Europe and the Collapse of Yugoslavia

The Role of Non-State Actors and European Diplomacy

Branislav Radeljic

• Publisher: I.B. Tauris
• Year: 2016
• ISBN:
  9781786720306
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Nationalism & Patriotism
• Index: Politics & International Relations

In 1992 Yugoslavia finally succumbed to civil war, collapsing under the pressure of its inherent ethnic tensions. Existing accounts of Yugoslavia s dissolution, however, pay little regard to the troubled relationship between the Yugoslav Federation and the European Community (EC) prior to the crisis in the early 1990s, and the instability this created. Here, Branislav Radeljic offers an empirical analysis of the EC s relations with Yugoslavia from the late sixties, when Yugoslavia was under the presidency of Josep Broz Tito, through to the collapse of the Yugoslav federation in 1992, after the rise of Slobodan Milo evi? and the beginning of the Yugoslav Wars. Radeljic explores the economic, political and social elements of these discords, and also places emphasis on the role of Slovenes, Croats and other diasporas focusing on their capacity to affect policy-making at a Europe-wide level. Radeljic argues convincingly that a lack of direction and inadequate political mechanisms within the EC enabled these non-state actors to take centre-stage, and shows how EC paralysis precipitated a bloody conflict in the Balkan region."

PART ONE

EUROPEAN COMMUNITY RELATIONS WITH YUGOSLAVIA

CHAPTER TWO

THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND YUGOSLAVIA FROM UNOFFICIAL TO OFFICIAL RELATIONS

This chapter examines the connections between the European Economic Community and Yugoslavia from their earliest interaction until the late 1970s. Keeping in mind the period it covers, the chapter is broadly divided into two parts: while the first focuses on relations until 1968, the year when official links between the two parties were established, the second part investigates whether, and to what extent, the establishment of diplomatic relations influenced further developments among them. In his writing, Adam Watson notes the diplomatic capacity of the European society of states: ‘When a group of states forms a closely knit system, the involvement of many self-willed political actors imposes upon each state a continuous awareness that the others have interests and purposes distinct from its own, and that the things other states do or may do limit and partly determine its own policies’.¹ Accordingly, the main questions of this chapter are: How knowledgeable were the Community and socialist Yugoslavia about each other and what kind of cooperation characterized their relationship? If a lack of attentiveness existed for one reason or another, when did the Community or Yugoslavia, or both, modify their position and begin considering the other party within its future policy-making framework? Answering these questions is of crucial importance as it would offer a broader understanding of the Community’s behaviour vis-à-vis the Yugoslav crisis in the early 1990s.

In spite of the fact that the second half of the twentieth century was characterized by a great interest in securing multifaceted cooperation through a number of regulatory bodies,² the relations between the European Community and Yugoslavia did not follow this pattern, but were rather fraught and, in fact, difficult to define. The period before 1968 was problematic for both actors; a mutual lack of substantial interest dominated the relations between them and thus no particular connection existed. This was a result of differently positioned objectives, where each party was primarily concerned with its own performance rather than being significantly involved in direct relations with the other: Yugoslavia was a country without a clear standpoint towards the EEC due to domestic miscalculations, while the Community was focused on its integrationist project and less interested in the Yugoslav federation. Further, once the Community had decided to play the role of sponsor and Yugoslavia accepted to play that of beneficiary, insufficient attention was paid to the negative consequences of such an arrangement. The growing dependence on the Community’s aid allowed Yugoslavia to ignore the seriousness of its economic mismanagement and postpone any significant steps to secure its own future.

After 1968, a greater opportunity for official communication and reconsideration of further policies presented itself. However, in practice relations between the Community and Yugoslavia did not become remarkably different from the ones characterizing the previous years. Again, both sides continued along their parallel lines lacking any serious interaction inspired by mutually beneficial cooperation, thus allowing ignorance and misinterpretation of one another. In fact, the parties continued with their roles of benefactor and beneficiary – a situation to be reconsidered only after the Community had labelled the Yugoslav problem as political in its nature and agreed that political cooperation was a fundamental tool for generating stable economic relations, thus diverting its attention from economics to politics.

Getting to Know Each Other

According to the first Five-year plan (1947–51), aimed at changing post-war Yugoslavia from an agricultural to an industrial economy, the country was supposed to take part in international economic relations focused primarily towards the socialist bloc, therefore ignoring the West.³ Despite its initial success, the economic plan proved overambitious and therefore unrealistic. Shaping Yugoslavia’s economy on the Soviet model ‘was conceptually flawed owing to the differences between the two states as economic entities’.⁴ In fact, there was no evident similarity between the two that might have served as a model to follow. Thus, for the sake of its own survival, Yugoslavia’s leadership decided to position the country between the East and the West and embark on a policy which would benefit the country by representing the midpoint between the two opposing sides.

For the Yugoslav leadership it was important to approach Western powers in order to obtain financial aid and sign trade agreements. Nevertheless, issues regarding Western assistance served to inspire further political discord. Such an atmosphere was the product of Western judgement which ‘strongly opposed communism in principle and in practice’, and for both the United States of America and Western Europe ‘it seemed ludicrous to support the “containment” policy with one hand and to assist an isolated and weak Communist state with the other’.⁵ In their examination of Yugoslavia’s policy, some scholars correctly conclude that initially, ‘there was no Yugoslav intention to abandon Soviet-style planning, despite results that were already unsatisfactory before the interruption of economic relations with the Soviet Union and its Eastern European allies’.⁶ This observation clearly demonstrates how the Yugoslav leadership approached the West: its self-centred ambition to secure financial support dominated the discourse, rather than development of closer cooperation and therefore stronger links at other levels.

To sum up the initial period of assistance, it can be noted that the benefits for Yugoslavia were remarkable: without general Western aid, the country would not have been capable of defending its independence against Soviet pressure. As observed from the outside, ‘Yugoslavia not only survived, but it became one of the most prominent and significant “neutral” states in the world, playing a role far beyond what its military and economic power position apparently justifies’.⁷ But, what proved to be the case is that the first half of the 1950s shaped its further development: Yugoslavia became a dependent state – a dependence that characterized almost the whole period of the Cold War and therefore allowed the Yugoslav leaders to avoid introducing the necessary economic reforms. In her study, Ann Lane criticizes the West for its policy towards Tito’s Yugoslavia: by offering ‘a choice of losing control of the state or bartering with the West’, Tito opted for the latter, and therefore provided the West with ‘an advantage in strategic terms of a foothold in the communist camp’.⁸ Thus, Western aid sustained the state but at the same time encouraged dependency ‘which militated against necessary economic reform, permitting economic mismanagement to be disguised until after Tito’s death’.⁹

Along with economics, which represented a key point in Yugoslavia’s post-war development, the political situation of the time also requires attention. The break with Stalin in 1948 gave birth to Yugoslav socialism or Titoism as it was known in the West – a unique phenomenon that proved to be a test of the state of national relations in Yugoslavia.¹⁰ According to one account, ‘[w]ithout the framework of the material and cultural circumstances of Yugoslavia, the inertia of the socialist illusions of the people, and the new social relations/conflicts, there is fertile ground for conflict in the political movement’.¹¹ This argument suggests that the situation in socialist Yugoslavia was not stable due to the lack of coordination among its constituent parts. Thus, the break with the Soviets implied the creation of a new Yugoslav model based on ‘the cohesiveness of the political system’, a model which made the Yugoslav leadership decide ‘to further de-emphasize the federative and multi-national features of the political system and society . . . and to concentrate on the creation of closer social bonds among citizens based upon the allegedly similar position and common interests of “producers” in all groups and sections of the country’.¹²

But, in complex systems (of which Yugoslavia was an example), successful political changes require a new set of people, otherwise it is difficult to achieve noticeable change. When analysing the political atmosphere in the country, it can be concluded that the Yugoslav issue ‘remained very sensitive, especially in reaction to the different phases in the Cold War, for Yugoslavia’s exposed position between East and West both geographically and ideologically, was uniquely vulnerable’.¹³ In fact, the country’s domestic situation determined its international standing. In his analysis of the situation at the time, Stevan Pavlowitch notes that the ‘[c]ircumstances had already put limits to Tito’s foreign policy ambitions’, and any attempt to approach one or the other side would have had significant consequences.¹⁴ Yugoslavia’s geographical vulnerability was understood as a product of non-alignment, and therefore it reflected the international aspect of its performance, whereas ideological vulnerability was a domestic concern. Still, in the West, the federal system of Yugoslavia enjoyed a good reputation and the country was appreciated for its highly unitary structure. While it was not possible to predict which path socialist Yugoslavia was to follow in the forthcoming years, the insecure domestic situation ‘was aggravated by the deterioration in Yugoslavia’s relations with the outside world’ provoking condemnation of everything capitalist and Western: ‘cultural relations were with other communist states [while] all contacts with the capitalist West were reduced to a minimum’.¹⁵

This Yugoslav reluctance was in opposition to the ideas promoted by the first European Community,¹⁶ which advocated greater interdependence between its Member and non-Member States being brought about not by a single force, but by different converging and mutually sustaining elements. Later, it proved that these elements constituted what Jacques Delors, the eighth President of the European Commission, defined as Europe: ‘A grouping that is unique in the density and quantity of its commercial exchanges, a comparative oasis of monetary order and even of financial equilibrium, and a considerable reserve of internal growth. It possesses a demographic, historical and cultural wealth, homogeneous even in its extreme diversity, which, doubtless, no other region of the world can claim’.¹⁷

Thus, it was envisaged that the Community would develop external relations and cooperation with non-Member States. For example, the 1953 General Report of the High Authority stated that ‘the relations with the other European countries were also further developed’, but without naming Yugoslavia among those countries.¹⁸ This omission was a consequence of Yugoslavia’s international position at the time, which consisted of charting a path that permitted it not to join either of the blocs, while maintaining bilateral relations with both blocs’ members.¹⁹ However, although the Yugoslav federation was not cited in the 1953 report, it is difficult to argue that the Community did not intend to consider it at some point in the future as its mission stipulated: ‘The European Coal and Steel Community is an open-to-all community. From its earliest days, it has set out to develop its relations with the countries which do not belong to the Community, and to cooperate with the international organizations’.²⁰

Nonetheless, the enthusiasm about the Community’s own development was very often accompanied by criticism. While being a major work in progress, the Community encouraged numerous analyses in regard to its sustainability. One of them is offered by Richard McAllister for whom the Community was ‘an animal in motion’, without ‘fixed’ destination and ‘not...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Dedication
• Title Page
• Contents
• Acknowledgements
• List of Abbreviations
• Introduction
• Part One: European Community Relations With Yugoslavia
• Part Two: The Role Of Non-State Actors
• Conclusion
• Notes
• Bibliography
• Index
• eCopyright