The United States And Japan In The Western Pacific

Micronesia And Papua New Guinea

Grant K Goodman, Felix Moos

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2019
• ISBN:
  9781000306774
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Asian Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

The interrelationships of the United States and Japan with Micronesia, a U.S. dependency, and Papua New Guinea, a newly independent nation, are the focus of this study. The authors demonstrate that dependence does not by any means automatically terminate by virtue of a legal change in political status. To a surprising extent, Micronesia (the last UN trusteeship) and independent Papua New Guinea depend for their very survival on the United States and Japan. The authors point out that the interests of the United States and Japan in this region too often–and unnecessarily–operate in isolation from one another and in direct conflict. Cooperative U.S.-Japanese efforts are vital in this area; whatever plans are made for the region, they must be island-specific, culturally congruent, politically sensitive, and economically viable.

Chapter I
Introduction

This study of the United States and Japan in the Western Pacific with particular attention to the cases of an American dependency, Micronesia, and of a newly independent nation, Papua New Guinea, will focus on these latter political entities, their historic antecedents, their economic developments and their strategic significance. The overall perspective of that emphasis, however, will be to evaluate the current and future interrelationship of Micronesia and Papua New Guinea with the United States and Japan.

These case studies will demonstrate that despite the euphoria of independence or of its anticipation, in fact, dependence does not by any means automatically terminate by virtue of a paper change in political status, by the singing of a new national anthem or by the creation of a flag-carrying airline. Moreover, development, as will be suggested below, is very evidently a concept originating among the highly educated specialized elite of the developed countries, individuals who in their “progressive” fervor for change may envision everywhere mirror images of their own culture, society and technology. Further the “targets” of such “plans” are almost always somewhat complementary elites, most of whom learned their “development economics” under the tutelage of the “movers and shakers” of those same developed countries. Thus, grandiose schemes which psychologically satisfy the planners in Washington, Canberra, Tokyo or wherever are, in fact, very often the only kind which the post-colonial governing class itself finds acceptable. As this report will suggest, however, frequently such plans, while impressive in theory and in magnitude, prove for the most part unrealizable in practice, particularly in the small island states of the Pacific. Moreover, these plans are most usually created in a kind of vacuum without any real consideration of the actual wants and needs of the general populace in a given society or of the unique cultural tradition of each newly delimited political entity.

It should also be stated that “development” may be perforce a moot issue if the population problem is not given immediate and serious attention. By virtue of unchecked population growth, especially in island mini-states but also in all “developing” societies, any improvements which may, in fact, be generated by well-intended funding, most of it from outside sourcesgrants, loans, etc. from governments or from private agencies, are negated faster than “progress” can be achieved. Lack of commitment to population control in most developing areas usually results from either foreign political and religious reticence or from domestic cultural resistance. Up to now most politicians and development economists have, however, refused to face this issue squarely.

It should also be noted that the developed societies of Euroamerica and Japan as well as the semi-developed “socialist” societies of Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union and even China all have their own politico-economic-military purposes in providing “aid” or in devising “plans” for the Less Developed Countries. Whether it is psychologically to try to unburden a particular country of guilt for its past “misdeeds,” e.g. Britain in its former colonies or Japan in Southeast Asia, or to seek political advantage with particular local leaders, e.g. the United States in Iran or the Soviet Union in Angola, or to secure presumed strategic predominance, e.g. the Soviet Union in Ethiopia or the United States in the Philippines, the purpose of such assistance is, of course, not altruism. Thus, recognizing this particular brand of contemporary realpolitik is essential for an appreciation of the special complexities of “development.” Clearly, then, in such circumstances technologically limited assistance needed by the Less Developed Countries to sustain and enhance small-scale subsistence agriculture, particularly important in the Pacific islands, is either downgraded or overlooked in favor of showcase projects requiring lavish funding and, in turn, theoretically redounding to the political advantage of the donor state as well as of the recipient local authorities in power.

In addition, in instance after instance an ecological balance has been the victim of technological development. Even in such sophisticated societies as the United States and Japan economic development is seldom integrated benevolently with existing ecological conditions. Although environmental impact statements are generally currently required, as experience has shown, these are often prepared by engineers or by other technologically oriented sources rather than by individuals who take into account some reasonable balance of technology and values. Thus, to expect development specialists in the Pacific islands to be more ecologically sensitive than their counterparts at home is obviously unwarranted. The result, then, is that increasingly the Pacific islands are becoming a maze of junk yards, and remote stretches of the Pacific Ocean have become so polluted that they can not sustain marine life and/or human activity.

Therefore, one of the questions which this report seeks to answer is what kind of development is really advisable or viable or possible for what kind of Pacific locale. Such considerations clearly concern not only the indigenous populations but the specific former or present colonial mentor of the new state in question. These same considerations also concern major external powers whether geographically proximate, economically adventurous, politically covetous, militarily ambitious, culturally aggressive or any combination thereof. In this study, therefore, wherever development is examined in relation to either Micronesia or Papua New Guinea, particular attention is paid to American and Japanese policies in all of the foregoing categories, and an attempt is made to determine the extent to which American and Japanese policies are congruent, divergent or even conflicting.

In order to achieve these results, the report, following this introduction, is organized into seven succeeding chapters: (1) an historical overview of Micronesia and Papua New Guinea; (2) a study of the American involvement in Micronesia and of the Micronesian response; (3) a study of the Australian involvement in Papua New Guinea and of Papua New Guinean politics since independence; (4) issues and policies in the economic development of Papua New Guinea; (5) issues and policies in the economic development of Micronesia; (6) Japanese policies in and perspectives on Micronesia and Papua New Guinea; (7) conclusions and recommendations. Hopefully the recommendations will reflect the wider significance of the specific political microcosms which are studied in this report and which can, perhaps, be to some extent extrapolated to the macrocosm.

In both Micronesia and Papua New Guinea the interests of the United States and Japan seem at present to be operative in isolation from one another and often to be in direct competition with one another. This is to date more evident in the West-Central-Paciflc-Micronesia-than in Papua New Guinea. In Micronesia, for example, the United States has usually expressed its aspirations in political and strategic goals whereas Japan has repeatedly professed political and military non-involvement, due ostensibly to Article 9 (no war clause) of the Japanese Constitution, and has accordingly established an overwhelming economic presence rapidly and effectively. Such differing policy emphases operating with minimal consultation and frequently generating mutual suspicions between the United States and Japan bode ill for future relations between these two countries particularly in respect to the Western Pacific. In contrast to this gloomy prospect, however, this report will also show how viable and how vital American-Japanese cooperative efforts in the area could be.

Unfortunately up to the present it appears that the Pacific island region has not been an area of high priority for either the United States or Japan. In the immediate postwar years, the Japanese found it emotionally too painful to be reminded of their thousands of dead and their military defeats in Micronesia and Papua New Guinea, and America preferred simply not to think about the Pacific War. Nevertheless, the United States retained political control of Micronesia for purposes of strategic denial while generally remaining aloof from the politics of Papua New Guinea. For America neither Micronesia nor Papua New Guinea has represented significant economic promise; yet for Japan both areas have offered quite attractive economic possibilities. Strategically, however, the Western Pacific has become increasingly important for both the United States and Japan since its waters cover a vast segment of the earth’s surface and provide vital sea lanes for all of Japan’s commerce and for a great share of America’s trade. In human terms, moreover, the Pacific islands are the last of the world’s regions to emerge from colonialism, and the United States, as repository of the only remaining United Nations Trusteeship, is among the last of the colonial powers. Accordingly, America’s administrative responsibility in Micronesia is both a challenge and an opportunity.

In future economic terms, it may well be that the oceans of the world and the islands in them with their surrounding 200 mile zones will be most significant. Manganese nodule mining, for example, as well as fishing rights are already at the forefront of international discussions. Thus, questions of the law of the sea in the Pacific may be added to broader problems currently affecting relations among and between Micronesia, Papua New Guinea, the United States and Japan. The essence, then, of the spectrum of these issues, like the others enumerated earlier, as they affect American-Japanese relations, means that what happens between Japan and the United States in the decades ahead may be more important than what happens between the United States and the People’s Republic of China.

As the above has indicated, both Japan and the United States have a stake in the Western Pacific, its mini-states and its islands, yet neither Japan nor the United States has adequate information let alone precise knowledge of the area. The United States remains, by virtue of its cultural heritage, essentially a Europe-oriented society. Japan, too, by virtue of its particular modern historical experience has been much more concerned about Europe and North America than about Asia and has, in fact, tended to “out-colonial” the colonials in its pejorative attitude toward the inhabitants of the Pacific islands. Neither the American nor the Japanese educational system at any level has informed its citizens about this area. Thus, clearly, given the long-range mutual involvements of both the United States and Japan in the Western Pacific, such disinterest and such ignorance is dangerous not only to the two powers themselves but for the uncertain futures of the new states in the region.

As will be discussed in the chapters that follow, differing degrees of change in Papua New Guinea and in Micronesia (The United States Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands) have been influenced not only by their metropoles and by local leaderships with strong aspirations for new political status but also by the other new nations and associations of the region. In fact, this latter proliferation of Pacific island states poses many problems because of the small populations and resource bases in most instances. Already independent Nauru, Fiji, Tonga, Western Samoa, the Solomons and Tuvalu (formerly the Ellice Islands) are shortly to be joined by the Gilberts, New Hebrides, and perhaps French Polynesia.¹ With the exceptions of Nauru, the Gilberts, and Tuvalu, these island groups rank among the nine most populous in the South and Central Pacific. France’s nickel-rich Overseas Territory of New Caledonia, Micronesia and the unincorporated United States Territory of Guam complete the nine largest groups.

When Papua New Guinea’s three and a half million people, Irian Jaya’s one million, and the Philippines’ 41 million are excluded, the population of the remaining hundreds of these Pacific islands totals less than two million. Almost one-third of that population is in Fiji. Such sparse populations on miniscule land areas over such a vast seascape underscore the need for cooperative if not coordinated approaches to common problems. Moreover, all of the islands except Nauru share the continuing need for substantial financial grants from their metropoles.

Nauru, a tiny republic of eight square miles in the South Pacific, has used its wealth of calcium phosphate (providing perhaps the highest per capita Gross National Product in the world) to try to advance its society (3,800 Nauruans; total population 7,100) to a level approximating the contemporary West. Its influence in the region is significant, principally because of an adventurous program for the use of its resources. Nauru funding has built a skyscraper in Melbourne, a high rise on the island of Saipan, a shipping line and an airline valuable to the trade and economy of Micronesia plus hotels and restaurants from Saipan to the Marshalls. Thus, energetic Nauruan investment programs, which appear to be a response to the lack of space and opportunity at home, have assisted prospects for development in and cooperation with neighboring areas.

Fiji is an independent dominion within the British Commonwealth and a leader in the South Pacific area. Its position is enhanced by its size (300 islands) and by its population (600,000) although more than half of its inhabitants are of Indian origin thus creating significant inter-ethnic tensions. Nevertheless, Fiji has been a leader in regional cooperation and has a defense agreement with New Zealand.

Western Samoa, an independent member of the British Commonwealth, is striving for economic viability. In the process it is seeking to stimulate Western European investment and is exploring relations with Eastern Europe and with major Asian states. The Kingdom of Tonga also seeks to spur its economy and to gain stature by flirting with powers on the Asian mainland. The Solomons achieved independent status in 1978, and even before the achievement of self-government and scheduled independence by the neighboring Gilberts, Tuvalu with its miniscule population has become one of the newest independent island states of the Southwest Pacific.

The giants among the developing nations on the periphery of the Western Pacific region are Indonesia and the Philippines. Both have an important potential bearing on the economics and politics of Papua New Guinea and of Micronesia, not only because of their size but because of their proximity. Moreover, Papua New Guinea has a sensitive common border with Indonesia’s sometimes recalcitrant Irian Jaya and is affected by developments such as Indonesia’s unilateral incorporation of formerly Portuguese Timor as well as by other events bearing on oil supply routes and communications through the area.

Australia’s posture in the Western Pacific, and in East Asia for that matter, is unique. It is “of the Orient” by location but shares Western values and an essentially European heritage and is an advanced country of enormous geographical scale. Australia is recognized as a force in the Economic and Social Council for Asia and the Pacific and in other forums of the region. Further, Australia has developed a growing sense of regionalism, which is reflected in the priority currently given by it to the South Pacific in its developmental aid programs.²

As will be described in detail later, under considerable domestic and international pressure, Australia moved with skill and speed to the effective termination of Papua New Guinea’s Trust status and to the achievement of Papua New Guinea’s nationhood. Remaining outstanding problems with Papua New Guinea, such as a final agreement with regard to the status of the Torres Straits islands, have proved to be easier to resolve because of the Australian policy toward Papua New Guinea and the South Pacific in general.

Overall, Australia’s role in the Southwest Pacific is understandably supportive of what it deems to be in its own national interest. Therefore, Australia has been generous in its aid not only for Papua New Guinea (as a special case) but for the Solomons and the Gilberts as well. Australia has, nevertheless, seemingly drawn a line to the south of Micronesia for its zone of economic aid. Evidently Australia regards the Trust Territory as the United States’ sphere. However, Australia continues to watch carefully events in Micronesia as a factor bearing directly on the future of the entire region.

In addition to the Australian role, Japan, with the help of time, has changed its adverse postwar image in the Western Pacific. Japan’s economic power in the area has been adroitly and aggressively utilized to engender a high degree of receptivity among the peoples of the area. In the last ten years, Japanese officials and businessmen have shown impressive tact and have even evidenced a propensity for compromise which has created a new climate for Japanese influence in the Western Pacific. Japan has done so by preserving its reputation for hard work and discipline while showing less of the abrasiveness which affected some of Japan’s earliest programs in the area. Moreover, the increase in Japanese tourism, trade, and aid to the Western Pacific has enhanced its influence in the region.

In addition, The Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between Japan and Australia gives political content to Japan’s increase of investment in and trade with Australia itself. Remarkably Japan’s trade with all the nations of the Pacific Basin has quadrupled since 1970. Moreover, Japan shares with the United States and Australia a deep interest in the stability of and in the growing sense of regionalism among the emerging states of the area.³

In the latter regard Australia and the United States and most ...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title
• Copyright
• TABLE OF CONTENTS
• Maps
• Foreword
• Preface
• Chapter I Introduction
• Chapter II An Historical Overview: Micronesia and Papua New Guinea
• Chapter III Micronesia Under American Rule, 1944–1978: Change and Persistence
• Chapter IV Papua New Guinea Under Australian Rule and After: The Shock of Independence
• Chapter V Papua New Guinea: Issues and Policies in Economic Development
• Chapter VI Micronesia: Issues and Policies in Economic Development
• Chapter VII Japanese Policies and Perspectives in Micronesia and Papua New Guinea
• Chapter VIII Conclusion
• Index