Egypt, Islam, and Democracy

Critical Essays

Saad Eddin Ibrahim

• Publisher: The American University in Cairo Press
• Year: 2002
• ISBN:
  9781617972546
• Topic: Theology & Religion
• Subtopic: Islamic Theology

These essays by one of Egypt's most influential intellectuals provide a fascinating perspective on the political, religious, economic, and social issues of contemporary Egypt. Written over a period of fifteen years, the essays cover a range of topics including civil society and the prospects for democratization in Egypt and the region, the urban sociology of Cairo, the development of Egypt's landed bourgeoisie, structural adjustment and the processes of economic liberalization, and the complexities of ethnic conflicts and minorities in the Arab world. A number of essays address different aspects of Islamic activism in Egypt: the formation, membership, and activities of activist groups and their philosophies, political and social roles, and ideological relations with the West.Written at various points in the modern history of Islamic activism, democratic reform, and economic and social liberalization, these essays reflect the processes of change and continuity in the sociopolitical development of present-day Egypt, while a new postscript written by the author in 2001 brings the story into perspective at the beginning of the twenty-first century.

6

Cairo: A Sociological Profile

1987

The history and sociology of Cairo are those of Egypt and, to some extent, those of the entire Arab region. Its size, splendor, power, and functions have been a reflection of this fact for the past eleven centuries. It is of little surprise, therefore, that the Egyptians themselves have used the same name for their country and their capital city, Misr, interchangeably, and the Arabs have admiringly dubbed this complex entity as ‘the Mother of the World’ (umm al-dunya).

This equation does not merely relate to a concrete physical entity, but describes a state of mind and spirit. To the Egyptians and their fellow Arabs. Cairo is at once a seat of political power, of artistic creativity and cultural pacesetting, of religious shrines and religious learning, of scholarships and higher education, of industry as well as entertainment. For Egyptians and fellow Arabs, Cairo, therefore, represents singularly what so many cities may pluralistically represent to their respective nations. In terms of regional influence, Cairo is the equivalent of the likes of Paris, the Vatican, Oxford, Hollywood, and Detroit combined.

As a giant national, regional, and international center with all the above functions and feats, Cairo is also gripped by giant problems. As much as the city is enriched and stimulated by the inputs of these concentric zones, it also carries their burdens. No one has analyzed the unfolding of this dialectic better than Janet Abu-Lughod in her masterpiece Cairo: 1001 Years of the City Victorious (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971). She skillfully recounts the story of Cairo, woven into a broader national, regional, and international canvas. In the following few pages, I propose to explore a number of sociopolitical forces which have been at work in shaping this unique city in more recent times.

Present-day Cairo has evolved historically through a series of grand political designs. The four physical formations which constituted premodern Cairo were all envisioned and initially carried out by great military—political commanders or empire-builders. Al-Fustat was built by Amr Ibn al-‘Aas, in 641 (A.H. 21); the Abbasid dynasty built al-Askar northeast of it, in 751 (A.H. 133); Ahmad Ibn Tulun added a third settlement adjacent to the second called al-Qita’i’, in 870 (A.H. 256); and the Fatimid Jawhar al-Siqilli built al-Qahira northeast of the three settlements, in 969 (A.H. 358). These four formations all started as military settlements for commanders and soldiers, with a mosque and often a palace at the center of each. They were spaced by the hundred-year ‘Khaldunian Cycle’ of the rise and fall of Muslim dynasties. The four settlements were finally joined and fenced by yet another great military-political commander, Salah al-Din (Saladin), before he set out on his campaigns against the European crusaders in 1187. After that time, premodern Cairo assumed its physical unity and functioned as a single city. Many of the developments—physical and sociocultural—which were to take place in the following three centuries under the Mamlukes occurred within the confines of this single entity, measuring about two square miles. So long as Cairo remained a seat of Egyptian power it thrived and prospered. As Cairo (Egypt) lost its political-military eminence with the Ottoman conquest (1517), the city began to decline in all spheres.

Not until the beginning of the nineteenth century was Egypt, and hence Cairo, able to start the struggle for autonomy from the Ottoman Empire. In this quest Cairo was the seat of two of that century’s most ambitious empire builders. The first, Napoleon, headquartered himself in the city briefly (1798), and tried to unlock its intricate physique and deep cultural secrets. To him, Cairo and hence Egypt, was a challenge and a gateway to the rest of the ‘Orient.’ To Cairo, and hence Egypt, Napoleon was equally a challenge. He was a symbol of another world which had remained almost forgotten since the last showdown with the crusaders six centuries earlier. Many waters had run under that other world’s bridges, but water had stood still and stagnant under Egypt’s bridges. Napoleon stirred the waters too violently for the taste of Cairo. The hitherto slumbering city revolted against the French, and finally forced them out, ending the longest three years in Egypt’s modern history. The traditional city may have been too weak to resist Napoleon’s initial onslaught, but it proved strong enough to foil his dreams.

Meanwhile, Cairo and Egypt were never to return to being a backwater of the Ottoman Empire. There appeared another rising star, Muhammad ‘Ali (1805). More shrewd and more resilient, he attempted to modernize Egypt by circumventing its traditional structures. He created modern institutions parallel to the old, and allowed a lifeline to connect both. With these arrangements, he provided a strong material and labor base which in a matter of two decades enabled Egypt to emerge as a giant regional power. Not only did Egypt secure a de facto independence, but also it posed a deadly threat to the Ottoman Empire itself. This story is too well-known to recount here. But in the process of his quest for modernization and empire-building, Muhammad ‘Ali laid the seed for the dual development of Egypt and Cairo. Muhammad ‘Ali also began the process of expanding modern Cairo—alongside the traditional Islamic city—to the northwest. Although most of Mohammed ‘Ali’s dreams were foiled by the European powers, the seeds and directions he laid for the future expansions of Cairo have proven more lasting.

Since Muhammad ‘Ali’s rule (1805–49), there have been four major modernization attempts: under Khedive Isma‘il (1863–79); during Egypt’s Liberal Age (1922–52); under Nasser (1952–70); and under Sadat (1970–81). Each of these attempts left a lasting impact. Between Ismail’s demise and the Liberal Age (that is, 1881–1922) Egypt was under complete British occupation. Even then, Egypt and Cairo did not cease developing. But it was a development mostly initiated by an alien power to serve its interests.

Ismail’s vision of modernization was to turn Egypt into a piece of Europe and to make Cairo a European city. Turning his back on the traditional Islamic city, he moved the seat of power from the Citadel to ‘Abdin Palace. He seized the opportunity of opening the Suez Canal to hurriedly build new districts in the European style, complete with parks, broad streets, an opera house, street lights, and additional palaces to accommodate his European guests. Many of these developments were to the west of the Islamic city—from Azbakiya to the eastern banks of the Nile between Bulaq and Qasr al-‘Aini, and across into Gezira Island. Ismail’s vision ended in a nightmare for Egypt. His designs and extravaganza saddled Egypt with heavy debts to European governments and banks, allowing growing intervention in Egyptian affairs by foreign powers. As a result, he was deposed, and a popular rebellion led by Egyptian officers again deposed his successor, Khedive Tawfiq, in 1880–81. British occupation of the country began in 1881. Ismail had already opened the doors of Egyptian society and the economy to thousands of foreigners. With British occupation, hundreds of thousands flocked to Egypt in search of fame and fortune. Most of them settled in Cairo and Alexandria. They settled in the new quarters created by Ismail or constructed their own. They started and operated Western-like institutions, and appropriated disproportionate shares of Egypt’s wealth—thanks to the capitulations, the legal shelter provided by the Mixed Courts, and the protection of foreign powers. The construction of Garden City, Zamalek, Heliopolis, and Ma‘adi occurred in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries The old city was very much left alone. While its population was steadily growing, its area remained fixed and its infrastructure completely neglected. As a result, population density skyrocketed and living conditions severely deteriorated. The more ambitious and successful among its population moved out to the newer quarters. The old city, while still containing nearly half of Cairo’s population in the second decade of this century, steadily became socially and economically marginalized. The decline of its guilds and crafts, its ‘ulama’ and merchants had begun with Muhammad ‘Ali a century earlier. But with British rule, the pace of decline was accelerated. While foreigners were the immediate beneficiaries of this process, a new native social formation emerged of technocrats and bureaucrats, who had been sent to Europe for training and higher education under Muhammad ‘Ali. However, it took almost a century for this new middle class (NMC) to fully mature.

The new middle class has knocked on the doors of power many times since ‘Urabi’s Revolt in 1879. It opposed the alliance between the royal aristocracy and foreign powers. In 1919, it managed to mobilize the entire population in a two-month uprising, reminiscent of the Cairo revolts against Napoleon’s armies. As a result, the door to power was partly-opened—enough to let the upper half of the NMC in. Between 1920 and 1950, Cairo lived a quasi-liberal age. A bicameral parliament was created to fulfill the quest for political power. An Egyptian banking industry was established to mobilize economic power, and a modern university was created in response to educational needs. Likewise, cinemas and theaters flourished, and a literary movement thrived. The upper echelon of the NMC was in its heyday in the interwar period. It was quickly turning into a bourgeoisie. Its successful banking encouraged an industrialization venture. The Banque Misr group implemented many projects, ranging from large-scale industries such as textile factories to motion pictures. In the process, a new working class was being created, which, like the NMC, had been unable to grow before, due to local despotism and foreign domination.

Cairo was the center of all these socioeconomic developments. The upper echelons of the NMC moved in large numbers to the newer and better quarters of Cairo—now as partners to and not intruders on the foreign residents. A tacit alliance was soon to develop between the new members of this class and foreign interests. The latter, long sens...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Contents
• Introduction
• Islamic Activism
• Society, Economy, and Polity
• Egypt and the Arab World Reclaiming the Future
• Revisiting Egypt, Islam, and Democracy:
• Back Cover