Reagan Versus The Sandinistas

The Undeclared War On Nicaragua

Thomas W Walker, Harvey Williams, Peter Kornbluh, Eva Gold

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2019
• ISBN:
  9781000309065
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

The product of research and investigation by a team of sixteen authors, Reagan versus the Sandinistas is the most comprehensive and current study to date of the Reagan administration's mounting campaign to reverse the Sandinista revolution. The authors thoroughly examine all major aspects of Reagan's "low-intensity war, " from the U.S. government's attempts at economic destabilization to direct CIA sabotage and the sponsorship of the contras or freedom fighters. They also explore less-public tactics such as electronic penetration, behind-the-scenes manipulation of religious and ethnic tensions, and harassment of U.S. Nicaraguan specialists and "fellow travelers." The book concludes with a consideration of the impact of these activities and their implications for international law, U.S. interests, U.S. polity, and Nicaragua itself. Reagan versus the Sandinistas is designed not only for courses on Latin America, U.S. foreign policy, and international relations, but also for students, scholars, and others interested in understanding one of the most massive, complex efforts—short of direct intervention—organized by the United States to overthrow the government of another country.

ONE
Introduction

THOMAS W. WALKER

Background

Located at the geographic center of Central America, Nicaragua is the largest country in the region. Even so, its 91,943 square kilometers of surface make it only slightly larger than the state of Iowa. And its population of a little over 3 million is also only slightly greater than Iowa's 2.8 million. Given Nicaragua's low population density, abundant natural resources (good land, timber, gold, petroleum), access to two oceans, and long-recognized potential as a site for a transoceanic waterway, one would expect Nicaraguans in general to be prosperous. In fact, however, when the Sandinistas overthrew Anastasio Somoza Debayle in 1979, the social conditions of the majority of Nicaraguans ranked that country with the two or three most backward of Latin America. The explanation for this apparent paradox lies in Nicaraguan history—one of the most unfortunate of the hemisphere.¹

Two major factors had combined to produce this situation: (1) elite irresponsibility flowing out of a highly unequal social system and (2) endemic foreign intervention or manipulation. The inegalitarian nature of Nicaraguan society had its roots in the Spanish conquest in the early sixteenth century. In contrast to neighboring Costa Rica where the Spaniards either killed or expelled the Indians, the conquerors of Nicaragua drastically decimated, but did not completely destroy, the native population. As a result, in Nicaragua there was an underclass of nonwhites who could be used as virtual slaves in the income-concentrating economic activities of the European minorities. In Costa Rica, the Europeans had no ethnically distinct underclass to exploit. Thus, over the centuries, Costa Rica developed the relatively more egalitarian society that gave birth in the twentieth century to liberal democracy whereas Nicaragua and the other Central American countries to the north—with which it shared sociohistorical characteristics—produced an endless chain of elite-run dictatorships. Although the natural resources of the country were exploited by the elite to produce export products to generate wealth for its members, the human condition of the bulk of the population actually declined as the country's rulers used law and brute military force to promote their already lopsided class advantage. In Nicaragua, the last of these income-concentrating regimes were those of the Somoza dynasty—Anastasio Somoza García (1937-1956), Luis Somoza Debayle and puppets (1956-1967), and Anastasio Somoza Debayle (1967-1979). By the time Anastasio Somoza Debayle (with a net worth estimated well in excess of US$0.5 billion) was finally overthrown, the poorer 50 percent of his country's people were struggling to make do on a per capita income of around US$250 per year.

Parallel to, and often intimately connected with, this history of elite exploitation was a long experience of foreign intervention and meddling. During the colonial period, the Spaniards on the Pacific Coast and later the British in the Atlantic region exercised control over what is now Nicaragua. Although Spanish rule in the west came to an end in 1822, the British were only finally expelled from the east in the 1890s.

Decades before, the Americans had also begun meddling in Nicaraguan affairs.² In the 1850s a U.S. filibuster, William Walker, briefly imposed himself as president of Nicaragua and actually won diplomatic recognition from Washington. Later, in 1909, the United States encouraged and assisted the minority Conservative party in overthrowing Liberal nationalist president José Santos Zelaya. Subsequently, to keep elite pro-American governments in power, U.S. troops occupied Nicaragua from 1912 to 1925 and from 1926 to 1933, In return, these client regimes signed treaties giving away Nicaragua's right to have its own transoceanic waterway (which would have meant competition for the U.S. canal in Panama) and relinquishing its claims to San Andrés and other offshore islands (which Colombia demanded in apparent compensation from the United States for its involvement in engineering the independence of the Colombian province of Panama in 1903). During the second occupation, the United States created the Nicaraguan National Guard to preserve pro-American stability. After the U.S. troops departed, the National Guard's first Nicaraguan commander, Anastasio Somoza García, wasted little time in creating a pro-American dictatorship, which with abundant U.S. assistance was to last until 1979. By the time the dynasty was finally overthrown, its National Guard—one of the most corrupt and exploitative military establishments in the hemisphere—was also the most heavily U.S.-trained in all of Latin America.³

Not surprisingly, the centuries-old themes of elite exploitation and foreign meddling produced numerous incidents of grass roots or nationalist resistance. Several heroic Indian leaders resisted the Spanish conquistadores. Centuries later, in 1881, thousands of Indians lost their lives in the War of the Comuneros in futile resistance to the seizure of their ancestral lands by Nicaraguan coffee planters. In 1912, Liberal nationalist Benjamín Zeledón lost his life after leading an unsuccessful revolt against the U.S.-imposed Conservative regime. From 1927 to 1932, Augusto César Sandino lead a long guerrilla campaign to liberate his country from both the U.S. occupiers and the client regime they had imposed. Though his effort was partially successful in that it forced the United States to withdraw its troops, Sandino— who had signed a peace agreement with titular president Juan B. Sacasa— was subsequently murdered by Anastasio Somoza's National Guard.

The final—this time successful—resistance began in 1961. That year, frustrated with the lack of nationalism of the Nicaraguan Socialist party (PSN)—the local pro-Soviet Communists—several young Marxists split from the PSN to form the Sandinist Front for National Liberation (FSLN). Relatively unsuccessful in their initial guerrilla activities of the 1960s, the Sandinistas gained popularity and strength in the 1970s as Somoza rule became harsher and even Catholic clergy—following the suggestion of the Latin American bishops at their second international conference at Medellín, Colombia, in 1968—began organizing and raising the social and political awareness of the masses. Finally, after an unprecedented eighteen-month War of Liberation in 1978 and 1979, Somoza's army was defeated and the Nicaraguan revolution came to power.

The War of Liberation had cost Nicaragua around 50,000 lives, or approximately 2 percent of its people. In the United States, that would be the equivalent of a loss of around 4.5 million people, or over seventy-five times the U.S. death toll in the entire Vietnam conflict. But as Nicaraguans reminded me on my trip there a few days later, freedom, justice, and national dignity are sometimes worth such a price.

The First Seven Years of the Revolution

The new system was inevitably controversial both at home and abroad. Though ardently nationalist and in many cases deeply religious, most Sandinistas were also openly Marxist or Marxist-Leninist in that they found the writings of Marx and Lenin useful in understanding the history of Latin America. Consequently, they were automatically viewed with suspicion both by Nicaragua's middle- and upper-class minority—who feared the immediate imposition of a Soviet-style state and economy—and by foreign-policy makers in Washington—who were worried about the specter of a "second Cuba." Internally, these fears led to a rapid class polarization, rumor mongering, and a notable lack of cooperation in the reconstruction effort on the part of the private sector. Internationally, especially after the election of Ronald Reagan in the United States, these perceptions produced a multifaceted program to destroy the Sandinista revolution, including a campaign of propaganda and disinformation⁴ depicting the government of Nicaragua as a grim, totalitarian Communist regime and an instrument of Soviet expansionism in the Americas. Although most of these allegations were either completely groundless or very nearly so, the U.S. mass media and opposition politicians (perhaps fearing to appear "naive," "liberal," or "biased") rarely challenged the carefully cultivated "conventional wisdom." Reagan's tactics for dealing with the Sandinistas could be criticized but not the administration's picture of the Nicaraguan regime itself.

For U.S. scholars who did research in Nicaragua during this period, the discrepancy between what was heard in the United States and what was seen in Nicaragua proved stark and frustrating. Far from being a coterie of wild-eyed ideologues, the Sandinistas behaved in a pragmatic and indeed moderate fashion throughout the first seven years. Although they were forced increasingly to rely on the Socialist Bloc for trade and aid, they did not impose a Soviet-style state or a Communist, or even socialist, economic system. They succeeded in carrying out innovative and highly successful social programs without inordinately straining the national budget. And contrary to the "conventional wisdom," their performance in the area of human rights—though not flawless—would probably rank Nicaragua at least in the top third of Latin America states.⁵

The Sandinistas enjoyed a number of political assets at the time of their victory, but their power was not limitless. Their greatest asset was the fact that their victory had been unconditional. The old National Guard had been defeated and disbanded. The new armed forces were explicitly Sandinist— that is, revolutionary and popularly oriented. Moreover, the mass organizations created in the struggle to overthrow the dictator gave the Sandinist Front of National Liberation (FSLN) a grass roots base that dwarfed the organized support of all potential rivals. Finally, the new government enjoyed broad international support. Nevertheless, the country's new leaders were well aware that their revolutionary administration faced certain geopolitical and economic constraints. The Soviet Union had made it clear that it was not willing to underwrite a second Cuba. Hard currency would not be forthcoming from that source, nor would military support in the event of a U.S. invasion. Furthermore, unlike Cuba, Nicaragua was not an island. Its long borders were highly vulnerable to paramilitary penetration, and any attempt to impose a dogmatic Marxist-Leninist system would certainly have generated a mass exodus of people. Finally, the Catholic Church in Nicaragua was so important and Catholics had played such a crucial role in the War of Liberation that the Sandinistas were neither inclined nor well situated to attack the Catholic traditions of their country. For these reasons, it is not surprising that for the next seven years the Sandinistas, in fact, attempted to govern in a pragmatic, nonideological fashion.

Sandinista rule was marked by a high degree of consistency and continuity —owing at least in part to the fact that the overall political trajectory of the revolution was set during these years by the same nine-person Sandinista Directorate (DN). Decisions made by the DN were based on consensus or near consensus. Reportedly, important decisions were never made on a five to four vote. This inherently conservative style of revolutionary stewardship meant that domestic and international policy, though adaptive in detail, remained consistent in overall characteristics and goals. During the entire seven years, the Sandinistas promoted (1) a mixed economy with heavy participation by the private sector, (2) political pluralism featuring interclass dialogue and efforts to institutionalize input and feedback from all sectors, (3) ambitious social programs, based in large part on grass roots voluntarism, and (4) the maintenance of diplomatic and economic relations with as many nations as possible regardless of ideology.

However, in spite of such overarching continuity, it is possible to divide this period into three subperiods that were clearly conditioned by the country's international environment. The first, which lasted until the election of Ronald Reagan in November 1980, was a time of euphoria and optimism. The second, spanning the nearly two years from that election to spring 1982, was a period of growing awareness of, and concern with, the hostile intentions of the new administration in Washington. In the third, during the little over four years that had elapsed from spring 1982 through summer 1986, Nicaragua would meet the full brunt of an unprecedentedly massive surrogate invasion, direct Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) sabotage, and economic strangulation.

The Quiet before the Storm

The first year (1979-1980) was the quiet before the storm. Jimmy Carter was still president of the United States. Though not pleased with the Sandinista victory, his administration had decided to make the best of it, offering economic aid with strings attached in the hopes of manipulating the Sandinistas in a direction acceptable to Washington. During this period, the FSLN consolidated the revolution politically by promoting the growth of grass roots organizations, reorganizing the Sandinista armed forces, and reequipping them with standardized military materiel. Much of the latter was obtained from the Socialist Bloc: The United States had earlier refused an arms purchase request by the Sandinistas. Nevertheless, the Sandinista Army was quite small (15,000 to 18,000 soldiers) and the civilian militia— little more than an association of patriotic marching units—hardly constituted a credible addition to the country's defensive force.

In economic affairs, the Sandinistas decided to honor Somoza's foreign debt in order to maintain Nicaraguan creditworthiness in Western financial circles. Lengthy negotiations with the international banking community led to concessionary terms for repayment. Public loans and aid poured in from a wide variety of countries. And, although the government immediately confiscated properties owned by the Somozas and their accomplices, it respected the rest of the private sector and even offered it substantial financial assistance (in the form of reactivation loans, preferential access to foreign exchange, and so on).

In line with the decision to preserve a large private sector, the revolutionaries created an interim government in which all groups and classes in society, including the privileged minority, could have a voice. The plural executive (Junta of National Reconstruction), created shortly before the victory, included wealthy conservatives as well as Sandinistas. The interim legislative body (Council of State) gave corporate representation to most parties and organizations of significance in Nicaraguan society. This was also a time of ambitious social programs—most notably the 1980 Literacy Crusade, which was carried out at relatively low cost to the government owing to its ability to mobilize massive voluntary participation.

The period was not without tension, however. Class polarization had set in almost immediately. Many in the minority privileged classes were certain that totalitarian communism was just around the corner. Accordingly, some fled immediately to Miami whereas others first illegally decapitalized their industries, transferred money abroad, and then fled. Moreover, a crisis of sorts occurred early in 1980, when conservatives on the Junta resigned in a pique over the fact that the organizations representing their class had been given representation on the new Council of State that was only slightly larger than the equivalent of the minority percentage that they represented in the population as a whole. At the same time, the independent daily, La Prensa, was taken over by a conservative wing of the Chamorro family and from then on took a critical position, playing on the fears of the privileged classes.

On balance, however, these were not bad times. Other conservatives were found to replace those who had resigned from the Junta. Human rights in general were respected. And La Prensa was allowed to make scurrilous and frequently false attacks on the system with virtual impunity. Former Somoza military personnel and accomplices were subjected to legal investigation and trial rather than execution. Indeed, the death penalty itself was immediately abolished.

The Gathering Storm

The second period, one of growing concern and apprehension, began in fall 1980 with the election of Ronald Reagan. That summer the Republican party platform had "deplor[ed] the Marxist-Sandinista takeover of Nicaragua" and had promised to end all aid to that country. Campaign aides to Reagan had advised using on Nicaragua the full gamut of techniques (e.g., economic destabilization, surroga...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• List of Tables and Figures
• Preface
• 1 Introduction
• PART 1 THE ASSAULT ON NICARAGUA
• PART 2 THE HOME FRONT
• PART 3 IMPACT AND IMPLICATIONS
• Acronyms
• About the Editor and Contributors
• Index