Te Iwi Maori

Population Past, Present and Projected

Ian Pool

• Publisher: Auckland University Press
• Year: 2013
• ISBN:
  9781775581642
• Edition: 1
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: Australian & Oceanian History
• Index: History

Te Iwi Maori presents an engrossing survey of the history of the Māori population from the earliest times to the present, concentrating particularly on the demographic impact of European colonisation. It also considers present and future population trends, many of which have major implications for social and resource policy. Among questions explored are the marked fertility decline of the 1970s, urbanisation, emigration (especially to Australia), and regional population patterns.

Part One
Interdependent Demographic Transitions

The two major groups of the New Zealand population, the New Zealand Maoris, and the non-Maoris (including Europeans, Pacific Island Polynesians and others), have been characterised by significantly different demographic histories. Their distinctive features and increasing similarity are an integral part of the historical growth of population in New Zealand.

(Dept of Statistics 1988a, The People of New Zealand’, p.49)

The Maori, an isolated and relatively diseaseless people met in the Europeans perhaps the least isolated people on earth.… Most of humanity’s major diseases, … were endemic or at least occasionally epidemic in Europe. Great Britain, which would be New Zealand’s chief point of contact with the Old World, was especially fecund bacteriologically, because urbanisation and the diseases associated with it were proceeding very rapidly there.…

The Maori hit bottom demographically in the 1890s, with a nadir of little more than 40,000, but since then they have recovered much of their morale and all their numbers and more.

(Alfred W. Crosby 1986, Ecological Imperialism: The Biological Expansion of Europe, 900–1900, pp. 232, 268)

1 Transition in a Bicultural Society

New Zealand’s demographic history

The sesquicentury since the Treaty of Waitangi represents merely one-sixth or one-ninth of New Zealand’s known demographic history. It is instructive from time to time to recall that by 1990 its real duration had been 1,000 years, and perhaps several hundred years more than that. A lack of data means that the first eight or more centuries must be covered very sketchily, but from 1769 this history can be dealt with in increasing detail. It is also possible to look into the near future, the population patterns and trends of which will be shaped by the past, particularly by what has occurred over the last two centuries.

Many contemporary issues having social and resource implications have demographic roots or are better understood by an analysis of past demographic structures and dynamics, even those pre-dating Captain Cook’s voyages. By that time, whether one takes 27.5 years, the theoretical ‘mean length of a generation’ in demography, or draws on Maori genealogies (Houghton 1980, p.76), and depending on the date accepted for the arrival of the first canoes, A.D. 600–1350, some 14–40 or more generations of New Zealanders had already inhabited and left their imprint on this land.

The detrimental impact of European expansion on Maori population was marked over the next three generations until 1840. This effect accelerated and was not halted during the first two to three generations of colonial rule. Almost three more generations were to pass while the Maori population recuperated from the demographic shocks following contact and reached levels of natural increase* close to the highest recorded anywhere. The period since then has seen dramatic changes which set new parameters and challenges for future generations.

At the national level, this book thus traces Maori population history from the arrival of the canoes until Cook’s voyages, through rapid nineteenth-century depopulation and gradual twentieth-century recuperation until 1945. From there it analyses the period of accelerated growth until the 1960s, as death rates dropped radically, and also reviews the subsequent decelerated mortality declines. It then studies the decrease in fertility in the 1970s, one of the most rapid anywhere. This history ends with an outline of the emerging patterns of fertility, as Maori and Pakeha family formation strategies converge. The final substantive chapters review contemporary and future patterns and trends. The conclusion provides an overview, but also critically examines some popular stereotypes relating both to patterns of Maori population size and growth and to their determinants.

Maori population history is clearly interlocked with that of Pakeha New Zealanders. There have been 8–9 generations of co-residence and intermarriage with post-1769 immigrant populations. This confounds statistical analyses and socio-cultural interpretations of demographic phenomena to such an extent, and has such profound policy implications, that any serious study of the Maori population must deal with issues of ethnic identification. More importantly, it is impossible to study New Zealand demographic trends, particularly in the nineteenth century, without understanding both the mechanisms by which Pakeha penetration of New Zealand occurred and the effects of this culture contact on Maori.

Two demographic transitions

In spite of this interdependence New Zealand has also seen two very different major population histories: the Maori, and the Pakeha, the latter a population predominantly of European descent. These two patterns are broadly analogous to two general models outlined in the most central paradigm of the academic discipline of demography: the demographic transition (Notestein 1945). Transition theory, which will serve as an analytical framework for this book, originally drew its inspiration from the experience of north-western Europe, termed here the ‘classical’ model. It involves a three- or four-stage shift:

— from a first phase in the late eighteenth or mid nineteenth century, of high mortality and high fertility, and thus low rates of natural increase;

— to a second stage, in the nineteenth century, of declining mortality and high fertility, and thus accelerated rates of natural increase;

— then a third stage, starting later in the nineteenth century or in the early twentieth, with declines in fertility, continuing decreases in mortality, and consequently a deceleration in the rates of natural increase;

— and a final stage, from about the Depression, involving a return to low rates of natural increase, resulting this time, however, from low to very low fertility, and very low mortality.

The underlying reasons for the transition, and in particular for improvements in survivorship, were seen to be the social and economic changes associated with the industrial and agricultural revolutions, or by the shift from a pre-industrial to a post-industrial society (Petersen 1961, p.12). In the New Zealand context this is the form of transition followed by the Pakeha population.

The classical model provides a useful comparison with what has happened more recently in the Third World. There, the transition has occurred more recently, often since World War II; improved survivorship came about primarily because of medical advances rather than social and economic change; and family planning programmes employing new, more effective methods of contraception have played important roles. Moreover, more recent transitions have been far more rapid, but have run their full course only in some of the newly industrialised countries such as Singapore. The Maori population is the major New Zealand example of this model and is now at the final stage. Pacific Island Polynesians are also following this pattern, but are still only at stage three.

More recently, the transition paradigm has been revised in several ways. Firstly, in the context of fertility decline, it has been enriched by the inclusion among explanatory variables of a wider range of social developmental factors — above all improved survivorship, but also education, communications and urbanisation — in addition to economic change (e.g. Borrie 1970, pp. 149-51; Demeny 1974; IRG 1979, p.91). Secondly, and again in the context of fertility declines, it has been shown that cultural factors also play a significant role (Freedman 1982; Cleland & Wilson 1987).

Thirdly, a more recent but closely linked theoretical construct, the epidemiologic transition, has permitted a more refined analysis of population–health interrelations, particularly the sequencing of mortality and fertility declines. This is an important consideration, given the major catalytic effect of improved survivorship for fertility change. Shifts in disease- age- sex-specific mortality patterns, from ‘The age of pestilence and famine … [to] The age of receding pandemics … [to] The age of degenerative and man-made diseases …’ are also identified. Finally, it is argued that this transition ‘usually favours the young over the old and females over males’ (Omran 1982, p. 172).

The epidemiological transition consists of four different models: the classical or western; the accelerated, which was followed by Japan, eastern Europe and the USSR, a variant of the classical model; the delayed model of the Third World; and the transitional variant of this model applying to the populations such as Sri Lanka, South Korea, and Singapore (Omran 1982), to which can be added the Maori. A point of critical importance for the present analysis is that these populations have converged more towards the classical model than have the poorer Third World populations falling into the delayed model.

Another related issue to be borne in mind when reviewing the Maori epidemiologic transition is that ‘modern medical technology’ played a minor role in mortality declines until after World War II, at which stage it became very significant. Community-based and other forms of preventive medicine, however, were a factor in Maori declines at certain times, notably, as will be shown, in the first decade or so of the present century. It must be stressed that the negligible impact of medical technology applied to all populations (Beaglehole 1988; Pool 1982; Skegg 1988), not just the Maori, although their isolation and poor living conditions meant that they benefited minimally from the limited medical breakthroughs available at that time.

A further refinement to transition theory is the identification of a first or even pre-transition stage of depopulation at the time of contact with European expansion. ‘The fact that the author considers the [Maori] depopulation in the eighteenth and nineteenth century as the first phase of the demographic transition must remind us that a decrease in the sizes of indigenous populations at the commencement of colonisation occurred without doubt elsewhere in Oceania, a phenomenon never taken into account by the demographic transition theory’ (J.-L.R. 1980, p.988, reviewing Pool 1977; author’s transl.). One might add that some African historical demographic studies now emerging show the same pattern (Cordell 1987; Turshen 1987; Dawson 1987), and undoubtedly it occurred also in parts of Asia and Latin America.

A pre-transition phase of this type has also been experienced by a number of other indigenous minorities. In the Arctic regions, Latin America, Australia, New Caledonia, Fiji, Israel and North America during the era of European expansion, autochthonous populations were colonised and eventually numerically superseded by migratory populations. Indigenous minorities have subsequently gone through a period of recuperation and exceptionally rapid growth, while some, like the Maori, are now at a final stage in their demographic transition. Once again they face low rates of natural increase, a factor which has policy implications such as those discussed below for the Maori (Pool 1986a).

It might be added that some authors are now identifying another pre-transition phase relating to the preconditions of fertility declines. There is mounting evidence that increases in levels of reproduction, from moderately high to high, or even very high, occurred in many societies, as a prelude to rapid decreases (Dyson & Murphy 1985).

Maori population mobility and distribution

Until recently, for all demographic purposes, the Maori population could be counted as ‘closed’ to migration. Over the last decade or so, however, there has been significant international migration — emigration, and its partner, return migration — with the largest movement to Australia. Although the number of modern day ‘Vikings of the Sunrise’ is often exaggerated, the very existence of this sub-population demands analysis, as it is an important component of modern Maori life. It is worth noting that the international mobility of Maori is something they share with the Pakeha and Australian-born populations, as well as many other populations outside Australasia.

Inter-country migration is not the only form of Maori mobility and redistribution. Throughout its history the Maori population has been unevenly distributed across New Zealand. Today, as was true in the past, there are regional differences in its structure and dynamics. Beyond this, from 1945 to 1961 the Maori population was subject to the most rapid urbanisation rates achieved by a national population anywhere, at least up until the 1970s (Gibson 1973, p.82). It is clear that this dislocation has had very profound social, cultural, economic, and demographic consequences for both the Maori and the non-Maori populations. Today not only are most Maori urban, but there are now multi-generational urban families; and there are rural-urban and other differentials in population structure and dynamics. To complicate the situation more, internal mobility is a multi-faceted phenomenon, with, for example, return migration as well as out-migration, and with inter-regional, inter-urban, intra-regional and intra-urban movements.

The future: demographic challenges

National-level projections of the Maori population allow a preview of some certain and some possible patterns over the coming decades. These new trends pose challenges which carry major policy implications for both the Maori and non-Maori populations. Maori population growth will constitute a very significant component of the total, but for both populations natural increase will probably be much slower. Against this, the age and cohort composition of the population will change rapidly, and over short time spans — from decade to decade. It is certain that cohorts of varying size will pass through the age structure as bulges representing the last of the high fertility birth cohorts are followed by smaller generations. This will demand flexible but careful policy and planning responses in areas such as the labour market, housing, health and education. For Maori, fluctuations in the size of age groups will be more extreme than for non-Maori, a function of both the very rapid mortality declines of the 1940s–1950s, and the accelerated fertility decreases of the 1970s. For example, while the Maori population, which is classified as ‘young’ today (less than 5 per cent aged 65 years and over), will still be ‘mature’ (7 per cent aged 65+) rather than ‘old’ (10+ per cent 65 and over) in 2011, the number of elderly will have tripled. Against this there may only be the same number of 0–4-year-olds at that time as there were in 1981.

Conclusion: interdependence of policy and theory

The analysis to be presented here has implications for both policy and theory. For New Zealanders passing the 150th anniversary of colonisation, a history of Maori population should be a reminder that patterns and trends of the past, even in the period before colonisation, must be taken into account in resolving many contemporary constitutional and political issues. Moreover, these past trends will determine population structure and dynamics for the foreseeable future. Future patterns will have a major impact on cultural, social, and economic policies in the coming decades.

At a more academic level, an analysis of changes in the structure and dynamics of the Maori population provides a valuable test of demographic transition theory. In particular, it allows an investigation of an indigenous minority population and a review of pre-transition characteristics.

Population studies can now draw on rigorous analyses of almost every one of the world’s national populations, as well as many of its minority and sub-national groups. These substantive studies have permitted the development and testing of what is now a systematic body of theory which has the ‘capacity to predict changes in societies that are not yet in low fertility–low mortality balance’ (McNamara 1982, p. 147). To date empirical analyses of populations have shown that they behave most predictably. The critical element, the capacity of transition theory to ‘predict’ fertility declines, while imperfect in terms of timing and of some more refined aspects of cultural differences, is based on the observation that populations reaching certain identified thresholds have then been subject to changes in fertility. The key pre-condition seems to be improved survivorship, but it is strongly reinforced by factors such as rapid urbanisation, increases in school participation, decreases in gender status differences and the availability of effective contraception. The more recent the fertility transition, the more rapid seems to be its path.

The resultant analytical models are of considerable applied value for both scientific and policy analyses on New Zealand. Cross-reference to international models provides a broader and less introspective view of New Zealand’s social demographic trends. The rapid decline in Maori fertility in the 1970s, for example, is far from unique, for similar trends have occurred both among indigenous minority populations, such as Canadian Indians, and in countries such as Thailand, Mexico, Brazil and South Korea. All of these populations, and Maori, have passed critical stages in social and economic development, and have seen the benefits of improved survivorship. Indeed, given the achievement of these pre-conditions, it would have been most surprising if fertility declines had not followed. Thus, while any serious analysis of Maori population must recognise the significance of purely local factors, such as the influence of cultural interactions with the Pakeha majority on the maintenance of Maoritanga, reference to these must not obscure the inclusion of more universal factors.

2 When is a Maori a ‘Maori’ ?

Setting the ‘problem’

Frequently when data on ‘Maori’ are presented, the question will be raised ‘What do you mean when you say “Maori”? ‘; or, in Metge’s words, ‘Who is a Maori?’ (1976, p.39; also Murchie 1984, pp.26-27). This problem is the central subject of the present chapter. On investigation it turns out to be more than merely a conceptual or methodological issue, but also has social, political and constitutional ramifications. In contemporary New Zealand, demography is every bit as much ‘Political Arithmetick’ as it was in the seventeenth century (Keyfitz 1982a, p.538): ‘The study of population is not just concerned with counting people; it is primarily about ensuring that people count’ (Pool & Sceats 1990, p.31). It is for this reason that a separate chapter is given over to this issue, while other narrower conceptual or methodological concerns, even definitional problems, are addressed as they arise in the text.

Superficially, there should be no problem deciding who is ‘Maori’. Somebody who feels he or she is a Maori, and who is recognised as such by other people is clearly a Maori. This is what might be termed a cultural definition and corresponds to social reality, or popular usage.

Unfortunately, both legal and statistical definitions differ from this simple formula, as well as from each other. To confound the issue further, each follows several variants, which have also changed over time. Such incongruencies create major difficulties for analysts of Maori population: not only must they attempt to determine the validity...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Contents
• Acknowledgements
• List of Tables
• Part One: Interdependent Demographic Transitions
• Part Two: Maori Population From First Settlement To 1945
• Part Three: Transition and Reyond, 1945–2011
• Part Four: Te Iwi Maori, Past, Present and Future
• Appendix
• Glossary
• References
• Author Index
• Subject Index
• Footnotes
• Back Cover