The Revision Of Psychoanalysis

Erich Fromm, Rainer Funk

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2019
• ISBN:
  9781000305142
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Education
• Subtopic: Behavioural Management

In 1965 Erich Fromm became professor emeritus of psychoanalysis at the National Autonomous University of Mexico City. In the same year he finished his field research on the social character of the Mexican peasant village Chiconcuac. Released from his obligations at the university and free for a new project, he applied to various funding organizations for money to undertake a "Systematic Work on Humanistic Psychoanalysis, " which he had decided to write in the course of the next few years. It was conceived as a work of three to four volumes that would deal with the complete range of psychoanalytic theory and practice. He intended nothing less than a dialectic revision.

1
On My Psychoanalytic Approach

There is a widespread assumption—not only in the scientific literature dealing with psychoanalysis and social psychology but also among the general public—that a basic contradiction exists between the biological and social (or cultural) orientations in psychoanalysis. Often the Freudian orientation is called biological and the theories of the so-called neo-Freudian schools (particularly those of H. S. Sullivan, K. Horney, and this writer) are called culturalist, as if they were opposed to a biological orientation. This juxtaposition between biological and cultural emphasis is not only superficial but plainly erroneous, at least as far as my own work is concerned. I do not discuss here Sullivan’s or Horney’s positions, in view of the fact that my own theoretical concepts differ on fundamental points from those of Sullivan and Homey, just as these two authors differ between themselves.

The idea that my points of view are anti- (or non-) biological is based on two factors: first, on my emphasis on the significance of social factors in the formation of character; and, second, on my critical attitude toward Freud’s theory of instincts and the libido theory. Although it is true that the libido theory is a biological one, like every theory that revolves around the life process of the human organism, my critique of the libido theory concerns not its biological orientation as such but, rather, its very specific biological orientation—namely, that of a mechanistic physiologism, in which Freud’s libido theory is rooted. I have criticized the libido theory and not Freud’s general biological orientation. On the contrary, another aspect of Freud’s biological orientation, his emphasis on the constitutional factors in the personality, I have not only accepted theoretically but have also considered in my clinical work. In fact, I have probably taken it a good deal more seriously than do most orthodox analysts, who often pay lip service to constitutional factors but, for all practical purposes, believe that everything in a patient is conditioned by his early experiences within the family constellation.

Freud arrived almost unavoidably at his particular mechanistic physiological theory. Considering the scarcity of hormonological and neurophysiological data at the time of Freud’s original formulations, it was hardly avoidable that he should construct a model based on the concept of chemically produced inner tensions that become painful and on the concept of the release of accumulated sexual tension, a release that Freud labeled “pleasure.” The assumption of the pathogenic role of sexual repression seemed all the more evident because his clinical observations were made among people belonging to the middle class, with its strong Victorian emphasis on sexual repression. The dominant influence of the concepts of thermodynamics may also have influenced Freud’s thinking, as E. Ericson has remarked.

Recognizing that, in neuroses, facets other than those usually called sexual desire play a most important role, Freud extended the concept of sexuality to that of “pregenital sexuality” and thus assumed that his libido theory could explain the origin of the energy that moves all passionate behavior, including aggressive and sadistic impulses. Since the 1920s, quite in contrast to the physiological-mechanistic orientation of his libido theory, Freud developed a much wider biological approach in his conceptualization of the life and death instinct. In considering the life process as a whole, he assumed that the two tendencies—that toward life (i.e., toward the increased unification and integration called Eros) and that toward death and disintegration (called the death instinct)—are inherent in every cell of the living organism. The correctness of this assumption may be questionable, but the new concept, though highly speculative, offered a global biological theory concerning the passions of man.

From a biological standpoint it should be noted that Freud’s earlier theory, in spite of its narrowness, was based on the assumption that it is in the nature of the living organism to want to live, whereas in his more profound biological theory of the second phase, he discarded the earlier notion and made the assumption that the aim of disintegration is as much a part of man’s nature as that following life and survival. In place of the hydraulic model of increasing tension and the necessity to reduce it, then, the nature of living substance, with its inherent polarity of life and death, became the new basis for Freud’s thought. But it is tragic that Freud, for many reasons, never clarified the basic contradiction between the earlier and later theories; nor did he even connect the two in a new synthesis.

As a parallel to the connection between necrophilia and anal sadism, I have tried to draw a connection between an element of Freud’s libido theory and his concept of the death instinct. Freud, still clinging to his older concept that the libido is masculine, avoided the almost obvious step to connect Eros with male-female polarity, but restricted the concept of Eros to the general principle of integration and unification.

Although Freud’s biological orientation is beyond doubt, it would be a distortion of his work to characterize it as biologically versus socially oriented. Quite in contrast to such a false dichotomy, Freud was always socially oriented as well. He never regarded man as an isolated being, separate from the social context; as he put it in Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego:

It is true that individual psychology is concerned with the individual man and explores the paths by which he seeks to find satisfaction for his instinctual impulses; but only rarely and under certain exceptional conditions is individual psychology in a position to disregard the relation of this individual to others. In the individual’s mental life someone else is invariably involved, as a model, as an object, as a helper, as an opponent; and so from the very first individual psychology, in this extended but entirely justifiable sense of the words, is at the same time social psychology as well. (Freud 1921c, p. 69)

It is true that when Freud thought of the social factor, he was mostly concerned with the family rather than with society as a whole or with classes within society; but this does not alter the fact that in his attempt to understand the development of a person he had to comprehend, first, the impact of social influenees (the family) on the given biological structure.

The false dichotomy between biological versus social orientation also underlies the false dichotomy in which my work is classified—as “culturally” rather than “biologically” oriented. My approach has always been a sociobiological one. In this respect it is not fundamentally different from Freud’s, but it sharply contrasts with that type of behavioristic thinking in psychology and anthropology which assumes that man is born as a blank sheet of paper on which culture writes its text, through the mediation of the all-pervasive influence of customs and education (i.e., learning and conditioning).

In the following pages I want to give a brief summary of the main points that express the sociobiological orientation (cf. Fromm 1932a, 1941a, and 1955a).

1. This orientation is based above all on the concept of evolution. Evolutionary thinking is historical thinking. We call historical thinking “evolutionary” when we deal with bodily changes that have occurred in the history of the development of animals. And we speak of historical changes when we refer to those that are no longer based on changes in the organism. Man emerged at a certain point in animal evolution, and this point is characterized by the almost complete disappearance of instinctive determination and by an increase in brain development that permitted self-awareness, imagination, planning, and doubt. When these two factions reached a certain threshold, man was born, and all his impulses from then on were motivated by his need to survive under the conditions that had arisen by this point in his evolution.

The “evolutionary” changes in living beings occur through changes in the physical structure, from the one-celled organisms to the mammals. The “historical” changes (i.e., the evolution of man) are not changes in man’s anatomical or physiological structure but, rather, are mental changes, which are adapted to the social system into which he is born. The social system itself depends on many factors such as climate, natural resources, population density, means of communication with other groups, mode of production, and so on. The historical changes in man occur in the areas of intellectual capacity and emotional maturity.

An important remark must be added. Even though man has retained the anatomical and physiological constitution that was present when he emerged as man, knowledge of the behavior and neurophysiological processes of animals, especially mammais, is of considerable interest for the study of man. It goes without saying that superficial analogies of the kind K. Lorenz is fond of making are of little scientific value, and that one has to be very careful about drawing any conclusion from animal and human behavior, precisely because man constitutes a system of his own characterized by the combination of weak instincts and a highly developed brain. But if one is aware of these pitfalls, the results of studies of animal behavior and of the neurophysiological processes in animals can be very stimulating for the study of man. Needless to say, the psychoanalytic study of man must make use of the neurophysiological findings concerning man. It is true that psychoanalysis and neurophysiology are sciences that use entirely different methods and, by necessity, do not proceed by tackling the same problems at the same time. Hence each science has to follow the logic of its own method. The synthesis of psychoanalytic and neurophysiological data is to be expected one day. But even before this happens, each branch of the science of man should not only know about and respect the other but should also stimulate the other by presenting data and posing questions that contribute to the research in both fields.

2. The sociobiological orientation is centered around the problem of survival. Its fundamental question is: How can man, given his physiological and neurophysiological apparatus, as well as his existential dichotomies, survive physically and mentally? That man must survive physically needs no explanation; but that he must also survive mentally requires some comment.

First of all, man is a social animal. His physical constitution is such that he has to live in groups and therefore must be able to cooperate with others, at least for the purposes of work and defense. The condition for such cooperation is that he must be sane. And in order to remain sane—that is, to survive mentally (and, in an indirect sense, physically)—man must be related to others. He must have a frame of orientation that permits him to grasp reality and to maintain a relatively constant frame of reference in an otherwise chaotic reality. In turn, this frame of reference enables him to communicate with others. He must also have a frame of devotion, including values, that enables him to unify and channel his energy in specific directions, thereby transcending mere physical survival. The frame of orientation is partly a matter of cognition, acquired by learning the thought patterns of his society. But to a large extent it is a matter of character.

Character is the form in which human energy is channeled during the process of “socialization” (relatedness to others) and “assimilation” (mode of acquiring things). Character is, in fact, a substitute for absent instincts. If man, whose actions are not determined by instincts, had to decide before every action how to act, he would be unable to act efficiently; his decisions would take too long to make and would lack consistency. But by acting according to his character, he acts quasi·automatically and consistently; and the energy with which his character traits are charged guarantees effective, consistent action beyond what the force of learning can accomplish.

Freud’s “character traits” are assumed to be rooted in the libido—specifically, in the libidinally cathexed erogenous zones. In the revision of the character concept that I attempted, character is seen as a biologically necessary phenomenon—necessary because it guarantees the mental and physical survival of man. The concepts of socialization and assimilation as two aspects of character orientation are also based on the biological consideration of man’s twofold need to relate to others and to assimilate things. As those familiar with my previous writings know, I have wholly accepted Freud’s clinical description of the various character syndromes. The difference lies precisely in the different biological approaches. One additional point needs to be mentioned, however. For Freud the energy with which the character traits are charged is libidinal—that is, sexual (in the broad sense in which Freud used this term). But as I have used the term, energy is the desire of the living organism to survive, channeled into various paths that enable the individual to react adequately to this task. Energy in a general sense, rather than in the narrow sense of sexual energy, was first used by C. G. Jung, who did not, however, connect it with the sociobiological function of character.

The sociobiological function of character determines the formation not only of the individual character but also that of the “social character.” The social character constitutes the “matrix” or “nucleus” of the character structure of most members of a group. This character structure develops as a result of the basic experiences and mode of life common to that group. The function of the social character, from a sociobiological standpoint, is to mold human energy in such specific ways that it can be used as a “raw material” for the purposes of the particular structure of a given society. It should be noted here that there is no society “in general” but only various structures of society—just as there is no psychic energy “in general” but only psychic energy channeled in various ways characteristic of a given character structure.

The development of the social character is necessary for the functioning of a given society, and the survival of society is a biological necessity for the survival of man. Of course, this is not to say that a given social character guarantees the stability of a given society. When the social structure is too contradictory of human needs, or if new technical or socioeconomical possibilities emerge at the same time, the previously repressed character elements will arise in the most advanced individuals and groups and help transform society into one more humanly satisfactory. Character, the cement of society during periods of socioeconomic stability, becomes dynamite in periods of drastic change.

To sum up: There is no “cultural” versus “biological” orientation, the former expressed by Freud, the latter by the “cultural school” of Fromm. Quite aside from the fact that I am not the founder of a school but, rather, a psychoanalyst who has attempted to further Freud’s theory by making certain revisions, my orientation is a sociobiological one in which the development of personality is understood as the attempt of man, having emerged at a certain and definable point of evolution of animal life, to survive by dynamic adaptation to the social structure into which he is born. The false dichotomy between cultural and biological orientation is due partly to the general tendency to turn ideas into convenient clichés, rather than to understand them, and partly to the ideology of the bureaucratically organized international Psychoanalytical Society, some of whose members and sympathizers seem to need an easily grasped label to rationalize their dislike for the ideas of those analysts who believe that psychoanalysis and the bureaucratic spirit are incompatible.

2
The Dialectic Revision of Psychoanalysis

The Necessity for the Revision of Psychoanalysis

Revision is a normal process within science. Paradoxically, a theory that remains the same for sixty years without being revised does not truly remain the same but becomes a system of sterile formulae. The question that matters, then, concerns not revision as such but what is revised and in what direction the revision leads. Does it continue in the direction of the original theory, even if it changes many single hypotheses within the theory? Or does it reverse the direction, even though it claims to continue the thought already indicated by the master?

In considering this problem of “revisionism” we stumble upon a serious difficulty. Who is to decide what the essence of the original theory was? Obviously a monumental work of genius carried on for more than forty years grows and changes and, in the process, shows contradiction. It is necessary to understand its nucleus—its essence, as it were—as difierentiated from the sum total of all its theories and hypotheses. But, we must further ask, who is to decide what this essence is? The founder of the system? That would, indeed, be the most desirable and most convenient solution for those who come after the master. But in most cases, unfortunately, the founder is unable to decide. Even the greatest genius is a child of his time, and he is influenced by its prejudices and modes of thought. Often he is so absorbed by the struggle with old views or the formulation of new and original ones that he loses his perspective on what actually constitutes the essence of his system. He may consider some details necessary for proceeding to new positions as being more important than do those by whom his discoveries have been accepted and, hence, are not in need of the auxiliary constructions.

Who else is to decide what is essential in a system? The authorities? This word may seem strange when used in connection with scientific discoveries. But it is nevertheless quite appropriate. Science is often administered by institutions and bureaucrats who determine the expenditure of money, the appointment of researches, and so on, and who, in fact, have a controlling influence over the direction of scientific development. This is not always the case, of course. But it was undoubtedly very much the case in the psychoanalytic “movement.” Without discussing why this was so, I believe that the psychoanalytic bureaucracy has tried to determine which theories and therapeutic practices deserved to be called “psychoanalysis”—and I do not think that this choice has been very successful from a scientific standpoint. This is not surprising. The scientific bureaucracies, like all others, soon acquire vested interests regarding power, position, prestige; and by controlling theory they arc able to control people.

How, then, can one determine the essence of any great theoretical structure, be it Platonism, Spinozism, Mar...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Series Page
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• Foreword
• 1 On My Psychoanalytic Approach
• 2 The Dialectic Revision of Psychoanalysis
• 3 Sexuality and Sexual Perversions
• 4 The Alleged Radicalism of Herbert Marcuse
• Bibliography
• About the Book
• Name Index
• Subject Index