Integrity and Historical Research

Tony Gibbons, Emily Sutherland, Tony Gibbons, Emily Sutherland

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2012
• ISBN:
  9781136637728
• Edition: 1
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: Historiography
• Index: History

There have been serious debates between historians, novelists and filmmakers as to how best present historical narratives. When writers and filmmakers talk of using historical research with integrity, what exactly do they mean? Integrity and Historical Research examines this question in detail. The first chapter discusses the concept of integrity. The chapters that follow reflect on this philosophical treatment in the light of fiction and film that deals with history in a number of ways. How should writers and filmmakers use lives? Can, and may, people who are now dead and who may have lived long ago, be defamed?

The authors include academics, historians, social historians, medievalists, oral historians, literary theorists, historical novelists and script writers. They examine the theoretical influences and practical choices that involve and concern writers and filmmakers who rely on historical research. The desire to be accurate may often conflict with the need to produce a work that goes beyond the mere depiction of events in order to excite the interest of readers and to hold that interest. At the same time there is a developing emphasis on historians, to write well in clear, accessible prose, which may involve using the novelists' techniques. How much license may be given to writers of fiction and filmmakers in their depiction of historical characters and events? This book begins to answer this question, while inviting further discussion.

1 The Concept of Integrity

Tony Gibbons

The word ‘integrity’ is used in many contexts, from the integrity of an ecosystem or a database to the integrity of a person. In common usage the notion that ties these uses together is that of an uncorrupted whole. The ecosystem has integrity when it is unpolluted and uncorrupted by factors alien to its well-being and flourishing. Alien factors are those that are inconsistent with the overall purpose and development of the ecosystem. These factors may be external or internal. The introduction of an open cut coalmine in an old-growth forest is the introduction of an alien element and would clearly have an effect on the existing ecosystem. On the face of it the continued well-being of the ecosystem is in hazard. Whether or not this is an acceptable hazard is another matter. Not all ecosystems are in a state of dynamic equilibrium and may contain within themselves a factor that is inconsistent with their continued well-being. Integrity of an ecosystem is thus, on many occasions, an assessment of an hoped-for outcome rather than an existing state of affairs. Integrity in this context is unlikely to fulfil one hundred per cent of the requirements, and the term is assigned on the basis of meeting sufficient requirements.

In a similar manner a person may be deemed to be a person of integrity because he or she is a person who is, as a whole, uncorrupted. This use of the term speaks of the person’s character and disposition to act in certain ways. The character of a person is a summation of the traits that go to make that character. If we say of a person that he or she is of good character, then we may be pointing to the fact that, in our estimation, that person possesses the character traits of justice, honesty, tolerance and the like. In other words they possess certain virtues. If a person is of bad character, then we estimate that his or her traits include a preponderance of traits such as maleficence, cowardice, mendaciousness, capriciousness, self-deceptiveness, dishonesty, hypocrisy, fanaticism and the like. In a similar fashion if it is said that a person is one of integrity and this is queried, then the answer is framed in terms of the various character traits that person actively possesses. We say—well, he is honest, trustworthy and the like. In estimating that a person is one of integrity then, nowadays, we normally mean that he or she has a preponderance of those character traits we term virtues. Preponderance because, in the first place, we do not expect fallible human beings to possess every virtue and certainly not completely, and second, we expect that people will have their vices. We also expect the possessor of these virtues to have actively exhibited them over a sufficient period of time, leading up to the present judgement. Of course, we can say of someone that he or she had been a person of integrity, meaning that person has fallen by the wayside. This emphasizes the point that a judgement as to integrity is not one given lightly but only after an historical survey. So, to say that someone is a person of integrity is to say that he or she has sufficient virtues in sufficient measure to outweigh any vices he or she may have and that this person had these virtues over a significant period of time. This person has a particular character. It is, like the ecosystem, an historical estimation of overall worth and non-corruption. It is clear that this argument makes the assumption that a thoroughly wicked person who possesses the vices in abundance and correspondingly very few virtues cannot be a person of integrity. The thoroughly wicked are certainly internally consistent in character but, in common parlance, the term integrity would not be used of them. Integrity is a value term. This fits with the remarks on the ecosystem. Alien factors affecting the character of a person may be both internal and external. Those alien factors that are internal are inconsistent with the virtuous traits the person possesses. Typically they are what we call vices. Those that are external are those that limit or damage the possession and exercise of the virtues.

We use the term ‘integrity’ with respect to the general life and character of people, and in doing so we are referring to their general social dealings with their fellow human beings and also to their history. We also commonly use it with respect to their work. Newton was a scientist of integrity although he had some remarkable failings in other areas. A. J. P. Taylor was an historian of integrity, and this can be said without reference to the rest of his life. George Macdonald Fraser was an historical novelist of integrity, and this can be said without reference to his war record or social life in the north of England. This usage of the term is consistent with its use in general. Certain virtues are judged important to the profession of historian, historical novelist or scientist. The list can be continued with reference to other areas of work. What that list is may be a matter for debate. What is not a matter for debate, if the usage of the term is to be consistent, is that the judgement that this person is an historian of integrity does not name the perfect historian, possessor of all the necessary virtues in full degree. It does name a person who has a sufficient preponderance of the necessary virtues and a limited number of vices. It is an estimation. Can it be, then, that the historian of integrity may be not a person of integrity or vice versa? And what are the necessary virtues?

Newton, Taylor and Macdonald Fraser are not judged persons of integrity in their fields on the basis of a single instance but on the basis of the history of their deeds. To act justly on one occasion is admirable, but for that virtue to qualify its possessor in the integrity stakes, a person must consistently be just over a lengthy period leading up to the present estimation. The narrative of a person’s life is a necessary point of reference when judging whether or not a person is a person of integrity. The personal history of the historian qua historian is important.

It appears from this initial discussion that the term ‘integrity’ is not a term that picks out a particular virtue, although it appears to be a virtue term. It more resembles a concept that picks out a range of virtues. Others have come to much the same view:

There is, however, no philosophical consensus on the best account. It may be that the concept of integrity is a cluster concept, tying together different overlapping qualities of character under the one term. In Cox, La Caze and Levine 2003, we argue that integrity is a virtue, but not one that is reducible to the workings of a single moral capacity (in the way that, say, courage is) or the wholehearted pursuit of an identifiable moral end (in the way that, say, benevolence is). We take ‘integrity’ to be a complex and thick virtue term. (Cox 2008)

As may be evident, I am inclined to agree. This needs further examination, and in that examination may be a clue to the historian or historical novelist of integrity. Bearing in mind that historians are a social group, as are historical novelists, let us consider something of the nature of a social group.

The argument that follows owes a great deal to the work of Alasdair MacIntyre. An example of a social group occurs in a village or town in which mining is the main industry that sustains the town. Mining is a complex activity in which the miners depend upon each other for the success of their work and for their lives. Above ground the families of the miners depend upon them and the town as a whole depends upon the mines and their product. The dependence is never one way; it is interdependence, a network of dependence. Criteria are developed from the proper exercise of all the interdependent parts of the society. Upon adherence to and continued development of these criteria hinges the ability of that society to achieve a sustained and worthwhile existence. This is not to say that it is a static existence but one that develops as circumstances demand and knowledge increases. A narrative develops. There is the pursuit of better practice. This pursuit is for the internal welfare of the society and its members and not simply for rewards external to it. The sustenance of the society and its continued welfare demand that certain criteria apply for the operation of the society and its individual elements.

First and foremost among the elements that are necessary for the sustenance and development of the society is the recognition of mutual dependence. The notion of society contains, necessarily, the notion of interdependence. All members of the society are to some extent interdependent, some more than others, some less. The person who refuses to recognize that interdependence is a parasite with all that that epithet implies. The person who does not realize the necessity of interdependence is a defective member of the society, and their ignorance may damage the society. The person who rejects interdependence is a danger to that society. In the same way we may say that the members of a family, for the sustenance and the flourishing of that family, must recognize the mutual interdependence of the members of the family. The young children of the family are dependent on the older members, and eventually, the older on the younger. Many human societies have recognized this by acknowledging that the young incur a debt, which is to be met by their care for the elderly. Society therefore has been seen as a network of dependence in which there is debt and obligation. This is not a novel idea; witness the Confucian view of the matter.

Societies are sustained and develop to the extent that they develop and improve a network of interdependence. To assert this is to attack the notion that society is made up of self-interested individuals. If the network is damaged or fractured, society suffers, and in the extreme case it is destroyed. What are the necessary conditions for the sustenance and development of interdependence? Some members of the society are more dependent than others, necessarily so. The very young, the physically damaged, and the vulnerable are all more dependent than most. At the other end of the spectrum there are those who are less dependent. The notion of interdependence has been expressed by MacIntyre as the virtue of acknowledged dependence (1999). It is a virtue of giving and receiving and has been expressed as giving from each according to his or her ability and to each according to his or her need insofar as this is possible. This notion contains within it a notion of the debt that each member of the society owes to others in that society. To this MacIntyre adds the notion of generosity, giving that goes beyond that which is required by justice. With these virtues we recognize mutual interdependence and the recognition of the worth of each individual and each group. They are the essential virtues for the sustenance and continued welfare of a society, whether it be as small as a family or as large as a nation-state.

Deciding what needs to be done and acting cannot be properly carried out without foresight and careful judgement. Such judgement demands that those judging are capable of standing back from their beliefs, decisions and actions in the past and present and viewing them with a reflective eye. With that reflective eye, they must evaluate. Crucial to the process is imagination, for the past must be imagined, instant accurate detailed recall is not possible, and the future must be imagined. Deciding what it is best to do is the question that faces society and the individual. To put it another way—what is it prudent to do? And so another essential virtue has been named.

In the making of decisions about the level and extent of need and ability and the consequent demands, difficult decisions will have to be made, and there has to be a determination to carry through those decisions. The matter is not simply an intellectual exercise. Moral courage is required at the individual level and the social level. Another necessary virtue, fortitude, has been named.

Clearly one cannot leave it at that. There are a number of virtues, all of which have their work to perform: compassion, honesty and benevolence, for instance. Comte-Sponville gives a wise account of some seventeen of them (2003). Virtues are produced and cultivated by a society in the attempt to realize that which is best in that society and to provide sustained, worthwhile growth. Virtues are excellences to be sought, to be learned and to be applied. They are essential if the society is to flourish. They are taught to the children of a society by word and deed, by aphorism and by proverb, in the hope that the children will become imbued with certain traits of character so that both they and society will flourish.

The network of developed and developing interdependence can only be sustained by the exercise of virtues. There has to be a minimum level of acknowledged possession and exercise of the virtues such as justice, prudence and fortitude and avoidance of partiality, rashness, moral weakness and the like. As is evident I do not mean to assert that these are the only virtues involved, but they are among those that are necessary conditions for the sustenance of any practice. In linking the sustenance of a society with the possession and exercise of the virtues, I am arguing the case for what is meant by an integrated society, or to put it another way, for a society with integrity. This is not an argument about moral theory but simply a statement as to the necessary conditions for the existence of a society and its continued sustenance and flourishing. That is what such a society is as a matter of fact. It is now evident that the concept of integrity is indeed a concept that covers a variety of virtues and that when we talk of a society or an individual having integrity, then we are referring to the possession of those virtues necessary for that society or individual to sustain a worthwhile existence, to flourish.

The study of history is the initiation into the practice of a discipline that has existed for centuries. MacIntyre has defined a practice as:

any coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative human activity through which goods internal to that form of activity are realized in the course of trying to achieve those standards of excellence which are appropriate to, and partially definitive of, that form of activity, with the result that human powers to achieve excellence, and human conceptions of the ends and goods involved, are systematically extended. (1981: 187)

A MacIntyrean practice is a socially established, cooperative human activity. One must distinguish the activity of a group from that of a practice. A group activity may be made up on the spot as a cooperative activity that does not occur elsewhere in society and, within this group, does not again or occurs rarely. It is not socially established. People may come together and, as a group, go to the cinema. In doing so they may exhibit cooperative action. They meet, see the film, have a coffee and go their separate ways. Contrast this with the group that meets regularly to discuss a book that has been chosen some time before. The book club is socially established and it is a cooperative activity. One element that starts to differentiate it from the group that goes to the cinema lies in the discussion and the terms laid down for that discussion. That is, the book club starts to take on the features of a practice when the group starts to define the activity and produce criteria by which the worth of that activity is measured. There are goods internal to the activity, and it is for the realization of those goods and their development that the activity takes place. That there may be goods and goals extraneous to the activity is not a problem provided that they are not destructive of the internal goals and goods. When and if they are, then the activity will start to break down and the book club to disintegrate. Note the final word. The book club also has a narrative. It starts and develops a history. It also becomes an instance of a club that has been and is commonplace in a number of societies. The idea of meeting regularly to discuss the books that have been read by the group is not a new idea but is an activity that has developed and changed over the course of time, and members of a present group may be aware of this. They may be aware of the discussions that took place in the coffeehouses of eighteenth-century England or the more formal workers’ educational institutions of the next century. Book clubs have a narrative. And in reflecting on that narrative one may conclude that the workers’ educational institutions so changed the criteria that they became distinct from the book clubs. In the same fashion, if you change the rules of chess, you have a different game. Book clubs are part of a larger narrative, that of literary appreciation and criticism. As a small social group, a book club exhibits the characteristics and the needs of any society. They are a socially established group. What has been said about the acknowledgment of interdependence applies. As a result, if the book club is to flourish, then there must be a level of acceptance and active possession of the virtues.

What is true of a simple example like a book club is true of more complex activities such as mining, and is also true of the practices of those intellectual activities which humanity has developed. It is true of science, of history, of literature, of music, of the graphic arts and many more. Our concern is with history and the use of historical research. Historians are practitioners in a socially established, complex activity. They are an established social group that can be analysed in the same manner that the mining community was analysed or indeed any social group may be analysed. The society that is historians is made up of a body of people with a variety of interests quite often defined in terms of periods of time but most certainly defined by their view of the world. However, if the society is to be sustained and flourish, then it must acknowledge the interdependence of its members. As with the societies discussed previously, there will be those who are less dependent and those who are more so. First-year university students studying history are dependent on the work and research of those teaching them and on the libraries of written research and exposition. They are in much the same position of young children in society. The senior figures in the society that is history are less dependent perhaps but still dependent on the conversation that is history to which they contribute. Without acknowledged interdependence, the study of history would atrophy. Those who make use of historical research, such as novelists, scriptwriters and dramatists, are clearly dependent upon it. It could be argued that historical novelists and others who use historical research serve a useful and necessary function in the practice of history, that there is interdependence. Whether or not that argument can be sustained is not the concern of this chapter. There is no argument that those groups that practise by using the fruits of historical research have within themselves and often with each other the essential element of mutual interdependence.

I have argued that a society in order to sustain itself and flourish must acknowledge interdependence and that this acknowledgement necessarily involves the development, possession and exercise of the virtues. The same is true of the society that is formed by the practice of history. We here have one account of what it is to be an historian of integrity and to use historical research with integrity. The historian of integrity is in active possession of those virtues which are necessary to the flourishing of the practice that is history. These virtues are no different to those demanded in a flourishing society. It is the same proposition for those who use the fruits of historical research. However, just as different circumstances demand the differential application of virtues, in this case a greater prudence, in that more fortitude, in this case more compassion, in that more generosity, so there is a differential application of the virtues by the practising historian. This is part of what is meant by an historian of integrity and the use of historical research with integrity.

History has to be seen in the context of its narrative. Just as the scientist should be aware of the narrative that shows the changing scientific conception of the physical world, so the historian should be aware of the changing views of the world embodied in the work of past historians. The subject matter of history also has to be seen within the context of its narrative. To be initiated into the practice that is history is to be initiated into a practice that has a narrative and whose subject matter has a narrative. I shall concentrate on the narrative of the subject matter. History is a human activity. It cannot be ahistorical or asocial. George MacDonald Fraser reminds us: ‘You cannot, must...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Halftitle
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• Introduction
• 1. The Concept of Integrity
• 2. ‘Who Would Want to Believe That, Except in the Service of the Bleakest Realism?’: Historical Fiction and Ethics
• 3. Transgressive Legacies of Memory: The Concept of Techné in Primo Levi’s The Periodic Table
• 4. Fictions and Histories
• 5. The Evil that Men Do Lives after Them, and the Good Is Oft Interred within Their Bones
• 6. When Is It Time for ‘Writing with an Untrammelled Pen’?: Reconciling the South Australian Settler Colony with Its Violent Past in Simpson Newland’s Historical Novel, Paving the Way: A Romance of the Australian Bush
• 7. Using Lives: Working with Life Stories in a Time of Revolution
• 8. Integrity and Oral History: Choices Facing the Oral Historian
• 9. ‘Nude Scenes of Lovemaking and Violation on Stage and Screen’: Heloise and Abelard, Old Bones and the Uses of the Past
• 10. Integrity at the Intersection: Peripheries, Herstories and Film
• 11. Historians in Fiction and Film
• Notes on Contributors
• Index