Military Strategy of Small States

Responding to External Shocks of the 21st Century

Håkan Edström, Dennis Gyllensporre, Jacob Westberg

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2018
• ISBN:
  9781351054324
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Histoire
• Subtopic: Histoire de l'armée et de la marine

The book explores how small states adjust their military strategies in response to external shocks.

Using primary sources from four Nordic countries, (Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden), this volume explores how small states have adjusted their military strategies in response to external shocks of the 21st century. The 9/11 terrorist attacks, the Russian interventions in Georgia and Ukraine, and the rise of the Islamic State have all forced the Nordic states to adopt new strategies. While the responses have not been uniform, their differing relations to the EU and NATO have not prevented these countries from behaving similarly in military affairs. Limitations in military capacity has led all four countries to pursue strategies that include cooperation with more resourceful partners. It is necessary for them to cooperate with others to protect and promote their national interests. Moreover, the Nordic cosmopolitan outlook expresses milieu-shaping ambitions that we generally would not expect small states to pursue against a potential great power aggressor.

This book will be of much interest to students of military strategy, defense studies, security studies, and international relations.

1Continuity and change in small states’ strategy

The present global order is in a state of flux. During the first two decades of the twenty-first century, the seemingly stable liberal order of the 1990s has been challenged on several unexpected events that have created great uncertainties and pressures on states to adjust their defence strategies to a changing security environment. In this book we will analyse how four potential strategic shocks – the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001, the Russo-Georgian war in 2008, the Russian war against Ukraine, and the rise of the Islamic State (IS) and the Caliphate in 2014 – have affected the defence strategies of four small states – the Nordic countries Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden. How and to what extent have these four small states adjusted their strategies in response to these events in their external security environment? Which factors explain differences and similarities in their responses and how can we explain elements of change and continuity?

In this study, we define a strategic shock as an event that is perceived as unexpected, deeply consequential and demanding counter measures by the political authorities of a specific state.¹ These shocks represent two very different types of strategic challenges for the small states included in our study. The first and fourth shocks triggered requests from a friendly superpower for contributions to military crisis management and for a global war against terror. These requests raised questions related to cooperative security, western solidarity and small states’ ability to contribute to multinational military operations against primarily non-state actors. The Russian-Georgian war and Russia’s annexation of Crimea and further military engagements in other parts of Ukraine are examples of traditional security threats that concern both the protection of individual European states’ territorial integrity as well the future of the post-Cold War security order in Europe. Russia’s use of military force against neighbouring countries also created a renewed concern regarding issues related to the management of power asymmetries between small and great powers and the strengthening of capacities needed for national and collective self-defence.

The four Nordic countries aforementioned share a number of structural similarities related to strategic exposure, interdependence and military capacity. Moreover, they all share similar national interests. These similarities would make an observer expect that the four Nordic states should respond in a similar manner to changes in their common external environment – they are likely to develop military strategies corresponding to similarities in terms of strategic exposure, limited military capabilities, security interests and general foreign policy outlook. Before and during the Second World War (WWII), armed aggression against one of the Nordic states could occur without the other states being directly involved in the war. Today, and ever since the beginning of the Cold War, this has been close to inconceivable. It also seems reasonable to argue that all four states are roughly equally exposed to threats related to radical Islamic terrorist movements. Regarding capacities and interests, all four states can be categorised as third ranked powers primarily focused on defensive security goals related to the survival of the own state. Additionally, they all have long traditions of support for international security cooperation.

However, each country also has different historical experiences in conflicts and wars as well as unique geographical characteristics regarding extension and relative closeness to friendly or threatening great powers. The four countries’ varying experience in military conflicts during WWII resulted in different strategies regarding participation in both military and political alliances. The German invasion in 1940 and the failure of neutrality made Denmark and Norway join North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949; Finland and Sweden continued their policies of peacetime neutrality during the Cold War and for both countries, their policy of neutrality was seen as incompatible with membership of the European Community (EC). However, in 1995, both countries became members of the European Union (EU) and now they both actively participate in the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). In 1973, Denmark became a member of the EU. Denmark has, however, remained outside the EU’s cooperation on defence and foreign policy. Norway is not a member of the EU but participates in different efforts related to the capacity building of the EU’s international military crisis management.

The differences between the countries’ unique geographical characteristics, historical experiences of armed conflicts and differing political and military alliance memberships will be used to analyse the strategic shocks’ potential and indirect effects. Varying unit-level characteristics are expected to produce different responses from the four countries by acting as intervening variables. In tandem with the structural similarities, unit-level differences between the four Nordic countries make them well suited for a comparative study of small states’ military-strategic adjustments to sudden and unexpected changes in their external security environment.

The 9/11 attacks against the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon led to the first invocation of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty.² President George W. Bush, who declared a Global War on Terror, immediately defined the attacks as ‘acts of war’. The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) condemned the acts and recognised the right to self-defence in accordance with Article 51 in the charter of the United Nations (UN). In late September, Resolution 1373 on counter-terrorism was adopted by the UNSC. The efforts of NATO and the UN to fight terrorism included a great number of distinctive measures. The initial attacks by the United States (US) against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan paved the way for the UNSC Resolution 1386 of December 2001, which authorised an International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. In August 2003, NATO assumed command of ISAF. How then, did the four Nordic states respond to the US’ calls for support in the global war on terror and to the request from the UN?

In August 2008, the territorial dispute between the Georgian government and a separatist movement in South Ossetia escalated into an armed conflict between Russia and Georgia. Striving for closer ties with Russia, the separatists received support from a large-scale military intervention launched by the same country. The fighting lasted only a few days and came to a halt with a ceasefire agreement, which largely reflected the Russian interest. Prior to the Russian invasion, the Georgian government had clearly expressed its ambition to join NATO. The Russo-Georgian conflict was by some observers quickly interpreted as a first step to re-establish a Russian sphere of influence in areas formerly part of the Soviet Union, i.e. the USSR (see, for example, Friedman 2008). This raises yet another question: to what extent did Nordic countries adjust their defence strategies³ in order to respond to this potential change in the balance of power in Europe?

Russia’s illegal annexation of the Crimean peninsula in 2014 and the continued military support to the pro-Russian separatists in other parts of Ukraine followed the pattern in Georgia. This time, Russia’s armed aggression was preceded by initiatives to establish closer ties with the EU. However, Russia’s use of military force to promote its political interest was even taken a step further and included the partial annexation and occupation of a recognised sovereign state. This time, the Russian aggression also resulted in counter measures from the EU, NATO and the US. These measures required deliberations on strategic options from the four Nordic countries. Should they increase their efforts to support common positions and policies decided by the EU and/or NATO, try to free ride on the security provided by major powers or try to isolate themselves from the increased tension between Russia and the western powers?

When western political leaders were still considering measures to counter the new challenge from Russia they were presented with yet another challenge. In June 2014, Islamic terrorists in Iraq and Syria launched a surprise attack and assumed control over several Iraqi cities, including Mosul. In late June, the foundation of a Caliphate was officially proclaimed (Rosiny 2015). The announcement was followed by a wave of terrorist aggressions that swept the globe. The attacks in Paris in November 2015 made France activate Article 42:7 of the Treaty of Lisbon, which made this challenge a matter of EU solidarity as well. Moreover, the internal wars in the Levant and different parts of Africa triggered refugee crises in Europe. Once again, the Nordic countries faced a situation in which the US called for a coalition of willing states. A new phase in the global war on terror had begun. Now, how would the Nordic states respond this time?

The Nordic countries’ responses to these shocks are of both practical importance and theoretical interest. An increased number of international operations and a greater need to find new ways to share costs and risks among participating states has characterised the post-Cold War security environment (Haaland Matlary 2013). All four Nordic countries made important contributions to UN peacekeeping operations during the Cold War (Jakobsen 2009). In the post-Cold War era, they not only participated in several UN missions but also contributed to international military operations led by NATO and the EU (Edström and Gyllensporre 2014). In matters related to collective self-defence, the Nordic countries constitute a common strategic area of vital importance to NATO’s ability to enhance the credibility of Article 5 commitments. Finland and Sweden’s enhanced partnership with NATO and their respective signing of the Host Nation Support Agreement with NATO in 2014 can be interpreted as an official recognition of this strategic interdependence.

Concerning theoretical contributions, this study develops a framework for analysing strategic adjustments and factors promoting change and continuity in defence strategies on both an (international) system and a (state) unit level of analysis. This analytical framework can be used to study both great powers and small states. However, our own theoretical contributions primarily aim to provide explanations for small states’ strategic responses to changes in their external environment. For a long time, researchers have argued that small states, due to their lack of capabilities and power asymmetries in relation to greater powers, are forced to develop strategies different from the strategies of great powers. However, there is still a very limited body of research on small states’ foreign and security policy and even less focusing on the military strategies of small states (Rothstein 1968; Reitner 1994; Neumann and Gstöhl 2006; Wivel et al. 2014; Jesse and Dreyer 2016). Since the vast majority of today’s states do not qualify as neither first nor second ranked powers, a deeper understanding of small states’ strategic behaviour is needed in order to include strategic choices and action possibilities of both great powers’ and small states in the field of Strategic Studies. Yet another reason to study small state strategies is the cuts in defence spending since the end of the Cold War. These reductions have diminished the former European great powers’ military resources to an extent that they have come to embody many of the characteristics traditionally associated with small states.

In this study, we will focus primarily on strategic choices articulated as defence strategies on the highest political level in each country. For the purposes of the study ‘defence strategy’ will be defined as interconnected ideas on how politically defined military-strategic ends should be achieved through a combination of alignment strategies and suitable strategic ways of employing military means (use of force). Furthermore, the concept of ‘defence strategy’ includes ideas on how current and future military capacities should be created (force generation). A defence strategy may include arrangements for pooling and sharing of military resources. Alignment strategies refer to different ways of interacting on a political level with other states and organisations in matters related to national security and defence. Examples of alignment strategies are balance of power, bandwagoning, isolation and hedging. These alignment strategies may be pursued both within and outside an alliance and different members of an alliance may pursue different alignment strategies. The different strategic responses among the member states of the EU and NATO to the four strategic shocks provide many examples of different alignment strategies within an alliance. The defence strategies analysed in this book are therefore less inclusive than most definitions of grand strategy (or most actual security strategies of states and organisations) but more inclusive than most definitions of military strategy. The discussion on the concept of strategy is further developed in Chapter 2.

In the next chapter, Chapter 2, we first introduce the general research design of this study together with our definition of small states. The details of our analytical framework are presented in Section 2.3 to 2.6. These sections begin with a further analysis of our independent variable, the concept of strategic shocks and continue with a presentation of the control variables. The latter accounts for the basic structural similarities between the four countries: (i) strategic exposure, (ii) capacity and (iii) interests. In the next section, we will introduce three intervening variables: (i) geographical characteristics (extension/strategic depth and proximity to a potentially hostile or friendly great power), (ii) historical experiences of armed conflicts, (iii) membership in NATO and/or the EU. These variables are used to explain differences in strategic responses and failure to respond to the external pressures exercised by the four shocks. Finally, we define the dependent variable; defence strategies.

Our analysis of the external systematic pressures for change is based on neorealist research on alliance formation and research focusing on small states. Since both neorealist theory and research on small state strategy assume, or at least recommend, that states quickly adjust their strategies to changes in...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Series Title
• Title Page
• Copyright
• Contents
• List of illustrations
• Acknowledgements
• List of abbreviations
• 1 Continuity and change in small states’ strategy
• 2 Studying small states’ strategic adjustments
• 3 Before the shocks
• 4 The first shock – the 9/11 terrorist attacks
• 5 The second shock – the Georgian war
• 6 The third and fourth shocks – Ukraine and the Caliphate
• 7 External shocks and the responses of small states
• Index
• Back Cover