Personhood in the Byzantine Christian Tradition

Early, Medieval, and Modern Perspectives

Alexis Torrance, Symeon Paschalidis

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2018
• ISBN:
  9781317081784
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Teologia e religione
• Subtopic: Denominazioni cristiane

Bringing together international scholars from across a range of linked disciplines to examine the concept of the person in the Greek Christian East, Personhood in the Byzantine Christian Tradition stretches in its scope from the New Testament to contemporary debates surrounding personhood in Eastern Orthodoxy. Attention is paid to a number of pertinent areas that have not hitherto received the scholarly attention they deserve, such as Byzantine hymnography and iconology, the work of early miaphysite thinkers, as well as the relevance of late Byzantine figures to the discussion. Similarly, certain long-standing debates surrounding the question are revisited or reframed, whether regarding the concept of the person in Maximus the Confessor, or with contributions that bring patristic and modern Orthodox theology into dialogue with a variety of contemporary currents in philosophy, moral psychology, and political science.

In opening up new avenues of inquiry, or revisiting old avenues in new ways, this volume brings forward an important and on-going discussion regarding concepts of personhood in the Byzantine Christian tradition and beyond, and provides a key stimulus for further work in this field.

Section II

Early to middle Byzantine

4 Hypostasis, person, and individual according to St. Maximus the Confessor, with reference to the Cappadocians and St. John of Damascus

Jean-Claude Larchet

Over the course of the last few decades, certain Orthodox theologians have developed, on the basis of modern personalism and existentialism, a particular conception of the person and the individual, and have then attempted to find a patristic basis and justification for this, especially in the Cappadocian Fathers (Basil of Caesarea, Gregory of Nazianzus and Gregory of Nyssa) and in Maximus the Confessor. It is not within the purview of the patrologist to challenge the freedom held by a philosopher or a theologian to develop a new theological or anthropological theory. It does, however, fall within the competency of the patrologist to pass judgment on the question of the agreement or disagreement of this theory with the patristic bases from which it seeks its backing.

A certain number of patrologists have long spoken out on the question of the relationship of personalism and existentialism (which we find particularly in C. Yannaras, J. Zizioulas, and the latter’s disciples) with the thought of the Cappadocians, concluding that there exists a discordance between the two conceptions and noting the anachronistic character of an interpretation of the theology of the Cappadocian Fathers based on modern personalism.¹ Some patrologists have, more recently, come to the same conclusion with regard to the relationship between the same personalist and existentialist conception and the thought of St. Maximus the Confessor.² Since representatives of the personalist current have, during a recent colloquium devoted to Maximus the Confessor, restarted the debate³ (with arguments which seem to this author to be marked by certain a priori notions and by insufficient reference to the sources),⁴ it is an opportune moment to return to the total corpus of St. Maximus’s writings to determine his precise position regarding the definition of, and relationship between, the concepts of hypostasis (ὑπόστασις), of person (πρόσωπον) and of individual (ἄτομον), all while highlighting in addition its relationship to the position of the Cappadocians and of St. John of Damascus.

Part one: the equivalence of the notions of person and hypostasis

In several passages in his writings, St. Maximus explicitly and unambiguously affirms the identity of the notions of hypostasis and person (generally expressed with the word ταὐτόν), or else their equivalence (denoted by the conjunctions ἤτοι, ἤγουν, τουτέστι or καί, or by the alternative and undifferentiated use of the two words).

a. In general definitions

He does this in a general way in the following well-known definition found in Th. Pol., 14 (PG 91:152A): “Hypostasis and person: the same thing (ὑπόστασις καί πρόσωπον, ταυτόν); the two indeed have what is proper and particular, being circumscribed in themselves, without possessing by nature, however, their predication in plurality.” This definition is similarly found in a passage in Ep. 15 (PG 91:549B) : “If [a hypothesis admitted by Maximus] hypostasis and person are the same thing (ταὐτόν δέ πρόσωπον καί ὑπόστασις).”

b. In various particular contexts

Maximus equally affirms the identity or equivalence of the two notions in particular contexts that relate to the Trinity, to Christ, to the angels, to men, but also to other natural beings. We can in particular mention the following passages:

• Ep. 12 (PG 91:468D): “The hypostasis, that is the person [τήν ὑπόστασιν, ἤτοι τό πρόσωπον].”
• Ep. 15 (PG 91:549BC): “If essence and nature are the same thing and similarly hypostasis and person are the same thing (ταὐτόν δέ πρόσωπον καί ὑπόστασις), it is evident that beings of the same nature and essence as one another are of a different hypostasis. And by both, the nature and the hypostasis, no being is the same as another. Thus, beings united according to one and the same nature, in other words beings of the same essence and nature, are never united according to one and the same hypostasis, that is to say person (κατά μίαν καί τήν αὐτήν ὑπόστασιν ἤγουν πρόσωπον), put otherwise they cannot have a single person or hypostasis (τουτέστιν ἕν πρόσωπον ἔχειν οὐ δυνήσεται καί μίαν ὑπόστασιν). And beings that are united according to one and the same hypostasis, that is to say person (τά κατά μίαν καί τήν αὐτήν ὑπόστασιν ἤγουν πρόσωπον ἡνωμένα), would be unable to combine themselves into one and the same essence or nature, that is to say would be unable to come from one and the same essence and nature. But beings united according to one and the same nature, that is to say essence, are distinguished one from the other by the hypostases, that is to say the persons (ταῖς ὑποστάσεσιν, ἤγουν προσώποις), as is the case with the angels, with men, or with all creatures considered in a genus or species.”
• Ep. 15 (PG 91:552A): “Unbegottenness, Begotenness, and Procession, do not split the single nature and power of the ineffable divinity into three unequal or equal essences or natures. But these things, regarding the single divinity, that is the essence or nature, characterize the persons, that is the hypostases (πρόσωπα τουτέστιν ὑποστάσεις). But the [elements] that are united according to one and the same hypostasis, that is person (τά κατά μίαν καί τήν αὐτήν ὑπόστασιν, ἤγουν πρόσωπον ἡνωμένα), are of one single hypostasis and constitute one person, differing by the logos of the essence or nature.” We can note in this passage the reversible character of the equivalence: person-hypostasis, hypostasis-person.
• Ep. 15 (PG 91:552BC): “All those who are united according to one and the same essence, that is to say nature, are always of the same essence one with the other, but of a different hypostasis; […] they are of a different hypostasis by the logos of personal heterogeneity which distinguishes them by the characteristic properties of the hypostasis, according to which one is distinguished from the other and they do not come together by the characteristic properties of the hypostasis (ἑτεροϋπόστατα δέ, τῷ λόγῳ τῆς αὐτά διακρινούσης προσωπικῆς ἑτερότητος καθ᾿ ὅν ἄλλος ἄλλου διακέκριται, μή συμβαίνοντες ἀλλήλοις τοῖς καθ᾿ ὑπόστασιν χαρακτηριστικοῖς ἰδιώμασιν). But each, by the coherence in it of its properties, carries the logos of its proper hypostasis which prevents it from being the same as those who are of the same nature and the same essence as it. Those things that are united according to one and the same hypostasis, that is to say person (κατά μίαν καί τήν αὐτήν ὑπόστασιν ἤγουν πρόσωπον), that is are completed in unity according to one and the same hypostasis, are of the same hypostasis but of a different essence.”
• Ep. 15 (PG 91:553D): “The Word of God, perfect according to essence and nature, according to which he is the same as the Father and the Spirit and consubstantial with them, and according to the person and hypostasis (κατά τε τό πρόσωπον καί τήν ὑπόστασιν) different than the Father and the Spirit, preserving unconfusedly his personal difference (τήν προσωπικήν διαφοράν).”
• Ep. 15 (PG 91:556AB): “By reason on the one hand of the communion of the parts of which he is constituted according to essence, united to his Father and to his mother according to nature, [the incarnate Word] revealed himself as preserving the difference one from the other of the parts of which he is constituted. By reason on the other hand of the identity of his proper parts according to hypostasis (τῷ δέ λόγῳ τῆς καθ᾿ ὑπόστασιν τῶν οἰκείων μερῶν ἰδιότητος), distinguishing himself from his ‘extremes’ – I mean his Father and his mother – he reveals himself in the unity of his proper hypostasis, absolutely without difference, united to the utmost degree by the personal identity (προσωπικῇ ταυτότητι) of his parts one with the other.”
• Ep. 15 (PG 91:556D-557A): “By [the hypostasis of the Word], the extremes – which I define as his Father and his mother – unite in him without [constituting] the least difference, so that there is no complete disappearance of the hypostatic identity of the parts (τῆς καθ᾿ ὑπόστασιν τῶν μερῶν ταυτότητος); for the coming to be of a hypostatic difference on account of the parts would dissolve the hypostatic union into a duality of persons (εἰς δυάδα προσωπικήν διαλύουσα τήν καθ᾿ ὑπόστασιν ἕνωσιν), and could not then be seen to safeguard the personal identity of the parts one with the other (τήν πρός ἄλληλα τῶν μερῶν προσωπικήν ταυτότητα), having been divided by the hypostatic difference into a duality of persons (τῇ καθ᾿ ὑπόστασιν διαφορᾷ πρός δυάδα προσώπων μεριζομένην).”
• Ep. 15 (PG 91:557C): “By the ...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• Acknowledgements
• Contributors
• Introduction
• Section I Ancient Christian, early Byzantine
• Section II Early to middle Byzantine
• Section III Late Byzantine
• Section IV Modern
• Index