Introduction part 1
The purpose and methodology of the study
Greek warfare after the introduction of the hoplite remained tactically static for centuries. A number of factors created this circumstance: the geography of Greece, the political climate, the lack of external spheres of conflict or military influence, and the lack of any necessity to develop other styles of warfare, to name a few. During the Peloponnesian War, Greek poleis began to make use of other units in battle and develop innovative tactics not wholly reliant on a hoplite phalanx as the new demands, resources, and operational theatres of war required. This process eventually led to the multi-faceted armies employed by Alexander the Great and his Successors.
The main focus of this book is an examination of Greek warfare from the archaic period through to the wars of Alexanderâs Successors, tracing the development and importance of âcombined armsâ in land warfare.1 In order to examine combined arms and the process of the implementation of âintegrated warfareâ in Greece, this study will concentrate on the introduction and development of individual units and their coordination and use in battle. This will start with the beginnings of hoplite warfare in the seventh century and end at the battle of Ipsus in 3012.
The battle of Ipsus is a good terminal point for a number of reasons: By 301 most units found in ancient armies had come into being and been used effectively; few new tactics involving combined arms occur afterwards; and after Ipsus primary source material becomes fragmentary and less reliable, especially concerning tactical details.
This study will provide a detailed analysis of all the trends and developments in Greek land warfare from Homeric warfare through to 301. It will demonstrate the importance of combined arms to warfare in general as well as examining specific examples of its influence on Greek warfare in particular. The overall result will be a comprehensive timeline of Greek warfare showing how each innovation in tactics and armament and different battles led to the eventual adoption of combined arms in every state in Greece. My aim is to demonstrate that different styles and periods of Greek warfare should be taken as a whole and not dealt with individually, and that the whole picture represents the widespread understanding of the need for the implementation of combined arms.
Examining Greek warfare through the lens of combined arms tactics will also shed more light on the independent culture of the Classical Greeks and how that culture shaped, or was shaped by, warfare reliant on the hoplite to the detriment of the implementation of combined arms tactics. It is this analytical tool that I hope will create the foundation for future examinations of Greek culture and serve as one means of assessment for its rather slow adoption of aspects of other cultures, both military and other.
Putting Greek warfare in context
Much has been written on Greek warfare in general and on specific armies, battles, and units. But when scholars discuss battle tactics or unit types, there is no concept of a tactical continuum or concern for unit evolution over the whole period. Even works intended as overviews of all Greek or ancient warfare often view each conflict independently with only a few threads of development followed throughout.
Very rarely in any society does warfare ever exist in a vacuum, isolated from outside influences on tactics or technology. Once an innovation occurs that significantly alters the outcomes of battles other states must adopt, or adapt to, this new practice or weapon in order to survive. Moreover, one innovation usually leads to many more in the future. There is always the drive to create better ways of waging war or to perfect what already exists. Carl von Clausewitz stated as much in On War in 1832: âWar is more than a true chameleon that slightly adapts its characteristics to the given caseâ. Mansoor rightly summarises:
as Clausewitz stated nearly two centuries ago, although war changes its characteristics in various circumstances, in whatever way it manifests itself, war is still war. War in the twenty-first century has been and will remain a complex phenomenon, but its essence has not and will not change.3
The classical Greeks did not develop their style of war isolated from all other cultures and eras, and so before examining hoplite warfare it is necessary also to be familiar with earlier Greek practices as well as contemporary warfare elsewhere. It is especially important to understand the methods of war in influential societies that had direct or indirect contact with early Greece, in particular the Persian Empire. The beginnings of combined arms can be seen in Homeric Greece, and therefore the subsequent shift of focus in Classical Greece to an army reliant on heavy infantry alone becomes that much more significant.
At the collapse of the Bronze Age, the Greeks regressed in military style to a simpler army structure reliant on hoplites loosely supported by light infantry and light cavalry, which, though simple, was better at effective conflict resolution. This change can be explained by a number of factors, such as the nature of the polis and consequent parochialism, Greeceâs mountainous terrain and isolated position, and the fact that war was primarily used for defence and resolving local disputes but not conquest. As Greek poleis expanded their influence outside their immediate area, rival states or different terrain prompted changes in military style. This necessitated a return to combined arms and led to the integrated warfare of the Macedonian-style armies of the fourth century.
The concept of combined arms in Greek warfare is touched on occasionally by scholars, in particular with regards to the armies of Philip and Alexander, but it is rarely dealt with in detail and in the context of a continuum of developments in Greek warfare.4 The most focused study on combined arms in a specific period of Greek warfare is Robert B. Pedersonâs A Study of Combined Arms Warfare by Alexander the Great (US Army Command and General Staff College and Penny Hill Press: December 6, 2015). But it is not a scholarly work, ignoring many of the aspects of ancient military history still debated by scholars and taking the sources at face value. However, no one previously has discussed in detail the importance of combined arms in Greek warfare as a whole5 or made clear the importance of recognising a continuum concerning the level of combined arms utilised at any time.
The best summary of combined arms in the context of a continuum of historical development is Archer Jonesâ The Art of War in the Western World (Chicago, 1987). However, he does not provide any background to earlier developments in combined arms warfare. Nevertheless, his account is valuable in relating ancient warfare to modern military theory, in particular the importance of combined arms in overcoming the strength of the enemy. Perhaps the best work that does trace the development of combined arms throughout the ancient world is Arther Ferrillâs The Origins of War: From the Stone Age to Alexander the Great (New York, 1986).
Ferrill begins with early man and briefly outlines Mesopotamian warfare before detailing Greek warfare up to and including Alexander. However, he does not mention combined arms specifically despite the use of modern military theoretical terms, such as firepower or fighting in column versus line. Ferrill praises the armies of Persia and Alexander because of their level of integration and criticises the hoplite phalanxes of Classical Greece because of their tactical simplicity. He is advocating the use of combined arms in warfare and to some degree tracing its development in the ancient world, but he never spells out if this is his aim. Nor does he provide any reasons for his preference for integrated armies or discuss what these actually entailed in each case. Moreover, in ending with Alexander, Ferrill fails to recognise the crucial developments in army integration that occurred under Alexanderâs Successors. In trying to write a general history Ferrill does not engage in detailed tactical analysis of the intricacies of army integration, and his arguments suffer as a result.
This book details the timeline in Greek warfare of innovative developments in armaments or tactics and how everything combined to lead to the integrated armies of Macedon in the late fourth century. Combined arms theory is the methodological lens through which we will examine in detail the various advances in Greek warfare leading up to the intricate and complicated armies of Alexander the Great and his Successors.
The theory of combined arms
Combined arms has a relatively modern application in military theory, but although the specific term is new, its application is not.6
The concept of combined arms in ground combat has existed for centuries, but the nature of that combination and the organizational level at which it occurred have varied greatly⌠. Since then twentieth-century warfare ⌠developed to the point where some form of combined arms is essential for survival, let alone victory.7
Similarly, post-traumatic stress disorder is a modern name for an illness, the symptoms of which are visible throughout history.8 âTotal warâ is another modern term that is often used to describe the all-encompassing warfare of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. More recently it has been ascribed to the Napoleonic period and even the US Civil War.9 However, many, if not all, of the aspects of war that are collated in this succinct name can be seen in the ancient world, but that is for another discussion.10
The model of combined arms warfare as outlined next serves as a way of analysing battles from a tactical perspective. It is very useful in detailing the intricacies of a battle where such information is not necessarily provided in the sources. This is particularly relevant in ancient warfare, where the number, focus, and reliability of sources is problematic for any tactical reconstruction and analysis. Using the complete implementing of combined arms as the end point for the most advanced and successful tactical realisation in battle, here referred to as integrated warfare, it is possible to review all battles through a comparative lens. Combined arms allows historians the means of comparing the tactical efficiencies of armies and commanders throughout the history of warfare. Here the focus is on Greece and the Near East, but this model of analysis is just as relevant for discussions of Roman or mediaeval warfare.
In this study there is no space for any detailed analysis of generalship in the ancient world and the ancient knowledge of the theory of combined arms. Nor is this study focused on strategy in ancient warfare. Here my focus is limited to the application of tactics in battle as the simplest way of assessing the level and importance of combined arms in ancient warfare.
Methodology and terminology â a conceptual methodological framework
Combined arms warfare
The very term âcombined armsâ means different things to different people, or it is left undefined and vague ⌠the combined arms concept is the basic idea that different combat arms and weapons systems must be used in concert to maximize the survival and combat effectiveness of the others. The strengths of one system must be used to compensate for the weaknesses of others. The specific arms and weapons included in this concept have varied greatly among national armies and over time.11
For the purposes of this study the term âcombined armsâ refers to the process of moving from an army centred on a simple unit to a diverse and multi-faceted army, as well as to the tactical uses and deployment of two or more units in combination in battle.12 This includes integrating all the diverse units into a successful tactical plan on the battlefield.13 The goal of combined arms is to enable a coordination of action in a battle that brings each unit into offensive or defensive action to mutually support the rest of the army âworking in concert towards a common objective to destroy or disrupt the enemy forcesâ.14 It is intended âto achieve an effect on t...