A Pragmatic Approach to Libertarian Free Will

John Lemos

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2018
• ISBN:
  9781351017251
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Philosophy
• Subtopic: Philosophy History & Theory

A Pragmatic Approach to Libertarian Free Will argues that the kind of free will required for moral responsibility and just desert is libertarian free will. It is a source of great controversy whether such a libertarian view is coherent and whether we should believe that we have such free will. This book explains and defends Robert Kane's conception of libertarian free will while departing from it in certain key respects. It is argued that a suitably modified Kanean model of free will can be shown to be conceptually coherent. In addition, it is argued that while we lack sufficient epistemic grounds supporting belief in the existence of libertarian free will, we may still be justified in believing in it for moral reasons. As such, the book engages critically with the works of a growing number of philosophers who argue that we should jettison belief in the existence of desert-grounding free will and the practices of praise and blame and reward and punishment which it supports.

1
Introduction

Jack is twenty years old and he lives at home with his parents. He has friends that are going on vacation far away and they have invited him to go with them, if he can pay his own way. But Jack doesn’t have the money for the trip, and so he decides to break into a neighbor’s house and steal property worth several thousand dollars to pay for a vacation with his friends.

It is my view that Jack is morally responsible for stealing this property if and only if (1) he knew or should have known that stealing is wrong and (2) he stole the property of his own free will. Let us call the first condition of his moral responsibility the knowledge condition and the second condition the free will condition. What I am saying then is that meeting the knowledge condition and the free will condition is both necessary and sufficient for being morally responsible for the commission of an act. Furthermore, when I say that a person, P, is morally responsible for an action, X, what I mean is that if X is a good/right act then P is a deserving subject of our praise for doing X and if X is a bad/wrong act then P is a deserving subject of our blame for doing X. Thus, on my view, assuming that Jack’s stealing of the property was wrong and assuming that he was morally responsible for stealing the property, then Jack is deserving of blame for stealing the property. Additionally, if he is deserving of blame for stealing the property, he may also, though not necessarily, be deserving of punishment for stealing the property.

It is my view that normal adult human beings often engage in actions for which they are morally responsible. Thus, it is often the case that when normal adult human beings act rightly they deserve praise for their behavior and when they act wrongly they deserve blame for their behavior. When they act wrongly but they fail to meet either the knowledge condition of moral responsibility or the free will condition, then they are not morally responsible for their action and do not deserve blame for their action. On my view, acting with free will is a necessary condition for moral responsibility and, thus, deserved praise or blame.

It is a matter of great and long-standing controversy what free will consists in and whether or not human beings possess the kind of free will that can make us morally responsible for our actions. Most human beings and most philosophers for that matter believe that we do have the kind of free will which can make us morally responsible for our actions. But some people deny that we do have this kind of free will. Philosophers who deny that we have the kind of free will which makes us morally responsible give different kinds of reasons for saying this.

In what follows I will speak about some of the different reasons that philosophers have given for the view that we lack the kind of free will which makes us morally responsible. However, before doing so I want to make a terminological point. In this book, I am interested in questions about the nature and existence of the kind of free will that makes us morally responsible. There may be some other kinds of free will, such as the freedom to do what one wants. But some deeper kind of freedom is required if one is to be morally responsible for one’s action. For instance, suppose Jack is a kleptomaniac and when he steals the property from his neighbor he knows he is acting wrongly but he is moved to steal by an overwhelming, compulsive desire to steal which he would rather not act on. If his free will is simply the freedom to do what he wants, then, since he does desire to steal the property, we’d have to say that Jack is morally responsible for stealing the property. However, his desire to steal is an alien desire and he’d rather not be moved to act on it. So, it is wrongheaded to say he’s morally responsible in this case. Or suppose Jack has never in his life wanted to steal anything. But last night an evil and savvy neuroscientist secretly manipulated his brain functioning so that today he wants to steal his neighbor’s property, and so he does. Again, if free will is simply the freedom to do what one wants, then in this case we’d have to say Jack steals of his own free will. But, again, this is wrongheaded, as he is subject to the manipulations of the evil neuroscientist. Thus, the kind of free will required for moral responsibility must be more complex than merely having the freedom to do what one wants.

Again, to be clear let me just say that in this book when I speak of free will I mean the kind of free will that is required for moral responsibility. Thus, by using the term “free will” I am referencing something more complex than the mere freedom to do what one wants. Rather, I am referencing that kind of freedom which when exhibited by an agent who knows that his act is wrong or should know it is wrong, he is then morally responsible for his action and a deserving subject of blame for his action.

Now, as noted some philosophers say that we lack the kind of free will that I am talking about and they give different reasons for saying this. Some of them are hard determinists. Hard determinists say that determinism is true and because of this we lack the kind of free will that can make us morally responsible. Determinism is the view that all events, including human actions and decisions, are the necessary consequences of prior states and events and the laws of nature. As such, determinists are committed to the view that at any time the universe has exactly one physically possible future. If determinism is true, then just as striking fragile glass with a solid, fast-moving object necessitates its breaking, so too all human actions and decisions are necessitated by the mental states of the agents in the moments leading up to their actions and decisions. Furthermore, on the determinist view, the mental states which causally determine an agent to act at time t were themselves causally determined by some earlier states and events at t-1 which were themselves causally determined by earlier states and events at an earlier time t-2 and so on, going back in time to events which occurred prior to the birth of the agent.

Regarding our case of Jack who stole from his neighbors, the determinist might say that given the laws of nature and given the state of Jack’s mind in the moments leading up to his decision to steal he was necessitated to steal the property from his neighbor’s home. This by itself need not be taken to imply that Jack lacked free will in acting or that he is not responsible for stealing the property. But the hard determinist will be quick to note that if all events are determined in this sort of way and if every action that Jack has ever committed has been determined in this way then it is hard to see how he could ever act freely or ever be morally responsible, since everything he will have ever done will have been a necessary consequence of prior states and events and the laws of nature.¹

Some other philosophers who deny that we have free will are hard incompatibilists. Unlike hard determinists, the hard incompatibilist’s denial of free will and moral responsibility is not grounded in the belief that determinism is true. Rather, the hard incompatibilist says that free will is incompatible with determinism and there is no free will. That is, according to the hard incompatibilists, if determinism is true then there is no free will and if determinism is not true there is still no free will. The hard incompatibilist thinks no one has free will whether determinism is true or not. The reader might initially find hard incompatibilism to be an odd view. The reader might think if determinism is not true and if some of my decisions/actions are causally undetermined, then not all of my actions are necessitated by prior states and events and so there may be a number of occasions in which I act where I could have done otherwise and so I can act with free will. But this is to move too quickly and the hard incompatibilist would be quick to note this, pointing out that just because determinism is false it would not necessarily mean that there are any undetermined human actions and even if there were it would not necessarily mean that undetermined human actions are the kind of actions that could rightly be described as free willed actions—undetermined human actions might just be random happenings that are not under our control in such a way as to be free willed.²

In response to those who say that we lack the kind of free will which makes us morally responsible, philosophers tend to take one of two different possible paths, defending either compatibilism or libertarianism. Compatibilism is the view that free will and moral responsibility are compatible with determinism. Thus, according to compatibilism, even if all events, including human actions and decisions, are causally necessitated by the laws of nature and prior states and events, human beings may still possess the kind of free will which makes them morally responsible for their actions and decisions. Furthermore, to be morally responsible for an action is to be a deserving subject of blame if the action is bad and a deserving subject of praise if the action is good. Thus, if compatibilism is true, then praising and blaming agents for what they do may be appropriate even if determinism is true. On this view, even if every action that Jack ever performed was causally determined by the joint effects of the laws of nature and prior states and events, he could still rightly be said to have freely stolen the property from his neighbors; and assuming he does so freely and meets the knowledge condition he would then be morally responsible for the theft and deserving of our blame.³

In contrast, libertarians believe that free will is incompatible with determinism and that we have the kind of free will which makes us morally responsible. As such, the libertarian is committed to the view that some of our free willed acts are causally undetermined acts. On this view, not all of our free willed acts must be causally undetermined; rather, only some of them must be undetermined. For instance, suppose Jack’s stealing of his neighbor’s property was causally determined by his character or motivational states in the moments leading up to his decision to steal. Even so, the libertarian will say that this could nonetheless be a free willed act if the act is a product of a character or motivational states which he has formed through prior causally undetermined free willed acts.⁴

In this book, I will argue that the libertarian view of free will is the view of free will that we should accept. This view is often criticized on two main grounds. First, it is often said that it is an incoherent view—that is, there is no way to make sense of how causally undetermined actions can be free willed acts. Second, it is said to be inconsistent with our empirically supported modern scientific world view. In response, I will argue that the libertarian view is indeed a coherent view and that it can be made to fit with our scientific understanding of the world.

Besides the previous two challenges that my defense of libertarianism must face, there is a third: the existence problem, the problem of knowing whether in fact anyone has libertarian free will. One of the great benefits of adopting the compatibilist theory of free will is the fact that it does not face the same obstacles regarding the existence question. Both compatibilists and libertarians believe that many of our decisions and actions are causally determined. Given the kinds of conditions which compatibilists believe are sufficient for free willed action, it is indisputable that we sometimes meet such conditions. As such, if they are correct in their account of the conditions of free will, then it will follow that we have free will. But libertarians believe that free will requires that some of our free actions be causally undetermined. Thus, since it’s not clear that any of our actions are causally undetermined, libertarians face a difficulty establishing that we have free will even if they can give a coherent account of the nature of free will. I will argue that the libertarian view is coherent and that the occurrence of causally undetermined free acts is consistent with a scientific world view, but this does not amount to evidence that we actually have such free will. It is my view that we simply don’t have the empirical, scientific evidence for the existence of such free will yet nor do we have any logical or metaphysical evidence of its existence. Nonetheless, I will argue that (1) compatibilism is false and (2) given the moral importance of the belief in free will and moral responsibility, we should accept a libertarian view.

In this book, I will proceed as follows: in Chapter Two I will provide a preliminary sketch of the kind of libertarian view I seek to defend. I favor the kind of libertarian view which has been developed and defended by Robert Kane. His theory has been much discussed in the literature and subjected to many published criticisms. I believe that many of these criticisms are answerable while others do raise some serious problems which suggest that Kane’s view needs modification. In Chapter Two, I merely try to give a clear and accurate general account of the nature of Kanean libertarianism and I contrast it with alternative kinds of libertarian views in hopes of making more clear some of the distinctive features of the view. In later chapters, I consider various criticisms of the view and I suggest ways in which the view should be modified to avoid the more significant problems which the view faces.

Chapter Three discusses manipulation arguments. In his writings, Kane motivates his consideration of the libertarian view by arguing that compatibilist views of free will fall prey to manipulation arguments. Some critics of Kane’s view have argued that his own view falls prey to manipulation arguments. In Chapter Three, I explain how Kane uses manipulation arguments to criticize compatibilist views and I also consider various manipulation arguments which have been made against Kanean libertarianism. I go on to argue that his view can be defended against such manipulation arguments and that compatibilism does, indeed, continue to be plagued with problems of manipulation. My defense of Kane’s view in this chapter helps us better see why it is that compatibilism is plagued with manipulation problems while libertarian views are not. Chapter Three is intended to help motivate the more extensive discussion of libertarianism in later chapters of the book.

In Chapters Four and Five I look at various criticisms of Kanean libertarianism and I respond to them. In Chapter Four I begin by considering various criticisms which can be answered without modifying the Kanean view. In the later parts of this chapter, I consider two criticisms which present more serious worries for the Kanean view and I show why it is that, despite his attempts to answer them, such criticisms continue to raise serious doubts about the coherence of his view. In Chapter Five, I examine some other libertarian views which are most similar to Kane’s and which avoid the problems Kane’s view faces. I argue that each of these views suffers problems of their own which are instructive in helping us understand how Kane’s view would need to be modified to make it more defensible. In the later parts of Chapter Five, I explain two different new ways in which Kane’s theory could be modified to avoid the problems originally considered in the latter half of Chapter Four. I provide some support for each of the new models I propose, but I remain uncertain as to which of them is more promising.

The last three chapters of the book develop what I call a “pragmatic justification” of libertarianism. It is my view that at this point in time we simply don’t have sufficient experimental/empirical evidence nor sufficient metaphysical nor logical nor intuitive evidence to establish that libertarian free will exists. At the same time, for reasons considered in Chapter Three of this book, we have reason to think that compatibilism cannot give an adequate conception of free will. Thus, as I see it, we are faced with a choice between living and acting as if we have the kind of free will which supports moral responsibility and the practices of praise and blame or living and acting as if we lack such free will. This is a kind of existential question, and in response to it I argue that there are strong pragmatic/moral reasons for us to live and act as though we have libertarian free will. In the last three chapters of the book, I argue that, even though we lack the empirical/metaphysical/intuitive evidence to prove we have it, to deny that we have the kind of free will which makes us morally responsible in the just desert sense threatens human dignity and weakens our concept of moral obligation. In Chapter Six, I consider the ways in which denying just deserts responsibility threatens human dignity in the realm of criminal justice. In Chapter Seven, I consider why the belief in free will is important to defending a strong sense of moral obligation which can help motivate moral behavior. And in the last chapter of the book I consider a significant challenge to the kind of pragmatic libertarianism I endorse—the problem of hardheartedness—and I respond to it.

Notes

1 Hard determinism is rarely defended these days. However, the view has been defended in the seventeenth century by Baruch Spinoza ([1677] 1992), in the eighteenth century by Baron Paul d’ Holbach (1770) and in the twentieth century by Paul Edwards (1958). Most contemporary philosophers who deny that we lack free will reject hard determinism because they believe it is no longer clear that determinism is true. The findings of quantum physics raise serious doubts about the truth of determinism.

2 This view has, perhaps, most famously been defended by Derk Pereboom (2001, 2007a, b, 2014), as well as Pereboom and Caruso (forthcoming). In Pereboom (2001) when he describes his view as “hard incompatibilist,” he seems to want to separate his view from other figures that I would include under this heading. I wish to include other figures in the hard incompatibilist camp, such as Gregg Caruso (2016), Saul Smilansky (2000), Galen Strawson (1986), and Bruce Waller (1990, 2011, 2015). I include these others, because like Pereboom, they all believe (1) free will is incompatible with determinism and (2) we lack free will. Pereboom wants to use “hard incompatibilism” as a distinct term for a view like his which (a) allows that there is a coherent concept of free will which could make sense of moral responsibility but also maintains (b) given the scientific evidence we have reason to believe such free will does not exist. In contrast, someone like Strawson finds the very concept of free will to be incoherent. Also, I would note that Bruce Waller, actually thinks, we have a kind of freedom of will, but it is not a kind of free will that makes us morally responsible for our actions. Thus, given the way I am defining free will in this book, as the kind which makes us morally responsible, I include him among these other figures whom I list as hard incompatibilists.

3 There are very many defenders of the compatibilist view on the nature of free will and moral responsibility. I cannot possibly list them all here. Some historically famous defenses of the view are Thomas Hob...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Copyright
• Dedication
• Contents
• Acknowledgments
• 1 Introduction
• 2 Kane’s Libertarian Theory
• 3 Libertarianism, Compatibilism, and Manipulation Arguments
• 4 Kanean Libertarianism Examined
• 5 A Consideration of Alternative Event-causal Libertarian Models of Basic Free Actions
• 6 Moral Responsibility Denial and the Problem of Punishment
• 7 Libertarian Free Will and Moral Obligation
• 8 Hardheartedness and Libertarianism
• 9 Conclusion
• Bibliography
• Index