Part I
Background and foundation
The era of unprecedented humanitarian crises
In recent years, finding ways to deal with humanitarian crises has become one of the most compelling issues for the international community. Humanitarian crises encompass large-scale disruptions to people’s sense of a ‘normal’ life, all too often affecting their survival, livelihood and dignity. The scale of human suffering nowadays has grown since World War II. More than 164.2 million people around the world need humanitarian assistance for survival (Development Initiatives 2017). At the end of 2015, 65.3 million people, or one in every 113 persons, had been displaced from their homes due to conflict or persecution (Edwards 2016), while an estimated 377 million people were affected by natural disasters in 2016 alone (Development Initiatives 2017, 19). Fears of famine once again plague the Horn of Africa and Yemen, while the rapid spread of infectious diseases continues to highlight our interconnected vulnerabilities.
Whenever such serious threats attract global attention, it is widely anticipated that donors, aid organizations, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) will provide solidarity and active engagement. In principle, state actors from the affected countries are in charge of addressing disaster situations. However, when crises overwhelm their capacity to implement solutions because of the scale and complexity of the threats, or when governments themselves become the primary source of danger, support from external actors for the population at risk becomes necessary. This support has grown steadily—from about US$800 million in 1989 to some US$4.4 billion in 1999, reaching US$27.3 billion in 2016 (Weiss 2013; Development Initiatives 2017). The budget allocated for humanitarian funds is normally around 10% of the total Official Development Assistance (ODA) budget in most of the major donor countries. However, this grew to 18.8% in 2016, generating discussions among the international community over what might be expected from this increase.
The practice of collective engagement from the international community in addressing humanitarian crises commenced only after the end of the Cold War. In the aftermath of World War II, the international community’s work on peace and security was based on the sovereign state system, which became the basis for the establishment of the United Nations (UN) and prevention of new global confrontations. During the Cold War period, the reconstruction of war-torn countries and long-term development of newly independent countries were the main agendas of donors, while humanitarian action was largely left to non-governmental institutions, such as the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs (Crisp 2007). It was only after the end of the Cold War that collective humanitarian support by the international community became fully functional through the UN. This was symbolically marked by the United Nations Security Council Resolution 688 of April 5, 1991, which provided the justification for an international response to the refugee crisis in northern Iraq in the aftermath of the first Gulf War (Hammerstad 2014, 180).
Successive crises in ensuing years made it clear that no single entity could fully serve the needs of an entire affected community in the crisis management process (Friis and Jarmyr 2008), resulting in the increased involvement of multiple actors in such endeavors. What started as a non-governmental undertaking has now become a concerted effort among inter-governmental organizations, sovereign states, the UN system, regional organizations, militaries and the private sector. In this way, the generation of broad concern and goodwill is a great achievement when compared with the preceding period of hot and less hot wars. Nonetheless, despite good intentions, the diversity in priorities and mandates of all the actors presently involved in the response to emergencies, as well as the ever-changing needs on the ground, make crisis management a very difficult task. Hence, when faced with present-day humanitarian challenges, more comprehensive and better managed humanitarian activities are urgently required.
Improving crisis management: coordination and the humanitarian-development nexus
Over the past 20 years, the international community has invested heavily in the intellectual and organizational development of the humanitarian crisis management concept and system. Two major areas requiring attention from the very beginning were (1) humanitarian coordination and (2) the humanitarian-development nexus. The coordination and nexus strategies in responding to the intricacies of several crisis contexts—together with the engagement of a great variety of actors with different visions—make humanitarian crisis management particularly challenging.
Of these two areas, coordination took precedence in the process of institutionalizing humanitarian action in the UN. The landmark General Assembly Resolution 46/182 in 1991 became a kind of new ‘Magna Carta’ in providing a basic framework for the international humanitarian system (Oshima 2004). The resolution established new arrangements for humanitarian coordination in the UN system (OCHA 2012) and strengthened the position of the UN Disaster Relief Coordinator by raising it to the level of Under Secretary General and renaming it the Emergency Relief Coordinator. The resolution also gave way to the creation of the Department of Humanitarian Affairs, which later became the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in 1998. Further reforms led to the creation of the Humanitarian Reform Agenda in 2005, by which the Cluster System for the coordination of humanitarian action was introduced to enhance predictability, accountability and partnership among multiple actors, particularly UN agencies. This was followed by the introduction of the transformative agenda in 2011, which stressed leadership, accountability and improved coordination.
Despite all this progress on coordination reforms, the issue of the humanitarian-development nexus has remained on the margins. During the 1990s, a major debate on improving the humanitarian crisis management revolved around the question of a disconnect between humanitarian assistance and development cooperation. It attempted to link the different forms of assistance to the changing nature of crises and needs, particularly in relation to protracted internal conflicts. Discussions stemmed from the recognition that there were certain gaps between humanitarian and development assistance in terms of (1) funding (temporal period of engagement and types of activities eligible for funding); (2) institutions (philosophy, mandates, strategies, approaches); and (3) partnerships and coordination (between different actors and between capitals and field offices within the same organizations). While it was more or less clear that the provision of life-saving assistance implies relief and that going back to non-crisis normality constitutes development, whatever lies in the middle (including prevention and preparedness) is less well understood.
The first-generation concept of a ‘relief to development continuum’ model was based on the idea of a linear or chronological transition from short-term relief by humanitarian actors to long-term development by traditional donors. It sought to bridge funding gaps that may arise between these two phases and actors. This was later replaced by the ‘contiguum’ model, where different phases and elements of assistance are thought to exist concurrently, with emphasis on shared responsibility between humanitarian and development actors rather than a temporal transition between them.1 While continuum and contiguum vary in emphasis, they both highlight three aspects of linking: (1) applying development principles early on in emergency settings to ensure the ground for development is prepared, (2) ensuring a smooth transition as well as continuity and coordination between interventions, and (3) using development cooperation to support prevention and disaster risk reduction (Steets 2011).
Several other approaches have been developed to analyze and address the nexus based on those two concepts, many of which are still used today. Some of these approaches include the long standing Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD), which was originally proposed by the European Union (EU) in 1996; the Development(al) Relief approach, which was suggested by the United States (US) in the early 1990s together with other related concepts such as Relief to Development and Transition; the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)-led Early Recovery, which is a part of the Humanitarian Cluster System; and the Gap approach spearheaded by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the World Bank in 1999, that originated from the Brooking Process (Crisp 2007; Suhrke and Ofstad 2005). There is also the Seamless Assistance emerging from the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA)’s strategy, and the Resilience Approach which appeared in several bilateral donor’s papers such as EU institutions, United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the United Kingdom Department for International Development (DFID) and various UN agencies during the past ten years. These will all be discussed in more detail in the next chapter. It is fair to say, however, that the use of these approaches still remains within the confines of the respective donors or organizations who invented them.
Bridging the nexus and remaining issues
Responding to the rise of these debates, donor policies on humanitarian development and security have also undergone major changes. Donors have created new funding instruments and offices or have devised bureaucratic procedures to fill the gap between humanitarian and development assistance and improve their ability to deal with ‘transitional’ activities. Among these are ECHO’s Global Plans, the EC’s Humanitarian Plus funding, the UK’s Global Conflict Prevention Pool (GCCP), and the World Bank’s Post-Conflict Unit and Post-Conflict Fund. Such trust funds are usually operationalized and managed by UN agencies and the World Bank. Donors have applied these instruments to enable appropriate financing to countries in prolonged periods of crisis and those suffering from major natural disasters.
In the 2011 World Development Report, the World Bank selected the theme ‘Conflict, Security and Development’ to address the cyclical nature of violence and emphasize that the repeated spiral model of institutional transformation and confidence are pathways to break the vicious cycle of conflict and violence (World Bank 2011). In the same year, OECD countries, together with international organizations and financial institutions, agreed to support conflict-affected and fragile countries through the ‘New Deal for Engagement in Fragile Countries’ (New Deal) at the 4th High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan, Korea. One of the principles of donor engagement in fragile contexts is ‘trust’, predicated on the commitment to risk-sharing between fragile countries and donors to ensure continued engagement even in times of transition (OECD 2011). The New Deal is upheld as a guiding principle for OECD donors’ engagement in fragile contexts through the fora of dialogue among donors (INCAF: International Network on Conflict and Fragility), and between donors and countries in fragile situations (International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding).
In regard to humanitarian actors, 17 donor governments—along with the European Commission, OECD, International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, NGOs, and academics—gathered and formulated the ‘Principles and Good Practice of Humanitarian Donorship’ (Good Humanitarian Donorship 2003). The 23 identified principles and good practices provided both a framework for guiding official humanitarian aid and a mechanism for encouraging greater donor accountability, support for the transition to development, and the prevention of future crises.2 Another effort that deserves mention is the Sphere Project, which has tried to develop standards for action that NGOs can use to increase their professionalism after the chaotic response to the Rwandan genocide in 1994. Yet, all of these innovations remain as work in progress and, as the former UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon said in his remarks after five years in office, ‘we will not create a safer and more secure world without building a more global, accountable and robust humanitarian system’ (United Nations Secretary-General 2012).
Some evaluation studies on the relationship between humanitarian and development aid suggest that there is still a long way to go in achieving a better system for humanitarian crisis management (Macrae and Harmer 2004; Steets 2011). It is argued that the international community for humanitarian action is still a rather messy assemblage of actors and activities lacking a leader (ALNAP 2015, 18). Despite various coordination and cooperation frameworks, the entire process of humanitarian action remains unmanaged. Another criticism is the unremitting lack of evidence-based studies on this topic. Much of the available literature consists of secondary desk reviews. While much has been written from a humanitarian perspective, there are insufficient studies written from a development perspective (Hinds 2015). Moreover, as the authors of this book suggest, there is even disagreement on what the problem is behind the continuum of humanitarian crisis management—not just among development practitioners but also from communities working specifically on disasters, peacebuilding and other types of crises.
The 2016 World Humanitarian Summit
Amid this context, the World Humanitarian Summit (WHS) was held on May 24–25, 2016, in Istanbul with the thematic goals of (1) re-inspiring and reinvigorating commitment to humanity and the universality of humanitarian principles, (2) initiating a set of concrete actions and commitments aimed at enabling countries and communities to better prepare for and respond to crises, and becoming resilient to shocks, and (3) sharing of best practices that can help save lives around the world, putting affected people at the center of humanitarian action, and alleviating suffering. The UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon expected the WHS to be
an opportunity for ‘we the peoples’—...