Islam and Sectarian Violence in Pakistan

The Terror Within

Eamon Murphy

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2018
• ISBN:
  9781351709613
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Terrorism
• Index: Politics & International Relations

This book analyses the growth of sectarian-based terrorist violence in Pakistan, one of the Muslim majority states most affected by sectarian violence, ever since it was established in 1947.

Sectarian violence among Muslims has emerged as a major global security problem in recent years. The author argues that the upsurge in sectarian violence in Pakistan, particularly since the late 1970s, has had less to do with theological differences between the various sects of Islam, but is a consequence of the specific political, social, economic, demographic and cultural changes that have taken place in Pakistan since it was established as an independent state. A major theme of the book is the increasing violence, extent and expressions of sectarian conflict which have emerged as new forms of sectarian terrorism. The volume provides an in-depth empirical case study which addresses some major theoretical questions raised by Critical Terrorism Studies researchers in respect of the links between religion and sectarian terrorism in Pakistan and more widely.

This book will be of much interest to students of critical terrorism studies, Asian politics and history, religious studies and International Relations in general.

1
Islamic sects in contemporary Pakistan

The many forms of Islam that are practiced in Pakistan share some common beliefs that are held throughout the umma or worldwide community of Muslims. The most important of these is the belief in the one absolute all-powerful Allah, the prophetic mission of his prophet Muhammad, the last and greatest of the many prophets of the Abrahamic tradition, and Allah’s eternal message that he gave to Muhammad and that is written in the Quran. Islam in Pakistan, however, has many unique characteristics that have been largely shaped by the religion’s long historical development in the Indian subcontinent. This chapter provides an overview of the different beliefs and practices of the many Islamic schools of thought, or sects as they are more commonly referred to, that are uniquely characteristic of Pakistan. An understanding of this complexity and uniqueness of Islam in Pakistan is essential when attempting to analyse and explain the growth of sectarian violence in the country.

What is an Islamic sect?

Muslims constitute around 96% of the population of Pakistan. At first glance, this would suggest that this would create an all-powerful sense of unity among Pakistani citizens, but, as elsewhere in the Islamic world, the Muslims of Pakistan are divided along sectarian lines. While there is a very substantial literature on sectarianism and sectarian violence in Pakistan and other Muslim states, very few authors attempt to define precisely what “sect” means within an Islamic, and specifically Pakistani, context. Some scholars try to avoid the semantic problem by using the more clumsy, if technically more accurate, term “schools of thought”, while others use the word “community”. To complicate the semantic problem still further, the terms “sub sect” and “sect like groups” also occasionally appear in the literature. Pakistani Shias also use the term “qaum” to refer to members of their own sect or community.

Attempting to define what is meant by a sect in Islam, therefore, is complicated and analytically troubling particularly if one tries to approach the definition from a Christian perspective. The word “sect” was originally applied to divisions within Christianity. In general, it can be argued that there is not the same sense of a separate identity among most Muslims that there is among the followers of the various Christian denominations. What are termed Islamic sects are not denominations in the Christian sense. Islam as practised by the vast majority of Muslims is not an institutionalised religion: There is no equivalent within mainstream Islam, for example, of the Catholic hierarchy of pope, cardinals, bishops and priests; the Presbyterian General Assembly; or the Mormon president whom the faithful believe is chosen by God. Muslims generally regard sectarianism as “a bad thing” and prefer to refer to differences of theological opinion or “schools of thought” rather than independent sects.¹

The Shia of Pakistan are a good example of the analytical problem of trying to use “sect” in the narrow Christian sense of the word. Most Pakistanis, especially those living in rural areas, do not strictly identify with any particular sect. According to the veteran Pakistani journalist Khaled Ahmed, most Shias “simply do not know the rituals that differentiate them from the Sunnis”.² Members of both sects regularly intermarry, socialise and live side by side generally peacefully. Sunnis take part in Shia rituals, while Shias go to Sunni mosques to pray. It is often regarded as bad manners to inquire as to whether one is a Sunni or Shia. When the founder of Pakistan, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, himself a Shia, was asked whether he was a Sunni or a Shia he simply replied, as do many other Pakistanis, “I am a Muslim”.³ Nevertheless, for convenience and because the term is used so widely in the literature, I will use the term “sect” throughout this volume with the caveat that it is used in a specific Islamic not a Christian context.

The Sunni/Shia divide

The main sectarian division in the Islam that is practised in Pakistan, as in most of the rest of the Muslim world, is between the Sunni majority, who make up between 75% and 80% of the population of about 150 million, and minority Shia sects which comprise about 15% to 20% of around 20 million–25 million.⁴ The Sunni themselves are divided into the Barelvis, around 50% of the population, and the Deobandis, around 20%, although the latter are rapidly growing in numbers.⁵ Other sects include the Sunni Ahmadis who comprise around 2% (legally classified as non-Muslims in Pakistan since 1974) and the Wahhabi influenced Ahl-i Hadith.⁶ Sunnis, however, are also deeply divided into competing sects (sometimes termed sub sects) as are the Shia but to a much lesser degree. In the past, ideological differences between Sunnis and Shias and other sects and among Sunnis have been largely confined to debates (munazara) between scholars, but in recent years these ideological debates have turned to political violence, especially since the 1980s.

The origin of the rivalry between Sunnis and Shias can be traced back to the succession crisis that followed the death of the prophet Muhammad in 632 A.D. The dispute was both a theological and a power struggle over who was to be the leader of the new Muslim community or umma. Most Muslims accepted that the best qualified elder among Muhammad’s followers should be the leader of the umma. They chose Abu Bakr, Muhammad’s father-in-law and close friend, as his successor or caliph to provide the leadership in religious and political affairs. A minority of the prophet’s followers argued that Muhammad’s cousin and son-in-law Ali (Ali ibn Abi Talib) was the better qualified and had been chosen by Muhammad to be his successor.⁷

Shias believe that their Imans, descendants of Ali and his wife Fatima, Muhammad’s daughter, are the only legitimate leaders of the umma because they have inherited the prophet’s charisma and spiritual qualities.⁸ (Sunnis also use the term “imam” for the men who lead prayers in their mosques.) For the Shias, the most important event in the Islamic calendar is the mourning rituals held during Muharram, the first month of the Islamic calendar. It was on the 10th day of Muharram, Ashura, that Iman Hussain ibn Ali, the son of Iman Ali and the grandson of Muhammad, along with his relatives and supporters, was martyred by the despised sixth caliph Yazid at the Battle of Karbala in what is now modern Iraq.⁹ In addition to making the pilgrimage to Mecca, Shias also attach great importance to visiting the tomb of Ali at Najaf and his son, Hussain, at Karbala in Iraq.¹⁰ Today, Shias are the majority of Muslims only in Iran, Iraq, Azerbaijan and Bahrain, while Sunnis are the majority in more than 40 Muslim majority countries stretching from Morocco to Indonesia.¹¹

A central grievance of the Sunnis against the Shia, which has often led to sectarian conflict, is the Shia attitude towards the first three caliphs. Sunni Islam looks back to the time of the prophet and his first four immediate successors as Islam’s golden age. In contrast, Shias regard the period after the death of the prophet as one of injustice and decline and regard the first three caliphs, Abu Bakr, Umar and Utman, as usurpers. A common Shia practice is tabarra, that is, dissociating themselves from the enemies of Muhammad’s family, the ahl al-bayt. The literal meaning of tabarra is to draw apart and to simply ignore the first three caliphs. The practice, however, sometimes involves the public ritualistic cursing and insulting of Abu Bakr, Umar and Utman which is highly resented by many Sunnis and often provokes sectarian riots despite the fact that many Shia leaders and scholars have stated that such practices are expressly forbidden by religion. Shias also are hostile to Aisha, the daughter of Abu Bakr and one of Muhammad’s favourite wives who is reputed to be one of the first scholars of Islam but whom the Shias say hated Ali and conspired against him and his family.¹² It is hardly surprising, therefore, that the disputes over tabarra have been the major cause of outbreaks of spontaneous violence between Sunnis and Shias both before and after the foundation of Pakistan in 1947.

Sectarian divisions among the Sunni: the Barelvi and Deobandi

The numerically dominant sect in Pakistan is the Barelvi school of ulama that represent the popular face of Islam in Pakistan, particularly in the Punjabi and Sindhi rural areas. Barelvi Islam is sometimes referred to as folk or traditional Islam. The sect gets its name from the north Indian town of Bareilly where the sect’s founder Ahmed Raza Khan established the sect’s most important madrassa, seminary. The Barelvis’ main theological rivals are the Deobandi, who regard themselves as reformers promoting what they claim is a purer form of Islam that was practised in Arabia during the lifetime of Muhammad in the years immediately following the death of Muhammad. The two sects were not new developments in Islam in India but simply formalised existing trends that were evolving in Indian Islam since the early 8th century. Each of these groups claims to represent the true Sunni Islam criticising their opponents as mistaken or even as apostates.¹³ These theological disagreements between the two sects have led to often fierce, acrimonious debates among scholars branding their rivals as mistaken or even as apostates, but in recent times the scholarly debates have given way to violent clashes between members of the rival sects.

Statistics for their numbers vary, but the Barelvis comprise about 60% of Pakistani Sunnis, while their main opponents are around 20%¹⁴ The Barelvis are particularly strong in the Punjab, the largest and most heavily populated province of Pakistan and the economic and political heartland of the country. They are also dominant in Sindh where the veneration of saints is common, particularly in the rural areas. The Barelvi attach great importance to the veneration of the prophet Muhammad, who is regarded as an infallible semi-divine being whose presence is everywhere. This belief is rejected by the Deobandi who believe that while Muhammad was the last and greatest prophet, he was still a mortal human being. The celebration of Muhammad’s birthday is a particularly joyous occasion for the Barelvi, but some Deobandis regard the custom as a heretical non-Islamic innovation to which they strongly object sometimes violently.

Like many Shias, the Barelvis are strongly influenced by mystical Sufism. The Barelvis follow many Sufi practices such as the use of devotional music (qawali) and dance in religious worship, another practice very much frowned upon by the followers of the rival Deobandi tradition. Unlike their rivals, the Barelvis also visit the shrines and graves of saints believing that the saints, both living and dead, can intercede with Allah on their behalf.¹⁵

One of the most famous Sufi mystics is Ali bin Usman al-Hajveri, an 11th-century mystic who came to the former Muslim capital Lahore with Central Asian invaders. After travelling extensively throughout the Middle East and Centr...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Copyright
• Dedication
• Contents
• Foreword
• Preface
• Maps of Pakistan
• Introduction: sectarian terrorism in Pakistan
• 1 Islamic sects in contemporary Pakistan
• 2 Islam and sectarianism in the Indian subcontinent: an historical overview
• 3 Sectarianism, politics and the making of Pakistan, 1937–1947
• 4 Sectarian conflict in the new state of Pakistan, 1947–1963
• 5 The Islamisation of Pakistan and sectarian conflict, 1963–1988
• 6 Sectarianism, proxy wars and global jihad: the Afghan Soviet war, 1979–1989
• 7 Regional and local dimensions of sectarian conflicts in Pakistan
• 8 Contemporary sectarian violence in Pakistan: Islam in crisis
• 9 The future of sectarian conflict and prospects for peace
• Appendix: the 2018 Pakistani Elections: a turning point in the war against sectarian violence?
• Conclusion
• Glossary
• Index