Marxism In The Contemporary West

Charles F. Elliott

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2019
• ISBN:
  9780429728037
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politica e relazioni internazionali
• Subtopic: Politica

What is the relationship between Marxist ideology and the politics of the contemporary West? The contributors to this book treat this question expansively, examining Marxism and the activities of European and Latin American communist parties in the broad context of contemporary Western politics. Their discussion encompasses not only political and p

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Marxism in the Contemporary West

Carl A. Linden

Revolutionary Marxism, it is often observed, has in its history contradicted its founder's theory of modern revolution. Marxism, principally in its Leninist incarnation, has had its most visible successes in capturing power not in the industrially advanced nations of the democratic West as Marx theorized, but in the economically under-developed nations of what is now loosely termed the "Third World." For Marx, a developed Western Europe not only was to serve as the fulcrum of his hoped-for world revolution, but also provide the industrial foundation of his envisioned communist society.

In modern Western Europe social democratic parties shed their Marxism and sought power not on a wave of revolution but through popular election. Finding the path to the seats of authority and the possibilities of major social reform open in Western civic culture, they dispensed with Marxist notions of forceful and total revolution and accepted the constraints of non-violent civil contest. Western communist parties, discovering few openings for revolutionary takeovers in the second half of the twentieth century, began diluting without discarding their Leninist and Marxist articles of faith and adopted electoral alliance strategies for obtaining power. This shift in doctrine and strategy, though varied in form and specific content in the individual Western communist parties, acquired the common name of "Eurocommunism." It amounted to a concerted attempt by such parties to erase the long-time scandal of the failure of Marxist revolution in the Western world. These strategies of Eurocommunism, while attaining some local and temporary successes, have nowhere gained a decisive and enduring victory. In fact, at the beginning of the eighties the chances of such victory for any Eurocommunist party have somewhat dimmed, at least for the time, and the Marxian paradox of success in the Third World and failure in the Western world remains. The Eurocommunist movement, however, continues its energetic effort to find a winning combination in Western electoral politics.

Lenin, who saw a great betrayal of the Marxist faith in the Western social democratic movement, was quick to sense the paradox in the original Marxian prognosis. Not very long after his Marxist faction seized power in Russia in 1917, he gave up his hope and expectation that Western Europe with its large and experienced labor movement, especially in Germany, would generate and sustain a world-wide communist revolution. He turned, it will be recalled, to the idea that communist-led revolution In the East would first have to prepare the way for revolution In the West. The Marxian paradox has applied not only to the "West" taken in a narrow geographic sense. Neither has revolutionary Marxism succeeded in winning power in nations outside the North Atlantic region which have undergone a fair degree of "Westernization" and where Western civil and democratic principles have gained a foothold in their political life.

The paradox does not, however, justify the conclusion that Western or Westernized nations are impervious to revolutionary Marxism under any circumstances. To fasten upon such a conclusion neglects the neither marginal nor inconsequential influence Marxist ideology and Marxist-inspired movements have exerted in the West over the course of modern political history. Contemporary Eurocommunism and its counter-parts elsewhere have built their hopes and programs on this basis and have at least been able to come within striking distance of the seats of governing power on several occasions. Italy provides the foremost example in Europe and the brief rule of Allende in Chile has provided the one case of actual, though short-lived, victory through electoral means.

Marxism as a political ideology, indeed, is broader and more far-ranging than its Leninist version which has historically animated the activity of the various communist parties of the Western world. The activity and influence of such parties cannot be understood in isolation but only in relation to Marxism as a persisting and peculiar ideological, as well as political presence in the politics of the Western world. Neither can such an understanding be complete without a consideration of the relation of Marxist ideology to the democratic civil ethos and the potentials for crisis and change in the contemporary West.

Marxism, as an ideology, casts a wide net and provides at hand a convenient common language of discourse for those whose discontent with the Western civil order and political tradition is radical or deep-seated. For some, the language and its presuppositions are adopted wittingly, either in whole or in part. For many more, it is accepted at least partially as a plausible and convenient view of the ways of the world and as a basis for action in the world.

Indeed, the historical rise of Marxist parties to dominion and rule in Eastern, rather than Western, lands has produced an impression that Marxism is more an "Eastern" than "Western" ideology, despite the fact that it arose out of Western philosophical culture. That Impression, however, has been reinforced by various political figures and writers. Guy Mollet, the former French Premier and socialist leader, for example, distilled a widespread opinion in his quip that the French communist party was not "Left" but "East"--its heart was in Moscow rather than Paris. The late Mao Tse-tung also promoted the notion of the Eastern-ness of Marxism with his slogans that the "East is Red" and the "East wind will prevail over the West wind" despite the obvious fact that "Red," ideologically speaking, was originally a Western export.

To say that Marxism arose out of Western culture of course can be understood in two ways--as an ideology that is a legitimate offspring of that culture or as one that comes out of that culture in the sense of standing outside of and over and against that from which it comes. Hence, the question is often asked: does Marxism represent a culmination of or a rupture of Western civic culture? Marx believed he could have it both ways; his predicted communist revolution destroys Western class society, its various forms of political rule and its intrinsic injustice, on the one hand, and, on the other, realizes the promise of freedom and equality in social life which originally arose in the West. Nonetheless, the notion of a rupture with the civil heritage of the West is of the essence in the revolutionary Marx. It prevails over the theme of continuity that is also found in his thought. The communist revolution, for Marx, could only be built on the foundations provided by the developed Western industrial societies. These foundations which Marx saw as more than narrowly economic and technological constitute the basic element of continuity in his revolutionary doctrine. Nonetheless, the revolutionary process he outlined entails a fundamental, not superficial, change of regime and a break with all past and present political orders that have come forth in Western civic culture.

Marx, like many 19th century Western revolutionists despite his dark picture of injustice and dehumanizing conditions of the industrial society of his time, was, in the last analysis, an optimist and true believer in the idea of progress. He did not heed, for example, the didactic pessimism of the founder of Western political thought, Plato. This father of Western philosophy warned of the strong tendency in man's political affairs to go from bad to worse, and took into account the temptations to which even the best in human nature is peculiarly prone. Modern constitutional thought--including the American--takes this warning seriously and seeks to hedge against the danger in its structuring of democratic institutions. Marx rather thought things in the modern world were getting worse in order, in turn, to get better. He thus offered his well-known five-stage progressive but dialectical ascent to the best regime,* i.e., matured communist society. The contrast of Marx's scheme to Plato's retrogressive but also dialectical five-stage descent in his Republic from the philosophical best to the palpably despotic worst regime is too pointed to be accidental.

Plato warned that tyranny is the final outcome of a process of first losing sight of the right principle of rule and then losing a grip on any principle of rule whatever. He argued that the reformation of politics begins by establishing the right principle of rule in ourselves through reasoning with ourselves and others and thus making self-rule the seed-bed for the best political life. Marx, by contrast, sought the revolutionary overthrow of all principles of political rulership as the precondition of the post-revolutionary communist regime. Only then, he believed, would men enjoy self-rule without political constraints.

Indeed, there may be reason to suspect that Marx put the cart before the horse. Plato's foresight rather than Marx's prognostication is borne out by the practice as against the theory of modern Marxist movements which have come to power in the modern world. The calculated destruction of politics that Marxism has sought, and that is in fact realized most categorically in its various Leninist incarnations, has, in practice, resulted in the formation of totalist ideocratic despotisms. Communist power structures systematically suppress normal political life in the societies they dominate. These despotic orders ironically allow none to rule themselves according to their judgment and reason, but impose by force and indoctrination their ideological dictates upon their subjects.

However, the argument is frequently made that despotic tendencies are not inherent in revolutionary Marxism, especially if it were to come to power in Western or in Westernized societies. Typically, such an argument gains public currency when the electoral strength of communist parties attain formidable levels through coalitions with socialist or other left-wing parties and they thus gain a chance of attaining governing power by constitutional or politically legitimate means. In the seventies the Eurocommunist current among the communist parties tirelessly promoted this argument. Eurocommunist leaders and their circles of sympathizers—whether in Italy, France, Spain or elsewhere--convey the notion that the manifest unfreedom in the dominions of their Eastern brethren would not be reproduced in the West if they were to gain power. Under Eurocommunist rule, they imply, the West would not lose its cultural identity or its democratic soul. Eurocommunism--despite the relative newness of the term--is not unique; Allende in Chile was among its earlier counter-parts.

Characteristically, the Eurocommunist-style leadership focuses on the element of continuity in Marxist doctrine. It plays down the other element of the same doctrine--the notion of a revolutionary rupture with the past. It discounts and sometimes revises those Leninist tenets which both in theory and practice provide justification for revolutionary violence, systematic suppression of opposition, and terroristic methods against the "class" enemy. Finally, it offers itself as an heir of Western culture, respectful of the rules of democracy and civil rights as well as of the constraints on political action imposed by parliamentary and constitutional traditions.

Many in the Western world have anguished a good deal in recent years over this preferred proposition. It also became a sore point of public debate. Some in the left and others even in the moderate left of center urged that this potentially irreversible experiment in Eurocommunist participation in government be tried. They suggested that in this way Western communist parties might finally become domesticated to Western democratic ways and even sever their long time tie with Marxist-Leninist revolutionism. Such notions recently lost some of their topicality as the fortunes of electoral Eurocommunism declined at the end of the seventies in various Western countries such as Italy, Prance and Spain.

Further, such notions have tended to lose force in the face of doubts among electorates and Western political elites on Eurocommunism's proclaimed fidelity to the democratic process. Similarly, Allende-ism in republican Chile even more dramatically foundered against these same doubts. Eurocommunism could not easily erase the awareness in the Western world of the chameleon-like character of revolutionary Marxism in its past adaptions to its political surroundings. It has shown Machiavellian skill in relying on craft and the manipulation of appearances as much as main force in the pursuit of power. It proceeds on the premise that not only are men easily deceived but are so because they are first of all ready to deceive themselves. Men also are distracted from the lessons of experience under forceful persuasion, and proceeding on such assumptions, it is ever persistent in the search for a winning strategy and is not fazed by failure. This remarkable persistence in devising strategies, however, is a distinguishing characteristic of communist parties and is rooted in Marxism-Leninism's ideological conviction in ultimate victory. Despite the revisionism of the Eurocommunist party leaders, their typical tracts observe certain political and ideological limits on the policy of adaptation to Western political orders. They do not, for example, renounce Leninism outright. Rather, their revisions focus on specific Leninist formulations. Moreover, such revisions are usually measured, circumspect and qualified lest they lose their identities as leaders of a communist party in the Marxist-Leninist tradition and thus become indistinguishable in ideological line, if not in organizational character from their moderate social democratic and socialist rivals.

The limits of adaptation of Eurocommunist leadership and their counterparts elsewhere to the norms and rules of Western-style democracy is perhaps nowhere more apparent than in their own intra-organizational practice. All Eurocommunist-style leaderships more or less assiduously protect the key Leninist concept of "democratic centralism" against fundamental challenge. The gist of the concept lies in its strict prohibition of "factions"i.e., no groupings within the party can openly canvass for and organize support to challenge or unseat the incumbent leadership. Here, of course, the extreme Stalinist and Leninist versions of the concept must be distinguished. The Stalinist version which radically stifles internal debate or expression of differing opinions inside the party organization is rejected and Lenin's version adopted which permitted a measure of internal debate and expression of differences of view--i.e., as long as critics of the party line did not act in concert in promoting their views. Nonetheless, even the Leninist concept remains an extremely effective weapon in the hands of an incumbent leader to ward off and, if necessary, purge challengers. It also well nigh prevents any movement "from below" to change the leadership. A striking example of its usefulness in helping an incumbent leader impose his will is provided in the case of the Spanish communist party's leader, Santiago Carrillo. "Democratic centralism" enabled him to impose his "Eurocommunist" views on the Spanish party despite the reluctance of important segments of the party to accept them. Thus, Carrillo used the same means that enabled his orthodox Leninist counterpart in Portugal, Cunhal, to enforce his views within the Portuguese communist party, sometime earlier.*

None of this denies strains and conflicts that the flexible Eurocommunist-style political line has produced within communist parties and especially between these parties and the Soviet communist party. Nonetheless, the Leninist organizational practice of Eurocommunist leaders does not harmonize well with their pledges of devotion to the democratic spirit and the legitimacy of loyal opposition. Of course, from the Soviet viewpoint, Eurocommunist selective tampering with Leninist tenets is profoundly questionable. It views as dangerous heterodoxy Eurocommunist assertions that the "dictatorship of the proletariat"--signifying the employment of political violence against opposition--is not the only means to power, but that various electoral coalition strategies with other parties are justified as a means to power in European parliamentary systems. Moreover, in Soviet eyes, the relative tolerance of differing opinions within Eurocommunist parties, for example in today's Italian communist party, undermines party discipline. Such tolerance, the Soviets warn, leads to the self-destruction of the party as a communist party. For the Soviets, the object lesson is provided by the liberalization of the Czech party in 1968 prior to the military intervention to crush that liberalization movement.

Despite the strain in the ties between the Soviet party and the West European parties under Eurocommunist leaderships, such ties still run deep and have, by no means, been destroyed. To cut the cord of connection with the Soviet party and in effect the 1917 Leninist revolution entirely, removes the ground of historical legitimacy from the Western communist parties. Moreover, the claim to be part of a single historically-based revolutionary movement is undercut and their peculiar identity, both ideological and organizational, as communist and not socialist or social democratic parties, is erased. Indeed, to the Soviets' great displeasure, the Italian and Spanish Eurocommunist leaders have blurred and de-emphasized these connections. Yet, ambiguity remains. The ties that bind have not been irrevocably broken.*

However, what may be more telling is not the unprecedented flexibility of the political lines of the Eurocommunist-type leadership, but rather the unrelenting persistence and constancy of Western communist parties over more than six decades in seeking a successful strategy for attaining power. The Eurocommunist strategies are the latest, and perhaps most daring, phase of a movement that has always been characterized by its combination of opportunism in means and single-mindedness in the pursuit of power. At the core of Soviet-Eurocommunist disagreements is not the goal of revolution, but rather the relationship between the two sides of standard party strategy--the opportunistic side carried to excess can dilute the party's sense of purpose and the doctrinaire side, if too narrowly insisted upon, can close out new possibilities for the seizure of power.

As engineers of revolution, their argument is really about how to mark out and then occupy the ideological and organizational space necessary for a successful bid for power within a democratic civil order.* Indeed, this is what Eurocommunism and its variants outside of Western Europe seek to do. It is for this reason that they question the adequacy of certain classical Leninist formulations for taking power and come into collision with the orthodox line of the Brezhnev leadership in Moscow. However, there is nothing unalterable in the Soviet position. A narrowing of differences with Western parties is always possible, though not, at the present stage, likely. The seed-bed for today's Eurocommunism is, in fact, found in the revisions of Leninist doctrine that occurred in the Soviet party after Stalin's death. Such themes as the permissibility of "different paths of socialism," and the possibility of "peaceful transition to socialism" were incorporated into the Soviet line under Khrushchev's aegis. These revisions of Leninist dogma were characterized as "creative Leninism," i.e., as consistent with Lenin's own revisions of doctrinal formulas to adapt them to changed political circumstances. While the Soviet leadership returned to a more orthodox stand after Khrushchev's fall, and soft-pedaled such changes in doctrine, the revised formulas have not been renounced. Such formulas can again serve as a future basis of a more flexible Soviet party line whenever the leadership may deem it to its advantage. While the long symbiosis between the Soviet party and the Western communist parties ha...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Series Page
• Title
• Copyright
• Dedication
• Contents
• Preface
• 1. Marxism in the Contemporary West
• 2. Marxism in Latin America
• 3. The Four Faces of Eurocommunism
• 4. The PCI, Leninism, and Democratic Politics in Italy
• 5. Ideology and Organization in the Spanish Communist Party
• 6. "Les Nouveaux Philosophes" and Marxism
• 7. Freedom, Marxism, and Modern Man: Solzhenitsyn's Moral Critique
• The Contributors
• Index