Civil-military Relations In Pakistan

From Zufikar Ali Bhutto To Benazir Bhutto

Saeed Shafqat

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2019
• ISBN:
  9780429723377
• Edition: 1
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: Military & Maritime History
• Index: History

Taking an explicitly comparative theoretical approach, Saeed Shafqat presents a comprehensive exploration of civil-military relations in Pakistan. He begins by describing the history of military hegemony in this volatile South Asian country and then examines the breakdown of military control, assessing the rise of the Pakistan People's Party and th

1
Introduction

In recent decades some very interesting and insightful literature has appeared on the study of civil-military relations in the developing countries and also the “newly emerging democracies,”¹ Between 1973–1996, some forty countries made transition from authoritarian or military regimes to civilian regimes. It helped sharpen our focus on “transition” from authoritarian regimes to democratic order. In the process we got some useful conceptual and theoretical framework analyzing the changing nature of civil-military relations in the developing countries. This literature has also drawn our attention to difficulties as regime change occurred from military to civilian rule.² Thus raising the pertinent question how transitions from military to civilian rule take place? Why some transitions lead to democratic consolidation while others falter, fumble and revive “nostalgia” about military rule?

Military continues to be a potent political actor in the developing countries, despite trends towards democracy and civilian rule. The causes of military’s intervention have been well theorized and documented.³ A number of excellent case studies have appeared on the developmental and modernizing role of the military in developing countries.⁴ In these studies, military emerges as an institution which is better organized, modern in out look and orientation, professionally sound, more competent than the civilian politicians and motivated to promote economic development. More so, in societies where literacy rates and economic development were low, the military rule was projected as giving order, stability, modernity and brightening prospects of economic growth and development.⁵ Modernization theorists made laudatory analysis of military’s developmental role, particularly with reference to Latin America and also produced the myth that the higher the rate of professionalism in the militaries of the developing countries, the lower the chances of their intervention.⁶ Fact of the matter was the more modern and professional the military became in developing countries, its intervention in politics also increased.

South Asian militaries remained under studied in this modernization literature. Yet whatever studies appeared they focussed on the developmental role of military in these societies.⁷ However, the analysis began to shift from modernization and intervention as scholars started analyzing the impact of military regimes on their society, economy and polity. This also brought to the fore difficulties that confronted civilian-successors in a “post-military state.”⁸

The focus began to shift from modernizing role of military to its coercive capacity and the dynamics of authoritarian rule, with the publication of O’Donnell’s path breaking work Modernization and Bureaucratic Authoritarianism: Studies in South American Politics. His principal argument was that social and economic modernization would promote political pluralism, which in turn led to authoritarianism.⁹ According to O’Donnell, in bureaucratic-authoritarian systems the higher governmental positions were occupied by individuals from armed forces, bureaucracy and private firms. Individuals in these institutions developed a highly complex network of bureaucratic organizations and pursued policies of political repression and economic exclusion, resultantly, politically active segments of society and industrial labor were excluded from processes of political and economic decision making. This in turn led to depoliticization of popular sector. Political and social problems were viewed by the decision-makers as “technical” in nature. This promoted and strengthened interaction among the decision-makers in the higher echelons. Consequently, changes in society occurred that promoted deepening of dependent capitalism and extensive industrialization. O’Donnell’s characterization of bureaucratic-authoritarianism provided an insightful analysis of governing elites, their interactions with various social classes and the nature of ‘dependent capitalism’ in Latin American countries, particularly in Argentina, Brazil and Chile.¹⁰ O’Donnell’s concept of bureaucratic-authoritarianism is instructive although of limited value for making an analysis of Pakistani experience.

First, compared to countries like Brazil, Argentina, and Chile, Pakistan had a relatively low level of economic development. At the time of independence, industry was almost non-existent, and the level of urbanization was low.¹¹ Pakistan was, and basically continues to be, an agrarian economy. Second, in terms of class structure, the feudal classes enjoyed power, privilege, and prestige in the political system, whereas the financial-industrial groups were weak, and the aspiring middle classes were in their formative phase. Concerned with elevating the level of economic development, the military-bureaucratic elites opted to promote and facilitate the emergence of financial-industrial groups. The military-bureaucratic elites believed that they (who perceived themselves as uniquely qualified modernizers) had to promote a “capitalist spirit” and to encourage the formation of financial-industrial groups before they could form any coalition. Thus emerged a patron-client relationship between the military-bureaucratic elites and the financial-industrial groups.¹² This relationship enhanced the power of the elites to impose various types of economic controls. It also provided the financial-industrial groups with an opportunity to expand without any pressure from competition. Third, the military-bureaucratic elites provided a vital link between the financial-industrial groups and international business, through a series of state sponsored economic policies the position of the financial-industrial groups was consolidated.

As noted above O’Donnell’s, bureaucratic-authoritarianism model provided a penetrating analysis of coalition formation among the military, the bureaucracy, technocracies and international business in the Latin American countries. In this sense, gave an understanding of the nature of the military’s rule and its relationship to “dependent capitalism.”¹³ As opposed to this in Pakistan’s case, it was not economic but strategic considerations that determined military-bureaucratic elites attitude towards the international security system and led to an alliance with the United States in the 1950’s and later in the 1980’s.

The purpose of this study is to explain why Pakistan has continued to oscillate between military-hegemonic rule and democratic propensities. It would explore and analyze why democratic processes and institutions have not gained ground in Pakistan and military’s hegemony has continued to prevail. In this context the study would aim to project two alternate but competing models of political development in Pakistan. It would be argued that the constraints and limitations of democratic process and successor civilian regimes in Pakistan could best be understood by analyzing the dynamics of military-hegemony and dominant party political systems in Pakistan. The proponents and beneficiaries of two types of political system have hampered but could strengthen and consolidate democratic development in Pakistan.

Since its inception, Pakistan, like other developing countries, has been struggling to establish a viable political system. Pakistan’s search for a viable political system produced two contradictory tendencies of political development. In the first, the primary objective was to curb participatory politics and to subordinate the political parties and other autonomous interest groups to military hegemony. This was best reflected in the military-hegemonic political system (1958–1969 and 1977–1985). In the second instance, the primary concern was to subordinate the military-bureaucratic elites to civilian-led party dominance, and to build an alternative to military rule. This was reflected in the party-dominant political system (1971–1977 and 1985–1996). The post 1985 period varied in form but was similar in substance. In either case, establishing control over the state and societal forces emerged as the sustained objective of Pakistan’s political development. This tendency persisted as various contenders in the political arena failed to develop any minimal consensus on the nature and direction of the political system. The post 1985-period, saw the revival of dominant party system, where the successor civilian regimes began to establish the dominance of party in power by first controlling and then dispensing resources of the state to the elected members of the assemblies and their cronies.

Before we analyze how military-hegemonic and dominant party systems have functioned in Pakistan, let me briefly define what variables like political leaders, elites, classes, groups mean in this study and how the interplay and inter-relationship among these various forces has helped or hampered the functioning of one or the other type of political system.

Groups in This Study

Bureaucratic-Military Elites

Bureaucratic-military elites constitute the epitome of power structure in Pakistan. They enjoy power, privilege, prestige and status. These elites also monopolize control over governmental resources—both of coercion and patronage. C. Wright Mills has pointed out that in America, “power elites” is lodged in the “institutional landscape” of the country. According to him, “the institution makes the man, since it determines who shall wield power.”¹⁴ This dictum has relevance for Pakistan, where the military and the bureaucracy are the principal institutions. These elites are relatively small, cohesive, share similar political attitudes, and enjoy institutional bases of power.

Political Leadership

In this study, political leadership is defined behaviorally as an art in acquiring followership, maintaining leader—leader relations (i.e., how various political leaders relate to each other on specific policy issues), and exercising policy choices to create and build political institutions.¹⁵ In examining politics in Pakistan, the concept of political leadership can be operationalized with greater precision as compared to that of political elite. The concept of political elite involves some degree of consensus, cohesion, similarity of beliefs and social origins. In Pakistan, political leadership is singularly non-cohesive, non-consensual, and non-institutionalized, despite similarities of social origins, beliefs, values and, to a certain degree, style.

Socioeconomic Classes

Class analysis shall be used to focus on the emergence of modern economic classes. In a Weberain sense, class refers to any group of people found in a similar class situation.¹⁶ Modernization forces (education, urbanization, industrialization) had differential impact on the rural and urban classes. In rural Pakistan, family background, descent, and ownership of land have traditionally been the determinants of status. On the basis of changing production relations (as they emerged under the impact of modernization) and their impact on the status, at least three classes can be identified in the rural areas of Pakistan.

Feudal Class

The feudal class is not a homogeneous entity. This class has vertical and horizontal cleavages. Vertically, the feudals are divided by rival factions. These factions can cut along personal, tribal or caste-like rivalries. Horizontally, regional cleavages divide them, despite inter-marriages, in some cases. Feudal power should not be confused with ownership of large land-holdings. It is a set of relationships in which those who own land exercise tremendous control over those who cultivate their lands, irrespective of the size of the land-holdings. This relationship is generally regarded as unequal and oppressive.

Middle Farmer Class

This class is the product and perhaps the greatest beneficiary of the “Green Revolution.” The middle farmer class has increased agricultural productivity, but had little impact in changing the socioeconomic relations in the rural area. In class situations, the middle farmers identify themselves with the feudals; they pursue similar economic goals and manifest a similar socio-political outlook.

Peasants, Tenants/Sharecroppers

These, in general, can be described as the rural proletariat who constitute 70 percent of Pakistan’s rural population. Small and poor peasants do own some land, but in order to sustain themselves, must cultivate the land of bigger landlords. The tenant/sharecroppers are those who do not own any land but cultivate land for the landlord. The most notable aspect is that the tenant/sharecropper is completely dependent on the landlord for his livelihood. Ejection by the land-owner means unemployment, not for one person, but the family he supports. Given this vulnerability, the tenant/sharecroppers tend to be submissive and comply to the landlords’ will rather than rebel.

The Urban Middle Class

The urban middle class can be divided into the following categories:

1. Urban professionals (i.e., teachers, students, doctors, engineers, lawyers and journalists). This class is a product of modern education. Given their diverse professional experience, the urban professionals are not a unified group. They are ideologically divided; nevertheless, they are the most dynamic segment of Pakistani society. These have been persistent in pursuing their social, economic and political goals. During 1971–1977 ascendancy of this class was visible in the political system of Pakistan.
2. Petty merchants, traders, small scale manufacturers and private agri-businessmen constitute the backbone of free market economy. They are entrepreneurs and strongly believe in the right to own private property. Therefore, these classes are the strongest defenders of the principle of market economy. They do not have the status and prestige that the intelligentsia and professionals have.

Industrial Labor

This class has emerged under the impact of modernization. It along with the rural peasantry, has been aroused in Pakistan in 1970s. It is highly politicized, participant, and the least organized.

Financial-Industrial groups

At the time of independence, contemporary financial-industrial groups were at the stage of petty merchants and trading classes. These classes made significant financial contributions to the movement for Pakistan.¹⁷

As Pakistan emerged, they became the primary beneficiaries of the government’s ind...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title
• Dedication
• Contents
• List of Tables
• Acknowledgments
• 1 Introduction
• 2 Military, Bureaucracy, and Party Politics
• 3 Breakdown of the Military-Hegemonic System and the Emergence of the Pakistan People’s Party
• 4 Patterns of Conflict in a Post-Military Hegemonic Political System
• 5 The Politics of Economic Reform and Resistance
• 6 Patterns of Civil-Military Relations: The Military, Political Parties, and Public Opinion
• 7 Military Hegemony: Policies and Legacies
• 8 Struggle for Party Dominance: Benazir Bhutto vs. Nawaz Sharif
• 9 Conclusion
• Bibliography
• About the Book and Author