A An overview of colonial expansion in the Southeast Asia
In company with commencing the long haul of transformation into modern capitalist economies and nation states, Europeans had conducted a process of expansion that led to European encounters with the âothersâ, beyond what the scope of the âbarbarianâ peoples referred to in ancient periods.1 This process of expansion, begun in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, extended well into following centuries, with expeditions keenly probing around the globe.
During the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the Europeans had advanced their explorations in three main areas. In the beginning they concentrated on the Atlantic basin from the Atlantic islands and coastal western Africa to the hinterlands of the American continents. Subsequently, the northern seas fell into the grip of the Europeans, stretching eastward from the Baltic to the White Sea and the Siberian Coast and westward to the coasts of Canada. Then came the Oriental seas and northern Asia. The Pacific region was brought under the European influence during the eighteenth century, when the islands and coastal regions in and bordering the west Pacific, such as Australia, New Zealand, New Guinea and the Pacific Islands, were grabbed by the European explorers.
When Europeans arrived in Southeast Asia as early as in the fifteenth century, they did not come into a decaying and impoverished hemisphere, but rather a wealthy, open and dynamic region. Situations subsequently changed, in both the Europeansâ intentions and the overall context, as the growing European interests extended beyond acquiring trade concessions into huge and prosperous markets in Southeast Asia and China. Instead, the desire to obtain minerals and growing crops for export, for further encroachment into the hinterland of Asian continent, and for prestige in both political and legal legitimacy began to overshadow those original mercantilistic commercial activities.
In this context, at the end of the nineteenth century, there was hardly a piece of land in the world into which the Europeans had not exerted their economic and military powers, let alone the more provocative religious and cultural infiltration. These European penetrations around the globe set in motion processes which resulted in a new reality that the world had been defined by trans-cultural and trans-national phenomena. Prescribed by Wolf, with insights and persuasions, these were the encounters and implications between the Europeans and the rest in the post-1400 world. European expansion created a market of global magnitude by incorporating pre-existing networks of exchanges and by creating new itineraries and historical trajectories between continents bridging European and non-European populations and societies. Intriguingly, this pattern of historical process and international commodity exchange had fostered regional specialization and had initiated worldwide movements of commodities. The growth of European trade and the dominion of capitalism, originating in the European continent, had brought about a qualitative change not only in the regnant mode of production, but also in the commercial network connected with it.2
In Southeast Asia, western countries came in different periods, but had gradually established a condominium of great powers both in the Asian continent and the bordering West Pacific Ocean. In Indonesia, the Dutch greatly expanded their power between 1750 and 1914, by conducting commercial activities and administrations mainly on two big islands, Java and Sumatra.3 After consolidating their position in India, the British became interested in, yet had not become deeply involved in the Malay Peninsula until the late eighteenth century.4 The British also extended their power into the area inhabited mostly by Muslim Malays in Borneo and Sarawak in the middle of the nineteenth century. The French ambitions were in Vietnam, gradually creeping into the Indochina continent in pursuit of a âcivilized missionâ to cultivate the people by spreading French culture and religion, commercial gain, and control of riverine areas along the Mekong and Red River routes.5
B Evolution of intergovernmental maritime cooperation and practices6
The European expansion would not have been vindicated without the advancement of maritime technology and the re-envisioned world views. Following the unfolding of the world map from the European continent, expansion expeditions of these empires helped cultivate the classic mercantilist economy, in which its theoretical advancement and operation was underpinned by state policies and practices of mercantilism, along with a row of measures that helped empires to maintain balances of trade.7 In this sense, it is argued that acquisitions of overseas territories and colonies were effected mainly to increase the wealth of the imperial mother nation by furnishing raw materials at controlled prices to the advantage of the mother country. The kinetics between mercantilist economy and the formation, and even collapse, of empires, could also be verified, as it has been asserted that âwealth is needed to underpin military power, and military power is needed to acquire and protect wealth.â8
From this line, imperial encounters on the sea aroused issues and challenges both among expeditioners themselves and with local and indigenous communities. Within these empires, raw materials, fresh labour and markets with huge export potentials brought about from overseas occupation triggered fierce competition in political manoeuvring in metropole capitals, and legal brainstorming among European intellectuals. The proposal of a liberal formula for maritime traffic, from which the right for free trade in the newly discovered territories was granted to those equipped with required capabilities, was staunchly upheld by late-coming Dutch colonialist-cum-merchants.9
One positive side was that this competition brought to the table the agenda of law-making and conflict management in maritime affairs among these empires. It developed further when maritime communication became an artery critical for continuing thriving of imperial dominance on the Indian Ocean and the Southeast Asian waters. Leaving aside whether certain criteria drawing the line separating the civil and military dimension of these imperial maritime activities had been developed in due course, it was an era where conventions were to be redrawn â and the view re-envisioned â in the scenario of law-making and rule-compounding in maritime communication. Nevertheless, what overshadowed this rosy picture was the differentiation, if not outright discrimination, in the application of rules and institutions to European polities and non-European kingdoms and dynasties in the exotic, non-Christian world. Adam Watson poignantly observed, âThe rules and institutions which the Europeans spread to Persia and China in the nineteenth century were those which they had evolved with the OttomansâŚrather than those in use within itselfâŚâ10
By the mid-nineteenth century, the ideal of international cooperation in maritime affairs was accompanied by sprouting efforts, taking multilateral treaties as a type of international legislation and an initiative for a prosperous outlook. The Declaration of Paris of 1856 marked the beginning of converging a consensus of maritime affairs management at the international level.11 Despite an aftermath effort in post-war period of the Crimean War, which seemed dedicated more to wrap up the conflict but not to commence commencing international judicialization and institutionalization of rules of maritime affairs, this Declaration laid out protections of vessels and cargos during belligerency.12 It further advocated the abolishing of privateering and the binding of blockades based on the effectiveness principle.13
Subsequent efforts were picked up in 1884, when the International Convention for the Protection of Submarine Cables was signed by 26 nations, aiming to deal with international communication and vessel operations.14 Later in 1889, the Washington Conference on Safety at Sea was convened to discuss difficult issues, such as rules to determine the seaworthiness of vessels and compulsory sea lanes in frequented waters.15 Other than these, the Conference had considered creating a permanent international maritime committee, a predecessor of the International Maritime Organization today. These international efforts, as law-making efforts aiming at global uniformity were nevertheless aborted.16 Yet, they had at least reaffirmed that treaty process, which converged, recalibrated and refined proposals and opinions from participating countries, all of which appeared essential for the progressive harmonization and unification of laws in maritime trade and shipping.17
These efforts, however, encountered rather tepid responses from the international community, as international cooperation was suspended during the ferocious maritime and naval competition between the powers in the early years of the twentieth century. The First World War further postponed these important international works, which were not resumed until 1929. The 1929 Conference produced a new convention, dealing with the subjects concerning safety standards and technology of vessels, and lifesaving appliances on the ship.18 An International Rules of the Road was also included.
The League of Nations, established after the First World War and surviving only 20 years, nevertheless took up some maritime subjects and was able to achieve some success with respect to uniform systems of maritime signals and buoys. However, subjects such as oil pollution of the oceans were less successful and had not seen any breakthrough until after the Second World War in 1958.19 To a considerable extent, the multilateral treaty process was one critical step in forging and reifying international consensus in maritime law-making and rules-compounding. Despite its overtly idealistic discourses and the lack of political support from members in the international community because of the deteriorating economy and dwindling trade, the League of Nations had demonstrated the feasibility of international cooperation in this early period in international law-making in maritime affairs, only that its system of collective security had failed to achieve the contextual stability and global peace thus required.20