Political Culture, Change, and Security Policy in Nigeria

Kalu Kalu

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2018
• ISBN:
  9781351065801
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: African Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

Demonstrating how political culture facilitates or distorts political preferences and political outcomes, this book explores how the historical development of social conditions and the current social structures shape understandings and constrain individual and collective actions within the Nigerian political system. Political Culture, Change, and Security Policy examines the extent to which specific norms and socialization processes within the political and civic culture abet corruption or the proclivity to engage in corrupt practices and how they help reinforce political attitudes and civic norms that have the potential to undermine the effectiveness of government. It also delineates specific doctrinal models and strategic framework essential to the development and implementation of Nigeria's national security policy, as well as innovative approaches to national development planning.

Professor Kalu N. Kalu offers an exhaustive study that integrates several quantitative models in addressing a series of theoretical and empirical questions that inform historical and contemporary issues of the Nigerian project. The general premise is that it is not enough to simply highlight the problems of the state and address the what question, we must also address the why and how questions that drive political change, policy preferences, and competing political outcomes.

1 Introduction

Antecedents and the trajectory of history

What I seek to do in this book is to illustrate how several events and developments that crystallized over the years have shaped the character of political culture and value change in Nigeria. Because some of these developments have led to one crisis or the other with enormous consequences for the country’s political evolution; I therefore see it as very crucial to take a broad-based multidimensional approach in the analysis of the Nigerian project. Of equal relevance is how political power can be used to serve its own purpose; and how the venality of state institutions can transcend as well as undermine its ability to maintain effective governance as well as “the fiscal responsibility necessary to nurture a genuine political community and citizenship.”¹

There are five key objectives of this book: examining how political culture facilitate or distort political preferences and political outcomes in Nigeria; observing how political culture reinforces or shapes the nature of interest articulation, representation, and accountability; providing a meta-theoretical review of the dynamics of corruption and how it impedes the process of national political development; understanding to what extent specific norms and socialization processes within Nigeria’s political and civic culture abet corruption or the proclivity to engage in corrupt practices? And finally, by undertaking a broadened analysis of the classical and contemporary literature on security, the book delineates specific doctrinal tools and strategic framework critical to the development of Nigeria’s national security policy; as well as new models of national development planning and the role of citizenship in support of state action.

On a broader theoretical level, the analysis draws from the general principles of critical social science as well as from classical and contemporary theories of development. “Critical social science recognizes and sees society as humanly constructed and, in turn, human nature as a collective self-construction.”² In this regard, the two broad premises that are relevant to this work are first, developing an interpretive understanding of the intersubjective meanings, values, and motives held by all groups in the political community; and second, to study the historical development of the social conditions and the current social structures that constrain actions and shape understandings.³ To this effect, one would hope that a better starting point would be to delineate the colonial and post-colonial settings which laid the foundation for contemporary political conflicts in Nigeria; and how they help shape civic attitudes regarding matters of public policy as well as reinforce habits, norms, and behaviors that have the potential to undermine the effectiveness of government.

A state is an organizational construct representing an aggregation of three elements: structure, process, and individuals. It is only when the three elements work together in such a way that the purpose for which the state exists is preserved, that we can then say that the state is functional. The problem of new states, therefore, revolves around: “how to create a stable political system; how to make such a system effective in meeting demands placed upon it; and how to adapt to changing environments or to internal changes within a society.”⁴ As a country, Nigeria is faced with many challenges of state-building, but invariably, the very structure of government and the unusual way the political system operates, undermines the ability of the state to deal decisively with most pressing issues of national interest. On the premise that a “concern with the phenomenon of political culture represents a significant development in contemporary political analysis; this project, therefore should signal an effort to return to the study of the total political system without losing the benefits of individual psychology.”⁵

As a constituent element of the state, individuals harbor an inherent paradox – the capacity to do good as well as the propensity to commit evil; but when this attribute is collectively expressed, for better or for worse, it has the power to bring about dramatic value change in the state and within the citizenry. It is therefore important to understand how individual behaviors and collective action shape the nature and trajectory of change within states, and what the likely effects would be. Hence by utilizing several theoretical and methodological approaches in the analysis of the survey data, the findings illuminate specific factors that could lead to political disagreements, divergence in policy preferences, and a general distrust of government among Nigerians; but also delineate key cultural factors that may explain the proclivity for corruption or corrupt behavior as well as the socialization processes that make it possible.

Charting state, culture, and identity

Nigeria, Africa’s most populous country with a population of approximately 191,835,936 persons, is composed of more than 250 ethnic groups. The most populous and politically influential are: Hausa and the Fulani 29%, Yoruba 21%, Igbo (Ibo) 18%, Ijaw 10%, Kanuri 4%, Ibibio 3.5%, Tiv 2.5%. It has a total land area of about 910,768 square kilometers. The country was initially governed as two separate colonial protectorates by Great Britain until the Northern and Southern Protectorates were amalgamated in 1914 by Sir Frederick Lugard. The original principle behind the amalgamation was not based on a normative consensus among the various ethno-linguistic categories, nor was it meant to create an assimilative political culture among the people. Rather it was meant to make it easier and more logistically manageable for the British colonial authority in terms of administration, commerce, and sovereign control. This meant that different cultural identities, customs, and traditions were lumped together in such a hurried fashion, that there was little time to reflect on its potential consequences for state-building and corporate mutual coexistence.

But “the story of Nigeria as it is known today goes back more than two thousand years; with much of the earlier history of its peoples contained in myths and legends;”⁶ “for only in the north, where the Kanuri and Hausa came into contact with the Arabs, are there any extensive written records before the nineteenth century.”⁷ Nonetheless, it was “sixteen years before the 1941 amalgamation that Flora Shaw (who later married Lugard) first suggested in an article for The Times that the several British Protectorates on the Niger be known collectively as Nigeria.”⁸ As succinctly illustrated by Michael Crowder, although Nigeria was the creation of European ambitions and rivalries in West Africa, it would be an error to assume that its peoples had little history before its final boundaries were negotiated by Britain, France, and Germany at the turn of the twentieth century. He points to the fact that the newly created country contained not just a multiplicity of pagan tribes, but also a number of great kingdoms that had evolved complex systems of government independent of contact with Europe.

And “within its frontiers, for example, were the great kingdom of Kanem-Bornu, with a known history of more than a thousand years; the Fulani Empire which for the hundred years before its conquest by Britain had ruled most of the savannah of Northern Nigeria; the kingdoms of Ife and Benin, whose art had become recognized as among the most accomplished in the world; the Yoruba Empire of Oyo, which had once been the most powerful of the states of the Guinea Coast; the city-states of the Niger Delta, which had grown in response to European demands for slaves and later palm oil; as well as the politically decentralized but culturally homogenous Igbo peoples of Eastern region and the small tribes of the Plateau.”⁹ And between these very diverse groups, a vibrant commercial and cultural contact had existed for years.

But the contacts over the years were interlaced with periods of crises and wars that not only retarded the process of commerce and development, but also tore apart the goodwill and community that had been built over a long period. “Politically, serious internal dissensions within the various states and communities threatened their stability and integrity and exposed them to external dangers.”¹⁰ In addition to the inter-communal raids necessitated by the lucrative nature of the Atlantic slave trade, as well as emergence of the holy wars of Usman dan Fodio (1804–1830), there were also the Yoruba civil wars of the 1700–1800s, the growth of Christianity in the 1800s, the beginning of alien rule, and the amalgamation decree. “The decline and collapse of the old Oyo Empire and the resultant long period of warfare among the various successor-states weakened the Yoruba communities until peace was restored under British auspices in 1891.”¹¹ “The British had by then acquired such advantages in mobility, remarkable improvements in transportation and communications, the necessary financial and human resources including a well-trained and properly equipped troops and police.”¹² And for this reason, “as well as in all encounters with several opposition groups in Nigeria, Britain demonstrated her will, power and ability to enforce her authority on a scale never before seen in pre-colonial times.”¹³

Yet, after Nigeria obtained its independence from Great Britain on October 1, 1960, the cultural tension within the civic polity did not abate but became even more obdurate. This was the situation that Nigeria found itself in its formative years as the political culture and the course of statehood shifted into a persistently conflictual and acrimonious direction. In addition to the concept of ‘divide and rule,’ which the British employed very heavily, they were also able to appoint some local personnel into the colonial administration as a way of giving them a stake in the system and also maintaining their loyalty. It is equally true to make the case that there was never a political entity that could reflect an idea of ‘one Nigeria’ both in culture, beliefs, and in traditions; but “assessed in political terms, most Nigerians later endeavored to work within the framework of the state formally established in January 1941.”¹⁴

History tells us that while “most states had been founded by conquest, rather than by some original contract among the governed population;”¹⁵ “the foundations of political power generally depend, not on any prior consent of the population, but merely on a common recognition by the population.”¹⁶ Hence, as people begin to develop a common and shared understanding of the necessity and efficacy of government, they are then more likely to acquiesce to its authority. As they continue to relate to each other in many different ways over an extended period of time, basic ideas, and belief systems start to develop and these eventually become part of the cultural architecture. It is for this reason that T. N. Tamuno, while stating that “the durability, so far, of the Nigerian state can be explained in more than military terms, also points to the fact that much of this has been due to the memories of pre-colonial and cultural contacts, inter-marriages, a common political experience during and after colonialism, and a growing awareness of the need for economic interdependence in a large and attractive domestic market.”¹⁷

On a political level, the sense of statehood that one often see in the sentiment of Nigerians also masks important differences in customs, religion, traditions and ideology. While some of the cultural differences were bridged as segments of the population began to acquire cosmopolitan characteristics, it can be said that “the most radical influence on Nigeria introduced by the British was the Western system of education.”¹⁸ Because most people could now read and write, education offered a common means of communication and exchange of ideas across tribal, religious, or geopolitical boundaries. While it was seen as a means not only of economic betterment but of social and upward mobility; education also provided an opportunity for Christian missionaries to use the various schools they owned as a vehicle to spread the virtues of Christianity to Nigerians, mostly in the South.¹⁹ Christianity led to the shattering of several traditional values and belief systems, but also ushered in a new political culture that embraced self-discipline, economic management, hard work, and brotherhood. But it also created ethnic and religious discontent within sections of the population, mostly in the North where they are predominantly Muslims.

The North was almost entirely insulated against the revolutionary effects of education by Lugard’s promise that missionaries would not be allowed in any Muslim emirate without the Emir’s consent; hence for the first years of British administration the only form of education available in the North was that of the Koranic school, other than small schools provided by the Church Missionary Society (CMS) missions in Zaria and Bida, and a government school that was opened in Zaria in 1912.²⁰ The reluctance by the Northern Emirs to embrace early western education will have enormous consequences for the region for many years after Nigeria’s Independence from Great Britain. Not only did...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Copyright
• Dedication
• Contents
• List of figures
• List of tables
• About the author
• Preface
• 1 Introduction: antecedents and the trajectory of history
• 2 Political culture and institutionalization: defining characteristics
• 3 Contested discourse: policy dissonance and the limits of deliberative consensus
• 4 Corruption and development: value ethics in comparative perspective
• 5 Corruption and political decay: an institutional footnote
• 6 Corruption and socialization: a cultural hypothesis
• 7 Constructing identities: norms of dissent and political violence in the Niger Delta
• 8 Developing national security policy: context and competing imperatives
• 9 Strategic fusion: the making of a grand doctrine
• 10 Reconciling state and citizenship: civic culture and national development planning
• Appendices
• Bibliography
• Index