Drones and the Future of Air Warfare

The Evolution of Remotely Piloted Aircraft

Michael P. Kreuzer

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2016
• ISBN:
  9781317285786
• Edition: 1
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: Military & Maritime History
• Index: History

This book examines the evolution of airpower and specifically the growth and proliferation of Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPAs).

While most existing literature examines either the law or ethics of RPAs, and some newer scholarship looks to the battlefield effectiveness (the gains from strikes versus the potential for 'blowback, etc.), this work investigates it from a broader military perspective. It examines the strategy for employment of RPAs across the spectrum of warfare, the potential deterrent value of RPAs in some circumstances, and the resulting ability of RPAs to fundamentally shift the character of when and how wars are fought. The central aim of this book is to evaluate the role of 'drones' in warfare to date, and make basic projections on how states will adopt RPAs and UCAVs in the future. At the core is the goal of answering a broad, underlying research question: How will the RPA innovation impact military strategy and international security?

This book will be of much interest to students of airpower, drone warfare, military and strategic studies, security studies and IR.

1
Introduction

Another book about ‘drones?’ Given the events of the past few years, the interest in the legal and ethical questions surrounding ‘drones’ and the technophile interest in the future of war with these new weapons, the market might appear saturated with writings on the topic ranging from condemnation of the moral hazards of ‘robotic warfare’ to others casually welcoming the prospect of what might be the next inevitable technological leap forward in modern warfare. So, why write another book on ‘drones,’ and why the insistence on calling them remotely piloted aircraft and unmanned combat aerial vehicles, or RPAs and UCAVs?¹

As I read through the material available on RPAs, I saw a number of perspectives represented, from legal scholars, policymakers, and those generally interested in the interaction of technology and society and/or warfare, but few written from the military perspective examining the strategic and historical implications. Tom Ehrhard, one of the earliest writers about RPAs in 2000, appears as a lone exception; though as with many works on the subject by military authors his perspective largely remains trapped in an unpublished dissertation. His more recent work and the work of many others on the subject of RPAs reside in military journals and defense policy papers, largely inaccessible to those without a deeper understanding of air warfare and military strategy.

This observation was central to a larger problem which is my central concern, that is, a growing divergence between the public policy discussion and defense establishment surrounding the employment of RPAs and the operational-level military perspective on the employment of RPAs. By 2012, RPAs were simultaneously being vilified as a dehumanizing, unethical tool of assassination which should be limited or barred outright by international treaties, or should be used to intervene to stop humanitarian crises brought about by terror campaigns of dictators in places like Libya and Syria. Simon Jenkins (2013) summarized one extreme, saying “The greatest threat to world peace is not from nuclear weapons and their possible proliferation. It is from drones and their certain proliferation.” Anne-Marie Slaughter, on the other side, argued in January 2014 “if he [Pres. Obama] is willing to contemplate using force against Al Qaeda without international authorization in the future, why not use drones now to strengthen the moderate Syrian opposition and force Assad into serious negotiations?” More dangerous than the RPA itself, in my eyes at least, was this chasm between the perceptions of what the RPA was and could be, and the reality of the specific niche that the RPA tool could fill and the limits of its effectiveness.

As with most innovations, the introduction of the RPA came with a fair share of hype, as individuals saw the extremes of what was possible, good or bad, and framed their perspectives based on this perception without regard to the other limits that would prevent these extreme visions from coming to pass, to include the organizational challenges to implementing a complex military system, the hidden costs associated with what ostensibly looks like a cheap technological innovation, the organizational roadblocks to widespread acceptance of what could potentially be a disruptive force within organizational hierarchies, and what is ultimately an unchanging nature of war marked by uncertainty, passion, and violent struggle. The initial perspective of the RPA suggested that American planners may at last have found a way, for good or ill, to render war clean and precise through technological advancement. But this was not the case, and likely never will be the case.

Another major challenge to thinking about the impact of ‘drones’ on warfare is that asking such a question in 2015 would roughly be equivalent to asking a military theorist in 1915 what the implications of the ‘aircraft’ would be for the future of war. Even at that early period it was quickly becoming apparent to those looking at the issue that the aircraft represented not a single innovation but a series of innovations that would impact operations across a wide variety of activities; from close air support of troops on the battlefield, to long-range bombing, to intelligence collection, to communications and rapid mobility among other uses. Very quickly, most nations would develop some form of air wing for their militaries, but few would develop the sophisticated long-range air forces that the major powers would develop. Aircraft showed great potential from their introduction in World War I, with some theorists such as Giulio Douhet and Billy Mitchell arguing that aircraft could render other forms of warfare obsolete, or at least secondary to the threat of air strikes to destroy a state’s capacity to wage war at will and without hope of defense. But even then, states were learning the challenges of applying airpower to a number of strategic puzzles they faced more immediately; particularly policing their own colonies and the limits of aircraft in ‘small wars.’

Just as we developed fighter, bomber, and transport aircraft, we today are developing a wide array of ‘drones,’ from simple hand-launched devices capable of observing the battlefield in front of us with greater fidelity, resupplying isolated forces with essential supplies, and dropping precision munitions on moving targets on the other side of the world. This has created a great deal of hype, both for advocates and detractors of RPA operations, on what their potential is to revolutionize warfare for good or ill. Cutting through that hype to understanding what the RPA is, what its real capabilities and limitations are, and how policymakers should address this innovation in current and future conflicts thus is my principal purpose for authoring this work. That process begins with my insistence on calling them RPAs, rather than the more common acronym ‘UAV’ for unmanned aerial vehicle, or the ever popular but widely despised term in the Air Force community, the ‘drone.’ These terms have the effect of shaping the discussion of their employment based on a misunderstanding and/or misrepresentation of what is actually being employed due to an oversimplification. When the discussion turns to ‘drones,’ the image that is invoked is a weapon that looks like the US Predator or Reaper, requires minimal manning, is cheap, and is capable almost by itself of finding the proverbial needle in a haystack of adversaries to strike with precision. Far from being unmanned or unthinking as is the connotation with the other words used to describe it, the Reaper is a manpower-intensive, technologically sophisticated weapons system requiring manning in multiple continents, satellite data-link connections, precision intelligence for sensor cueing and targeting, and an organizational infrastructure to supervise and carry out all aspects of missions from logistics to legal oversight. And it comes with a hefty price tag. Others are small, cheap, unsophisticated, and ultimately not ‘game changers’ in wars because their value is limited by the low number of sensors available to operators combined with the enduring ‘fog and friction of war.’

RPAs are also not going away. Though many well-meaning people would like to see their use curtailed and proliferation stemmed, as with manned aircraft and strategic bombing, the RPA is a fact of modern warfare and was so long before the Predator made its armed debut in late 2001. By 2011, RPAs could be found in the inventory of at least 76 countries (UK, 2012), with at least five experimenting in armed, medium-altitude long endurance models similar to Predator. Critics have questioned whether the increased safety of warfighters afforded by RPAs to the risks of combat has increased the likelihood that policymakers will prematurely move toward war to achieve a desired policy outcome.² But similar debates over the role of technology and its dangers have occurred throughout history as advances in technology have been perceived to dehumanize warfare by increasing standoff range and elevate strategic decision making to policymakers removed from the horrors of the battlefield.

The English long bow, cavalry, and the airplane among other innovations sparked similar debates in their time, yet were both normalized and counter-innovated over time to the point of their own obsolescence in many cases.³ The Cold War era saw the rise of ballistic missiles and cruise missiles and with it the fulfillment of the vision of early airpower theorists who foresaw scenarios where bombs would be able to penetrate any defensive system, and in so doing to threaten the vital centers of an adversary to deter or swiftly end hostilities. The late Cold War saw further innovations in precision strike both for conventional bombs and cruise missiles, enabled by lasers, the Global Positioning System (GPS), and other technological systems. US demonstrations of the impact of precision-guided munitions by the United States during the 1990s in conflicts from the Gulf War (1991)⁴ to conflicts in Yugoslavia and the War on Terror (WoT) have fueled interest in precision weapons throughout the world, and the late 2000s saw a dramatic increase in the proliferation of cruise missile technology and similar advanced systems.⁵ Today, RPAs continue this trend of extending the range of US firepower far beyond the range of an adversary’s ability to counter, virtually eliminating the direct combat risks posed to operators.

The question for policymakers may include how international agreements can limit the proliferation of RPAs, but policymakers must first ask the question of to what extent such an accord would be necessary, and what can be learned about the proliferation and use of RPAs both from history and our experiences with them to date. What types of RPAs are likely to proliferate, and what will be the net impact on future battlefields? Are there ways of limiting the potentially negative consequences of RPAs under existing arms regimes, and simply through demystifying this strange military contraption known as the ‘drone’? I believe the tools are available, and that the RPA can be easily understood when contextualized within the broader revolution in military affairs that airpower has undergone in the last two decades owing not just to the RPA, but an array of technologies enabling precision strike fueled by the advancement of strategic airpower doctrine. The RPA by itself is a tool with minor strategic importance in isolation; only when paired with global communications, precision strike, advanced intelligence collection and modeling, and most importantly a significant human organization to bring it all together and facilitate operations does the networked RPA represent a revolutionary capability.

Modeling the RPA innovation

The central aim of this book is to evaluate the role of ‘drones’ in warfare to date, and make basic projections on how states will adopt RPAs and UCAVs in the future. At the core is the goal of answering a broad, underlying research question: how will the RPA innovation impact military strategy and international security? I aim to provide policymakers with a framework for better understanding the strengths and limitations of RPAs in warfare, and outline basic planning considerations for future wars based on the projected spread and innovations of this technology. This will entail understanding the technological, organizational, and doctrinal strengths and limitations of fielding such weapons, both for the US and foreign powers. This understanding will also inform questions surrounding proliferation, allowing RPAs and UCAVs to be modeled under existing models for the diffusion of technology and military power, and organizational change.

From their emergence as a key tool in the US WoT in 2007, RPAs have been central to an ongoing debate on the role of technology in modern warfare. Some, from the writers of the magazine Wired to noted author P. W. Singer, have spoken of RPAs as revolutionary in terms of their implications for warfare, envisioning a world where humans are effectively removed from the decision-making process of many aspects of future wars and advanced technology nations are increasingly insulated from paying the cost of war in blood, and possibly treasure given what they see as the low cost of RPAs. If these forecasts are accurate, the RPA may become a destabilizing technology susceptible to rapid proliferation as predicted by Michael Horowitz, which could lead to increases, rather than decreases in warfare and human suffering. This may come to pass with further significant innovations in the future, and skeptics have cause to question the advancement of technology and how it relates to human control of lethal force; but I find for the near future these fears are exaggerated, overstating the impact of RPAs and even future UCAVs. This perspective fails to distinguish between the capabilities of different classes of RPAs, and places capabilities above strategy and implementation. Understanding the character of modern airpower and both the potential and limitations of the ‘targeting revolution,’ real and perceptions, is a necessary first step to evaluating the nature and likelihood of proliferation from state to state.

Once the character of the RPA’s role within the broader targeting revolution is clarified, the implications for the future of warfare can be more easily understood. Networked RPAs will be limited in their proliferation as few countries have the strategic requirement to employ such an aircraft in small wars⁶ or the human and financial capacity to develop global infrastructure to support such operations, while tactical RPAs will spread rapidly but ultimately have a more minor impact as they do not change the underlying system of warfare as they will be readily available to both sides of conflicts and both sides will quickly develop counter-innovations. Rather than thinking of all RPAs as being akin to global systems like strategic missiles, it is easier to think of networked RPAs like strategic bombers (which few countries adopted) and tactical RPAs like attack helicopters, which are common worldwide. The adoption of the former by a state has significant implications for the international system, the adoption of the latter is relatively minor for the system as a whole but a key consideration for states at the tactical to operational level of war (i.e. on the battlefield). Emerging networked RPAs with maritime capabilities have the potential to be revolutionary in the conduct of naval operations particularly in peacetime operations, but the true effects of maritime RPAs are reliant on developmental systems that have yet to be demonstrated.

As this work is focused on a broad policy problem rather than a unique puzzle, I apply multiple models from a variety of disciplines to shed greater light on the diffusion and potential future roles of RPAs. To this point, the bulk of studies and other literature surrounding RPAs show a focus on the tactical utility of the US campaigns in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Yemen from a military standpoint, while policy discussions have focused around the legality of operations and the impact of proliferation, generally with an ominous undertone. In both cases, the primary focus of study is the technology itself, with other factors surrounding the employment of RPAs largely looked at in a secondary role. I start with the impact of the RPA on military systems first, placing doctrine and employment as the priority over the focus on the technology.

Defining RPAs – platforms versus capabilities

As earlier noted, I generally use the term RPA to emphasize both the human element at work in the operation of these systems, and the level of sophistication for which ‘drones’ has a negative and insufficient connotation. This terminology is itself controversial, as advocates of traditional airframes see it as trying to elevate all pilots to the same level regardless of their platform.⁷ RPAs are defined as robotic, fixed- or rotary-winged aircraft capable of sustained controlled flight using on-board propulsion and aerodynamic lift and designed for return and reuse.⁸ This definition excludes blimps, balloons, missiles, and other similar forms of pilotless aircraft. This is in itself controversial as many of the capabilities provided by RPAs can also be provided in some environments by those types of aircraft. Many of the implications of RPAs can apply to piloted blimps as well but my desire is to limit the technical analysis of existing programs.

I refer to aircraft as ‘platforms,’ which is the common terminology used through both Air Force and Joint US military doctrine to define aircraft, ships, and vehicles. Though undefined in the doctrine itself, a platform is generally any structure on which a military capability, such as a weapon or an intelligence collection system, can be mounted. The purpose of this terminology is to separate the airframe itself from the military capability it provides. In many discussions, as is the case often with the RPA, the former becomes the object of discussion when in fact the emphasis should be on the latter. The best example of this is the regular conflation of the Reaper, which is today the US’s largest and most visible RPA attack platform, with other RPA platforms such as the Global Hawk, which is a networked RPA that functions solely as an intelligence collection platform; a role RPAs have filled for decades. I focus most of my discussion on networked attack platforms such as Reaper as that is where most of the debate surrounding RPAs is, but I find it is important to note when looking at either trends in RPA proliferation, discussion of sales of RPAs, or any number of other RPA-related issues that it is flawed to lump all RPA platforms into the same category and talk about all interchangeably, spreading the false impression that everyone with a ‘drone’ has the capabilities of a Reaper.

The RPA alone represents a major military innovation in platforms, which is critical to understanding the difference between advanced ‘networked RPAs’ and ‘tactical RPAs’ for both use and proliferation. Removing the pilot from the aircraft serves three improvements over traditional aircraft which affect the utility of RPAs, but usually not all three simultaneously. First and most readily apparent, it reduces the risk to the operator. Second, it allows for smaller aircraft which can be produced more cheaply. Third, it can increase the duration of flight for RPAs, allowing for ‘persistent’ operations. As with other forms of aircraft, tradeoffs are involved.

The reduced risk to operators and the prospect of smaller, cheaper RPAs increases their utility for missions which are categorized as ‘dirty’ or ‘dangerous,’ where the aircraft is expendable and easy for either an individual or small team to operate. These RPAs, tactica...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• List of figures
• List of tables
• Preface
• 1 Introduction
• 2 US employment of RPAs
• 3 The human challenges of ‘unmanned’ aircraft
• 4 The global diffusion of RPAs
• 5 Planning for the future of RPAs and UCAVs
• Appendix 1 RPA database comparison (2006–09)
• Appendix 2 Terrorist plots in US after 9/11
• Appendix 3 List of cruise missiles by country
• Appendix 4 RPA diffusion
• Glossary of acronyms and abbreviations
• Index