today’s Anglo-European relationships, in this regard. While it may be thought that Brexit would put an end to the United Kingdom’s European experience, Brexit is not the story of Britain leaving the EU. Rather, Brexit is the continuation of Britain’s relationships with the EU, even by other means. Maintaining security cooperation in the field of anti-terrorism is set as a clear goal in the Government’s exit strategy,³ a position reiterated by Prime Minister Theresa May at the Munich conference in February 2018.⁴ The British government is not against the EU, in this regard. It continues to play the European game by defending a mode of participation in European cooperation arrangements which is UK-specific. The British executive’s approach is not new and is part of a series of precedents where the executive has managed to obtain exemptions from EU legislation in JHA,⁵ allowing it to have specific provisions for its participation in related arrangements. This is the purpose of the so-called British opt-outs, which enable Britain to engage with targeted dimensions of JHA. Opting out from, or opting in to, JHA measures (formerly Third Pillar measures) typify Britain’s approach to EU security cooperation. While Britain has not signed up to the Schengen Agreement, the Amsterdam Treaty grants Britain and Ireland the right to opt in to some or all aspects of the Schengen provisions enshrined in the Schengen acquis.⁶ Britain opted in to the Schengen Information System and police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters in 1999⁷ while it has more recently opted out from 130 JHA measures pertaining to police and criminal justice before opting back in to 29 of these in 2014. Just as previous ‘round trips’ to European arrangements, Brexit does not derogate from the rule: it is about getting out and then negotiating a re-entry on new terms to meet ‘national interests.’

From the outset, the British executive has stated its ambitions to secure an ad-hoc agreement in the field of security cooperation. Britain’s role is seen as a “global foreign and security policy actor”⁸ in a post-Brexit world, positioning itself to sustain relationships with both the EU and international partners (including, notably, the United States). Starting from the principle that Britain holds a status different from countries that have not been EU members, the actual position of the executive is to secure a new security partnership with the EU that reflects Britain’s trajectory with, and contribution, to the EU (Alegre et al., 2017). The exit strategy echoes the British executive approach to Britain’s future:

Our pre-existing security relationship with the EU and its Member States means that we are uniquely placed to develop and sustain a mutually beneficial model of cooperation in this area from outside the Union. We are starting from a position of strong relations with EU Member States, where we have been at the forefront of developing a number of EU tools which encourage joint working across the continent to protect citizens and our way of life.⁹

The future UK-EU security partnership is meant to enable Britain to sustain operational business with the EU on the basis of an unprecedented settlement, which goes beyond the existing and usual EU-third-country agreements.¹⁰ As part of a future security partnership, the Home Office, and the Department for Exiting the European Union, along with operational services, are pushing forward a UK-EU internal security treaty,¹¹ which builds upon legal precedents from outside the field of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters¹² while operating on the basis of existing EU police and criminal justice measures. The European Council (and the European Commission) shares Britain’s position to reach ‘as close as possible’ a future partnership in the field of cooperation against terrorism and other insecurity matters and targets the same areas, which would include intelligence exchange and operational cooperation in law enforcement matters, inter alia.¹³ If both parties are aligned on the principle of a continuing relationship, the British executive’s position is nonetheless confronted with the EU’s own political line and requirements. Although the British executive aims for securing a special partnership while not participating in the Schengen area, non-EU member states cannot have the same rights and benefits as an EU member from the EU’s perspective. Similarly, while Britain rejects legal control of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) on all EU activities, including security cooperation, enforcing the authority of the ECJ through enforcement and dispute settlement is set out as one of three of the EU’s main exigencies for any future relationships, together with safeguarding fundamental rights as set out in the EU Charter for Fundamental Rights and ensuring a level of data protection essentially equivalent to that of the EU through a data adequacy agreement.¹⁴

Although Britain and the EU each have their own requirements for any future settlement, both are not prepared to sacrifice anything, neither for Britain’s national sovereignty nor EU’s mantra of ever deeper integration. Each side is aware of the significance of a continuing relationship, if only in the name of EU integrity and practical necessities to sustain cooperation, which in the end might weigh more than political lines. The belief in intelligence cooperation to fight security threats will be maintained, even if working with the EU has to take another form than at present. From a practice-based perspective, intelligence cooperation is performed along operational rather than political lines, including EU-led ...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• List of figures and tables
• Acknowledgements
• 1 Introduction
• 2 The contribution of Pierre Bourdieu to anti-terror intelligence cooperation: field, habitus, and practices
• 3 Going out to go back: Britain's opt-out from the European Union's Justice and Home Affairs
• 4 The European space of anti-terror intelligence cooperation: EU-led cooperation, Europol, and the fight against terrorism
• 5 The European space of anti-terror intelligence cooperation: the experiences of British security services in Europe
• 6 Conclusion
• Appendix A
• Appendix B
• Appendix C
• Index