The Making Of A Premier

Zhao Ziyang's Provincial Career

David L Shambaugh

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2019
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• eBook ISBN:
  9781000303100
• Subtopic: Asian Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

How did Zhao Ziyang rise through the provincial apparatus of the Chinese Communist Party to become premier in 1980? How did he develop the policies of economic reform in the provinces that have now become national policy? What does Zhao Ziyang's professional development indicate about upward elite mobility in the Chinese political system? These are the central questions the author addresses in this political biography, tracing Zhao Ziyang's career in detail from his youth, through the Anti-Japanese War, the 1949 revolution, land reform, a series of political and economic campaigns during the 1950s and 1960s, the Cultural Revolution, political rehabilitation, and the "Sichuan Experience." Mr. Shambaugh goes beyond a chronological account to elucidate Zhao's job responsibilities and performance, political and economic philosophy, survival strategies, and behavior during thirty tumultous years in provincial politics. Bringing forth much new information drawn extensively from primary source materials, he also provides insights into the functioning of the post-1949 Chinese political system, especially the interplay between central and provincial politics.

1
Pre-1953 Training During Wartime and Establishing Credentials in Guangdong: Land Reform and Personnel and Information Management

Zhao Ziyang was born in 1919 in Hua xian (county), Henan province. His father was a landlord who also owned grain storage facilities.¹ Between 1928 and 1937 Zhao successively attended Hua County Number One General Primary School, Kaifeng Number One Junior Middle School, and Wuhan Senior Middle School. In March 1932 Zhao joined the Communist Youth League (CYL), becoming a full member of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in February 1938. He joined the CCP in his native Hua county but it is not known who recruited him. He may have subsequently attended a Party school, but he had no form of higher education nor did he travel abroad.

From 1938 to 1940 Zhao served as a CCP secretary in his native Hua xian. During the Japanese invasion this xian became part of the Third Special District in the Hebei-Shandong-Henan border region, where Zhao remained until 1946. During this period he served as a secretary of the Hua xian CCP Work Committee (where he was involved in land reform during 1945–1946), and director of the CCP Propaganda Department and Organization Department for the Third Special District.² Thus very early in his career he was exposed to three key areas of Party work: agriculture, propaganda, and personnel. Other individuals who would later become national leaders and are known to have worked in this border region, and with whom Zhao may have come into contact, were An Ziwen, Xie Fuzhi, Huang Zhen, Li Xuefeng, Liu Bocheng, Bo Yibo, Su Zhenhua, Song Renzhong, Wang Renzhong, and Yang Dezhi. In 1946 Zhao relocated to the Dongboshan mountain region in the Ouyuan base area (also known as the Fourth Rear Base Area) in the Henan-Hebei-Anhui border region, where he continued his work in the Propaganda and Organization Departments.³ In the Ouyuan base area Zhao served under Li Xiannian, who was the region’s commander for the Fourth Front Army. Other important members of the Fourth Front Army with whom Zhao might have had contact were Xu Shiyou, Xu Xiangqian, Chen Xilian, and Liao Chengzhi.⁴ In 1948 Zhao was transferred to southwestern Henan where he served as deputy secretary of the Dongbai xian CCP Committee, and then first secretary of the Nanyang District CCP Committee until 1951.

It is not clear exactly when Zhao arrived in Guangdong province. He was first identified there in May 1951 as the assistant director of the South China Sub-Bureau’s Land Reform Committee. This date suggests that he arrived in April as part of a large contingent of northern cadres who were sent (by the Central-South Bureau in Wuhan) to enforce a harsher land reform policy than had previously been implemented under the direction of Ye Jianying, Fang Fang, and Li Xuefeng· As Ezra Vogel describes in his classic account, Canton Under Communism, local patronage networks coupled with an official “peaceful land reform” policy in the first year of communist rule, prevented the CCP from penetrating the rural political power structure in Guangdong.⁵ At the behest of central political authorities, the “peaceful” land reform policy turned harsh in the winter of 1950–1951, and new personnel from the north were assigned to Guangdong to administer the new policy.⁶ The center apparently achieved the desired results. A brutal campaign against landlords and other “bad elements” was carried out during the spring of 1951. Their land was confiscated and redistributed, and many of them were executed. In his capacity as assistant director of the Land Reform Committee, Zhao was involved in overseeing the work teams and personally participated in several “struggle sessions” (douzheng hui) against landlords in the central and northern districts of Guangdong. His “hard line” against all elements of the bourgeoisie put him at odds with Ye Jianying and Fang Fang, who advocated leniency for relatives of overseas Chinese and the petit bourgeoisie.

By August 1951 Zhao had been promoted to secretary-general of the South-China Sub-Bureau Secretariat and had become a member of the Sub-Bureau’s Standing Committee.⁷ As secretary-general, Zhao worked at the nexus of day-to-day provincial affairs.⁸ The secretary-general is the major conduit in the document transmission process from higher to lower authorities, is responsible for briefing the first secretary on these documents, and overseeing the drafting process of the latter’s reports and speeches. Thus, as an information manager, Zhao held one of the tools of power in the Chinese political system. Since the Chinese political system is a highly compartmentalized bureaucratic one where directives flow vertically down from the center and local reports upward, Zhao was in the perfect position to keep tabs on local officials and interpret directives to suit his and other’s needs.

It is unclear who is to be credited with Zhao’s promotion to this position, but it is reasonable to assume that Du Rensheng, in his capacity as secretary-general of the CCP Central-South Bureau, had something to do with it. Like Zhao, Du is also an agricultural specialist and at that time was known to be a leading exponent of harsh land reform policy. Du served concurrently as vice-director (under Li Xuefeng) of the Central-South Land Reform Committee. In 1954 Du was transferred to Beijing, where he continued his work in agricultural affairs. Thus, Zhao and Du had contact early in their careers. Today Zhao and Du continue to work together. In 1982 Zhao (Premier and Director of the State Counci’s Committee on Restructuring the Economy) appointed Du to head the State Council’s Commission on Rural Policy Research.

As secretary-general Zhao delivered an important speech to an enlarged cadre meeting (6–20 August 1951) that was convened at the behest of the Wuhan authorities who were upset over the slow pace of land reform and wanted to affix blame on the appropriate local cadres as a first step towards purging them from their positions. In his speech, Zhao called on low-level cadres to severely criticize all higher-level cadres who obstructed land reform.⁹ In so doing, Zhao was following the lead of his superiors in Wuhan, not in the Guangdong Party apparatus (e.g., Ye Jianying and Fang Fang). An outpouring of criticism ensued, the thrust of which however was not against the slow pace of land reform, but rather the harsh tactics practiced by the northerners. This is not what the authorities in Wuhan had in mind. The Central-South Bureau responded with a propaganda campaign that attempted to explain that the harsh policy was necessitated by the Korean War and over one hundred “democratic personages” were dispatched from the center to survey the political landscape.¹⁰ In addition, many more northern cadres were sent down to quell the resistance and speed up land reform, which from the center’s perspective continued to lag because of “localism” (difang zhuyi).

The most prominent of these new arrivals was Tao Zhu. Tao would later become the most powerful figure in south China, as well as Zhao’s superior and patron, over the next fifteen years. Tao arrived in late January or early February 1952 from Wuhan where he had been a leading official in the Central-South Bureau.¹¹ One of his first tasks was to conduct a survey of the current status of land reform. Zhao was appointed to oversee the inspection teams.¹² This was the start of their close working relationship.

Tao’s major obstacle was Fang Fang. Fang was the titular chairman of the Land Reform Committee and third secretary of the South China Sub-Bureau, ranking just above Tao, the fourth secretary, in the pecking order. In effect, Fang Fang ran the provincial Party apparatus. First secretary Ye Jianying was much more involved in military affairs, and the second secretary, Zhang Yunyi, was in charge of Guangxi province. Fang, a native of Guangdong, spoke a variety of local dialects, and had been an important guerilla leader there before 1949. His contacts and influence thus ranged throughout the province. Fang was not easy to dislodge. Tao’s strategy was not to attack him directly and immediately, but rather to isolate him by means of well-timed preemptions on agriculture and land reform policy, and purges of Fang’s cronies. Zuo Hongtao was the first to go. Since Zuo had served directly under Zhao as assistant secretary-general of the Sub-Bureau, it is not unlikely that Zhao played a key role in Zuo’s purge, although firm evidence to confirm this is lacking. Zuo, along with Yang Qi, another of Fang Fang’s cronies, were expelled from the Communist Party on 1 April 1952.¹³

Tao’s next step was to attack Fang’s followers at the district level. He launched a series of rectification (zhengfeng) campaigns in all Guangdong districts (except Hainan Island). Tao personally directed the campaign in the central district, while Zhao directed it in the northern district. In Zhao’s bailiwick, over one thousand cadres were purged.¹⁴ The method of rectification employed was so-called “dosed door” group criticism (guanmen piping mi), which was followed by dismissal.¹⁵ As Frederick Teiwes has pointed out, the Guangdong purges were only part of the nationwide “Three-Anti” and “Five-Anti” rectification campaigns, and tactics varied regionally.¹⁶ In south China, where localism and corruption were most widespread, attacks on cadres were harsh and purges were extensive. In a number of cases, Guangdong included, entire county Party committees were disbanded.¹⁷ Following the local rectification campaign, an enlarged provincial cadre conference was held in late June. Land reform still dominated the agenda of the conference. Tao Zhu presided, and Ye Jianying (still first secretary) gave the keynote speech, in which he praised Tao and Zhao for their leadership in the rectification campaign and apologized for the errors of local cadres.¹⁸ Fang Fang also appeared, urging support for land reform, but offering no apologies for his past behavior.¹⁹ Gu Dacun, another of Fang Fang’s close associates dating from Fang’s guerilla days and a provincial Party secretary and vice governor, also delivered a speech in which he apologized for the local cadres’ ideological deviation.²⁰ By so doing, Gu was able to separate himself from Fang Fang. This helped Gu avoid being dismissed with Fang the following year, although Gu’s time would also come during the Anti-Rightist Campaign.

Gradually, Fang Fang’s power base was eroding, and Tao Zhu was the beneficiary. Fang’s political allies had either deserted him or been purged, he was no longer the official spokesman on land reform, and his public visibility declined dramatically throughout 1952. In October, he was demoted from third to fifth secretary. Finally, in May 1953 he was forced to confess his “crimes against the people” at a salt workers meeting.²¹ Fang’s days in Guangdong were over and if it were not for his personal connections (guanxi) his career may well have been over too. But in 1954 Fang appeared in Beijing as Liao Chengzhi’s assistant on the Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission, where he finished his career in a largely ceremonial capacity. At any rate, he left Guangdong and concomitantly a major obstacle to Tao’s consolidation of power was removed.

The last remaining obstacle to Tao’s consolidation of power was Ye Jianying. Ye had a strong local power base, but also had national stature as a People’s Liberation Army (PLA) marshal, a Central Committee member, and a ranking member in the Central-South Military Region and Party Bureau. His regional and national positions proved to be a method to remove him from his local posts. #x0129;n late 1952 and early 1953, Ye began to spend most of his time in Wuhan and then in 1954 in Beijing. No official announcement was made of his departure and change in portfolio, but in May 1953 Tao Zhu was named acting first secretary of the Sub-Bureau (a position he had held de facto since October 1952).²²

With Tao now in control of the provincial apparatus, Zhao’s position became more secure. In September 1953 Zhao was named director of the Rural Work Department, and he continued to serve as secretary-general of the South China Sub-Bureau Secretariat. As director of the Rural Work Department Zhao had An Pingsheng as a deputy. An would go on to become a leading figure in t...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title
• Copyright
• Dedication
• Contents
• Abbreviations
• Preface
• Introduction
• 1. Pre-1953 Training During Wartime and Establishing Credentials in Guangdong: Land Reform and Personnel and Information Management
• 2. Campaigns and Career Advancement, 1954–1960
• 3. Capitalizing on the Economy and Campaigning for Power, 1961–1965
• 4. Losing Power: The Cultural Revolution, 1966–1968
• 5. Rehabilitation and Return to Guangdong, 1971–1975
• 6. The “Sichuan Experience”: Blueprint for a Nation, 1976–1979
• 7. Zhao Ziyang’s Career and Elite Mobility in the Chinese Political System
• Bibliography
• Index