PART I
SACRED IMAGERY
CHAPTER 1
THE BEHOLDER AS WITNESS
Masaccio, Trinity (c.1425â7)
Sven Sandström, Levels of Unreality (1963)
I
The genesis of this book began with a 2008 journal article on Masaccioâs Trinity (c.1425â7; Plate 1), which sought to make the case for a role for the external beholder.1 For some time, this extraordinary painting has been central to my thinking about the relation between in situ art and beholder. Not least, Trinity represents a rare paradigmatic shift in the history of reception â a work engaging an implicit beholder as integral to its semantic content. Not only is Trinity widely credited as the earliest extant painting using a systematic linear perspective,2 but it depicts a novel architectural schema where the bounding frame is fully integrated with the illusory architecture of the vaulted chapel.3 Crucially, Trinity distinguishes between those parts of the fresco depicted as being spatially in front of the supporting surface (the painted architectural frame, the two patrons and the sarcophagus on which a skeleton is laid to rest) and those implied as behind (the scene within the vaulted chapel, at the threshold of which stand the figures of the Virgin and John the Evangelist): a categorical distinction in degrees of reality that is fundamental to the workâs meaning. The illusory painted architecture is thus tethered to its host church, Santa Maria Novella, Florence, and directly related to the beholderâs address. Moreover, all the figures are life-sized, with the paintingâs centric point (what later is termed the vanishing point) somewhere in the region of 172 cm above ground (i.e. head height). However, this is not a straightforward demonstration of perspectiva artificialis; as we shall see, the location of the Trinity within the implied space of the painted architecture is impossible to verify, the implication being that it lies outside of empirical time and space.
Overfamiliar, as we are, with self-contained easel painting, cut off from the space of the viewer, we need to remind ourselves not only of the situatedness of frescos but of the role of the host religious space in priming our engagement with in situ works. Locked into its institutional context, the viewer of Masaccioâs Trinity occupies an already sanctified space, differentiated from empirical space; the beholder is thus primed not only by certain expectations as to the workâs content but also by the ritual behaviour that accompanies such a setting.
Writing of how such bounded works structure a relation with an embodied beholder, Thomas Puttfarken registers the importance of taking the beholderâs position into account:
Puttfarken takes his notion of the bounded image from Meyer Schapiro, who refers to the âlateâ invention of the frame as âa finding and focusing device placed between the observer and the imageâ.5 As Schapiro notes, while the frame belongs to the space of the beholder, ârather than of the illusory, three-dimensional world disclosed within and behindâ, in some circumstances, âthe frame may also enter into the shaping of that imageâ.6 This is particularly true of painted frames, which evolve in relation to the organizational demands of picture cycles such as Giottoâs Arena Chapel (Cappella degli Scrovegni) in Padua (c.1305â6; Figure 1.1). Here it is necessary, as Puttfarken suggests, to treat Giottoâs individual scenes not as isolated easel pictures but as part of an integrated solution with a strong centralizing tendency.
It is Masaccioâs particular innovation to align the newly evolved structuring device of perspective with the workâs religious content. Indeed, that fictive space in Trinity encroaches into âourâ reality raises problems with Erwin Panofskyâs much-quoted claim that with perspectiva artificialis âthe entire picture has been transformed ⊠into a âwindowââ.7 The simile of âseeing throughâ fails to account for the fact that so much of a work such as Masaccioâs Trinity is implied as being on our side of the wall. The theoretical implications are drawn out by Patrick Maynard, who argues that the theoretical âmix-up of pictorial and (transmission) projection planesâ leads to a conflation of âpictures with their real or hypothetical projection surfacesâ.8 In other words, the hypothetical projection plane used for constructing a measured perspective (i.e. the intersection of Albertiâs visual pyramid) does not have to align with the picture surface. While this conflation can occur (and does so, in part, in Trinity), Maynard notes that âthe history of depiction shows we can imagine depicted scenes (perspectival or not), in whole or in part, to be behind picture surfaces, also at those surfaces, in front of them â or in no spatial relationship to themâ.9 This has particular relevance for Trinity, in that the space that we imaginatively âenterâ is not that of the religious representation, but the space of the church we âshareâ with the donors and skeleton, depicted as being in front of the supporting wall.
As Wolfgang Kemp notes, âperspective achieves more than connecting the space of the beholder with the space of the paintingâ, in that it also âregulates the position of the recipient with regard to the inner communications; that is to say, the presentation of the painting with its demands on how it should be viewedâ.10 Indeed, throughout the book I utilize this premise of reception aesthetics in order to make a case for a workâs prepositional structuring of its conditions of access, functioning to orientate the beholder with respect to the artworkâs different levels of implied reality. As such, there are two performances operative here: that of the artwork, conceived not as a âthingâ but as an âevent-likeâ entity; and that of the beholder, who must imaginatively enact such a performance, using cues contained within the work to orientate herself within the situated context.11
As an encounter involving both imagination and ideation, this does not, of course, exhaust our engagement with the work as painting, but rather supplements and informs the perceptual encounter it affords. Perspective, combined with framing, has a particular role in structuring our implied spatial relationship to painting; and Masaccioâs Trinity, by allying its perspectival schema to its religious content in such a way as to acknowledge the embodied viewpoint of the beholder, constructs an unprecedented proximity to the religious image that, in turn, demands means to delimit this engagement if requisite decorum is to be upheld. While reciprocity is facilitated, our role as beholder is that of a witness. As Rona Goffen observes, âRenaissance verisimilitude is both psychological and physical. It concerns both the representation of emotions in a manner intended to engage the beholderâs empathy and the representation of visible reality in terms of space and light.â12
II
The notion of different levels of reality being operative within the same painting is the subject of Sven Sandströmâs 1963 Levels of Unreality. This book, little known outside of narrow art historical circles, sets out an analysis of the role of degrees of reality-effect in structuring the relationship between different parts of a picture. It offers a functional account, which, despite its formal concerns, is distinguished from âformalistâ accounts such as that offered by Heinrich Wölfflin. Indeed, Sandström differentiates his position from Wölfflinâs by stating that the âconcepts âdegrees of realityâ and âplanes of realityââ refer to âthe functions of a work of art, instead of being associated with the enduring properties or qualities of the paintingâ.13 Nonetheless, Sandström acknowledges a debt to Wölfflin, whose 1899 account of the Sistine Chapel in Die Klassische Kunst was the first to employ the concept of a âdifferent level of realityâ when distinguishing between Michelangeloâs narrative scenes and his portraits of the prophets and the sibyls.14
Sandström evolves a theory where an interplay of degrees of reality is described as providing âstructural conditions which are syntactic in a pre- or non-linguistic meaningâ.15 For Sandström, visual images are thus âcognitive structuresâ, such that âviewing a scene or object must be understood as a highly structured cognitive activity which relies heavily on a variety of mental resources â something more comprehensive and much more intellectually qualified than what immediate perception usually is meant to beâ.16 With its debt to Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Edmund Husserlâs phenomenology, Sandström thus seeks to distinguish his approach not only from âillusoryâ perceptual models such as Ernst Gombrichâs17 but also from linguistic models of depiction; he identifies a non-linguistic notion of âspatialâ syntax â apprehending images as spatial constructs â as an organizational principle founded upon implied relations to (in the specific case of fresco) the muralâs surface and bounding frame.
This is a graduation that concerns not so much reality itself, but âon the c...