Part I
Disability, normalcy, and the everyday
Chapter 1
Introduction
Disability, normalcy, and the everyday
Gareth M. Thomas and Dikaios Sakellariou
This edited collection brings together scholars from around the world to explore understandings of disability, normalcy, and the everyday. Our concern is with the taken-for-granted, everyday human activities at the heart of how social life is reproduced, and how this impacts on the lives of those with a disability together with their family members and other allies. It is well established within the literature that disability, as a form of embodied difference or body trouble, can trigger personal and social consequences, from stigmatisation to discrimination, from embarrassment to resilience and resistance. In its effort to make sense of such consequences, the literature on disability often aligns with the social model of disability. In its simplest form, the social model treats disablement as a social problem belonging to society; that is, society disables people on account of unequal access to resources. This social model is commonly contrasted with the (bio) medical model of disability which depicts disablement as a biological problem belonging to a person, that is, there is an emphasis on fixing or curing a person. The social model, in contrast, argues that disability âhas nothing to do with the bodyâ since âit is a consequence of social oppressionâ (Oliver 1996: 35).
Much ink has been spilled over the merits and drawbacks of each model, and a range of alternative models (e.g. critical disability theory) have been presented as possible solutions to the shortcomings of the mutually exclusive social and medical models. In this book, we do not intend (or want) to repeat such ideas â nor do we want to be caught up in debates on language, including whether we should say people with disabilities or disabled people; both are used interchangeably here dependent on author preference. The social model of disability has been widely critiqued for its alleged disregard for the physicality of impairment, its failure to take account of difference within the broad category of disability, and for being restrictive and endorsing counterproductive dualisms. While we recognise the importance and potency of these well- (arguably over-) rehearsed debates, we intend to avoid the trap of pouring old wine into new bottles.
It is with this purpose that we introduce recent theoretical and empirical contributions from around the world (namely the UK, US, Australia, Sierra Leone, Malawi, and Guatemala) which depart from static arguments of models and, instead, move towards making sense of how disability is lived, mobilised, and enacted in everyday lives. This involves, for us, foregrounding micro and mundane moments in order to make sense of powerful discourses, practices, and relations. Many critical analyses of disability address key macro concerns, yet are often too far removed from an interactional and micro-level focus. Although the following contributions are broad in focus and navigate diverse social contexts, they are united by their drawing upon qualitative data (e.g. interviews, observations, case studies, life histories) and their valuing of everyday, mundane moments to illuminate the world-making, power relations, and affects at stake for disabled people and their allies. Located within, but also deliberately outside, of disability studies, these contributions thrust disability, as a matter of concern, further into the limelight. Disability studies has frequently operated independently of other fields, including the likes of medical sociology.1 In this book, we are less concerned with staking a disciplinary allegiance. Instead, our hope is that this volume represents a willingness to explore disability from different vantage points and to acknowledge the telling contribution of other voices.
Theoretically, the chapters in this book are united by a concern with the mundane, everyday interactions and practices of daily life â and what disability is and does in these moments. In this respect, there is a clear affiliation with inter-actionist concerns and, particularly, with the work of Erving Goffman (1963). A central concept here, with respect to Goffmanâs corpus, is social stigma. Goffman argues that stigma sets people apart from (normal) others, marking them out as socially inferior and to be avoided, shunned, rejected; âa blemished person, ritually polluted, to be avoided, especially in public placesâ (1963: 1). He highlights how a person may possess an attribute that âmakes [him/her] different from others⌠and of a less desirable kindâ, reduced in our minds âfrom a whole and usual person to a tainted, discounted oneâ (1963: 5). Here, the person departs from ideas of normalcy, possessing an âundesired differenceâ from what âthe normalsâ expected (1963: 5).
Goffmanâs ideas have formed a substantial component of the lexicon of stigma politics; his concepts have been taken up many times, such as by those writing on disability and courtesy stigma â known as the stigma of association (e.g. Gray 2002; MacRae 1999; Ryan 2008; Thomas 2014). However, his work has also been heavily critiqued, particularly for its lack of engagement (at least explicitly) with issues of power and inequality. Yet Goffmanâs contributions align with a crucial concern of this book: how embodied difference is negotiated in everyday lives. Disability can often present a problem in such moments, for example, people may not have the capacity to maintain a personal front in public interactions; ânonplussed, out of countenance, embarrassed, experiencing the kind of anomaly that is generated when the minute social system of face-to-face interaction breaks downâ (Goffman 1959: 23â24). Disability, indeed, can involve breaking social rules and norms (Gray 2002) and disturbing the subtle scaffolding of interaction, alluding to âcompetence in social presentationâ with respect to bodily dispositions (Nijhof 1995: 198).
When disabling conditions are visible, or what Goffman (1963: 41) terms âdiscreditedâ, social situations can be tense, uncertain, and ambiguous for people â and this can be so for invisible conditions too, in that they often involve strategic management during interactional exchanges. Drawing on ethnomethodological sensibilities, we may interpret this as a âbreachâ in âbackground expectanciesâ (Garfinkel 1967: 34â35). For ethnomethodologists, social life entails rule-following to ensure the smooth flow of everyday situations and to reproduce a recognisable and reasonable social order. Such situations are constantly worked at, created by routines and rituals transforming the âtaken-for-grantedâ into ânaturalâ and âmoralâ facts of life which frame normative conduct (1963: 35). In so doing, people do membership, upholding the social order as a socially managed production. Yet this membership or passing may be disrupted by the presence of something which is unexpected, such as â we argue â a person with a disability; â[he/she] who passes will have to be alive to aspects of the social situation which others treat as uncalculated and unattended. What are unthinking routines for normals can become management problems for the discreditableâ (Goffman 1963: 88).
This idea is highlighted by Garland-Thomson (2009: 20) who claims that âdisability provides us with one of the best opportunities to understand how we stareâ. She argues that social interactions between disabled and non-disabled people are âtense, awkward, and problematicâ, the common result being ocular evasion â a form of âcivil inattentionâ (Goffman 1967: 145). Interactions can be strained; meeting neighbours, attending parties, and introductions, for example, as the zones of first impressions, present possible opportunities for concerns to arise (Davis 1961). Specific empirical examples of this phenomenon have been discussed in relation to autism (Gray 2002; Ryan 2008) and blindness (MĂĽseide and Grøttland 2015; Schillmeier 2007). These contributions identify how people with disabilities and their allies manage public interactions and, on occasion, present a self which is grounded in the normative expectation to repair any possible rupture and disquiet.
Disability thrusts people, then, into a realm of experiments. Here, we may draw upon Mattinglyâs (2013: 309) metaphor of the âmoral laboratoryâ, that is, a space in which âexperiments are done in all kinds of places and in which the participants are not objects of study so much as researchers or experimenters of their own lives â subjects and objectsâ. Such experimentations do not happen separately to everyday life, but are in the midst of the everyday âas the expected or the normative becomes subject to experimentâ (2013: 322). These experiments are about being able, for instance, to walk, eat, participate in social gatherings, or be able to share a bed with oneâs partner. Such experiments are orchestrated by people with disabilities, along with their families, friends, colleagues, other allies, or sometimes complete strangers.
In these experimental moments, people with disabilities arguably become rooted within what can be called an ethic of care. Care is a relational, intersubjective process that emerges in the spaces between people; people with chronic conditions and their allies negotiate and adjust to their situation, often with the purpose of enabling the production of a good life. Mol et al. (2010) discuss care as a process of putting together different assemblages, leading to the creation of a good, or better, life. Providing care can prompt the transformation of relationships, and the intimacy within, so that new forms of engagement between people, including family members, often result (Warren and Ayton 2015). These engagements are broad-ranging, from helping with toileting and bathing, to wiping faces or helping people to eat, or with mobility and beyond, both at home and in public spaces (Manderson and Warren 2013; Sakellariou 2015a). Carers adapt their understanding of their role â as wife, husband, spouse, son, daughter, friend, or other â to accommodate these activities of care. For Tronto (1993: 102):
Care implies a reaching out to something other than the self: it is neither self-referring nor self-absorbingâŚ. Care implicitly suggests that it will lead to some type of action.
People with disabilities, and the people around them, negotiate what needs to be done in order to produce an outcome that they recognise as good. This aligns with what Jackson (2002: 13) describes as:
An ongoing struggle to negotiate, reconcile, balance, or mediate these antithetical potentialities of being, such as that no one person⌠ever arrogates agency so completely and permanently to itself that another is reduced to the status of a mere thing.
The anticipated outcomes of these negotiations might appear to be mundane, yet they are crucial in determining how disabled people perceive themselves and how they are recognised by others. The outcomes we refer to here concern the multiple ways people enact their desires and needs, and how they perform the everyday. Here is what we mean by the everyday: the mundane, familiar, and unremarkable stuff of everyday worlds, that is, the routine, repetitive, and rhythmic reproduction of social life, including, but not limited to, attending school, meeting up with friends, seeing the doctor, or going out on a date. Everyday worlds are infused with power and politics; âwhat is mundane and ordinary to one person might be quite extraordinary for anotherâ (Scott 2009: 2). The contributions in this book, therefore, prioritise the everyday â the micro practices and taken-for-granted social relations that are co-constitutive of the wider complexities and structures of social worlds. For instance, how do people eat, dress, walk, work, interact with others, access resources, and so on? It is our contention that routine, taken-for-granted micro-encounters in the everyday lives of disabled people can produce both hindrances and opportunities.
Focusing on the former, a clear example is the material environment itself (e.g. Boys 2014, 2016), such as absent ramps for people in wheelchairs to access buildings. In this sense, âdifferent bodily forms, abilities, and disabilities are not independent of architecture, but are mutually constitutive such that âproduced spaceâ also forms âsocial normsââ (Galis 2011: 831). Extending this focus on space and place, Serlin (2010) and Molotch (2010: 16) suggest that there is a âgeneral hostility to bodily difference, disability includedâ, and that particular sites become zones of exclusion for some disabled people â toilets being one example of this. A clear design challenge for how disabled people use toilets is the set-up, which must cover the diversity of disabilities and ways through which people navigate that space (e.g. people in wheelchairs, people using crutches or a white stick, or people with invisible disabilities, among others). Providing access means considering how social and physical contexts work, or not, as âensembles of dignityâ, affording possibilities for enacted performances (Molotch 2010: 16). Toilets, thus, âteach lessons about identity, embodiment, and ab/normal ways of being in the worldâ (Slater et al. 2016).
Such ordinary moments of everyday life âmake up the complex and contingent scenarios of dis/abilities that create enabling and disabling practicesâ (Schillmeier 2010: 127). Using the example of how blind people use money, Schillmeier highlights the role of materiality in shaping sociality; money fabricates enabling and disabling spaces of calculation which link bodies, materials, technology, and sensory practices. Likewise, MĂĽseide and Grøttland (2015) put forward that interactions for blind people in public settings indicate the ambiguities of action, morality, and meanings in social space which often do not unfold according to the (moral) principles of the interaction order. One aim of the book, thus, is to make sense of the multiplicity of everyday practices with respect to disablement; âhow bodies, senses, and things connect or disconnect, enable or disable, provoke good as well as bad experiencesâ (Schillmeier 2010: 118). This includes attending to how non-human elements are woven into the social fabric, that is, how materials and space share the scene in order to stabilise a social order (Latimer 2004; Latour 1991). Assemblages of people, things, space and place, and talk combine to produce and order the social, a phenomenon seldom discussed extensively in empirical accounts of disability. The role of space, place, and materiality is captured by a small number of contributions in this collection, particularly Chapter 2 (Buse and Twigg).
Many chapters in this book also unpack the concept of normalcy, or normality (the terms are used interchangeably throughout), within a context of how disabled people go about their everyday lives. For Davis (1995: 2), normalcy and disability are âpart of the same systemâ since disability âdefines the negative space the [normal] body must not occ...