Xinjiang and China's Rise in Central Asia - A History

Michael E. Clarke

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2011
• ISBN:
  9781136827051
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: International Relations
• Index: Politics & International Relations

The recent conflict between indigenous Uyghurs and Han Chinese demonstrates that Xinjiang is a major trouble spot for China, with Uyghur demands for increased autonomy, and where Beijing's policy is to more firmly integrate the province within China. This book provides an account of how China's evolving integrationist policies in Xinjiang have influenced its foreign policy in Central Asia since the establishment of the People's Republic in 1949, and how the policy of integration is related to China's concern for security and its pursuit of increased power and influence in Central Asia.

The book traces the development of Xinjiang - from the collapse of the Qing empire in the early twentieth century to the present – and argues that there is a largely complementary relationship between China's Xinjiang, Central Asia and grand strategy-derived interests. This pattern of interests informs and shapes China's diplomacy in Central Asia and its approach to the governance of Xinjiang. Michael E. Clarke shows how China's concerns and policies, although pursued with vigour in recent decades, are of long-standing, and how domestic problems and policies in Xinjiang have for a long time been closely bound up with wider international relations issues.

1 China and the integration
of Xinjiang

A history of a permanent provocation

On 5 and 6 July 2009 a wave of violent unrest rocked Ürümqi, the capital of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) of the People's Republic of China (PRC), causing the deaths of one hundred and eighty-four people and injuring over one thousand. The immediate cause of this event was an incident occurring over a week before at a toy factory far to the east in Shaoguan, Guangdong Province, where Han Chinese workers beat to death two Uyghur migrant workers on the basis of a rumour that some Uyghurs had raped Han girls. Reports and images of this violence spread to Xinjiang via the internet, including the posting of a video of the incident on You Tube (Radio Free Asia 2009). Subsequently, a large demonstration of Uyghurs on 5 July, demanding justice for the incident in Shaoguan, deteriorated into a violent riot in which Uyghurs reportedly attacked Han Chinese businesses and individual Han Chinese on the streets. Significant numbers of Ürümqi's Han population then took to the streets on 6 July, many of them crudely armed, and reportedly vandalised Uyghur businesses and attacked Uyghurs before being dispersed by the security forces (Wong 2009a; Economist 2009). Simmering ethnic tension continued throughout the final months of 2009. For instance, large protests by Han Chinese took place in Ürümqi on 3 and 4 September demanding action against alleged attacks on Han by Uyghurs armed with hypodermic syringes. These protests were forcibly broken up by police and resulted in the deaths of up to five people (Wong 2009b). The ongoing unrest prompted unprecedented calls for the resignations of senior officials including Xinjiang's long-serving Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Chairman Wang Lequan (Reuters 2009; Hille 2009). These events also prompted Western governments, particularly the United States, to call on Beijing to exercise ‘restraint’ in its response (White House 2009).

The Ürümqi violence and its aftermath led to five government responses. First, the security forces arrested close to 1,500 Uyghur men in connection to the riots (nine of whom were subsequently sentenced to death) and deployed a major police and army presence in the city. Second, in what is now a customary refrain regarding any unrest in Xinjiang, officials blamed ‘hostile external forces’ for the events in Ürümqi. In particular, Chinese officials excoriated US-based exiled Uyghur activist Rebiya Kadeer and the Munich-based World Uyghur Congress (WUC) for orchestrating it. Third, Beijing forcefully reiterated that Xinjiang is an ‘integral’ part of the ‘motherland’ (China Daily 2009a). Fourth, Beijing sacked the Ürümqi CCP secretary, Li Zhi, Ürümqi's police chief, Liu Yaohua, and eventually replaced long standing regional Party secretary, Wang Lequan, late in 2009. Finally, the authorities paid up to 200,000 yuan (US$29,282) in compensation to the families of Han victims of the Ürümqi violence (Xinhua 2009; Associated Press 2009). This response to the unrest was somewhat incongruous given the current status of Chinese power in Xinjiang. In 2009 China's position in Xinjiang appeared more secure than at any previous time in the sixty-year history of the PRC. China's sovereignty over Xinjiang is not challenged by any other state, territorial disputes with its Central Asian neighbours have largely been settled, Xinjiang–Central Asian trade is blossoming and Xinjiang has experienced substantial economic development. However, Beijing as its response to the July 2009 events, demonstrates remains as sensitive as ever regarding its position in Xinjiang.

Why should this be the case? According the PRC's 2003 White Paper, ‘ The History and Development of Xinjiang’, the region has been an ‘inseparable part of the unitary multi–ethnic Chinese nation’ since the Han Dynasty (206BCE–220CE) (Information Office of the State Council of the PRC 2003). Regardless of the historical accuracy or otherwise of this claim, it is one that is recognised by the majority of states in the contemporary international system. The contemporary Chinese government's regular statements that Xinjiang is an ‘integral’ province of the PRC is not as banal and innocuous as it would first appear – it in fact contains a number of key questions or problems that form the core foci of this book. Indeed, these questions concern the ‘what’, ‘who’ and ‘how’ of the process of Xinjiang's enmeshment into the contemporary Chinese state: what was defined and claimed as constituting ‘China's Xinjiang’, who was deemed to constitute the population of the region, and thus became Chinese citizens, and finally, how, through what strategies, techniques or policies, has the Chinese state sought to make good on these claims?

In this book, I present three main arguments stemming from these questions. First, I argue that the history of Xinjiang from the nineteenth century onward can be seen as an integral yet uncompleted part of the territorialisation, in the Westphalian sense, of modern China. Indeed, the recognition of China's claim to exclusive Westphalian sovereignty over Xinjiang by other states in the international system in the middle of the twentieth century has proven to be but the first, albeit extremely important, step in the Chinese state's quest to make the region an ‘integral’ part of China. Since 1949, the task of the PRC has been to determine who constituted Xinjiang's population and how best to manage their relationship to the state. Second, it is in the realm of these ‘who’ and ‘how’ questions that the theme of a ‘permanent provocation’ is situated. In particular, the manner in which the Chinese state has attempted to resolve these questions has reflected that development in the ‘order of power’ which Michel Foucault termed ‘government rationality’ or ‘governmentality’ (Foucault 1991). This primarily concerns the various processes, means and strategies that the PRC has employed to integrate Xinjiang with China. Third, the manner in which the PRC has sought the integration of the region, has also shaped its foreign policy in Central Asia in fundamental ways by transforming how Beijing conceives of the relationship between Xinjiang and China. Specifically, the progress of integration has meant that Beijing, no longer simply conceives of Xinjiang as a strategic buffer region in the traditional sense, but as a potential strategic and economic asset that can actively contribute to the power of the nation-state.

Territoriality, governmentality and Xinjiang

Charles Maier has argued that the conventional, morality-laden narrative of twentieth-century history, ‘obscures one of the most encompassing or fundamental socio-political trends of modern world development, namely the emergence, ascendancy, and subsequent crisis of what is best labelled “territoriality” ’ (Maier 2000: 807). Maier subsequently defines territoriality as, ‘simply the properties, including power, provided by the control of bordered political space, which until recently at least created the framework for national and often ethnic identity’ (Maier 2000: 808). Of course the dominant form or model of territoriality that shaped ‘modern world development’, in Maier's phrase, has been one that can be broadly characterised as Westphalian – defined by notions of exclusive sovereignty within clearly delimited geographic boundaries. The conventional definition of Westphalian sovereignty in contemporary international relations implies a complementary relationship between authority and territory. For example, one scholar asserts that sovereignty can be understood simply as, ‘supreme authority within a territory’, while Krasner highlights the external implication that, ‘the Westphalian state is a system of political authority based on territory and autonomy’ (Philpott 1999: 570; Krasner 1995/96: 115). Philpott also identifies the crucial role of territoriality in the conception of Westphalian sovereignty: ‘The collection of people over whom the holder of sovereignty rules is defined by virtue of its location within borders, not by some other principle such as family kinship or religious belief … their location within boundaries requires their allegiance to their sovereign’ (Philpott 1999: 570).

Therefore, Westphalian sovereignty implies the exclusive exercise of political authority within a defined territory and that this political authority is independent of all other political authorities within these bounds (Philpott 1999: 570; El Ouali 2006: 637). Thus, the real innovation of Westphalian sovereignty is the pairing of the notion of exclusive political authority within a defined territory with independence – the lack of subordination to other political authorities – in their mutual relations, which leads to the oft noted idea that sovereign states have an equality of rights in the international system (El Ouali 2006: 637). The consensus in the contemporary international relations literature, across realist, liberal and indeed constructivist approaches, thus regards Westphalian sovereignty as the central organising concept of international society (Waltz 1979; Bull 1977; Wendt 1999).

What, then, is the connection between Westphalian sovereignty and the history of Xinjiang's incorporation into modern China? There are two key linkages. First, there is a consensus amongst China scholars that Chinese history since the mid-to late-nineteenth century onward can be seen as an attempt to enter the ‘modern’ international system. This system that was (and is) comprised of Westphalian nation-states required China to reorder or restructure the relationship between political authority and territory. Of particular importance for the Qing in the late imperial period and even more so for its Republican heirs, was to assume the trappings of nation-statehood in order to have their claims to exclusive authority over the territory of the empire recognised as legitimate by other states in the system. This task, it can be suggested, took place at the diplomatic and foreign relations level and was not completed until the middle of the twentieth century. Indeed, William Kirby, has remarked of Republican China (1911–49) that, ‘everything important had an international dimension’, pointing to the fact that much of post-Qing China's transformation, from the nationalist revolution itself to that of the communist revolution, were inextricably linked not only to the role of external powers in China but also China's self-image (Kirby 1997: 433). Essentially, this diplomacy concerned the ‘what’ of China, whether ‘defending’ the Chinese-ness of Xinjiang, Mongolia or reclaiming the treaty ports as ‘Chinese territory’ from Western imperialism.

Second, although this claim had been made and recognised by the ‘international community’ by the mid-twentieth century, it did not necessarily follow, particularly in the case of such frontier regions as Xinjiang, that political authority directed from Beijing filled out those territorial boundaries. This concerns the realm of the ‘who’ and ‘how’ dilemmas noted above – who was deemed to constitute the population of the region, and thus became Chinese citizens and how, through what strategies, techniques or policies, has the Chinese state sought to make good on these claims? Therefore, the second element in the consolidation of China's territoriality, and one that is incomplete, concerns the internal imbrication of Westphalian sovereignty. That is to say, it concerns not only the challenge of extending Beijing's exclusive political authority within the PRC's defined territorial boundaries but to make such authority ‘legitimate’ in the eyes of the population over which it is exercised. This task has been made all the more difficult for the state in the context of Xinjiang (and other regions such as Tibet for example) by the region's multi-ethnic population and their various ethnic, linguistic and religious connections to other political entities in Central Asia. I will suggest that the existence of alternative sources of political authority and alternative modes of legitimacy in Xinjiang can be termed, to use Foucault's characterisation of a ‘power relationship’, as constituting a ‘permanent provocation’:

At the very heart of the power relationship, and constantly provoking it, are the recalcitrance of the will and the intransigence of freedom. Rather than speaking of an essential antagonism, it would be better to speak of an ‘agonism’ – of a relationship that is at the same time mutual incitement and struggle; less a face-to-face confrontation that paralyzes both sides than a permanent provocation:

(Foucault 2002: 342)

In the context of the relation between Xinjiang and China, the Chinese state has often attempted to utilise this ‘permanent provocation’ to reinforce both its perceptions of Xinjiang and the complex of strategies and tactics aimed at integration. The rationale of the Chinese state since the nineteenth century in this regard has been clear and is evident in the contemporary government's claim to the ‘integral’ nature of Xinjiang's attachment to the PRC. The intent to integrate is simultaneously reinforced and legitimated in the state's perception by the very existence of potential alternative political realities both within and external to Xinjiang. Thus, the themes of integration and confrontation have at certain points worked simultaneously to strengthen the state's perception of the necessity of integration and developed its ability to implement this vision.

Arguably, the state's attempt to resolve these ‘who’ and ‘how’ dilemmas has been reflective of a form of power described by Foucault as ‘governmentality’. Foucault's characterisation of ‘government’ as the ‘conduct of conduct’ is essential to the analytical and descriptive power of the notion of governmentality. This definition relies on a number of meanings or senses of the word ‘conduct’. In the first sense ‘to conduct’ means to lead or direct. In a second, and perhaps more important sense, the moral or ethical dimension is emphasised, such as ‘to conduct oneself’ (Foucault 2002: 341; Dean 1999: 10). This second sense, which implies a self–guidance, refers ultimately to the realm of our behaviours and actions. Moreover, the ‘conduct of oneself’ is generally evaluative, in that one's conduct is measured against a set of norms, thereby facilitating a ‘rational’ judgement of actual behaviour (Dean 1999: 10). The exercise of power through this ‘conduct of conduct’ thus essentially constitutes a ‘management of possibilities’. For Foucault, ‘government’ not only refers to political structures or the management of states:

... but also modes of action, more or less considered or calculated, that were destined to act upon the possibilities of action of other people. To govern, in this sense, is to structure the possible field of action of others.

(Foucault 2002: 341)

This ‘management’ of the possible field of action of ‘others’ has been central to the Chinese state's integrationist project in Xinjiang, particularly so since 1949. This has been reflected in such variegated realms or fields as cartography, ethnography and the management of religion across the eighteenth to twenty-first centuries within the state's discourse and actions in Xinjiang. Importantly, the Chinese state's long-term endeavour to integrate the region has also had at its core a concern to establish the legitimacy of Chinese sovereignty in the eyes of the region's non-Han population. Legitimacy has been sought through the application of two broad instruments across two major historical periods. First, as we shall see in Chapter 3, from 1949 to 1976 the CCP sought to establish its legitimacy in Xinjiang initially through the application of its interpretation of the Leninist model of ‘national selfdetermination’, and then through the application of the revolutionary Maoist model of political and economic organisation. Second, as will emerge from Chapters 4, 5 and 6, the Party increasingly moved away from the Maoist model from the late 1970s onward. In the decades since the death of Mao, the Party's legitimacy has increasingly relied on its capacity to deliver continued economic growth and development to the region and its peoples.

Yet the variegated instruments that Beijing has deployed in the region in the furtherance of this goal has arguably contributed to growing insecurity amongst the non-Han population of Xinjiang, a dynamic that suggests a failure to resolve the ‘who’ and ‘how’ questions of Chinese governance of the region. Despite this, however, it is clear that the PRC has achieved a level of control and power in Xinjiang that its Qing predecessors would have envied. The basis for this lies in the connections between processes of territoriality and governmentality. Indeed, the history of Chinese policy in Xinjiang since 1949 suggests that Beijing has gradually recognised that to simply conquer and hold a particular territory will not necessarily make it an ‘integral’ part of the whole nation-state. Rather, as Maier notes, it must be made to work, to be ‘productive’:

The area within will no longer be construed as a passive enclosure to be policed and kept orderly; it will be a source of resources, livelihood, output, and energy. Territory is envisaged not just as an acquisition or as a security buffer but as a decisive means of power and rule.

(Maier 2000: 818)

As such, there has been a significant shift in the Chinese state's perception of Xinjiang since 1949. Under the PRC Xinjiang is no longer simply conceived of as a strategic buffer region in the traditional sense but as a potential strategic and economic asset that can actively contribute to the power of the nation-state. The book is thus focused simultaneously on two ‘tracks’ or themes: the evolution of the state's integrationist strategies and their impact on the PRC's foreign policy in Central Asia.

The integration of Xinjiang and the shape of Chinese foreign policy in Central Asia

Despite the turning of the international spotlight on the region courtesy of the events of 11 September 2001, the question as to what drives China's power and imperatives in Central Asia remain a matter of debate. This book suggests that there is a largely complementary relationship between what may be termed China's Xinjiang, Central Asia and grand strategy-derived interests. This threetiered pattern of interests informs and shapes not only China's diplomacy in Central Asia but also its approach to the governance of Xinjiang. Beijing's apparent post-1991 synthesis of two enduring aspects of its Xinjiang ‘problem’ is the key to the balancing these three tiers. The first aspect concerns the great goal that lends continuity to Xinjiang's history under the People's Republic – that of integration, understood in its two predominant senses. Integration can refer to the relationship between the majority and minority populations of a given state and to ‘the patterns by which the different parts of a nation-state cohere‘ (Mackerras 1994: 7). Meanwhile, integration also concerns, ‘the manner and degree to which parts of a social system (its individuals, groups and organs) interact and complement each other’ (Seymour 1976: 6). The first understanding of integration can be seen as a means by which a large, multi-ethnic state can ensure and maintain sovereignty over its territory, while the second concerns the operation of society once the territorial integrity of the state has been ensured. Thus, the goal of integration in the context of Xinjiang encompasses both senses – the mechanisms by which the state has attempted to incorporate the territory of the region and the deeper endeavour to incorporate the non-Han peoples of the region into what the PRC has defined as the ‘unitary, multi-ethnic’ Chinese state.

The second aspect, and one that has for much of Chinese history prevented the achievement of the goal of integration, concerns the geopolitical position of the province itself – its ‘centrality and intermediate position in Eurasia’ between the great ‘sedentary homelands’ of Europe, Iran, India and China (Millward 200...

Table of contents

• Front Cover
• Title page
• Copyright
• Contents
• Preface
• Acknowledgements
• Abbreviations
• 1 China and the integration of Xinjiang: a history of a permanent provocation
• 2 Xinjiang from the Qing conquest to the Republic of China, 1750–1949
• 3 Completing the forbears behest: the resurgence of the state’s integrationist project under the PRC, 1949–1976
• 4 ‘Crossing the river by feeling for the stones’: Xinjiang in the ‘reform’ era, 1976–1990
• 5 Reaffirming Chinese control in the wake of Central Asia’s transformation, 1991–1995
• 6 Biding time and building capabilities: Xinjiang and Chinese foreign policy in Central Asia, 1996–2001
• 7 Walking on three legs: balancing China’s Xinjiang, Central Asia and grand strategy derived interests, 2002–2009
• 8 The integration of Xinjiang: securing China’s ‘silk road’ to great power status?
• Bibliography
• Index