H. Kumarasingham
âVous lâavez voulu, George Dandinâ mischievously exclaimed the Soulbury Commissionâs report in 1945, implying that their recommendation of the British parliamentary system was at Ceylonese instigation if anything went wrong. The report quoted French playwright Molièreâs 1668 comedy Dandin and defended their counsel that Ceylon adopt a Westminster inspired constitution on the grounds that not only was it best suited for the island, but it was also appropriate since âthe majority â the politically conscious majority of the people of Ceylon â favour a constitution on British lines. Such a Constitution is their own desire and is not being imposed upon themâ.2 Ceylon strolled towards independence on 4 February 1948 with an unabashed fervour for Westminster government. The Soulbury Commission dutifully served an institutional tiffin that satisfied in large measure the specific appetite of Ceylonâs elite. A republic would have been as welcome as an Indian invasion, and instead a unitary bicameral realm within the Commonwealth was established that self-consciously saw any other style of government as beneath the dignity of the Ceylonese elect. As such, the new constitution was generally deaf to the apprehension from corners in the Colonial Office, old Ceylon civil service hands and a few local lawyers of loquacious and argumentative tendencies. The result was that precious few alterations were made of the Westminster model for the context, complexities and conventions of Ceylon.
This system was more commonly associated with the British settler countries like Australia, Canada and New Zealand, where âkith and kinâ links with Britain seemed to make this appropriate. However, the British and the Asian indigenous elites saw advantages in applying this very British system to the very different context of the East. These Asian nations did not have centuries to interpret and adjust in order to develop their constitution as the British had. Instead within months they needed to formulate and design a constitution and therefore invariably drew upon the system of their imperial master. The local elites with the involvement of external actors like Sir Ivor Jennings determined that Westminster could work in the East. Since the Westminster system is based on convention and ambiguity and not rigid rules and clarity the same Westminster system could be adopted and manipulated to produce diverse results and reactions that would shape their countries forever. These states therefore became Eastminsters that consciously had clear institutional and political resemblances to Britainâs system, but with cultural and constitutional deviations from Westminster, five of which will be explored below.
This chapter focuses on Westminsterâs trajectory through the Asian states of India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Malaya and Nepal when it tranformed into Eastminster. Analysis is centred on the period when these states adopted a parliamentary state modelled on the British example set at the colonial and metropolitan levels. The approach taken will be to understand much of the state-building that occurred through the work of Jennings.3 This Cambridge educated scholar advised all these states in their constitutional quests in the state-building period with the exception of India, where he instead acted in those transition years as a major constitutional authority and commentator. Jenningsâ work on India was highly cited in those early years when few others existed from his vantage as a world famous English constitutional expert living and working in Asia.4 For India, Pakistan and Ceylon the key period observed was within the first five to ten years of freedom in 1947â1948. In Malaya Jennings was active with the Reid Commission leading up to independence in 1957,5 while in Nepal he worked for a short, but crucial time in 1958 in preparation for the Himalayan kingdomâs first general election in February 1959. Though Nepal was never formally under British rule it was nonetheless very much part of imperial interests in the region from the nineteenth century and can be designated within the British âsphere of interferenceâ.6 Through the role of Jennings it is possible to gain a unique and comparative perspective of constitution-making and state-building in these key Asian territories. Jenningsâ work by no means fairly or comprehensively covers how these processes worked, but as an individual he is exclusive in linking these states constitutionally with his first-hand experience of them during the era of state-building in the wake of the British Empire. Never before has a study constitutionally linked these states to understand their constitutional lineage with Britain during their quest to craft a parliamentary state. Part I of this chapter examines the scholarly importance and present gap in history, law and politics of examining the British constitutional legacy and Westminster model in Asia. Part II will place Jenningsâ work and role in the region in context and Part III will outline five interrelated deviations the Eastminster model historically had from the traditional settler states.
Eastminster happened in a context when South Asian decolonisation captured international attention. Indiaâs first ambassador to Washington, M. Asaf Ali, told the New York Times that his countryâs independence was in the âspirit of the American revolutionâ and for the benefit of his audience that the âbattle cryâ of Indiaâs revolutionaries was also, curiously enough, Abraham Lincolnâs everlasting and inspiring dictum, âGovernment of the people for the people and by the peopleâ.7 The government in India was still very much, however, drawn from the British and not the American model. Woodrow Wilson had believed in 1884, at the height of the British Empire, that the Westminster model had become the âworldâs fashionâ8 and it remained so as the empire decolonised. Sir James McPetrie and Sir William Dale, as legal advisers to the Colonial and Commonwealth Offices respectively, recorded an enormous international appetite for Whitehall constitutional devices. McPetrie noted the âexceptional activityâ of the post-war era where, in the short period between June 1959 and June 1960 alone, 92 constitutional instruments were drafted by the Colonial Office for territories around the world.9 Dale wryly commented that very often the Colonial era legislation endured after independence since even though âthere was a new emperor ⌠his suit of clothes was far from newâ.10
However, despite such activity there was no uniformity of approach even within regions. The 1956 colonial law of Loi Cadre dictated by the French metropolitan state, which provided a detailed institutional framework for an almost blanket application of major governance reforms across the French African empire would find no equivalent in the British decolonisation process in Asia or elsewhere.11 The 1931 Statute of Westminster may have provided a critical constitutional milestone for the few settler dominions by clarifying their political independence, but with just four and half pages it could not, and did not, claim constitutional homogeneity, as the diversity of dominions and their individualist political temperament made any such attempt undesirable. Compared with continental cases the British Westminster model was malleable, moveable and mendacious. As Sartori assessed, unlike Britain most states could ill âafford the luxury of not formalizing their constitutionsâ and observed that it was better to see the British constitution as âwritten differentlyâ than âunwrittenâ. British constitutionalism unlike its European and American counterparts was not meant to be âprescriptiveâ, but instead practical.12 This analysis lends weight to the view that British âinstitutions prove themselves capable of adaptation to new conditions; and this arises in large measure from a refusal to define. The task of definition is left to academic lawyers who, being independent, are ipso facto irresponsibleâ. One of those âirresponsibleâ academic lawyers and author of the above quote was Sir Ivor Jennings.13 The flexibility of the ârefusal to defineâ feature of Westminster allowed liberties and possibilities for the model to drift away from its moorings both geographically and theoretically leaving great scope for individuals to influence the constitutional character of their states more than any statute could. Jennings sought to explain why Westminster travelled East:
The one common characteristic of all these Constitutions was that they were all based on the unwritten British Constitution. This was a deliberate choice by the local politicians and it has, I suppose, several explanations. First, all the countries concerned had been under British rule, were familiar with British methods, and knew no other. Secondly, all the politicians concerned had been educated in British universities, or called to the English Bar, or educated in local institutions using an English ...