The Epistemological Skyhook

Determinism, Naturalism, and Self-Defeat

Jim Slagle

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2016
• ISBN:
  9781317230076
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Filosofia
• Subtopic: Epistemologia in filosofia

Throughout philosophical history, there has been a recurring argument to the effect that determinism, naturalism, or both are self-referentially incoherent. By accepting determinism or naturalism, one allegedly acquires a reason to reject determinism or naturalism. The Epistemological Skyhook brings together, for the first time, the principal expressions of this argument, focusing primarily on the last 150 years. This book addresses the versions of this argument as presented by Arthur Lovejoy, A.E. Taylor, Kurt Gödel, C.S. Lewis, Norman Malcolm, Karl Popper, J.R. Lucas, William Hasker, Thomas Nagel, Alvin Plantinga, and others, along with the objections presented by their many detractors. It concludes by presenting a new version of the argument that synthesizes the best aspects of the others while also rendering the argument immune to some of the most significant objections made to it.

1
Introduction to the Skyhook

Set your minds on things above.

Colossians 3:2

1 Overview of the Argument

There is an interesting argument hovering in the margins of philosophy that has rarely been given systematic treatment, often being advanced and critiqued with little or no awareness of its expression and development by others. In this book I will explore this argument’s secret history, presenting a compendium that focuses primarily on the last 150 years, as well as examining some of the objections raised against it.

According to this argument, two common philosophical positions are self-referentially incoherent: that is, by believing, arguing for, asserting, or just considering these positions as possibilities, one acquires a reason to withhold belief in them, a reason that can neither be rebutted nor counteracted by other considerations. These two positions are purportedly reached via rational thought but render rational thought impossible, and therefore they are ultimately self-defeating.

The two positions are determinism and naturalism.

1.1 Initial Statement of the Argument

The most basic form of the argument is used against those who try to explain away beliefs or arguments—particularly those with which they disagree—as motivated by some force(s) other than rationality. Freudianism and Marxism, at least in their more naïve expressions, are common targets. Freudians believe (allegedly) that all beliefs are the products of nonrational psychological dysfunctions, or at least functions that do not reliably produce true beliefs. ¹ And Marx himself wrote of his critics, “Your very ideas are but the outgrowth of the conditions of your bourgeois production and bourgeois property, just as your jurisprudence is but the will of your class made into a law for all, a will whose essential character and direction are determined by the economical conditions of existence of your class.” ² Thus, his critics’ beliefs are brought about by social conditioning and their economic position in society and, as such, can be dismissed.³

The obvious response to such claims is to apply it to the Freudian and the Marxist themselves, not to mention Freud and Marx: if all beliefs are the product of nonrational forces, and thus nonveracious in some way, then belief in Freudianism and Marxism is similarly produced and so just as nonveracious as any other. If all reasoning is hopelessly tainted, then the Freudian and the Marxist arrive at their doctrines by tainted processes too, and if this condition allows their critics to be discounted, as Marx seems to suggest, it allows Freudianism and Marxism to be discounted by the same token. More broadly, if all beliefs are produced by nonrational forces and are thus nonveracious, then the belief that “all beliefs are produced by non-rational forces and are thus nonveracious” is itself produced by nonrational forces and is thus nonveracious. This belief, and any position that leads to it, is therefore self-defeating: if it is true, we no longer have any reason for believing it to be true. It is hoist with its own petard.

To put this another way, those who claim that all beliefs, acts of reasoning, etc., are nonveracious are positing a closed circle in which no beliefs are produced by the proper methods by which beliefs can be said to be veracious or rational. Yet at the same time, they are arrogating to themselves a position outside of this circle by which they can judge the beliefs of others, a move they deny to their opponents. Since the raison d’être of their thesis is that there is no outside of the circle, they do not have the epistemic right to assume a position independent of it, and so their beliefs about the nonveracity of beliefs or reasoning are just as nonveracious as those they criticize. If all of the beliefs inside the circle are suspect, we cannot judge between truth and falsity, since any such judgment would be just as suspect as what it seeks to adjudicate. We would have to seek another argument, another chain of reasoning, another set of beliefs, by which we can judge the judgment—and a third set to judge the judgment of the judgment, ad infinitum. At no point can they step out of the circle to a transcendent standpoint that would allow them to reject some beliefs as tainted while remaining untainted themselves.

What this entails is that, returning to our twin scapegoats, belief in Freudianism and Marxism must be claimed to be exceptions to this general rule of nonveracious beliefs. Yet in order to avail themselves of this option, they must be willing to provide some justification for it: to simply exclude their own beliefs and no others from their thesis would be completely ad hoc and question-begging. So in order to limit the application of their charge of irrationality, they must explain how some beliefs can escape being produced by nonrational forces or escape the subsequent nonveracity. This is problematic for them, because it means that their opponents’ beliefs may meet these criteria as well. In other words, if their condemnation of reasoning or argumentation is universal, then it applies to their condemnation also, and so is self-defeating. If it is only partial, thereby allowing them to escape the problem, then it may not apply to their interlocutors either. Nor can they assume that arguments are guilty until proven innocent, since, again, this would have to be applied to their own beliefs in Freudianism or Marxism. In this case, no analysis could ever get started, since such an analysis would also be guilty until proven innocent, and so must first be established by another analysis, which would itself be guilty until proven innocent, and so on. So, perhaps inconveniently, their opponents’ arguments and beliefs must be shown to be false rather than assumed to be false.

We can ask further what principles they will use to determine a belief’s potential veracity. The obvious answer is the canons of rational thought: thus, any attempt to justify their beliefs as not subject to their criticism of other beliefs must presuppose the general validity and veracity of reasoning, thought, and argument. Unless reasoning is veracious, they cannot give any reason why their beliefs are veracious while those of their opponents are not. Insofar as their claims of nonveracity are universal in scope, they apply to all reasoning, including the reasoning employed in reaching their own doctrines, which are thus self-defeating.

This book will address the claim that determinism and naturalism fall victim to the same argument as Freudianism and Marxism, although more subtly. If determinism and naturalism are true, then their advocates have arrived at their beliefs, including their beliefs in determinism and naturalism, by nonrational processes, thus taking away any epistemic motive they may have had for accepting determinism and naturalism in the first place. I say “more subtly” because determinists and naturalists do not usually assume that their opponents are inherently irrational, and so will not find it discomfiting to have to provide explanations by which one can judge beliefs true or not. The argument, however, seeks to show that in employing such explanations, the determinist or naturalist is unwittingly presupposing their position(s) to be false.

The most concise statement of this argument as it applies to both determinism and naturalism is that given by the atheist scientist J.B.S. Haldane: “For if my mental processes are determined wholly by the motions of atoms in my brain I have no reason to suppose that my beliefs are true. They may be sound chemically, but that does not make them sound logically. And hence I have no reason for supposing my brain to be composed of atoms.” ⁴ He refers to determinism when he writes of one’s mental processes being “determined wholly” by something other than rational processes, and he refers to naturalism when he writes that the processes in question are the physical, chemical, neurological processes of brain activity. Taking this statement as our starting point, the argument is roughly as follows:

1. If determinism or naturalism is true, then beliefs are not produced by logical processes.
2. Beliefs that are not produced by logical processes are not logically sound.
3. Determinism and naturalism are beliefs.
4. Therefore, if determinism or naturalism is true, belief in determinism and naturalism is not produced by logical processes. (from 1 and 3)
5. Therefore, if determinism or naturalism is true, belief in determinism and naturalism is not logically sound. (from 2 and 4)

As stated, this argument plainly fails. The first premise is manifestly contestable, and the second is simply false. Nevertheless it suffices as a first pass at the argument. The above puts it in terms of beliefs, but it may also be expressed in terms of knowledge, rationality, argumentation, contemplation, or assertion.

This argument has sometimes been promoted on the popular level, and this has led some to dismiss it as being outside the province of professional philosophers.⁵ This is unfortunate; as Ernest Gellner writes, “This argument has a distinguished history,” and thus is worthy of being taken seriously. ⁶ In the 20th century, versions of the argument have been defended by some of the most renowned philosophers, and of course it has had its share of detractors as well.

1.2 Branding Strategies

This argument is known by several names, but none has been applied to all versions of it. ⁷ I have chosen to name it after a passage by Daniel Dennett, which may have been inspired by similar passages by Richard Rorty.⁸ Dennett writes of two types of explanations, those built from the ground up based on what has already been scientifically established and those that depend on something intentional reaching down from some transcendent viewpoint to fix or establish something. He calls the bottom-up explanations “cranes,” and the top-down explanations, “perhaps a descendant of the deus ex machina of ancient Greek dramaturgy,”⁹ he calls “skyhooks.”

Cranes can do the lifting work our imaginary skyhooks might do, and they do it in an honest, non-question-begging fashion. They are expensive, however. They have to be designed and built, from everyday parts already on hand, and they have to be located on a firm base of existing ground. Skyhooks are miraculous lifters, unsupported and insupportable. Cranes are no less excellent as lifters, and they have the decided advantage of being real. ¹⁰

The top, in Dennett’s reasoning, is mind, whereas the bottom is the material, physical, mechanistic entities and processes that science studies. Thus, any attempt to explain anything by starting with mind or intent is a skyhook, and such explanations are unscientific and disallowed. More precisely, they are nonexistent: skyhook explanations cannot trace their existence back to the mindless, mechanistic processes of nature (if they could then they would be cranes), and so are essentially appeals to miracles. Mind must be explained in naturalistic, deterministic terms, and any attempt to deny this is to appeal to a skyhook. “Let us understand that a skyhook is a ‘mind-first’ force or power or process, an exception to the principle that all design, and apparent design, is ultimately the result of mindless, motiveless mechanicity.” ¹¹ Dennett, of course, is using these concepts to argue for Darwinism (unde...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Copyright
• Dedication
• Contents
• Preface
• 1 Introduction to the Skyhook
• 2 Defining Terms
• 3 Paradox Lost
• 4 Eliminationist Rhetoric (or, Truth Takes the Hindmost)
• 5 Mental Problems
• 6 Knowledge and Normativity
• 7 Language Games
• 8 Popper Function
• 9 Being Thomas Nagel
• 10 Epistemology Supernaturalized
• 11 Leftovers
• 12 Object Lessons
• 13 An a Priori Teleological Argument
• Conclusions
• Bibliography
• Index