The Theravada Abhidhamma

Inquiry into the Nature of Conditioned Reality

Y. Karunadasa

• Publisher: Wisdom Publications
• Year: 2019
• ISBN:
  9781614294696
• Topic: Theology & Religion
• Subtopic: Buddhism

A lucid explanation of the basic contours of the Theravada Abhidamma system for serious students of Buddhist thought. The renowned Sri Lankan scholar Y. Karunadasa examines Abhidhamma perspectives on the nature of phenomenal existence. He begins with a discussion of dhamma theory, which describes the bare phenomena that form the world of experience. He then explains the Abhidhamma view that only dhammas are real, and that anything other than these basic phenomena are conceptual constructs. This, he argues, is Abhidhamma's answer to common-sense realism—the mistaken view that the world as it appears to us is ultimately real. Among the other topics discussed are

• the theory of double truth (ultimate and conceptual truth),
• the analysis of mind,
• the theory of cognition,
• the analysis of matter,
• the nature of time and space,
• the theory of momentary being, and
• conditional relations.

The volume concludes with an appendix that examines why the Theravada came to be known as Vibhajjavada, "the doctrine of analysis." Not limiting himself to abstract analysis, Karunadasa draws out the Abhidhamma's underlying premises and purposes. The Abhidhamma provides a detailed description of reality in order to identify the sources of suffering and their antidotes—and in doing so, to free oneself.

THE REAL EXISTENTS

IN THE ENTIRE VOCABULARY of the Abhidhamma no other term is as central to defining its theory of reality as dhamma. In its characteristically Abhidhammic sense, it embraces not only the basic factors into which the whole of phenomenal existence is resolved but also that which transcends phenomenal existence — namely, the unconditioned reality of nibbāna.⁵⁶ This rendering of dhamma in an all-inclusive sense is nevertheless not without antecedence. In the early Buddhist scriptures (Pāli suttas) too, we find it used in a similar sense. A case in point is the well-known statement sabbe dhammā anattā (all things are non-self).⁵⁷ There is, however, a difference to be noted here. In the earlier texts sabbe dhammā means “all things” in a general sense, whereas the Abhidhamma uses it in a technical sense to mean “the basic factors into which all things can be resolved.” In this shift of the term’s meaning from a general to a technical sense we can trace most of the methodological differences between early Buddhism and the Abhidhamma. For it is within a framework where dhamma is postulated as the basic unit of reference that the Abhidhamma seeks to present all its doctrinal expositions. In this methodological difference we can also observe a shift in emphasis from an empiricist to a rationalist approach.

The dhamma theory of the Abhidhamma is based on the philosophical principle that all the phenomena of empirical existence are made up of a number of elementary constituents, the ultimate realities behind manifest phenomena. It is this principle that provides the rationale for all the modes of analysis and classification found in the Abhidhamma systematization. The dhamma theory is, however, not merely one principle among others in the body of Abhidhamma philosophy. It is the base on which the entire system rests. It would thus be quite fitting to call this theory the cornerstone of the Abhidhamma. Yet the dhamma theory was intended from the start to be much more than a mere hypothetical scheme. It arose from the need to make sense out of experiences in meditation and was designed as a guide for meditative contemplation and insight. The Buddha had taught that to perceive the world correctly is to see not self-entities and substances but bare phenomena arising and perishing in accordance with their conditions. The task the Abhidhamma specialists set themselves was to specify exactly what these bare phenomena are and to show how they interact with other bare phenomena to make up our commonsense picture of the world.

The dhamma theory was not peculiar to any one school of Buddhism but penetrated all the early schools, stimulating the growth of their different versions of the Abhidharma. Of these, the Sarvāstivāda version of the theory, together with its critique by the Madhyamaka, has been critically studied by a number of modern scholars. The Theravāda version, however, has received less attention. There are sound reasons for proposing that the Pāli Abhidhamma Piṭaka contains one of the earliest forms of the dhamma theory, perhaps even the oldest version. This theory, after all, did not remain static but evolved over the centuries as Buddhist thinkers sought to draw out its implications and respond to problems it posed for the critical intellect. Thus the dhamma theory was repeatedly enriched, first by the Abhidhamma commentaries and then by the later exegetical literature and the medieval compendiums of Abhidhamma, the so-called little finger manuals, such as the Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha, which in turn gave rise to their own commentaries and subcommentaries.

The present chapter seeks to trace the main stages in the origin and development of the dhamma theory and to explore its philosophical implications. The first part will discuss the early version of the theory as represented by the Abhidhamma Piṭaka. At this stage, the theory was not yet precisely articulated but remained in the background as the unspoken premise of Abhidhamma analysis. It was during the commentarial period that an attempt was made to work out the implications of early Abhidhamma thought, and it is this development that will be treated in the subsequent parts of this chapter.

The Early Version of the Dhamma Theory

Although the dhamma theory is an Abhidhammic innovation, the antecedent trends that led to its formulation and its basic ingredients can be traced to the early Buddhist scriptures that seek to analyze empiric individuality and its relation to the external world. In the discourses of the Buddha there are five such modes of analysis. The first is that into nāma and rūpa.⁵⁸ This is the most elementary analysis in the sense that it specifies the two main components, the mental and the corporeal aspects, of the empiric individuality. However, what we must not overlook here is that nāma-rūpa, when it occurs in the twelve-factored formula of dependent arising, conveys a more specific sense. In this specific sense, nāma means five mental factors that invariably arise with consciousness — namely, feeling (vedanā), perception (saññā), volition (cetanā), contact (phassa), and attention (manasikāra). Rūpa in nāma-rūpa means the four great material elements and the materiality that depends on them.⁵⁹ In this specific sense, therefore, we cannot consider nāma-rūpa as an exhaustive definition of empiric individuality. Nāma-rūpa represents only a part of the individuality, the other part being represented by viññāṇa, which is consciousness. That viññāṇa is not part of nāma is shown not only by the statement that nāma-rūpa has viññāṇa as its condition (viññāṇa-paccayā nāma-rūpaṃ) but also by the other statement that viññāṇa has, in turn, nāma-rūpa as its condition (nāma-rūpa-paccayā viññāṇaṃ).⁶⁰ What both statements show is the reciprocal conditionality of viññāṇa and nāma-rūpa and not that one could be subsumed under the other. What has been observed so far should show that it is not correct to translate indiscriminately nāma-rūpa as mind and matter, or to define the psychophysical personality as consisting of nāma and rūpa. The textual or the doctrinal context should be taken into consideration to determine whether the two terms are used in the general or in the specific sense.

The second mode of analysis is that into the five khandhas (aggregates): corporeality (rūpa), feeling (vedanā), perception (saññā), mental formations (saṅkhāra), and consciousness (viññāṇa).⁶¹ The third is that into six dhātus (elements): earth (paṭhavī), water (āpo), temperature (tejo), air (vāyo), space (ākāsa), and consciousness (viññāṇa).⁶² It will be noticed that in the second analysis attention is focused more on mental aspects, for while they are represented by four aggregates, what is nonmental is counted as one. In the third, on the other hand, attention is focused more on nonmental aspects, for while they are represented here by five elements, what is mental is counted as one. It is very likely that the two analyses were made to supplement each other. The fourth analysis is that into twelve āyatanas (bases of cognition): the eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, and mind, and their corresponding objects: the visible, sound, smell, taste, touch, and mental objects.⁶³ The fifth analysis is that into eighteen dhātus (elements of cognition). It is an elaboration of the immediately preceding mode obtained by the addition of the six kinds of consciousness that arise from the contact between the sense organs and their objects. The six additional items are the visual, auditory, olfactory, gustatory, tactile, and mental consciousnesses.⁶⁴

Now the purposes for which Buddhism resorts to these different modes of analysis are varied. For instance, the main purpose of the khandha analysis is to show that there is no ego either inside or outside the five khandhas that go to make up the empiric individuality. None of the khandhas belongs to me (n’etaṃ mama), they do not correspond to “I” (n’eso’ ham asmi), nor are they my self (n’eso me attā).⁶⁵ Thus the main purpose of this analysis is to prevent the intrusion of the notions of “mine,” “I,” and “my self” into what is otherwise an impersonal and egoless congeries of mental and physical phenomena. The analysis into twelve āyatanas shows that what we call individual existence is a process of interaction between the internal (ajjhattika) sense organs and the external (bāhira) sense objects. The analysis into eighteen dhātus shows that consciousness is neither a soul nor an extension of a soul substance but a mental phenomenon that comes into being as a result of certain conditions.⁶⁶ There is no independent consciousness that exists in its own right.

In similar fashion, each analysis is used to explain certain features of sentient existence. It is, in fact, with reference to these five modes of analysis that Buddhism frames its fundamental doctrines. The very fact that there are at least five kinds of analysis shows that none of them is taken as final or absolute. Each represents the world of experience in its totality, yet represents it from a pragmatic standpoint determined by the particular doctrine it is intended to illuminate.

The purpose of our referring to the five types of analysis is to show that the dhamma theory of the Abhidhamma developed from an attempt to draw out their full implications. It will be seen that if each analysis is examined in relation to the other four, it is found to be further analyzable. That the first, the analysis into nāma and rūpa, is further analyzable is seen by the second, the analysis into the five khandhas. For in the second, the nāma component of the first is analyzed into feelings, perceptions, mental formations, and consciousness. That the analysis into khandhas can be further analyzed is shown not only by the use of the term khandha, which means “group,” but also by the next analysis, that into six dhātus. For, in the latter, the rūpa component of the former is analyzed into five — namely, earth, water, temperature, air, and space. That the analysis into six dhātus is also further analyzable is seen from the fact that consciousness, which is reckoned here as one item, is made into four in the khandha analysis. That the same situation is true of the analysis into twelve āyatanas is shown by the next analysis, that into eighteen dhātus, because the latter is an elaboration of the former. This leaves us with the last, the dhātu analysis with eighteen items. Can it be considered final? This supposition too must be rejected, because although consciousness is here itemized as sixfold, its invariable concomitants, such as feeling (vedanā) and perception (saññā), are not separately mentioned. It will thus be seen that none of the five analyses can be considered exhaustive. In each case one or more items is further analyzable.

This, it seems to us, is the line of thought that led the Ābhidhammikas to evolve still another mode of analysis that in their view is not amenable to further analysis. This new development, which is more or less common to all the systems of Abhidharma, is the analysis of the world of experience into what came to be known as dharmas (Sanskrit) or dhammas (Pāli). The term dhamma, of course, looms large in the discourses of the Buddha, found in a variety of connotations that have to...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Title Page
• Dedication
• Contents
• Foreword by Bhikkhu Bodhi
• Preface
• Introduction
• 1 The Real Existents
• 2 The Nominal and the Conceptual
• 3 The Two Truths
• 4 The Analysis of Mind
• 5 Consciousness
• 6 Classes of Consciousness
• 7 The Ethically Variable Mental Factors
• 8 The Unwholesome Mental Factors
• 9 The Beautiful Mental Factors
• 10 The Cognitive Process
• 11 The Analysis of Matter
• 12 The Great Elements of Matter
• 13 The Real Dependent Matter
• 14 The Nominal Dependent Matter
• 15 The Material Clusters
• 16 Time and Space
• 17 Momentariness
• 18 The Conditional Relations
• Appendix: Theravāda and Vibhajjavāda
• Abbreviations
• Notes
• Bibliography
• Index
• About the Author
• Copyright