Religious Responses to Marriage Equality

Luke Perry

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2018
• ISBN:
  9781351798853
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

The Supreme Court ruling in Obergefell v. Hodges (2015) ended a 20-year political battle over same-sex marriage in the USA. The ruling in favor of a constitutional right for gays and lesbians to marry reflected growing social acceptance and political rights for gays and lesbians. At the same time, America remains a deeply religious country and many religious organizations have long opposed same-sex marriage. How do religious organizations interpret, process, and respond to shifting attitudes and public policy toward the LGBT community?

Examining how religious groups in America have responded theologically and politically to the legalization of same-sex marriage, the book provides case studies from across the American religious spectrum to explore how each group understands same-sex marriage and has reacted theologically, socially, and politically to its new standing as a constitutional right. Each case study focuses on formal statements made by church leaders, incorporates original data gathered from interviews with regional and local religious authorities, and analyzes existing polling data of adherents at large.

Offering a comprehensive examination of religious responses to marriage equality in the USA, this book will interest scholars and students in the fields of religion and politics, civil rights, social change, and public policy.

1 The advancement of marriage equality

Introduction

The issue of marriage equality may have been legally resolved by the Supreme Court in 2015 after 50 years of related contestation at the local, state, and federal levels of government. The court ruled in Obergefell v. Hodges that gay and lesbian couples throughout the United States have a constitutional right to marry. Political differences that fueled these debates, however, did not suddenly disappear, and that should not have been expected. Religious objections, based on theological and moral claims, do not typically change quickly.

This book examines how religious groups have responded to the legal reality of marriage equality. The book focuses on three questions. First, and most fundamentally, how did religious organizations respond? What statements and actions occurred in the two years since the Obergefell ruling? “Religious factors are among the strongest predictors of public opinion toward same-sex relationships.”¹ The religiously devout, and particularly theological conservatives or fundamentalists, tend to most strongly oppose homosexuality. At the same time, America has strong rule of law whereby most Americans follow the law most of the time, a particular priority for political conservatives. Such obedience involves a high amount of trust and respect for law, democratic institutions, and the judiciary. The U.S. Constitution, in particular, is the supreme law of the land, intimately connecting constitutional rights with national norms that shape culture and society. The newly established constitutional right for gay and lesbian couples to marry will undoubtedly influence social perceptions, including those who are religious. 2015 was a pivotal movement and the starting point for scholars to understand the socio-legal implications of marriage equality on a national scale.

Initial scholarship has already suggested that “it would be a grave mistake to believe that the favorable resolution of marriage equality questions somehow represents the end of the struggle for LGBT equality in America.”² Moreover, “one lesson to be drawn from today’s marriage equality movement from African Americans’ early celebration of the ability to legally marry is that homophobia, like racism, will have an afterlife.”³ This afterlife can fuel backlash against new rights holders.

Still, religious organizations are bureaucratic structures that operate to some degree within a religious marketplace whereby the lack of a government-established religion enables an array of choices for people who are religiously inclined.⁴ Religious leaders are thus responsible for responding to specific issues and do so with consideration of their history, beliefs, and contemporary realities. In turn, religious leaders faced practical, moral, and strategic choices in determining how to proceed after Obergefell. This research examined the extent to which these choices promoted the status quo or change in the years after Obergefell.

A second, and related question, is how Obergefell impacted public opinion among religious people and Americans at large. The movement toward marriage equality was relatively quick and remarkable. This “historic success” was “an accomplishment that almost no one, a few years ago, predicted would happen as soon as 2015.”⁵ Just a decade ago, a Democratic U.S. Congressman shared with me an anecdote of when he told House leadership he wanted to support gay marriage. The response he got was: “Of course, we all think that, but we can’t say it.” This dichotomy reflects how public opinion surrounding deeply held convictions and perspectives can and has changed. At the same time, contemporary politics also provides many reminders of how this change was not uniformly embraced. The 2016 Republican Party platform understood “traditional marriage and family” as “the foundation for a free society” and “condemn(ed) the Supreme Court’s lawless ruling in Obergefell v. Hodges.” The party’s primary concern was that “five unelected lawyers robbed 320 million Americans of their legitimate constitutional authority to define marriage as the union of one man and one woman,” twisting “the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment beyond recognition.”⁶ Moreover, opposition to same-sex marriage has been fairly consistent over time.

People who are more opposed to same sex relationships tend to be older; male; politically conservative; southern; African American; more rural; less educated; less exposed to diversity; hold to the belief that homosexuality is a choice, not innate; gender traditionalists; and, most consistently, tend to be more religiously devout and/or conservative by a variety of measures.⁷

This research examined the extent to which these attitudes changed and stayed the same surrounding the Obergefell ruling.

The third and final question is focused on religious groups who have critically opposed same-sex marriage. Will these groups soften on this issue substantively or rhetorically, or remain resolutely opposed as societal and legal norms rapidly change? The American experience “was born of religious zeal,” and this thread of the American fabric is unlikely to unwind.⁸ Today, Americans have high rates of religious belonging, behaving, and believing.⁹ Eighty percent have a religious affiliation and are absolutely certain God exists. Sixty percent pray weekly. A majority of Americans are absolutely certain there is life after death. Forty percent attend religious services weekly or more.

The First Amendment prohibits excessive government entanglement in religion, but “the separation of church and state does not create a separation of religion and politics.”¹⁰ Such separation is very difficult, if not impossible, in a liberal democracy that affords an array of freedoms, including speech, assembly, and press. The non-religious may advocate for complete separation, but “It is counter-intuitive to believe that a religious individual can, in any meaningful way, divorce himself or herself from a professed set of beliefs when behaving as a political actor.”¹¹ The collective mobilization of religious individuals enables them to exercise significant influence socially and structurally, solidifying their role as an important consideration in contemporary American politics.

The spectrum of religious beliefs in America manifests itself in nuanced ways, so there will not be one definitive answer to questions about change. Still, increased public acceptance of diverse sexual orientations, and marriage equality in particular, will pose difficult questions for religious and political groups that continue to defend “traditional marriage.” The newest dimension of marriage will be difficult to revoke. This research will examine if increased public acceptance follows.

These three major questions and the large considerations they raise are approached through comparative case studies of religious groups across the political and religious spectrum. Chapter Two will examine evangelical Protestants with particular focus on Southern Baptists. Chapter Three will examine mainline Protestants, beginning with mainline Methodists, followed by mainline Presbyterians and Episcopalians in Chapter Four. Chapter Five will move to non-Protestant denominations, beginning with Roman Catholics. Chapter Six will provide an abbreviated analysis of different Judeo-Christian religious minority groups, including Judaism, Orthodox Christianity, and the Church of Jesus-Christ of Latter-day Saints. Chapter Seven will identify insights and considerations derived from this comparative analysis.

The case studies begin with a basic understanding of demographics, religious beliefs, and denominational history. This is certainly not intended to be comprehensive. The goal is to provide readers with a general sense of who the members of these religions are, how they organized, and what their basic beliefs entail. The second half of the case studies focuses on how these religious groups have understood marriage and sexuality over time, including before and after Obergefell. Again, it is not possible to provide every possible formal statement or teaching toward this end. That said, the goal was to provide a meaningful compilation of relevant formal statements by prominent religious leaders.

In addition, the final component of the case studies was an effort to gather and provide some insight from mid-level religious authorities. Public opinion studies by research organizations, such the Pew Research Center, provide very detailed data on the demographics and beliefs involving members of religious groups. Respective religious organizations readily provide formal understandings of their beliefs, histories, and specific perspectives on homosexuality and same-sex marriage. This research conducted dozens of interviews with mid-level religious authorities to gather their insights, experiences, and perspectives. The goal was to develop a qualitative dimension that complements existing quantitative data and original sources to capture some of the nuance on the ground within religious groups throughout the country.

The remaining bulk of this chapter seeks to lay a historical and philosophical foundation for understanding the issue of marriage equality. The first section explains how marriage equality became a political issue. This brief historical overview highlights advancement of LGBT rights in the United States. The second section illuminates different perspectives on marriage equality. This philosophical discussion articulates theoretical and legal frameworks that have been employed to understand and analyze the issue of marriage equality.

How marriage equality became a political issue

Marriage was an unlikely focus for the LGBT movement. Not long ago “almost all leading societal institutions condemned or were hostile toward sexual minorities, including organized religion, the medical profession, and government.”¹² As a result, “they were under attack from almost all quarters in society and there was little social, political, or legal space in which to allow openness about sexuality.”¹³ The legalization of same-sex marriage was nothing short of a remarkable accomplishment. Initially, marriage equality was not deemed an achievable objective and was secondary in importance to other concerns, such as reducing anti-gay violence, employment discrimination, and housing discrimination. Even before specific policy concerns were vocalized, gay and lesbian supporters advocated on behalf of a generally libertarian approach to sexual minorities.

The term “homosexual” dates back to the late nineteenth century. Prior to this, same-sex behavior was typically categorized with “sodomy” and legally impermissible, due to the legacy of the English common law tradition inherited by the United States.¹⁴ Urbanization created greater opportunities for same-sex couples to navigate and overcome social stigma. The fledging gay and lesbian enclaves that emerged during the 1920s and 1930s provided the foundation for the social and political organization that would develop. Gay and lesbian people advocated for rights “when laws were enacted that prohibited lesbians and gays from gathering in any state-licensed public place, as part of the virulent New York City crackdown of the 1930s.”¹⁵ This was a precursor to the organized political resistance that emerged a few decades later. A central goal of the early gay and lesbian movement was improving media depictions of homosexuality. Prior to the 1950s, gay and lesbian people were commonly depicted as sick deviants and sexual predators. They were understood as flawed and afflicted, not victims of social injustice.¹⁶ The hope was that changing this perception would lessen the perceived threat sexual minorities posed to society.

“World War II accelerated the pace of lesbian and gay community formation through massive mobilization and demobilization of men and women.”¹⁷ For many “the war was the first time they came into contact with other gays and lesbians.”¹⁸ After the war, many stayed in port cities, such as San Francisco, Los Angeles, and New York, while others returned home with new sexual identities. The aftermath of the war contributed to the Lavender Scare, an effort to prohibit and purge gays and lesbians from the government out of concern they threatened traditional values. These efforts ran parallel to the rise of anti-communism and the Red Scare.

One prominent example was the U.S. Senate Subcommittee for Investigations, under The Committee of Expenditures in Executive Departments, who issued a report in 1950 on “Employmen...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• List of figures
• List of boxes
• 1 The advancement of marriage equality
• 2 Evangelical Protestants and marriage equality
• 3 Mainline Methodists and marriage equality
• 4 Mainline Presbyterians, Episcopalians, and marriage equality
• 5 Roman Catholics and marriage equality
• 6 Religious minorities and marriage equality
• Conclusion – understanding religious responses to marriage equality
• Bibliography
• Index