The Un Inspections In Iraq

Lessons For On-site Verification

Kathleen C Bailey

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2019
• ISBN:
  9781000306675
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

This book describes the problems encountered by UN inspection teams assigned to find and destroy Iraq's nuclear, chemical, biological, and missile capabilities following Desert Storm. Kathleen C. Bailey focuses on the initial inspections—the period in which Iraq was struggling to camouflage and conceal its weapons and production equipment as inspectors were trying to define their role in the process. Working from interviews with these initial inspectors, Bailey extracts important lessons for future verification efforts. On-site arms control inspectors in Iraq found information to be carefully controlled by the government. Pertinent documentation was destroyed, only selected people were allowed to interact with inspectors, and officials refused to make full, complete declarations. Buildings were tom down, equipment was moved, and un-exploded ordnance was placed in the way. These and other techniques helped Iraq to hide its past activities and to preserve some of its weapons capabilities. In the future, arms control inspectors will need to develop strategies for dealing more effectively with recalcitrant inspectees and for creating the best possible procedures and processes. Bailey concludes with concrete suggestions for overcoming some of these obstacles with more effective inspection practices.

1
Chemical Weapons Inspections

This chapter outlines Iraqi CW capabilities, describes briefly the UNSCOM chemical weapons missions, and analyzes the missions to define lessons applicable to drafting and implementing a potential Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). The analysis section is divided into two parts: practical lessons relevant to inspections implementation, and lessons regarding the ability of inspections to detect noncompliance.

Iraqi Chemical Weapons Capabilities

Iraq made mustard and nerve agents, including sarin (the Iraqi definition of which may refer to GB, GF, or a combination of the two) and tabun (GA). It also experimented with the nerve agent VX. Precise estimates of Iraq’s production of agents prior to Desert Storm are unavailable, but it had the capacity to produce more than 1,000 tons per year.

Iraq developed multiple modes for delivering its CW agents. Inspectors initially discovered seventy-five chemical warheads for ballistic missiles, including GB/GF-filled and binary warheads.¹ In addition to delivery by missile, Iraq’s chemical arsenal included aerial bombs, artillery rockets, artillery shells, modified cluster bombs, and mortars. (See Table 1.1 for a listing of Iraqi chemical munitions.) During its war against Iran, Iraq used several of these munitions types and also dropped barrels filled with agents from helicopters against Iranian troops. Furthermore, several rocket calibers were used against Iran that were not declared to UN inspectors by Iraq.

Several inspectors were surprised at the high purity of mustard found—generally around 90%. Because storability is a function of purity, Iraq would be able to store mustard successfully, if it were to choose to hide the agent. However, it is also possible that Iraq would choose to hide agent intermediates such as DF and, separately, mixed alcohols.

Table 1.1 Iraqi CW Agent Delivery Systems

155-mm-artillery shells	82-mm mortars
DB-2 500-kg aerial bomb	PROSAB-250 Cluster bomb (modified)
Al Hussein ballistic missiles	OFAB-500 SHR Cluster bomb (modified)
122-mm artillery rockets	M904 250-kg bomb
LD 500-gauge bomb	M904 500-kg bomb
LD 250-gauge bomb	155-mm artillery projectile (M82)
V-429 artillery projectile

The production of CW agents was managed by the Muthanna State Establishment, which incorporated the Al Muthanna complex and its subsidiary facilities—the three Fallujah facilities and the storage site at Muhammadiyat. The main site, Al Muthanna, produced agent and precursors, and filled munitions. The facility had an extensive production capacity that could have produced thousands of tons of agent annually prior to its destruction. In addition to agent production, Al Muthanna was the site of several precursor production facilities and storage for several dozen types of chemicals.

Desert Storm bomb damage and destruction of Al Muthanna was incomplete. In one area, four facilities were surrounded by sand berms, approximately 13 dummy sites, and mounds for anti-aircraft batteries. Three of the facilities were inspected. Two were identical pilot plants (bunker-type structures, partially underground), both of which were unscathed. Although the purpose for these plants is not known (Iraqis claimed they were for precursor chemical production), they were built to extremely high standards and could possibly be used for nerve agent production. A third pilot plant, which appeared to be destroyed, was not inspected. The fourth facility was an inhalation chamber for lethality estimations.

Another part of Al Muthanna contained a second chemical production area that was more extensively damaged. It contained five production facilities and six dummies. One of the five facilities had been a sarin production plant. It had operated from 1986 to 1988, when, according to the Iraqis, damage to a reactor caused it to be closed. Production was then shifted to another plant that contained two operational units. This plant was in use until its alleged dismantlement in October 1990. UNSCOM inspectors found that all piping and major vessels had been removed from the first facility; the Iraqis said the second sarin plant was destroyed by Desert Storm bombing and therefore was not inspected.

At the first sarin facility, Iraq had been able to make agent in 2.5-ton batches, with one batch every 24 hours. Sarin purities of 40–60% had been achieved. The plant had been able to operate continuously, if necessary. Iraq’s sarin was unsuitable for long-term storage because high HF concentrations caused fairly rapid decomposition. (Iraq’s procedure was to manufacture agent as needed and use it right away.) During the inspections it was noted that sarin decomposed 10–15 percentage points every two to three months. Hence, under optimal circumstances, sarin could be stored for little more than one year. Iraq’s munitions, ordinarily kept in bunkers designed for CW storage, had been dispersed into the open desert to avoid bombing. Higher temperatures there increased the rate of decomposition.

Near the sarin production plant, there were four other facilities. None was inspected, but all appeared to be heavily damaged or destroyed. The declared purposes of these facilities were the production of methyl phosphonyl dichloride (MPC, an intermediate product for DF); dimethyl methyl phosphonate (DMMP); MPC and D4, intermediates for sarin and tabun, respectively; and mustard agent. The capacity of the mustard plant was said to have been 5 tons/day, with the last production having been in October 1990.

Other areas of Al Muthanna included facilities for storage of chemicals and explosives, manufacture of aerial bomb cases, and filling of chemical munitions. There were eight impressive air-conditioned bunkers for chemical weapons storage. Several of these facilities were damaged by bombing and were rendered hazardous to inspectors by unexploded ordnance and spilled chemicals. It was therefore impossible to inspect them to determine their purpose, status, or whether equipment had been removed.

Fallujah 2 was the most developed of three sites designed to produce and provide precursor chemicals to Al Muthanna. Thionyl chloride and methyl phosphonic dichloride were produced in very small quantities, and there were unrealized plans to make methyl phosphonic difluoride (DF) and trimethyl phosphite (TMP). Additionally, there was a facility under construction to produce phosphorus trichloride and phosphorus oxychloride. Table 1.2 illustrates production at Fallujah 2.

Bomb damage to Fallujah 2 was heavy. The only two units which could still be rendered operational were the chlorine plant, parts of which were undamaged, and the phosphorus trichloride/phosphorus oxychloride production unit. The latter, while undamaged, was not operational because its control instrumentation was unfinished.

Fallujah 3 was never used to produce CW precursors as was originally intended. It was completed following the Iran-Iraq war and was adapted to pesticide formulation using active ingredients such as malathion. However, several CW imported precursors were stored at this site, including 2-chloro benzaldehyde (used for CS), diisopropy- lamine (for VX), dimethylamine hydrochloride (for GA), and thiodiglycol (for mustard). Although the pesticide formulation installations at Fallujah 3 were destroyed by coalition bombing, the Iraqis worked after Desert Storm to repair existing equipment and to install new equipment at the site. The capability to produce nerve agents is closely related to the ability to manufacture pesticides, as is outlined in Figure 1.1.

Table 1.2 Production at Fallujah 2 (Pre-Gulf War)

Product	Quantity
Chlorine	10-12 tons/day (actual production)
Hydrochloric acid (35%)	10-12 tons/day HC1 (100% capacity)
Caustic soda (33%)	33 tons/day NaOH 100% (actual production)
Sodium hypochlorite	10-12 tons/day (capacity)
Sulphur trioxide	A few runs only
Sulphur chloride	Two runs only
Thionyl chloride	Two runs only
Methyldichlorophosphonate	Two runs only
Methyl phosphonic difluoride (DF)	Two runs only

Fallujah 1 was the least developed of the three Fallujah sites. Unfinished production facilities were destroyed by bombing. Since the end of the Iran-Iraq war, Fallujah 1 had been used for storage, including for the precursor diisopropylamine. Although Iraq had not declared it, UNSCOM inspectors also found a small quantity of triethylamine (a stabilizer for G agents).

Figure 1.1 Organophosphorus Compounds

UNSCOM Chemical Weapons Inspections

UNSCOM 2

The purpose of UNSCOM 2, the first CW inspection, was to survey Al Muthanna and to prepare a description to be used in a subsequent full inspection. Special hazards and problems were to be identified. Chemi-Ctd weapons munitions and filling facilities were to be described and an assessment made regarding the possibility of using the site for CW destruction. Any undeclared items or activities that were discovered (whether related to CW or to other weapons covered by Resolution 687) were to be reported. A brief summary of UNSCOM 2 findings at Al Muthanna follows:

• A very large number of CW munitions were found, including bombs, artillery shells, mortars and rockets. Over 6,000 declared sarin-filled 122-mm rockets were stored at Al Muthanna at the time of UNSCOM 2.
• UNSCOM 2 first identified the unstable nature of Iraqi sarin, the production method, and the GB/GF mixture. The identity and purity of the mix was regarded skeptically until a vapor sample taken from the 122־mm rockets was analyzed at the Chemical & Biological Defence Establishment in the United Kingdom.
• Discussions with Iraqis revealed that CW munitions were not marked, but mistakes were avoided by close control exercised by Al Muthanna personnel. Munitions were filled on demand and any unused munitions were returned to Al Muthanna after an offensive, thereby avoiding storage problems associated with the reduced stability of the Iraqi sarin.
• One area of Al Muthanna used to produce sarin (from 1986 to 1988), mustard, and some precursors was heavily damaged by bombing. Inspectors found that major vessels and pipework in the sarin production facility had been removed from the one facility not destroyed by bombing. (The other was claimed to have been destroyed.) The Iraqis said the equipment had become unserviceable and was still on the plant site.
• Hundreds of tons of chemical precursors for agents were present. Many of the weapons and storage containers were leaking and hazardous.
• Two sophisticated, partially underground pilot plants were intact; a third was heavily damaged.
• Safety manuals and other documentation were requested, but none was made available. The site had been stripped of all paperwork.

Problems identified included how to destroy the remaining agent and chemicals, how to move them safely to the destruction site, and how to improve medical backup for the inspection team. There were no glaring discrepancies between the Iraqi declarations and what was found on site. This was not surprising to inspectors, since Iraq had substantial time—at least two months’ warning beginning with the approval of UNSC Resolution 687 until the first CW inspection—to remove any agent, documentation, or equipment that it wished to conceal.

UNSCOM 9

The primary purpose of UNSCOM 9, the second CW inspection, was to conduct a detailed inspection of three chemical production facilities in the Fallujah area 40 km south of Al Muthanna. Two additional tasks were inspection of three pilot plants at Al Muthanna that the Iraqis were suggesting be used for CW destruction, and inspection of the CW storage site at Tammuz Airbase (also referred to as Al Takhadam Airbase).

The inspection team found that the Iraqi declarations regarding the Fallujah sites were essentially accurate. CW were not produced there. Some precursors were manufactured in small quantities, and several types of precursors were stored.

One irregularity discovered by UNSCOM 9 was the removal by Iraqis, prior to the inspection, of an undamaged scrubber unit from Failujah 3 for use at Fallujah 2. Attempts had been made to camouflage with debris where the scrubber had been at Fallujah 3.

Regarding the Al Muthanna pilot plants, the inspectors concluded that two of them could be used for destruction of some CW agents, if the facilities were modified. The plants were fairly new, had excellent equipment, and had high standards of safety and design. The third had been damaged and was hazardous.

At Tammuz Airbase, inspectors verified the Iraqi declaration that 200 mustard bombs were stored on the site. Other bombs, presumably high-explosive (HE), were there, but were not closely inspected. Because Iraq generally did not physically distinguish its chemical from other munitions, inspectors did not verify that the other bombs were HE and not CW-filled.

UNSCOM 11

UNSCOM 11, the third CW inspection, was designed to visit a minimum of two sites at which chemical munitions had been declared to be stored and one undeclared site, Fallujah General Headquarters. Inspectors found no chemical weapons at the latter site, although protective equipment and riot control agent (CS) were present. Most of the riot control devices apparently, according to their markings, had been looted from Kuwait. At other locations, however, Iraq had large quantities of indigenously produced and weaponized CS.

At one declared site, Dujayl, the team inspected 30 declared Al Hussein missile warheads lying in an orchard. According to Iraq, they contained nerve agent Some appeared to be binary weapons because they were filled only with alcohols, and jerry cans of DF were nearby. The team instructed that the missiles and chemicals be removed to Al Muthanna for destruction.

A subgroup of the team visited a storage site at Al-Mutasim Airfield, near Al Bakr Airbase. The purpose was to verify the presence of 160 declared bombs containing mustard. Four of the bombs had burst; others were under over-pressure. The team instructed that these bombs also be removed to Al Muthanna.

A portion of Al Taji, a site that had been declared in conjunction with ballistic missiles but not CW, was also inspected. The team discovered an estimated 6,000 undeclared nerve-agent containers for 122-mm rockets that were either unfilled or rejected. Instructions were issued that they be destroyed. Documentation regard...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• Preface
• Introduction
• 1 Chemical Weapons Inspections
• 2 Biological Weapons Inspections
• 3 Nuclear Weapons Inspections
• 4 Ballistic Missile Inspections
• 5 Iraqi Circumvention of Export Controls
• 6 Summary
• Notes
• Appendix A: List of UNSCOM Inspections and Sites
• Appendix B: United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 678
• Appendix C: UNSC Resolution 707
• Appendix D: UNSC Resolution 715
• About the Book and Author
• Index