Restructuring Soviet Ideology

Gorbachev's New Thinking

Sylvia Babus Woodby,Alfred Evans

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2019
• ISBN:
  9781000309904
• Edition: 1
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: World History
• Index: History

This book offers an analysis of the character and impact of ideological change, addresses a different arena of Soviet policy or social life, and reflects somewhat different concerns about the role or significance of ideology. It summarizes the way in which Marxism-Leninism has been understood.

1
Introduction

Sylvia Woodby

Ideological change is a central feature of the reform campaign known as perestroika (restructuring) which Mikhail Gorbachev hopes will revitalize the economy and society of the USSR. Not only did these reforms begin with ideology, but as Gorbachev himself has stated, they would have been “simply unrealistic and inconceivable” without “a kind of breakthrough” in ideological and theoretical work.¹ By emphasizing that Leninism is a flexible and creative system, Gorbachev has sought to discard dogmatic approaches which make doctrine the servant of conservatism, and tie ideology to the institutional status quo. Gorbachev’s emphasis on results and his candor about the many shortcomings of Soviet society provide the driving force behind his demands for new thinking. His iconoclastic approach incorporates a harsh view of accepted wisdom, and has promoted experimentation with hitherto unacceptable ideas in economic, social and foreign policy. In place of rigidity and intellectual conformism, Gorbachev advocates glasnost’ (openness) and greater tolerance of novel ideas from both domestic and foreign sources. In March 1990, Gorbachev accepted his new post as President of the USSR with a dramatic statement of this outlook:

We have been hampered by inertia, by dogmatic views which have taken root over decades, by a habit of stagnation, by passiveness, by a life of being instructed from above…. Whatever the difficulties of an economic and social kind, and acuteness of other problems, the main obstacle on the road of transformations remains the ossification of thinking.²

Much of this new thinking attempts to replace antiquated ideological concepts with analysis which more accurately describes contemporary realities. Some of the new thinking is instrumental, and is intended to justify new domestic and foreign policies which will be more successful than some of the old ones. But in many ways perestroika has meant a critical and destructive attack on ideology itself—or on specific doctrines and ideas which Gorbachev has identified as obstacles to change.

Gorbachev defends his commitment to fundamental socialist values, but has been eager to discard or redesign institutions long considered sacrosanct. He has criticized the bureaucratization of Soviet society and insisted that the Leninist legacy be reinterpreted so as to permit the emergence of a more efficient and prosperous modern economy. Gorbachev has also suggested that the Soviet Union shares responsibility for international tensions, and has called for the removal of ideology from interstate relations, because “black and white thinking” is too dangerous in a nuclear world. In place of class solidarity and alliances with revolutionary forces, Gorbachev proposes international cooperation in the service of universal human values.³

The sweep of the reforms Gorbachev has introduced is truly grand. Fundamental rules for managing the economy are being rewritten to permit “diverse forms of ownership”: Price reform, cooperatives, family farming, wholesale trade, a convertible currency, and many competitive market mechanisms are explicit goals. The budget deficit is now openly discussed, and the new party platform accepts “individual” ownership of the means of production as appropriate to the present era.⁴ Gorbachev has announced ambitious cuts in military spending and significant withdrawals from Eastern Europe. The USSR has paid its United Nations arrearage, withdrawn from Afghanistan, cooperated in a muitinationally policed cease-fire between Iran and Iraq, and pledged support to negotiated settlements in Angola and Cambodia. Multiple-candidate elections have been held for redesigned central legislative institutions, the role of local party bodies in economic management has been reduced, and the Constitution has been revised to drop the clause according the Communist Party a political monopoly as the people’s vanguard.⁵ Glasnost’ has meant drastically expanded debate and discussion in the media, in elected bodies and on the streets; openness to foreign citizens and ideas is officially encouraged.

Gorbachev is like all Soviet reformers in that he has targeted those interpretations of ideology which are manifested in ideas, institutions, or practices he wishes to change. But his critique of the past is so thorough as to approach the very Leninist revolutionary imperative. While Gorbachev defends the “socialist choice” of the Bolshevik revolution, he denounces the “authoritarian and bureaucratic system” that was established by Stalin and defended by a “distorted” theory.⁶ The new party Platform, published in February 1990, is equally critical in its renunciation of “the total statization of social life and everything that led to arbitrariness and lawlessness.”⁷ It is not surprising then that some Soviet scholars imply that the Bolsheviks’ effort to “leap ahead” of history by seizing power to carry out a socialist revolution in a backward country is ultimately responsible for many of the faults of contemporary Soviet society. A few, like the maverick historian Iurii N. Afanas’ev, have gone so far as to discuss Stalinism’s “Leninist essence” and describe Marxism-Leninism as an outdated state ideology.⁸

By rejecting many of the answers previously provided by the ideology, Gorbachev has sanctioned searching. “Today,” he has stated, “we are facing the complex task of reviving the prestige of Marxist thinking and the Marxist approach to reality.”⁹ Although he has sought to keep this searching within bounds, Gorbachev’s call for a positive vision of the goal of perestroika is elusive. Gorbachev has admitted that however clear the basic socialist values may be, a “vacuum” of sorts still exists with regard to ideas about the future.¹⁰ He has challenged Soviet social scientists to fill that vacuum with new ideas about the application of Marxism-Leninism to contemporary circumstances.

Gorbachev’s reforms are not only changing Soviet ideology, but may be changing the way in which ideology is used, or the spheres to which it is applied. A great deal of rethinking reflects pressures for ideological adaptation and revision which substantially predate Gorbachev’s ascendancy, and which may be understood as the intellectual dimension of the contemporary crisis in Soviet society. A search for new methodologies in social science is one manifestation of this process. Within the large-scale reforms we are witnessing, subtle variations may be observed. Whereas in some areas fundamental components of theory have collapsed or been discarded, in others new ideas about the interpretation of Marxism-Leninism’s basic postulates have produced a flurry of novel doctrines.

The complexity and scale of the reform process underway in the USSR admit many interpretations of the meaning and prospects of ideological change. This is not surprising, considering that the character and function of ideology in Soviet society and political life are complex topics which have been widely debated. Moreover, the reform process is not uniform, and is continuing to develop in many directions at once. The essays in this volume are intended to contribute to a careful evaluation of these changes. These essays are neither uniform nor entirely parallel in their subject matter and conclusions. Nonetheless each of them documents a particular aspect or “zone” of ideological change with important social and political implications. While their judgments differ, each notes significant and serious changes in the content or use of the ideology. The changes they describe raise many questions about the overall impact of perestroika for the future of Marxism-Leninism.

The integrity of Marxist-Leninist ideology is one major issue. While Gorbachev has certainly insisted that he is not discarding Marxism-Leninism, but only ridding it of its “accretions,” he has demanded a better match between social reality and basic socialist values. In short, he is exposing the failure of the Soviet system to produce a society which realizes these values and is demanding that ways be found to do better. Thus in some sense Gorbachev is a fundamentalist reformer. However, his emphasis on performance criteria would seem to make Gorbachev a pragmatic revisionist, one who is modifying the ideology in the interest of better results. How much ideological adaptation can occur before the distinctiveness of the ideology is lost? And what would such a loss mean in the Soviet context? As a highly articulated belief system—what Tony Smith calls a “hard” ideology—Marxism-Leninism suffers from inherent tension between its claim to explain everything and its need to adapt to changing times.¹¹ Gorbachev’s oft-expressed antipathy to the imposition of preconceived models, and his conviction that “working on the basis of Lenin’s ideas means investigating how the future will grow out of present reality,” certainly sanction adaptation. What will be left of the Marxist-Leninist heritage is still an open question.

An important but somewhat different issue concerns the political impact of large-scale ideological change. To the extent that these changes mean the ideology becomes more realistic, more apparently accurate, the changes may be positive and enhance the ideology’s authority and value. On the other hand, extensive admissions of error and rejection of precepts formerly touted as true and controlling can discredit the ideology entirely. In the past, effective control over the process of revision has been crucial for the authority of the new ideas. Yet those who direct or encourage ideological reform may be eroding the foundations of their own legitimacy and authority—not just because the Soviet political system defines itself ideologically, but because movements for change can be difficult to control once underway. The more extensive the revisions, the greater the threat.

Functions of Ideology in the USSR

Each of the essays in this volume offers an analysis of the character and impact of ideological change. Each essay addresses a different arena of Soviet policy or social life, and reflects somewhat different concerns about the role or significance of ideology. The functions of ideology in the Soviet Union are complex, and deserve some preliminary clarification. What follows summarizes the way in which Marxism-Leninism has been understood to operate to date; much of this is problematic today.

Marxism-Leninism is neither meaningless rhetoric nor the only source of ideas for the Soviet political system. As a philosophy, Marxism-Leninism offers core beliefs about the nature of man, a definition of what is good, and a theory of progressive social change which identifies economic relationships as the determining force. As a revolutionary doctrine, this ideology provides motives for political activism, but presumes that an elite is needed to interpret reality, and has condoned the purposeful use of coercive state power to serve the cause of social progress. As a distinctively explicit political culture, the ideology provides a political vocabulary, and functions on many levels to articulate and communicate political and social values within the Soviet Union, whose institutions, social practices, and public policies are all said to flow from Marxism-Leninism. The ideology is also presumed to supply concepts and theories sufficient to equip its adherents with true and hence powerful social analysis; the party’s role as trustee of this science is central to its secular authority within the party-state system.¹²

The ideology does not preclude change. In fact, Marxist-Leninists claim unique abilities to understand and move along with the flow of history, which is expected to evolve according to a dialectical process of conflict and synthesis. Moreover, the Marxist-Leninist corpus encompasses a host of theoretical and tactical tracts which supply many ambiguous, incomplete and internally inconsistent ideas. Over time, major shifts in policy have been justified by this flexible system of thought. The emergence of “new thinking”—understood both as a call for new ideas and the endorsement of certain specific new propositions—has much in common with innovations of previous periods.

As a world view, the ideology posits an ongoing process of economic and social change driven by conflict among oppressors and oppressed in which exploitation will eventually be eliminated. Marxism-Leninism identifies Communists as agents of the future and provides a self-congratulatory identity for the faithful. Marxism-Leninism is a combative doctrine, which expects conflict and predicts violence as exploiting groups resist extinction. The USSR claims to represent the vanguard of human history, which is understood to be moving toward an ultimate state of social justice through struggle. As the self-described leader of the world’s progressive forces, the Soviet Union is embattled but morally superior sacrifice and struggle are acceptable temporary costs for the winning side. Over time a number of specific propositions about this process of historical change and the role of Communists and other actors have evolved along with the increasingly fractious international communist movement. Thus the ideology supplies the USSR and its leadership with a mission and a cause, as well as criteria for identifying adversaries and ultimate goals.

The ideology also serves as the source of political authority in the USSR. Marxist-Leninists claim to have the truth about human beings, the societies which shape them, and the economic forces which determine history; and because they see forces of the past and future in conflict, being right is extremely important. Thus ideas are both the power and the prerogative of those in authority. To be in charge means to define the truth, and to elaborate the ideas which should guide thought and action within the society as a whole. Likewise, the notion that error connotes illegitimacy is inherent in the establishment of a party-state. In practice, Marxism-Leninism in the USSR has served to entitle an elite, which has established a tightly controlled circular flow of power that buttresses the party’s dominance over the economy, social institutions, culture, and intellectual life. The ideology justifies this system but also supports it in practice, through socialization and enforcement mechanisms. Thus the ideology has both explanatory and operational uses. The association of rectitude with power inhibits innovation both intellectually and organizationally.¹³

Values derived from the ideology affect all areas of life. The ideology’s dedication to freedom from exploitation and i...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• 1 Introduction
• 2 Rethinking Soviet Socialism: The Politics of Ideological Change
• 3 Toward a New Political Economy of Socialism
• 4 Changing Views of Social Differentiation in Soviet Ideology
• 5 The End of the “National Question”: Ideological Decay and Ethnic Relations in the USSR
• 6 Changing Soviet Conceptions of International Security
• 7 Gorbachev’s “New Political Thinking” and Soviet National Security Policy
• 8 The Death of a Dream? Gorbachevist Revisions of Marxism-Leninism for the Third World
• 9 Conclusion
• About the Editors and Contributors
• Index