The Logical Structure of Science

A. Cornelius Benjamin

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2019
• ISBN:
  9781000735499
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Philosophy
• Subtopic: Philosophy History & Theory

This book addresses the argument in the history of the philosophy of science between the positivists and the anti-positivists. The author starts from a point of firm conviction that all science and philosophy must start with the given… But that the range of the given is not definite. He begins with an examination of science from the outside and then the inside, explaining his position on metaphysics and attempts to formulate the character of operational acts before a general theory of symbolism is explored. The last five chapters constitute a treatise to show that the development from one stage of symbolismto the next is inevitable, consequently that explanatory science represents the culmination of knowledge.

THE LOGICAL STRUCTURE OF SCIENCE

CHAPTER I

THE PLACE OF SCIENCE

What is science ?

The question is easily formulated and frequently asked. But as is the case with some of our most profound queries and some of our most recurrent difficulties, the question is asked more often than it is satisfactorily answered. The ease and frequency of its formulation lead one to expect a certain readiness and simplicity in its answer. Neither of these expectations seems to be fulfilled by the rather extensive literature upon the subject. In fact, one gets the distinct impression that many of the most significant features of science are still clouded in relative obscurity. Superficially there seems to be a rather general agreement among authorities; science uses inductive and deductive methods, employs experimental techniques where possible, claims generality, disregards questions of value, etc. But as one penetrates beneath the surface he discovers significant differences and disagreements as to the precise way in which science combines the inductive and deductive methods, the extent and limitations of experimental techniques, the range of the generality of its knowledge, the legitimacy of neglecting questions of value, etc. The conclusion seems to be that, by and large, science is not understood in any satisfactory or final sense.

As is often the case with questions which do not readily yield answers, the difficulty may be due to a lack of precision in formulation. Science, clearly, has a twofold nature. It is a discipline having a subject-matter and internal structure, but it is also a phase or aspect of human culture. Two questions are therefore suggested: (a) What is the structure of science? (b) What is the place of science in the general scheme of things ? The fact that the answers to these questions maybe inter-dependent does not prevent their isolation for purposes of study. The answer to the former involves such considerations as the following: the method of science, its assumptions, the validity of its results, its chief problems and the way in which they are solved, the meaning of its basic concepts and principles. The result is a synthetic view of science as the systematic whole of its elements; one sees science as a whole because he has seen it piece-meal. But this obviously does not characterize science adequately, for science is a type of human behavior, a phase of social activity; it cannot therefore be understood apart from its logical and functional relations to the other aspects of human life. Not only is there science; there is science and religion, science and art, science and morality, science and industry. Thus one may attempt to determine the nature of science by examining human activity as a whole and pointing out the place which science occupies in this total experience.

Moreover, the second of these two questions yields to further analysis. Two more specific questions emerge: (1) How has science in any particular historical period influenced and been influenced by the contemporary art, religion, morality and other associated human activities ? (2) What are the logical relationships which the activity we call scientific bears to those other human activities which we call art, religion, morality, etc.? The former is a question of actual causal influences, the latter is one of theoretical coordination; the former presupposes a thorough understanding of the historical epoch, the latter involves a philosophical perspective of human activities in general. The former might be answered in terms of the modern period by pointing out how science by its emphasis on the physiology of human behavior has weakened the efficacy of moral standards in the life of the individual, how the worship of science has led to the attempt to apply its methods and criteria to the field of religion in the effort to “make religion scientific,” how the recent advances in the practical aspects of science have led to a significant revision in our manner of living and in our resulting outlook upon life, how the concepts of growth and development in the biological sciences have determined a view of the universe as organic in which we must “take time seriously.”

It is the task of the following pages to answer the question, What is science ? But I hope to profit by this preliminary analysis of the problem. As a result, I shall confine my attention mainly to the more specific question of the structure of science. The chapters which follow the present one will, in fact, be devoted to a consideration of precisely this question. But to begin immediately with this issue would be to approach the subject somewhat abruptly. A more gradual introduction seems desirable. Consequently, since one is in a better position to understand the structure of science if he sees it first in its general context, I have chosen to devote the present chapter to a discussion of the logical place of science in the general scheme of human activities and experiences. The historical, i.e. the functional, problem will be neglected completely; it is obviously of too great scope to be considered here.¹ Our problem, then, is one of determining upon the basis of a general analysis of human activities the nature of scientific activity and its logical relations to certain other disciplines of which the most important is philosophy.² It is the essential task of this chapter to determine what is meant by the philosophy of science.

Human Activities

The outstanding fact with reference to human activities, which may be taken as the starting-point for the discussion in this chapter, is that they are all value activities. The essential feature of a value activity is that it is pursued for the sake of an interest or a desire. Now the end or goal of the activity may be found in the activity itself or it may be found in something external to it. It seems to be characteristic of the basic human activities that they are pursued not for themselves but for the sake of an end which, although intimately bound up with the activity, is essentially outside of it. Thus the value activities are pursued extrinsically for the sake of ends which are desired intrinsically. To say that the ends are desired intrinsically is simply to affirm that they are preferred in and for themselves. It seems to be impossible to get beneath the fact of preference; man, as a matter of fact, does have likes and dislikes. Furthermore he seeks that which he likes and avoids that which he dislikes. The end of the activity is the value, and the activities pursued in the attempt to gain the end are the value activities.

¹ The literature upon this problem is extensive. Typical examples are the following: E. A. Burtt, Metaphysical Foundations of Physical Science (New York, 1925); A. N. Whitehead, Science and the Modern World (New York, 1925); C. E. Ayres, Science, the False Messiah (Indianapolis, 1927); J. W. Krutch, The Modern Temper (New York, 1929); B. A. W. Russell, The Scientific Outlook (London, 1931).

² Some of the most valuable references upon this topic are the following: Robert Flint, Philosophy as Scientia Scientiarum (London, 1904); H. E. Bliss, The Organization of Knowledge and the System of the Sciences (New York, 1929); E. C. Richardson, Classification, Theoretical and Practical (New York, 1901); C. S. Peirce, Collected Papers, Vol. 1 (Harvard University, 1931), Book II; E. Goblot, Le système des sciences (Paris, 1922).

Now these characteristic value activities and experiences seem to fall more or less naturally into certain fairly well defined classes. In other words human experience reveals certain typical or representative kinds of activity, each of which is associated with its proper end or ideal. In presenting such a classification of human activities one is confronted with alternative methods of describing them. One may define the activities in terms of the ideals or one may define the ideals in terms of the activities. Since the two are strictly correlative the difference is of no great importance. In the following listing it will be more convenient to characterize the activity in terms of the ideal.

Perhaps the most obvious of these types of activity is that which is concerned with the satisfaction of the wants of the body; it is activities of this type which relate us most intimately with the animals. The ideal of this type of activity may be characterized as health or physical well being, and the essential activities will be those of eating, sleeping, exercising and resting, caring for the body in such ways as to prevent the encroachment of disease, protecting oneself from harm, etc. Closely related to this type of activity, but distinguishable from it, is that whose end is recreation in general without particular regard for considerations of health. Man is essentially a play-loving animal and engages in certain definite pursuits whose aim is the realization of this end. The great diversity of activities employed in the attainment of this end makes any listing of them impossible; obviously what is for one individual recreation is for another work, and what is recreation for an individual at one time may be work at another. But the fact that they are distinguishable indicates that they are different kinds of activity, and the principle of differentiation must lie in the character of the goal in the attainment of which they are employed. In such a list we find all kinds of play—individual and social, pursuit of hobbies, intellectual and physical pastimes, etc. But life is not all play, and we find that the need of man for food, clothing, and shelter gives rise to another type of activity which is usually classed as economic. The ideal in this case we may characterize as wealth, using this term in the ordinary sense as that which has value in exchange. Economic activities are usually defined, at least in the more highly developed societies, as those devoted to the attainment through social activity of goods which could not easily be attained through individual activity. Through co-operative enterprises man finds it possible to produce and store up goods of one kind, which may then be employed as exchange values in obtaining goods of another kind; in this class fall all activities devoted to the production and transfer of the material and immaterial goods of life. But as social beings we participate in new activities devoted to the attainment of more permanent and more satisfying relations with our fellow men. Within the life of the individual there are certain experiences which are incapable of being understood apart from what may be called values of association; in this class fall all of the activities concerned with the family, the community, the state and the nation. Activities related to experiences of this sort clearly fall together and constitute a type of human activity. Intimately bound up with these activities is that class which is constituted by moral activities. Here we find all of those experiences, more strictly individual than the former, which are directed to the pursuit of goodness or character. The generally recognized values of this type are honesty, temperance, virtue, benevolence, etc. Still more characteristically human, perhaps, are those activities concerned with the pursuit of esthetic values; man is intrinsically interested in the creation and appreciation of beauty. However beauty may be defined, it is possible to group together all of the activities and experiences of the individual in his attempt either to embody beauty in a material form or to extract it for his own enjoyment from the creations of nature or the productions of other beings like himself. Of somewhat the same kind are those activities called religious. These are less adequately defined though they possess enough marks in common to be grouped into the same class. Here will be found worship, prayer, devotion, faith, and allied experiences, in so far as they are concerned with the attempt to establish harmonious relations between man and the world of nature. Man finds himself in a world which is fundamentally hostile and antagonistic to the realization of many of his fondest hopes. Through propitiatory acts and intellectual constructions he attempts to allay the hostility either by bringing the world into harmony with his wishes or by explaining the fact of evil and thus seeing it as an inevitable concomitant of natural processes. The final aim of the activity is reconciliation with nature, and this may therefore be taken as the ideal in terms of which the activity is to be defined. Finally there are the activities which may be classified as reflective or scientific in the broadest sense of the word. In this group fall all experiences associated with the pursuit and attainment of truth or knowledge in its diverse forms.¹

At this point one is tempted to loiter. Such a classification of human activities suggests a large number of interesting and important problems. But since such problems are foreign to the main content of our discussion, we may be satisfied with a mere mention of one of them.²

It is clear that such a list of value activities, if an ordering principle based upon preference is adopted, readily expresses one’s value outlook upon life in general. For man not only engages in these various value activities but is prone to evaluate the values among themselves and to order them upon the basis of the part they play in life. This is the problem of the evaluation of values. Since conflicts often arise between two kinds of activity, it is important to have at hand a scale which will inform us as to which of the antagonistic values is more to be desired. For the academically minded, truth is supreme and all else is to be sacrificed to the pursuit of truth; for the religious enthusiast, values of religion are paramount; for the artist, beauty is supreme; for the materialist, wealth is the ultimate end of life. Thus such an ordering of value activities expresses one’s philosophy of life, in the ordinary sense of the word. Since our concern is not with a value attitude toward the universe, no attempt at appraisal is to be read into the list presented above.

¹ The results of this discussion and of that which immediately follows are summarized in a table on page 32. It may be well for the reader to refer to this table in advance.

² It is unnecessary to point out that such a listing is largely arbitrary. Many would wish to exclude play activities, others would question the advisability of including bodily activities, still others would identify morality and religion or morality and social behavior. I note that the list as given coincides closely with the list given by W. G. Everett, Moral Values (London, 1920), p. 182.

It is true that such a classification suggests that the various types of activity are more independent of one another than they are in fact. If we consider one of them, say the reflective activity, we can readily illustrate this point...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Original Title Page
• Original Copyright Page
• Preface
• Table of Contents
• Chapter I. The Place of Science
• Chapter II. The Structure of Science
• Chapter III. Nature: Occurrents
• Chapter IV. Nature: Complexes
• Chapter V. Awareness
• Chapter VI. Operations
• Chapter VII. Meaning
• Chapter VIII. Meaning: Correlational symbols
• Chapter IX. Meaning: Constructs and Hypotheses
• Chapter X. The Development of Knowledge
• Chapter XI. Models
• Chapter XII. Description
• Chapter XIII. Explanation
• Chapter XIV. Quantitative Methods
• Index