Technology, Politics, And Society In China

Rudi Volti

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2019
• ISBN:
  9781000314250
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Asian Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

This study is the first to summarize the major technological policies implemented in China since 1949 and to place them in their social and historical context. Dr. Volti looks at technological change in China as part of a broader process of economic, political, cultural, and organizational change, focusing primarily on four key areas—agriculture, energy, ground transportation, and medicine and public health. He emphasizes how technological change has been shaped by political and ideological structures, notes how China's unique cultural heritage has affected adoption of technologies developed outside China, and assesses China's success in developing technologies appropriate to its specific needs as an economically and politically developing nation. He draws on interviews with technicians engaged in the transfer of technology to China as well as extensive primary source materials.

1
Introduction

In our era, some of the traditional Western faith in technological progress has turned sour. Anxiety and discomfort accompanied the introduction of new technologies in other times, but in few other periods have the benefits of material progress been offset by such ambivalence about the effects of technological change. For many, the “technological threat” has grown as alienation, the disruption of patterns of living, and a sense of powerlessness accompanied technological progress. Even the economy of abundance, which technology has helped to generate, appears transitory as resource depletion and environmental degradation often follow the full utilization of many technologies.

Yet, just when the United States and other developed countries find themselves racked by doubts about the world created by continuous technological change, the poor nations are engaged in a desperate effort to lift their economies above subsistence level through the application of modern technologies. The profound yet ill-defined malaise of the West seems but a chimera to peoples beset by poverty and disease and worn down by the toil for survival. Their economic and technological backwardness is all too clearly revealed in statistics on caloric intake, morbidity, child mortality, illiteracy, unemployment, and so on.

The enthusiasm shown by many in the West for the new society taking shape in China should not blind us to the fact that the country is still poor, with many aspects of life following patterns established centuries ago. This backwardness causes considerable discomfort to many Chinese people, who realize that their revolution will remain incomplete until their nation creates an economy supported by modern technology.

Technological change has accordingly been an integral part of modern China’s transformation. At the same time, however, the importance of initiating new ways of doing things has often been obscured by the pursuit of even more important goals. The driving force behind China’s long revolution has been the search for a more equitable social order. Throughout China’s long history, the oppression of the Chinese people at the hands of men and nature was a fact of life. Throughout the first half of the twentieth century this misery was compounded by China’s subjugation by foreign powers. Indigenous sources of exploitation had been bad enough; foreign domination bore witness to China’s tragic decline. A nation that had led the world in virtually every index of civilization had been reduced to a “semicolony”; in failing to maintain the dynamism of earlier eras, its vulnerability had been painfully demonstrated.

The reversal of China’s fortunes would require more than a redistribution of international political power, for China could not hope to regain its status as long as it was saddled with a backward economy. The Chinese nation and people had suffered decades of exploitation because the longstanding debilitation of the economic order prevented a vigorous response to the forces of oppression. China was poor because it was weak, but it was also weak because it was poor. Resurgence would require nothing less than a technological and economic revolution.

This transformation came under the banner of communism, for Marxism-Leninism offered the means of overcoming oppression and exploitation. But the appeal of communism was not confined to its promise of a more just and equitable domestic order. The egalitarian message of this imported ideology strongly appealed to many Chinese; its antiforeign component was perhaps even more central. Chinese Communist ideology had been profoundly shaped by Lenin’s transmutation of Marxist principles, which had purportedly revealed the international dimension of oppression. According to this formulation, the evolution of the capitalist economy had enlarged the arena of the class struggle: Instead of being confined to a single nation, this struggle occurred within an international context as the industrially developed “bourgeois” nations exploited the “proletarian” nations of the non-Western world.¹ For many Chinese the lesson was clear: The establishment of an equitable domestic order required an independent national economy. Both in turn hinged upon a vast increase in the productive capacity of the Chinese economy. In short, a social and political revolution required a parallel economic and technological revolution.

For this reason, a technological revolution was an inseparable part of China’s search for national dignity. The establishment of a socialist state in 1949 thus represented only the beginning of China’s revolution. As Mao Zedong recognized, social and political transformation was linked with the rapid and continuous development of new patterns of production:

We are now carrying out a revolution not only in the social system, the change from private to public ownership, but also in technology, the change from handicraft to large-scale machine production, and the two revolutions are interconnected…. The social and economic physiognomy of China will not undergo a complete change until the socialist transformation of the social and economic system is accomplished and until, in the technical field, machinery is used, wherever possible, in every branch of production and in every place.²

To be sure, the introduction of machinery was only part of this revolution, for the vigorous pursuit of technological change required allied changes in the economy and society. In China, as in other lands, the development and application of new ways of doing things cannot be confined to the introduction of new items of hardware. Technological development requires complementary changes in management, social organization, and even patterns of thought. As technology can most generally be defined as the systematic application of knowledge for the achievement of particular results, technological progress requires a concentration on specified ends and the rational selection of the means of obtaining them. Technological progress is thus predicated on a search for appropriate principles and the application of these principles to specific goals. A society imbued with the spirit of technological progress is concerned with performance, for a major requirement of technological development is the continuous evaluation of the way things are done.

This spirit of calculation and performance rating is also manifested in the sphere of human organization. Without the necesssary adjustments of organizational patterns, many technologies cannot be successfully applied. But at a deeper level, both modern technology and modern organization share the common principle of rational evaluation, for they are equally attuned to the use of explicitly defined activities for the attainment of specified goals. Individual technologies and organizational forms may fail to achieve their intended purposes, but their failure cannot be long ignored in societies where a spirit of rational inquiry and performance checking is an integral part of life and thought. A technologically dynamic society does not always realize its vision of continuous material progress, but it does provide the will and the means for monitoring and redirecting its activities.

Viewed from this perspective, technology and modern forms of organization have a close correspondence. The clear stipulation of goals and the systematic application of means for their achievement are common to both. The parallel development of modern technology and modern organizations is not simply the outcome of their interdependence; both are products of a world view that cannot be simply assumed. In the West, these patterns of thought and behavior developed in conjunction with epochal changes in economic relations, religious belief, and national identity. In China, the changes came later but with consequences that were no less profound.

Rational patterns of thought, well-defined organizational structures, and technological dynamism define the contours of the modern world. Attempts to generate technological progress in the absence of the first two elements are likely to prove quixotic. At the same time, these changes, rather than technological change per se, pose the greatest threat to the most familiar details of life and culture. Traditional patterns of behavior, organizational modes, and other distinctive national characteristics face extinction or profound mutation whenever a major commitment is made to the pursuit of technological progress. Whatever long-term gains may emerge from technological development, the process of innovation bespeaks a hostility to the existing order.³

Must technological development and all the changes associated with it hold out such a disturbing prospect? Certainly few Chinese, whatever their political orientation or station in life, would willingly allow technological “imperatives” to destroy a social order that is compounded of an ancient civilization and a modern revolution. Above all, a pattern of social and technological modernization that took the experience and achievements of the Western world as its prototype would represent the repudiation of a distinctly Chinese approach to development. Rarely have the policies of the People’s Republic of China (P.R.C.) that are aimed at economic and technological development represented the willing acceptance of the inherent superiority of developmental patterns derived from the experiences of alien cultures. Yet at the same time, China has not always been able to follow a truly indigenous model of development. Even during the Maoist era, efforts to follow a unique path were offset by technological endeavors that did not differ fundamentally from practices established elsewhere. The process of technological development in China has always contained a dialectic between efforts at self-sufficiency and uniqueness, and the perceived need to make use of the “advanced experiences” of other lands.

In recent years, many of the qualms about the importation of specific items of technology as well as more general patterns of social organization and even culture have seemingly been laid to rest. China is now pursuing a vision of national transformation that focuses on the “four modernizations,” the simultaneous development of industry, agriculture, defense capabilities, and science and technology. In many ways, technological development is at the heart of all of these hoped-for changes, for each is predicated on the application of new inputs and techniques. At the same time, the development and application of new technologies will entail even greater changes. The commitment to modernization on the part of the current Chinese leadership will not eliminate the problems of modernization, and an analysis of these problems and the manner in which they have been resolved will be recurrent themes in this book.

These dilemmas of technological change in China represent the greatest irony, for few nations can match China’s historic record of inventive capacity. At the same time, however, the cumulative impact of Chinese inventions was of lesser magnitude than was the case in other parts of the world. Despite the impressive number of economic and technical innovations, Chinese society did not exhibit the dynamism manifested in other lands. Chapter 2 surveys China’s technological accomplishments and notes their consequences for the development of the traditional Chinese economy and society. At the same time, it indicates how the traditional culture and political order limited the effects of technological change. A brief account is given of the Confucian world order and the ways in which it shaped economic behavior, along with an analysis of how Confucian political orientations and status rankings proved inimical to the single-minded pursuit of material and technical progress.

To be sure, any assessment of the obstructive nature of traditional Chinese culture is necessarily judgmental, and it would be a mistake to equate technological progress with human progress in general. Despite the misery of large segments of the population, Chinese civilization contained much that was admirable. Moreover, the history of the Chinese empire was one of cyclical development and decline, and left to its own devices, China might have found new sources of vigor. But by the nineteenth century, China could not leave its destiny to the forces of internal readjustment. Confronted by an expanding, technologically dynamic West, China faced an insuperable threat. By the end of the century, even the most unregenerate traditionalists had realized that China’s survival depended on military and productive strength. This chapter briefly documents some of the efforts of the imperial government to foster changes in the economy without disrupting the traditional order. It concludes with a brief narrative of the first attempts to incorporate foreign sources of technological change within the existing framework of Chinese civilization.

The subsequent political and economic history of China demonstrated the futility of these ventures. China under the Qing Dynasty proved incapable of supporting a thoroughgoing technological revolution, a revolution that could not gain momentum until profound changes had come to the political order. After the nearly four decades of turbulence that followed the collapse of China’s last dynasty, the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949 vested the governance of China in a leadership committed to technological and economic advance. But at the same time, the accession of the Communist leadership did not resolve all the problems of linking technological progress with other areas of concern. Chapter 3 takes up this issue through a narrative description of technological policy since 1949. Technological policy is analyzed in conjunction with the evolution of general economic, political, and social policies, for programs aimed at effecting technological change have never been isolated from broader issues. This chapter notes that economic and technological achievements have created new problems and challenges that have necessitated subsequent policy revision. It pays special attention to the manner in which these policies have determined the relative importance of agricultural and industrial development, the importation of foreign technologies, the training of technical personnel, and the combination of technical expertise with political rectitude.

The resolution of these issues has also been strongly influenced by the ideological orientations of the Chinese leadership. Ideology in turn has been shaped by both abstract ideas and the specific problems confronting China in its quest for social and economic transformation. Chapter 4 begins with a discussion of the basic components of Maoist ideology, for even though the death of Mao was followed by the repudiation of a distinctively Maoist pattern of development, the problems that stimulated its formulation remain. For example, even though the nativist strain in Maoist thinking no longer shapes technological policy, the importation of foreign techniques and equipment still gives rise to many problems; these are described in the next section of Chapter 4. The following section takes up the now-fashionable topic of “appropriate technology”; it describes some of the achievements and shortcomings of the Maoist policy of “walking on two legs” and closes with a brief analysis of the fate of this approach to economic and technological development. The discussion then turns to one of the prime political issues of technological development in China, the potential conflict between the politically correct “red” and the technologically proficient “expert.” This section traces the historical dimensions of this conflict and notes its implications for the future development of science and technology in China. The next section extends this issue through a brief presentation of educational policies and achievements in China, with particular emphasis on how they have shaped the course of technological advance. Chapter 4 closes with a brief consideration of the current state of Chinese Communist ideology and its influence on the course of technological development.

In all periods and under all programs, technological change in China has been intertwined with the construction, destruction, and modification of existing modes of economic and social organization. Chapter 5 again takes up the theme of ideological orientations and policy choices, this time emphasizing the role of organizations in the translation of ideology and policy into specific technological programs. It outlines some of the key issues surrounding the development of these organizations, and it examines alternative emphasis on centralized and decentralized organizational models, hierarchy and specialization, and formal versus ad hoc ways of organizing technological change. Finally, it identifies the major Party, government, academic, and professional organizations involved with the development, diffusion, and utilization of new ways of doing things and notes their interrelations. It concludes that the organizational network of contemporary China may still be inadequate to the needs of rapid and continuous technological development.

The first five chapters outline the basic organizational, political, cultural, and ideological issues that have shaped the process of technological change in China. The next four chapters seek to illuminate these general orientations and to present a sharper picture of accomplishments and continuing problems by examining the process of technological development. Each chapter is a detailed case study of a sector of the Chinese economy and society; at the same time, these details are related to the general pattern of technological development in China.

Chapter 6 examines agricultural technologies. It is the longest of the studies for two reasons. First, general economic progress in China is predicated on a continuous increase in China’s crop-growing capabilities. Second, the Chinese have recognized the pivotal position of agriculture and have devoted a great deal of media attention to the development and use of new agricultural technologies. The first part of the chapter analyzes basic means of raising the technological level of agriculture through irrigation and water control, mechanization, seed improvement, fertilizer, insecticides, and cultivation techniques. The next section discusses how technological changes have been implemented through the parallel development of training programs and special-purpose organizations. The chapter closes with a brief consideration of some unresolved problems engendered by current means of agricultural modernization.

Chapter 7 looks at the major current and future sources of energy production in China. Particular attention is given to fossil fuels and the technologies employed for their extraction and distribution. The chapter also looks at China’s use of alternative sources of energy, both large-scale ones like nuclear generators and small-scale ones like small hydro-generators and biogas digesters. It reviews the technologies involved and assesses the contributions of these sources to China’s energy economy. The chapter closes with some speculations on the future development of energy technologies as well as the effects of energy-devel...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Dedication
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• Acknowledgments
• 1. Introduction
• Part I Technological Development in Context
• Part II The Process of Technological Development: Four Sectoral Studies
• Selected Bibliography
• Index