Marxism and Phenomenology

Shirley R. Pike

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2019
• ISBN:
  9781000704815
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Philosophy
• Subtopic: Political Philosophy

First published in 1986. The social sciences in the twentieth century have tended to fragment into different disciplines and schools of thought. Often these schools of thought are complete but closed systems of thought, permitting no exchange of ideas with other disciplines or schools. In view of this, one very interesting recent development has been the attempt by some Marxist theorists to develop a theory of phenomenological Marxism. At first sight the possibility of a liason between dialectical materialism and subjective idealism appears remote and indeed other Marxists have dismissed phenomenological Marxism as simplistic humanism, revisionist and incompatible with Marxist science. This book explores the possibilities and difficulties of synthesising two apparently disparate philosophical frameworks. It looks at the philosophical roots of the two frameworks and discusses the logic, epistemology, ontology and methodology of each. The author concludes that a synthesis between Marxism and phenomenology is not impossible on philosophical grounds.

PART I

MARXISM AND PHENOMENOLOGY

Chapter One

THE POSSIBILITY OF A SYNTHESIS

Defining the Synthesis

The notion of a theoretical synthesis is fundamental to this enquiry. It therefore needs clarification at the outset. For a term in such general philosophical use we would expect to find criteria by which to isolate, inspect and evaluate a synthesis. But is the synthesis as a theoretical construct such a distinctive entity? What is its epistemological and linguistic status? To answer such questions I do not intend to examine exhaustively the usage of the term in the history of philosophical discourse, though some aspects of its origin as philosophical currency are illuminating. My main intention is to analyse the concept and its theoretical implications. A preliminary question is whether we can distinguish a synthesis from a theory or theoretical framework. If we make a distinction between a theory and a synthesis, then a synthesis of separate theories cannot become a new theory; it will retain a distinctive character by definition. What, then, is a synthesis and why is it important as an object of study?

The synthesis is a particular mode of theorising. It is the outcome of relating two frameworks of ideas in such a way that they each inform and regulate the other, producing new questions, insights and problems. This process of bringing theories into conjunction can be deconstructive on many levels, provoking new uses of old concepts, suggesting new problems and giving rise to new combinations of thought. Without this kind of stimulus, philosophical endeavours are stultified. In its broadest sense, synthesis can be defined as the process by which philosophy has developed, a process of adaptation in conceptual structures to changing modes of argument, conjecture and assertion.(1) Inherent in this type of definition is the basic concept of an origin, tangential to which alternative ideas arise and against which new constructs are evaluated. These may then become assimilated to the degree where a qualitative change can be identified.(2)

The term ‘synthesis’ could also be used to describe the mode of development of the traditional areas of philosophical investigation, from their origins in Greek thought to their institutionalisation in modern academic philosophy. It is, however, doubtful that such a broad application of the term is useful in describing the growth of philosophical discourse. The term becomes inevitably restricted by its association with certain specific theories. It was in early use to define an integral aspect of the dialectical process. Dialectic, denoting the process of dialogical reasoning, appears before Plato and Aristotle in the paradoxes of Zeno.(3) Its earliest usage did not include the notion of synthesis as later developed by Kant,(4) Fichte,(5) and Hegel.(6) In Fichte and Hegel the synthesis is not the mere outcome of a process of dialectical opposition of antithesis to thesis which it resolves – the synthesis elevated thought to a higher logical status.

The concept of a synthesis as an element of dialectic is worth considering in more detail here. In the dialectics of Hegel and Fichte it signifies the closure of the dialectical procedure and becomes transformed into the thesis for the next stage of the process. The synthesis designates a resolution which, when we turn to examine it, has become a different theoretical entity, the new thesis. By contrast, Aristotle’s scheme of dialectics as set out in Topica(7) does not develop the concept of synthesis as a closure. According to Aristotle, the dialectic as an on-going interaction between two sets of premises was not sufficient to yield new knowledge or scientific knowledge. For this, inductive reasoning could be the only basis. Aristotle’s account of the dialectical process itself is consonant with my claim that synthesis is a distinct type of theoretical framework. Aristotle regarded dialectic as a process of interplay; reasoning was held to be dialectical if the epistemological status of the premises was that of the true and the self-evident. The value of dialectic was three-fold: it was useful in training the intellect; useful in challenging the premises of an antagonist in general discussion; and useful in examining first principles of the sciences (a priori and unprovable): ‘Dialectic is a process of criticism wherein lies the path to the principles of all inquiries.’(8) With this emphasis on its critical force, Aristotle’s account of dialectic as an unresolved interplay is particularly instructive for, and consonant with, my view of synthesis as:

a) a liaison which provokes the questioning of fundamental principles;

b) a relationship of theories which continually stimulates critical evaluation of concepts;

c) a theoretical construct which, in its dialectic nature, demonstrates the processes of consciousness to be themselves reflexive and dialectical.

If we take the process of dynamic interplay to be its fundamental character, then what emerges as a synthesis is distinct from a theory. It is primarily a mode of theorising. However, the synthesis should not be regarded as a methodology only; such a notion would be limiting and inaccurate.(9) A synthesis will display more than its dynamics. It will have a distinctive epistemology and ontology. The process of synthesising is obviously a methodology but the synthesis itself, I would argue, can achieve a discrete theoretical status.

The term ‘synthesis’ retains connotations which provide us with a context for its examination. My intention is, however, to give the concept of synthesis a more specific reference. I propose to examine attempts to relate distinct and disparate frameworks of thought. The merger of certain theoretical traditions is common to the history of philosophy. Marxist thought in the twentieth century has been under constant revision and therefore allows us to exmaine closely the process of theoretical synthesis. The attempts to synthesise the work of Marx with other perspectives have been made in response to conditions of crisis and conceptual impasse. Where, at a particular historical juncture, the current theory has failed in either explanatory power or effectiveness as a spur to revolutionary action, the consequent disillusionment has impelled Marxism in new directions.(10) It is my intention to explore the origins of those frameworks from which four branches of Marxist thought – Hegelian, structuralist, existentialist and phenomenological – derive.

Before attempting an analysis of these theoretical systems it is essential to define the construct which stands as the basis of the enquiry -the theory itself. This preliminary should enable us to isolate criteria for analysing and assessing a synthesis. Perhaps the most simple and cogent way of characterising a theory is in terms of the types of enquiry it opens up. These can be codified within a schema of four levels of analysis – logical, epistemological, ontological and methodological.(11) It is accepted practice in philosophy to employ these categories to develop lines of enquiry as follows:

i) logical enquiry – into the internal coherence, structure and consistency of a theory.

ii) epistemological enquiry – into what counts as knowledge; how new knowledge is created; how concepts are formed, their truth status and meaning.

iii) ontological enquiry – into the nature and meaning of existence, into theoretical entities and their ‘real’ existence and appearance.

iv) methodological enquiry – into the methods of investigation; the validation of forth-coming data; the principles by which resulting material is organised.

These traditional modes of enquiry(12) are the guidelines for my analysis but will not be employed systematically throughout. Such a procedure would impose unnecessary constraints. However, for the initial task of formulating the criteria of a synthesis of two frameworks of thought I have retained these categories. The criteria relate to the format above as follows:

i) logic – the task here would be to discover to what extent logical coherence is possible; also, to identify related aspects of structure;

ii) epistemology – the conceptual structure of elements which form the synthesis must be shown as capable of producing new knowledge; the status of concepts must be clarified together with their relationships; the possibility of equating or substituting concepts must be examined;

iii) ontology – basic assumptions concerning the nature of a priori principles and ’ givens’ must be demonstrated as compatible;

iv) methodology – the enquiry must look for compatibility in methods of gaining data, analysing propositions and establishing truths.

These necessary elements of analysis are presented in a formalised way in this schema. I am not, however, proposing to follow such a systematic analysis but to operate with these criteria in a flexible manner, the intention being to discover how the various aspects of a synthesis inform and illuminate one another. It should be possible to identify the constraints which become operational when one framework of thought yields to another. The gains and losses need evaluating in terms of the criteria stated. Can we claim, for instance, that a particular theoretical liaison is a forced synthesis, unacceptable in that the ideas of its originators have been distorted and misrepresented? We have already defined the synthesis as distinct from the theory. The point to be stressed in formulating criteria for its evaluation is that, although the levels of analysis parallel those used to examine theories, at each level emphasis is on the degree of compatibility. We should expect the synthesis to display inconsistencies at certain levels. Where the greatest compatibility overall can be demonstrated we would take this as the measure of success of one synthesis against another.

The question is raised in the preamble as to whether phenomenology is able to render an interpretation of Marx which would overcome classic problems within Marxism. Alternatively, can phenomenology be given a Marxist interpretation? Though questions in a similar form may be posed throughout this analysis, it is important to emphasise that a theoretical synthesis can and must be distinguished from a theoretical interpretation of one theory from the standpoint of another. The synthesis, as I have defined it, must be susceptible of logical, ontological and epistemological evaluations, according to certain established criteria which I hope to demonstrate. By contrast, the procedure of interpretation remains in a hermeneutic relationship to the theory under scrutiny and the outcome, the interpretation itself, is bound to retain a peripheral character in relation to the original theory.

The synthesis is a distinct type of theoretical construct. It is subject to the same kinds of epistemological enquiry as other modes of theorising but it retains a distinctive character as an interplay of ideas. Although, as a duologue, it carries the potential for unity, it is always susceptible of deconstruction and recombination. This account has so far not intended to explain modes of theory construction but to suggest that a theoretical synthesis can be more productive of new ideas because of its hybrid nature, its origins in disparate traditions. We should expect it to retain the dynamic tension of the dialectic.

We may not extend the scope of our enquiry by tracing the sources of certain theoretical standpoints. In this we attempt to follow the injunctions of both Marx and Husserl to go back to foundational ideas. To Marx this meant drawing back the veil on the processes at work in society. Similarly, Husserl intended phenomenology to be a first philosophy by which to examine the presuppositions of philosophy itself.

Basic Traditions in Marx and Husserl

The investigation of the possibilities for a liaison between Marx and Husserl must begin with an account of the traditions evident in their work. This is essential to an understanding of their basic assumptions, their use of concepts and their original contributions to philosophy. At the outset we are...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Contents
• Dedication Page
• Preface
• Introduction
• Part I Marxism and Phenomenology
• Part II The Crisis of Science and the Analysis of Capitalism
• Part III The Synthesis of Marxism and Phenomenology
• Glossary
• Bibliography
• Index