Shaping China's Future In World Affairs

The Role Of The United States

Robert G Sutter

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2019
• ISBN:
  9781000311365
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politik & Internationale Beziehungen
• Subtopic: Asiatische Politik

This book considers Chinese foreign policy and China's future role in world affairs in the context of the country's recent past. Robert Sutter shows that although it appears to be in U.S. interests for post-Mao leaders to continue moving toward international norms, a post-Deng leadership backed by growing economic and military power and reflecting profound changes in China's economy and society could move in markedly different directions. Most foreign powers appear willing to accommodate China, avoiding actions that could prompt a sharp shift in Chinese foreign policy, but Sutter argues that current U.S. policy intrudes on so many issues that are particularly sensitive for Beijing and for China's future that it represents perhaps the most critical variable determining how China will position itself in world affairs. Concluding that there is no guarantee the United States will use this influence wisely, Sutter examines the uncertainty and unpredictability of U.S. foreign policy in the post-Cold War environment that work against the creation of an effective U.S. policy toward China.

1
Shaping China’s Future in World Affairs: The Role of the United States

Introduction

China has often been seen as a challenge or an opportunity to the prevailing international system. The victory of communist forces in China in 1949 was followed in 1950 by the signing of the Sino-Soviet alliance, the start of the Korean War, and Chinese military force intervention in the Korean conflict. Chinese actions prompted a reconfiguration of world politics. The United States and its allies and associates felt compelled to broaden the emerging international containment system from Europe and the Middle East to East Asia. The result was twenty years of military confrontation, economic isolation, and political stalemate.

China’s break with the Soviet Union in the 1960s provided a basis for the realignment of Asian politics carried out by Richard Nixon and Mao Zedong in the early 1970s. Cooperation with China was now seen as an important strategic opportunity for the West in its continuing competition with expanding Soviet power. China too saw its interests directed against Moscow and sided with the United States and its allies and associates for mainly strategic reasons.

As Americans and other outsiders observed firsthand the conditions prevailing in China, they often reevaluated their past, sometimes exaggerated views of China’s power and influence. Nevertheless, most thought well of the Chinese leaders’ efforts after the death of Mao Zedong in 1976 to revitalize China’s stagnating economy through reforms that gave freer rein to Chinese private enterprise and to Chinese economic interaction with the developed countries of Asia and the West.

As the East-West conflict declined in the 1980s as a result of Mikhail Gorbachev’s playing down of military expansion and his renewed emphasis on international détente, China’s strategic importance as a counterweight to Soviet expansion declined to some degree in world opinion. But this appeared to be more than compensated for by the strong positive interest seen in the developed countries regarding China’s steady progress toward economic reform and outreach to foreign economic powers, and by Beijing’s concurrent interest in complementary political change.

The prevailing international view of China’s power and influence took a radical turn downward in 1989. In the period immediately following the June 1989 Tiananmen incident and subsequent collapse of communist regimes in Europe and elsewhere, it was common for journalists, analysts, and other observers outside China to judge that the communist regime in China was destined for collapse. Observers also sometimes warned of major retrogression in Chinese economic reforms, speculating that Beijing would feel compelled in the face of domestic and foreign pressure to revert to autarchic development policies of the Maoist past. These would reduce Chinese interdependence with other countries and substantially reduce China’s incentive to avoid disruptive behavior in interaction with its neighbors and other world powers.¹

On balance, China’s record in recent years has undercut the more extreme near-term predictions of collapse or retrogression. The regime in Beijing has presided over a period of unprecedented growth in the Chinese economy. This growth has not only benefitted many in China, but has come at a time of general lackluster growth in other parts of the world. The result has been a period of unprecedented international investment in and interaction with the Chinese economy. When combined with Beijing’s careful avoidance of major controversy and generally accommodating posture in world affairs in recent years, the result has been to erode foreign sanctions and to enhance the international legitimacy of the Chinese leaders. The success of China’s continued economic reform also has undermined the arguments of those conservative Chinese leaders who might be inclined to press for a more autarchic development strategy and a more assertive, less flexible posture in world affairs.

Nevertheless, analysis of key determinants of China’s future shows a wide range of possible outcomes for China over the next decade. In particular, a good deal of the success of Beijing’s efforts in recent years came under the leadership of senior leader Deng Xiaoping. Deng’s demise means that a vacuum at the center of political power in China could lead to political struggles with possibly adverse outcomes for the country. The leadership transition is likely to complicate an already difficult set of problems of governance caused by dynamic economic growth, rapid social change, a realignment of central and local power arrangements, and other factors.

A positive scenario for China’s future posits an effective administration and greater political reform along with powerful economic modernization. More negative scenarios fall into two categories. The first sees a series of developments leading to degeneration of government effectiveness and authority with a range of negative effects on China’s economic and social development. The second envisions China developing formidable economic power while retaining strong authoritarian political control. This raises the possibility of an emerging Chinese economic and military superpower, less interested in accommodation with the outside world and unfettered by the political checks and balances that accompany less authoritarian political structures.

U.S. Interests in and Influence on China

The United States has a lot at stake in China’s future. China lies at the center of the world’s most dynamic economic region. Disruption in China not only would have a major impact on U.S. investment (over $7 billion utilized since 1979) and trade (over $40 billion annually) with China, but also would have a serious effect on U.S. trade, investment, and other commercial interaction throughout East Asia. Strategically, cooperation from China is central to U.S. efforts to maintain peace on the Korean peninsula, the Taiwan Strait, and the South China Sea; curb the spread of nuclear weapons and related delivery systems; and create a cooperative atmosphere among the great powers in the UN Security Council in order to deal effectively with international trouble-spots. Because of its size, economic growth, and location, China is having an increasingly important impact on U.S. interests in curbing environmental pollution and promoting sustainable development internationally. Over the longer term, China is one of the few world actors capable of creating economic, political, and military power sufficient to pose a strategic danger to the United States.

The United States also exerts important influence on China.² Beijing recognizes that the United States still exerts predominant strategic influence in East Asia and the Western Pacific; is a leading economic power in the region, surpassed locally only by Japan; and is one of only two world powers capable of exerting sufficient power around China’s periphery to pose a tangible danger to Chinese security and development. As the world’s only superpower, the United States also exerts strong influence in international financial and political institutions (e.g., the World Bank and the UN) that are very important to Beijing, and its role in particular areas sensitive to Beijing-notably policy regarding Taiwan and international human rights-is second to none.

As a result, Beijing sees the United States as the key link in the international balance of power affecting Chinese interests. This judgment goes far toward explaining why Chinese leaders so avidly sought a visit to China by President Clinton. It would signal to all at home and abroad that the United States has muffled its opposition to and endorses cooperation with the Beijing government. Of course, there is ample evidence that some Chinese leaders remain deeply suspicious of U.S. motives. They believe the U.S. government is conspiring to weaken and undermine the Chinese leadership and “hold back” China from a more prominent position in world affairs.

There is general agreement in the United States that Washington should use its influence in order to have Beijing conform to international norms and over time to foster changes in China’s political, economic, and security systems compatible with American interests. At the same time, there is little agreement in Washington on how the United States should achieve these objectives. At present, the United States and China have a mixed relationship, cooperative on some issues (Cambodia, Korea, anti-drug efforts, anti-crime efforts, trade promotion) and contentious on others (intellectual property rights, market access, missile proliferation, Taiwan, human rights). As China undergoes its post-Deng Xiaoping leadership transition, U.S. officials will be called upon to decide how to position U.S. policy toward China’s future government.³

Post-Cold War International Conditions

The interaction of China’s uncertain future with the sometimes confused U.S. policy toward China will have a significant impact on the international environment. If the two powers are able to achieve cooperation and close interaction on the basis of common interests in peace and development, this presumably would be advantageous for most world people. At the same time, there is plenty of opportunity for friction and conflict in future U.S.-Chinese relations. Given the size and importance of both countries, such frictions will probably have a serious impact on a wide range of people and nations positioned between the United States and China.

Prevailing conditions in international affairs give U.S. observes little clue as to which of many possible outcomes ranging from confrontation to cooperation is more likely in U.S.-China relations over the next decade. The rapid change from the collapse of the cold war bipolar order has seen several trends emerge. But few are in a position to judge how long these trends will last and what effect they will have on international affairs, including those of China and the United States, over the next decade. The trends include the following:⁴

• Multipolarity. The nation state is still a dominant actor in world politics. With the demise of the cold war order, these states have broken out of some of the constraints imposed by the alliance politics of that era. Allies now argue and compete with one another more openly. Other “nonaligned” power centers (e.g., China, India, and Indonesia) have also emerged as important world actors;
• Distribution of power. Reflecting the more fluid multipolar post-cold war order, one is hard put to determine a stable balance of power in many world regions. More common is a distribution of power, which is fluid and subject to change. The rigid alliance-based, balance of power is a thing of the past;
• Democracy, free markets, interdependence. Post-cold war economic and political trends have been dominated by the prominence of powerful free market economies promoting economic interaction and interdependence throughout the developed and developing world. There have been few notable exceptions to this trend, although many countries have not done well economically or politically as they have adjusted to the prevailing free market ways of the world. Less universal but still important is the spread of democratic ideas and practices among many of the previously authoritarian regimes of the Soviet bloc and similar regimes in parts of the third world and elsewhere. The transitions toward democracy have been most dramatic in places like South Africa, Russia, and South Korea, but examples abound in all regions. Of course, there remain plenty of examples of politically authoritarian leaders who are determined to hold on to their power and resist popular pressure for change;
• Domestic-centered politics. As they have pulled back from the life-and-death struggle of the cold war, politicians from Moscow to Washington and from Tokyo to Berlin have been compelled to focus on domestic problems. Gorbachev and George Bush were replaced by the much more domestically oriented Boris Yeltsin and Bill Clinton. Expectations that Germany and Japan would use their large economic power to greatly influence the post-cold war world have been dampened by the needs of leaders in both countries to deal with pressing political, economic, and other domestic problems. Other power centers like China, India, and Brazil also have remained focused on internal issues in the current period;
• Primacy of economics over politics. The political ideologies that dominated debate in the cold war are a thing of the past. Increasingly leaders throughout the world are basing their political standing on their ability to meet the needs and improve the material conditions of their people. This trend inclines states and peoples to cooperate for economic advantage and helps to promote greater international interdependence. Nevertheless, counter currents remain. Nationalism and religious fundamentalism are used by leaders, often in areas without good prospects for economic advantage in the current world order. They can provide a core for conflict and disruption of the main trend toward economic development;
• Transnational issues. With the decline of the importance of security and strategic issues following the end of the cold war, so-called transnational issues have achieved new importance. In general these issues reflect international concerns that cross national boundaries and challenge traditional views of state sovereignty. They require leaders to adjust their views of national power in order to deal with them effectively. Notable examples include international pressures to promote better human rights conditions; to improve environmental quality; to discourage unfair trade or economic practices; to curb the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; to deal effectively with mass migrations of suffering peoples; to curb the spread of highly infectious diseases; and to suppress international terrorist, drug, or criminal activities; and
• Influence of technology. Peoples throughout the world are increasingly aware of events in other areas that have an effect on their lives. The so-called communications revolution includes mass media and personal channels that challenge governments anxious to control access to sensitive information by their peoples. The prime minister of Vanuatu tried in vain in mid-1995 to blackout news in his country of France’s decision to resume nuclear testing in nearby French Polynesia. The prime minister presumably wanted to avoid the disturbances and anti-French feelings such news would likely engender. Nevertheless, most nations are too interconnected with world information systems-needed for effective economic policies and growth-to allow such an isolationist stance to succeed.

Scope of this study

In making a case for the importance of Chinese-U.S. interaction for the future international order, this study adheres to the following steps:

• It first examines China’s record in world affairs, assesses China’s growing role today, and determines what trends and influences are likely to be most prominent in the decade ahead;
• It then examines conditions inside and outside China that are likely to affect China’s policy and practice abroad;
• Making a case that the U.S. policy and behavior toward China may be the most important and unpredictable variable determining China’s future approach to world affairs, the study examines why the United States has so much influence on China today and why U.S. policy toward China is so hard to predict; and
• The study concludes with an evaluation of three possible outcomes for China in the next decade, what they would mean for the international order, and what, if anything, the United States can do about them.

Notes

1. For background on this period, see among others, Kerry Dumbaugh, China and Congress in 1992, Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report 93–894F, October 12, 1993. These and other CRS products referred to in this book have been reprinted in and are available to the general public in What Should be the Policy of the United States Government Toward the People’s Republic of China, compiled by the Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 104th Congress, 1st Session, Senate Document 104–3, (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1995).

2. For background, see Robert Sutter, China In Woñd Affairs-U.S. Policy Choices, CRS Report 95–265S, January 31, 1995, pp. 15–19.

3. For a review of U.S. policy options and approaches toward China, see China-U.S. Relations, CRS Issue Brief 94002 by Kerry Dumbaugh, Washington, DC (updated regularly).

4. This discussion benefitted greatly from consulta...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• 1 Shaping China’s Future in World Affairs: The Role of the United States
• 2 China’s Foreign Policy in Historical Perspective
• 3 China’s Emergence as a Global Actor
• 4 Determinants of China’s Future in World Affairs
• 5 The U.S. Factor
• 6 The U.S.-China Relationship
• 7 Charting China’s Course: Outcomes and Implications for U.S. Policy
• Appendix
• Chronology
• Bibliography
• About the Book and Author
• Index