The Operational Role of the OSCE in South-Eastern Europe

Contributing to Regional Stability in the Balkans

Victor-Yves Ghebali, Daniel Warner

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2018
• ISBN:
  9781351749893
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politique et relations internationales
• Subtopic: Politique

This title was first published in 2001. An authoritative look at the operational role of the OSCE in South-Eastern Europe, this book provides in-depth examination of the efforts of an international organization to contribute to regional stability in the volatile Balkans in the 1990s. Essential reading for students and academics of international relations and specialists on South-Eastern Europe.

Part I
The Operational Activities of the OSCE in South-Eastern Europe

Chapter 1
A Success Story: The United Nations Transitional Authority for Eastern Slavonia

Willy Hanset

Firstly I would like to thank the organisers of the international conference of which this volume is the Proceedings for having invited me. This opportunity, this privilege, allows me to present the immense work done by our ‘Blue Helmets’ in Eastern Slavonia.

My chapter will treat three principal themes: a short historical summary, the UNTAES Mission and some historical lessons which explain the Mission’s success. I will be writing from personal experience.

The Yugoslav Crisis: Short Historical Summary

In June 1991 the Yugoslav crisis erupted on to the international scene. Slovenia and Croatia claimed their independence while the Serb population, minority but certainly present, remained loyal to the federal power. Croatia and Slovenia were rapidly shaken by violent fighting. The Federal Army under Serb control, guarantor of Federal unity and identity, remained in its barracks in the heart of the dissident regions. Soon, Yugoslav troops invaded the new States to support the Serbs who refused to accept the division. In January 1992 Croatia and Slovenia were officially recognised by the European community and in March by the United States. Also in March, the first Blue Helmets arrived, dispatched by the United Nations to ensure that the ceasefire was respected, and peace maintained.

In Eastern Slavonia, it was Russian and Belgian soldiers who from March 1992 to January 1996 handled, both well and badly, this difficult mission. They belonged to the United Nations Protection Force, UNPROFOR, deployed throughout the territory of the former Yugoslavia. In May and August 1995, Croat armed forces launched operations ‘Flash’ and ‘Storm’ recapturing all the territory under Serb control, except for Eastern Slavonia. The Croat authorities and the Serb leadership started peace negotiations, which ended with the signature on the 12 November 1995 of the Erdut accord.

The Erdut Accord

This basic agreement, brokered and stewarded by American Ambassador Peter W. Galbraith and the United Nations mediator Thorvald Stoltenberg was signed at Erdut on 12 November 1995 by Milan Milanovic, head of the Serb delegation, and by Hrvoje Sarinic, head of the Croat delegation. The signatories to the accord agreed among other things:

• - That a transitional period of twelve months would be established, which could be extended for a further twelve months at the demand of one of the parties.
• - That the UN Security Council would put in place a transitional administration charged with governing the region in the interest of all the persons residing in or returning to it.
• - That the Security Council authorise the deployment of a multi-national force during the transitional period to maintain peace and security. The region was to be demilitarised not later than thirty days after the force was declared operational. This demilitarisation was to effect all the military forces and the police and above all apply to the weapons present in the region.
• - That the transitional administration would ensure that refugees and displaced persons could in complete security return to their homes. The transitional administration was to take all necessary measures for the re-establishment and normal functioning of public services.
• - That a transitional police force would be established under the control of the transitional administration.

To summarise, this accord foresaw the progressive and peaceful return of the region to Croat rule, underlined the importance of respect for the rights of the people involved, and imposed the holding of elections at the latest thirty days before the end of the transitional period.

UNTAES

Based on the Erdut Accord, the UN Security Council on 15 January 1996 unanimously created UNTAES with resolution 1037:

The Security Council

1. Decides that the military component of UNTAES shall consist of a force with an initial deployment of up to 5,000 troops which will have the following mandate:
   • (a) To supervise and facilitate the demilitarisation as undertaken by the parties to the Basic Agreement, according to the schedule and procedures to be established by UNTAES;
   • (b) To monitor the voluntary and safe return of refugees and displaced persons to their home of origin in co-operation with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, as provided for in the Basic Agreement;
   • (c) To contribute, by its presence, to the maintenance of peace and security in the region; and
   • (d) Otherwise to assist in implementation of the Basic Agreement.
2. Decides that Member States, acting nationally or through regional organisations or arrangements, may, at the request of UNTAES and on the basis of procedures communicated to the United Nations, take all necessary measures, including close air support, in defence of UNTAES and, as appropriate, to assist in the withdrawal of UNTAES;
3. Reaffirms that all States shall co-operate fully with the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and its organs in accordance with the provisions of resolution 827 (1993) of 25 May 1993 and the Statute of the International Tribunal and shall comply with requests for assistance or orders issued by a Trial Chamber under article 29 of the Statute;
4. Stresses that UNTAES shall co-operate with the International Tribunal in the performance of its mandate, including with regard to the protection of the sites identified by the Prosecutor and persons conducting investigations for the International Tribunal.

A Strong Mandate

The mandate defined by the Security Council is strong because it rests on Chapter VII of the UN Charter which authorises the use of force, not only in the case of legitimate defence but also for the execution of a mandated mission.

This strong mandate was given added credibility by UNTAES’s military component which included 5,000 men, later joined by more than a hundred military observers. A credibility reinforced by the weapons at the Force Commander’s disposition: two artillery batteries, and two squadrons of tanks. A firepower further reinforced by the presence of six combat helicopters under the direct command of the Force Commander. Finally, if ever needed the Force Commander could call upon Close Air Support from NATO planes deployed to support IFOR troops in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Force Commander had this authority and all that was logistically necessary for this support was already present within the theatre of the operation. Full-scale training exercises were organised two or three times per week. A strong mandate, supported by a credible force was a major asset for the Force Commander whose mission, put differently, was to reintegrate Eastern Slavonia into the Croatian State, while maintaining its multi-ethnic character and ensuring respect for minorities and more generally the rights of all.

UNTAES 1996: Demilitarisation

The military component of UNTAES attained two important stages in 1996 led by the Belgian Force Commander Major General Schoups. Based on the two units of Blue Helmets already in place, the Belgian and Russian battalions, the Force Commander by the beginning of May was up to full strength with an operational force of 5,000 men including a Belgian battalion reinforced by an Argentine reconnaissance company, a Russian battalion, a group of Pakistani forces, a group of Jordanian forces, a squadron of Ukrainian tanks, a squadron of Ukrainian helicopters, a Slovaque engineering corps, an Indonesian medical company, a Czech field hospital, a group of Polish police and a Headquarters company provided by Belgium.

The demilitarisation of the zone started on 26 May and by 26 July the demilitarisation was completed and respected by the two parties. Only UNTAES soldiers controlled the zone and they secured it by occupying all the points controlling access and by patrolling night and day in all the villages and conurbations. An important de-mining effort was undertaken. A ‘security and logistics’ support was brought to a series of projects developed by the civil elements of UNTAES. Let me mention, just by way of example, that on 1 November, 500 people were authorised to return to the cemeteries to celebrate in dignity All Saints’ Day. Step by step Serbs and Croats relearned how to meet, talk and help each other; but the road to refound confidence remains a long one.

UNTAES 1997: en route for Success

I once again took command of UNTAES on 6 January 1997. At that time everyone was conscious of the determination of the UN. The work of UNTAES was having its effects from day to day: the opening of a school, a market being set up, checkpoints opening. As foreseen by Security Council resolution 1037, UNTAES was to organise elections and rubber-stamp the result.

These elections were to take place on 13 and 14 April 1997. They were a success for the UN and for UNTAES. In spite of serious organisational problems the elections passed off without a single incident, not a shot fired, not even a punch-up. Everybody recognised that the reason these elections were able to take place was thanks to the extraordinary security effort of the Blue Helmets. They gave of their best. For a whole week both night and day 4,000 Blue Helmets were deployed on the ground in three concentric circles of security. The first circle was made up of checkpoints and observation posts installed on the edges of the region and controlling all entry points to the zone. At these checkpoints strict control stopped the introduction of arms into the zone and refused entry to troublemakers. The second circle, composed of checkpoints was inside the zone. On all roads leading to the polling stations and the ballot paper collection points, patrols and mobile checkpoints dissuaded any disruptive actions. Finally, the third circle was a discreet but real presence of intervention forces installed in the vicinity of the polling stations. Under the orders of the Force Commander, a mobile (by helicopter and by road) specialised intervention force stood by, ready to intervene anywhere in the zone.

Order and security in the polling stations themselves was the responsibility of the Transitional Police. The one hundred military observers, unarmed, were in the polling stations and continually updated the Force Commander on how things were evolving, and the electoral mood. This security presence and also the extra logistic support supplied by the military allowed the elections to take place.

In his report to the Security Council the Secretary-General of the UN, Kofi Annan, underlined that ‘the success of the local elections of 13 April mark an important stage in the process aimed at giving the local population a legitimate representation’.

The elections marked a point of no return in the process of reintegration of Eastern Slavonia into the Croatian State. The military, the Blue Helmets of UNTAES played a fundamental role in this, and I pay homage to them.

At the request of UNTAES the office of the OSCE in charge of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) sent observers to check the correct execution of the elections of 13 and 14 April 1997. The mandate of these OSCE teams was simply to observe, not to supervise nor to certify the elections. The certification was the responsibility of the transitional administrator of UNTAES, Mr Klein.

Since mid-February 1997, twenty-two OSCE long-term observers had been deployed in ten different places in Croatia, including in UNTAES’s area of responsibility. Its worth noting that the 192 OSCE observers (ODIHR) were deployed on election day throughout the Croat territory, including UNTAES’s zone.

After the elections, while the new elected bodies were having trouble getting set up, it appeared that the next challenge which faced UNTAES would be the return of refugees. The local Serbs had shown that they were resolved to assume their rights and responsibilities as Croat citizens but there remained in the region a feeling of distrust, even of fear. The moment came to cut the lifeline which linked Eastern Slavonia with Serbia and to reintegrate the region within the Croat system. For example, and without being exhaustive, I could mention public services such as the post, justice, teaching, public health, the pensions system, the railways and the prison system, and the introduction of the kuna instead of the dinar. The refugees would only return on the condition that they had somewhere to stay, to send their children to school, and to work. The reactivation of the region was essentially led by the civil branch of UNTAES with logistic support from the military part at a strength of 5,000 men from twenty-two different nations.

During this period which lasted from May until October 1997, the military force transferred progressively and with great caution a part of its power to the Transitional Police Force (TPF) which was undergoing training. This was the period of peaceful co-existence. In order to avoid an everlasting deployment, following a scenario ‘a la Cypriot’ but above all because the essential objectives of the mandate had been attained, UNTAES planned a two-stage pull-out strategy. During the first stage, the transitional administration was to transfer to Croatia the responsibility for the majority of civil administration of the region, while guarding the right to intervene. During the second stage, depending on progressive results, the last administrative functions (particularly police functions) were in turn transferred to Croatia. On the military side, a plan of progressive disengagement was elaborated.

On 14 July 1997, with resolution 1120, the Security Council prolonged UNTAES’s mandate until 15 January 1998 and authorised the execution of the plan for military withdrawal. During August the Pakistani, Jordanian, and Argentinean Blue Helmets went home. This reduction by half of men and heavy weapons obliged the Force Commander to redeploy the Belgian and Russian battalions. Who, ironically, were back to their original deployment in the former Eastern sector.

At the same time, the security system, until then based on fixed checkpoints evolved into an essentially mobile system: the control of entry being gradually passed to the Transitional Police guided and watched by the civil UN police.

On 15 October the number of men was again reduced, and a residual force of 720 men was installed charged with ‘liquidating’ the mission. From this date the sole mission of these soldiers was to assure, if needed, the security of UN personnel and to guard the materials and equipment belonging to the organisation.

On 15 January 1998, complete authority for the region was transferred to the Croat Government: the mandate was completed. Eastern Slavonia was returned peacefully to the Croatian fold. The region has kept her multi-ethnic character. With their presence, their determination and their professionalism, UNTAES’s Blue Helmets were the framework around which all of UNTAES’s civil action could develop and consolidate. This was my extraordinary experience at the head of UNTAES’s Blue Helmets during 1997.

Conclusion

The UNTAES operation was considered a success by everyone. The principal objectives imposed by the Security Council on the transitional administration were attained. The military component of UNTAES realised all its objectives. Two essential tasks remain to be completed: to organise a dignified return for the refugees and to handle with generosity the displaced persons. It is the Croat State which is now responsible for this. It is up to the Croats to reconcile the different populations in Eastern Slavonia. Then, and only then, will UNTAES have been a real success.

For the moment the factors which allowed the success of the military operation can be identified as the following:

• - A mandate which clearly defined the civil and military objectives while remaining sufficiently general. It covered all the situations encountered on the ground, giving military action an official legitimacy.
• - The reference in the mandate to Chapter VII of the UN Charter which allowed the development of solid rules of engagement: it was the price of UNTAES’s credibility.
• - A credible military component: 5,000 men equipped with their armaments, and able to count on the close aerial support of NATO planes.
• - A simple chain of command, clear and short. All decisions were taken by the Transitional Administrator and the Force Commander.
• - The decisional process was rapid and reacted directly according to developments on the ground. The situation was not aggravated.
• - The presence of a hundred military observers deployed in all the region’s villages. They were the ‘eyes and ears’ of the Force Commander.
• - Excellent co-ordination with all the humanitarian organisations, logistic efficiency and efficient de-mining teams were also assets.

In order to achieve a full reconciliation between the individuals who had become embroiled in the war, the UN decided to maintain a Support Group of Civil Police in Eastern Slavonia for a period of nine months. At the request of Croatia, the OSCE will return to the region to ensure that the signed accords between the Croat Government and UNTAES are put into action. This will allow the UN to withdraw, while ensuring that the enormous work realised by the international community is consolidated. Already, before the end of its mandate UNTAES co-operated closely with the members of the OSCE to ensure a smooth transition.

Whatever the future holds in this magnificent region of the Danube that is Eastern Slavonia, we must pay our respects to the gigantic achievement of all the Blue Helmets. We should bow before all those who gave their lives or suffered bodily.

Chapter 2
Croatia: Status Report

Bernard Poncet

As an introduction, I will begin with a short review of the most recent political events in Croatia. I will then present the general activities of the Mission and its preliminary conclusions regarding progress made by the Government in fulfilling its international commitments in recent months and conclude with an update on the forthcoming parliamentary elections.

Introduction

Croatia today is a country in transition in several respects. Croatia is confronted with a process of post-conflict normalisation, as well as the transition from socialism to democracy. The upcoming elections for the Lower House of the Croatian Parliament, which have been called for Monday 3 January 2000, present the possibility of another transition: political. For the f...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• Contributors
• Foreword
• Opening Address
• Introductory Remarks: I
• Introductory Remarks: II
• Part I The Operational Activities of the OSCE in South-Eastern Europe
• Part II The Development of Regional Stability in South-Eastern Europe
• Part III Appendices
• Index