Arab-Iranian Rivalry in the Persian Gulf

Territorial Disputes and the Balance of Power in the Middle East

Farzad Sharifi-Yazdi

• Publisher: I.B. Tauris
• Year: 2015
• ISBN:
  9780857739643
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Personal Development
• Subtopic: Conflict Resolution

Iranian ambitions in the Persian Gulf and rivalries with Arab neighbours are subject to intense - and heated - speculation, controversy and debate. Here, Farzad Cyrus Sharifi scrutinises the rival Arab-Iranian claims to Bahrain, the Shatt al-Arab waterway, and the Abu Musa and Tunbs islands in the years after World War II and before the Iranian revolution. Through investigation of previously unexamined primary materials and interviews with leading players, this book sheds new light on the evolution and dynamics of hegemonic and nationalistic Arab-Iranian rivalries and how these rivalries began to find symbolic expression through territorial disputes. Sharifi illustrates that these ongoing disputes - and the deep-seated tensions still prevalent in Arab-Iranian relations - are largely rooted in how they were constructed in the post-World War II period, making this book vital reading for researchers of the politics, history, international relations and diplomacy of the Middle East.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Arab-Iranian territorial disputes: ‘from resurrection to relinquishment’

Of the numerous territorial disputes that have plagued the troubled Persian Gulf region (see Figure 1.1) over the past 50 years, three in particular have generated an intense degree of publicity, controversy and regional tensions. Notably, all three cases involve Iran: her now settled claims to Bahrain, her dispute with Iraq over the boundary alignment in the Shatt al Arab waterway and her dispute with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) over the sovereignty of the islands of Abu Musa and the Tunbs.

The above listed cases are now either settled (i.e. Bahrain) or technically dormant (i.e. Shatt al Arab and Abu Musa and Tunbs). Nonetheless, they have constituted three of the most sensitive, publicized and politicized territorial issues in the Persian Gulf that continue to resurface periodically, often as sources, manifestations and symbols of nationalistic and power-political Arab-Iranian tensions in the region. This book seeks to shed new light on the dynamics of these disputes and regional irritants by closely examining their conduct during a critical 12-year period; a period in which, as this book will demonstrate, new patterns in the conduct of the disputes began to be established and the aforementioned politicized and symbolic dynamics of the disputes were constructed and set in motion. This specified period begins with the year 1957, when Tehran resurrected and politicized its claim to Bahrain, and ends in 1969 when the same claim was effectively relinquished and a dramatic new crisis—the third of its kind in a decade—erupted along the Shatt al Arab waterway.

Within this period, Iranian claims to the Abu Musa and Tunbs were also stepped up significantly. Moreover, the timeframe witnessed Britain announce (in January 1968) its intentions of withdrawing from East of Suez by 1971, a move that would end over a century of British dominance in the Persian Gulf.¹ Two further associated developments that transpired during the years under analysis include the emergence of the United States as the most influential non-regional actor in the Persian Gulf and Iran’s rise to become the region’s most militarily and economically powerful littoral state.²

The central question this book explores is why Tehran’s interests in—and longstanding claims to—Bahrain, the Shatt al Arab waterway and Abu Musa and Tunbs islands intensified dramatically within the 1957 and 1969 timeframe; was there one common and pervasive factor involved? This focus raises a series of important subquestions which this study takes on. What lay behind Iran’s decision to resurrect and politicize her claim to Bahrain in 1957 and consequently to relinquish the claim in 1969; can explanations for the latter move shed light on the motives and timing behind the former move? What shaped the conduct of the claim between 1957 and 1969 and was the claim anything other than nominal? What was driving intensified Iranian efforts to establish equal rights along the Shatt al Arab and how can this help explain flare-ups along the waterway in 1959, 1961 and 1969? Were there any other factors in the domestic, regional and international realms that were at play in shaping and driving these important episodes? How and why was the Shatt dispute politicized within this timeframe? And finally, what lay behind Iran’s intensified efforts to establish sovereignty over the Abu Musa and Tunbs islands within the given timeframe; when and how was this expressed and was the dispute politicized in any way during the given timeframe? In addressing these vital questions the book also seeks to shed light on who was responsible for formulating and shaping Iranian actions, both ‘major’ and ‘minor’, in respect of the named territorial disputes between 1957 and 1969. Indeed, a reading of the existing literature on Iranian foreign affairs during the period in question strongly suggests that the Shah of Iran was firmly in control of Iran’s foreign policy throughout much of his reign.³ In this respect, some have also not entirely dismissed the role and influence of some of the Shah’s closest ‘associates’.⁴ But what has yet to be clarified is whether these observations apply accurately to the context of Iran’s territorial disputes in the Persian Gulf. It is therefore not absolutely clear who was ultimately in charge of and directing policy towards the conduct of the Bahrain claim, the Shatt al Arab and Abu Musa and Tunbs disputes. Was it the Shah himself who was formulating and shaping Iranian actions, both major and minor, in respect to these disputes and what role if any did the Iranian Foreign Ministry and the Shah’s trusted and ‘close associates’ (who were these ‘close associates’?) play in this regard? These are integral questions that this book also aims to take on. It follows from all this that a large part of this study focuses on the causes of Iranian engagement in these disputes, with Iran being the key protagonist and challenger in all three cases during the given timeframe. Nonetheless, close attention is also paid to the Arab responses and initiatives that played into and affected Iran’s conduct of the given disputes.

So why the 1969 cut-off date? It could certainly be argued that the Persian Gulf witnessed developments of equal if not greater significance in the few years immediately after 1969. There was, for example, and perhaps most notably, Iran’s actual takeover (albeit partial) of Abu Musa and the Tunbs islands in 1971; the establishment of Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates as independent nation states in 1970 and 1971 respectively; Britain’s actual departure from the Persian Gulf in December 1971; and the signing of a landmark agreement between Iran and Iraq in 1975 (the Algiers Accords and package of agreements) that temporarily settled the Shatt al Arab dispute and alleviated overt Iranian-Iraqi tensions and rivalry. These developments could, justifiably, prompt the reader to question the chosen 1969 cut-off date. Yet several important considerations underpin the decision to focus on the specified timeframe. Firstly, the aforementioned events of 1970 and beyond have already been covered extensively by the secondary literature; yet, frustratingly, much of the crucial primary documentation that records these events has been retained for what is usually characterized as ‘security’ reasons.⁵ Thirdly and crucially, it is postulated here for the first time that the conduct of the disputes beyond 1969 was a reflection and continuation of established trends and patterns that were set in motion in 1957 and that had crystallized by 1969. Indeed, it is this author’s impression that both the resurrection in 1957 and relinquishment in 1969 of claims to Bahrain represented and signalled a critical evolution in Iran’s approach to territorial questions in the Persian Gulf and to Persian Gulf affairs more generally. This book sets out to demonstrate this assertion by addressing the above outlined questions.

The underlying theoretical notion that underpins this book is that a state’s interest in territory or the conduct of territorial disputes is often driven by factors extraneous to the historic, geographic, functional details of the territory or boundary itself. This idea is by no means new to the social sciences. One can recall for example the assertion of the famous French geographer Jacques Ancel that ‘there are no problems of boundaries’, only ‘problems of nations’.⁶ The observation of Stephen Jones that ‘a boundary, like the human skin, may reflect the illnesses of the body’ is also relevant here.⁷ To be sure, the political geography and international relations literature often ascribes state interest in territory and the conduct of territorial disputes to a range of factors relating to the international, regional and domestic realms. Though it is not the place of this chapter to examine these factors in detail, they can be summarized as including: the intrinsic quest of states for greater power and natural resources; shifts in regional power balances; the innately emotive and symbolic dimensions of territory and the associated utility of territorial disputes in engendering nationalistic sentiment or diverting attention from domestic political shortcomings.⁸ These more conventional explanations for territorial disputes will certainly be taken into account, while each may, to varying degrees, have played a role in the conduct of the disputes in question during the period of interest. But it seems that in the context of the Persian Gulf region and Arab-Iranian territorial disputes in particular, two additional factors may also be relevant and require close scrutiny. The first is the notion of ‘prestige’. Prestige, as an element or prime aim of foreign policy, has indeed been entertained in the international relations literature, where it has commonly been defined as the ‘reputation’ or ‘appearance of power’; power measured, in essence, by military and economic capability and political influence.⁹ Writers such as the distinguished Hans Morgenthau have asserted that prestige has served as an ‘indispensable element of a rational foreign policy’; sought by states aiming to enhance their actual power or to prevent challenges to their power position.¹⁰ Recognized tools and symbols of prestige include naval and military armaments and displays, propaganda and bold rhetoric.¹¹ These arguments are also explored in greater detail in the following chapter. It bears mentioning here though that according to Chubin and Zabih prestige was strongly ‘emphasized’ in the Shah’s Foreign policy. What is not clear however is the role it may have specifically played in the conduct of Iranian territorial disputes during the Shah’s reign.¹² This is a further shortcoming, which this book looks to shed light on.

The second factor that appears to have relevance in the context of Arab-Iranian territorial disputes and to which this book pays close attention is the notion of Arab-Iranian rivalry. To be sure, a number of prominent writers have seemingly supported the Ancelian assertion that Arab-Iranian rivalries across Persian Gulf waters have found symbolic expression in either the Shatt or Abu Musa and Tunbs disputes.^{13, 14} The latter dispute, for example, has been characterized as a symbol of Arab national resistance to the spread of Iranian influence in the Persian Gulf.¹⁵ Be all this as it may, existing writings have stopped well short of developing any notion of ‘Arab-Iranian rivalry’ or ‘Arab resistance’ to Iranian ambitions finding symbolic expression in the Shatt or Tunbs and Abu Musa islands. A number of critical questions thus remain unanswered: how exactly can ‘Arab-Iranian rivalry’ be defined and what states were involved in this rivalry and resistance to Iranian influence in the Persian Gulf? Exactly when, how and why did the Shatt al Arab and Abu Musa and Tunbs disputes develop into symbols of such rivalries and how was their conduct affected as a result? And did the Bahrain issue ever serve a similar symbolic role in the arena of Irano-Arab relations? It is this author’s impression that considerable light can also be shed on all these questions through an examination of the conduct of the Bahrain, Abu Musa and Tunbs and Shatt al Arab disputes between 1957 and 1969.

Indeed, the book will show that it was within this timeframe that the Persian Gulf began to see patterns of hegemonic Arab-Iranian rivalries crystallize and find expression in all three disputes. Previously unexamined primary records are utilized to demonstrate how the waning of Britain’s influence in the region between the late 1950s and throughout the 1960s gave rise to Tehran’s burgeoning ambitions of becoming the prime power in the Persian Gulf; and how this ambition found symbolic expression in heightened attachment to and more assertive policies towards disputed territory in the region. Accordingly, this book sheds light, for the first time, on how and why consideration of prestige—defined as a reputation and appearance of power and influence—also become enmeshed in and shaped Iran’s approach to territorial issues. By the same measure, we shall also see how the three disputes also developed, albeit to varying degrees, into symbols of ‘Arab resistance’ to Iran’s hegemonic ambitions and began to be characterized and presented in highly nationalistic terms. These findings provide a vital backdrop to explaining why each dispute remains, even to this day (and beyond formal legal settlements), a highly politicized, cyclical and symbolic regional issue; that is, a symbol and expression of localized hegemonic and nationalistic rivalries.

Historic, topical and cyclical: overview of the Bahrain, Shatt al Arab, Abu Musa and Tunbs disputes

Iran’s claims to Bahrain

Iran’s long-established claims to Bahrain were rooted in her intermittent occupation of the archipelago before the Khalifah commenced their uninterrupted control of the islands in the 1780s and before the British established a protectorate over it in 1820. Iran’s Royal Court maintained a low-key nominal assertion to Bahrain thereafter but escalated and seemingly politicized her claim in 1957 by passing legislation (in the Iranian parliament) declaring the archipelago as Iran’s 14th province. Only 12 years later however, in January 1969, the Shah of Iran effectively dropped the claim; and thus made way for the UN Secretary General to ascertain the wishes of the population of Bahrain through a survey of public opinion and the establishment of the archipelago as a fully-fledged independent and sovereign state in 1971. In July 2007, the issue of Iran’s claim to Bahrain, which appeared to have been put firmly to rest in 1969 resurfaced dramatically (if certainly not officially) when the Iranian newspaper Kayhan published an article about a ‘public demand in Bahrain’ for ‘reunification’ of the ‘province with its motherland, Islamic Iran’. The article was signed by Hussein Shariatmadari, the managing director of Kayhan and a close adviser to Iran’s supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.¹⁶ Though the Iranian Foreign Ministry tried to distance itself from Shariatmadari’s controversial comments, his views did have their strong supporters in Iran, with various other newspapers, parliamentary members and some senior Basiji officials voicing their approval.¹⁷ Not surprisingly, Shariatmadari’s comments triggered a ‘unified chorus of official and unofficial condemnation in Bahrain and elsewhere on the Arabian Peninsular’ and even led to heated demonstrations outside the Iranian Embassy in Manama.¹⁸

Various analysts cited the build up of US naval forces in the Persian Gulf in the spring and summer of 2007 and Manama’s close ties to Washington, marked largely by the presence of US military bases in Bahrain, as the ‘source of Shariatmadari’s indignation’.¹⁹ And there were those who opined that the resurfacing of the Iranian claim fell in line with Tehran’s bid to exert her influence in the Persian Gulf and (re-)‘establish a position of regional hegemony’.²⁰ It was also argued that the claim had been orchestrated by the government in Tehran to divert domestic attention from the country’s mounting social and economic problems.²¹

The Shatt al Arab dispute

Iran and Iraq’s dispute over the 120-mile Shatt al Arab waterway—formed out of the confluence of the Euphrates and Tigris rivers—can be traced back to the 1840s when the waterway’s eastern bank was recognized as forming part of the vaguely defined Ottoman-Persian frontier. This very basic delimitation was inherited by, and thus came to form, the most southerly portion of Iran’s boundary with the newly formed Iraqi state in 1920; effectively giving Iraq exclusive sovereignty over the waterway. Thereafter, Iran progressively contested this boundary by means of low key, behind the curtain diplomatic protests, demanding that the thalweg boundary line be established along the Shatt to give her share...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title Page
• Contents
• List of Figures
• List of Tables
• Acknowledgments
• 1 Introduction
• 2 Explaining disputes over territory
• 3 The origins and evolution of the Bahrain, Abu Musa and Tunbs disputes
• 4 The origins and evolution of the Shatt al Arab dispute
• 5 1957–67: reignition and politicization of Arab-Iranian territorial disputes and rivalries in the Persian Gulf
• 6 1968: Britain’s withdrawal decision and its impact on the Bahrain and Abu Musa and Tunbs disputes
• 7 1969: Iranian power projection in the Persian Gulf and Shatt al Arab
• 8 Conclusions
• Appendix 1: Military balance table: 1968–72
• Appendix 2: 1937 Treaty
• Appendix 3: 1959 Agreement
• Notes
• Bibliography
• Index
• eCopyright