The Soviet Union In Transition

Kinya Niiseki

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2019
• ISBN:
  9781000305906
• Edition: 1
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: World History
• Index: History

Because of the recent transition in the Soviet Union's leadership, scholars worldwide have found it necessary to reevaluate Soviet domestic and foreign policy. In this volume, prominent Japanese, U.S., and European experts examine changes within the USSR as well as Soviet reactions to changes in the rest of the world. They assess the immediate implications of change for such areas as technology, energy policy, and economic reform and deliver commentaries on current policy directions and historical backgrounds of Soviet policies. To commemorate its silver jubilee and to add the valuable perspective of Japanese Soviet-studies scholars to Western analyses, the Japan Institute of International Affairs held the symposium on which this volume is based.

1
The Soviet Union in a Changing World

Seweryn Bialer

The title of this chapter defines the problem for the Soviets and for us: The world is changing very rapidly and the situation in the 1980s is very different from that in the 1970s, when the Soviet Union was changing very slowly. Until recently, there had been a gap in many respects between what was happening in the Soviet Union and what was happening in the rest of the world. But the traditional Soviet slogan, "to catch up with and surpass the industrial countries of the world" in economic or military power, has now been replaced in practice if not in words by the desire to keep up with the industrial democracies in technology and to some extent in military matters as well.

I have divided this chapter into two parts. The first will deal with the changing world and the second with the Soviet Union. Without an understanding of what has changed in the world, one cannot really understand the major dilemma in which the Soviet Union finds itself today and which, in my opinion, will continue throughout the 1980s and beyond. Of course, the subject matter—a changing world—is enormous; accordingly, I shall provide some very brief comments and then concentrate on one element of the changing world—namely, the correlation of forces, both political and military, in the international arena.

The underlying change in the world over the past ten years was the technological revolution. The third industrial revolution into which many countries, almost all industrial democracies, entered has been a revolution of communications, information, and services, and we only vaguely understand it. The question of how far this revolution will go has not yet been fully analyzed. When Andropov noted in one of his articles that the Soviet people really do not know the society in which they live—that their images are based on the past—I realized that one could say the same about Western societies with regard to the technological revolution. We are too preoccupied with its immediate development, but we really have not studied deeply what the consequences of this revolution will be for all the countries of the world.

There is a new factor to consider now, an element that we all regarded in the 1950s and 1960s as being in decline in the industrial democracies— namely, the question of nationalism. In my opinion, an upsurge of nationalism has occurred in the industrial democracies. It is largely related to the issue of protectionism.

Another factor we did not expect has been the rise of fundamentalism. Fundamentalism can be understood as pertaining not only to religion but to ideology as well. I am referring here to both Islamic fundamentalism and the upsurge of ideological fundamentalism occurring in the United States.

A third factor is the increased polarization occurring in almost all dimensions of international affairs. There is no doubt that after a period of fifteen years of improvement in U.S.-Soviet relations (or, let's say, at least the absence of a decline), we now see a period in which the polarization between the democratic countries and the Soviet Union has increased, especially with regard to relations between the Soviet Union and the United States. It is not a cold war like the one we remember from the first ten years after World War II, a period without any communication and without any recognition, either by the Soviet Union or by the United States, that a conflict had to be managed. The rules of the game, and some kind of minimal accommodation to prevent confrontation, simply had to be defined. But this is not the case today. I think that even during the most tense moments of U.S.-Soviet relations in the past few years—in the middle of the Reagan administration, for instance—the world was not close to a war; and I do not believe that we have a cold war now. One reason we cannot speak about cold war is that, although detente has been nearly destroyed, the damage has occurred primarily in the relations between the Soviet Union and the United States. But detente is still alive—maybe not so vibrant as in the past, but still very much alive in Europe. Nevertheless, I must stress that the changes occurring in the world have resulted in a greater polarization between the two superpowers—a polarization that, in my opinion, will continue for a very long time regardless of the achievements gained in the summit meeting or in arms negotiations after that.

Another great polarization exists between the north and the south. The illusion that developing countries can industrialize and develop— and especially the illusion that the Soviet model provides a road, a map of how to change, of how to become industrial—has been abandoned not only in Africa, which is faced with a tragic economic situation, but also in countries in Central and South America. Moreover, the gap between the north and the south in international relations has grown rather than contracted. At the same time, the idea of socialism in those countries has declined enormously (albeit with some exceptions).

A still greater polarization exists within the alliance of free nations: Western Europe, Japan, and the United States. Differences of opinion and policy are inevitable between sovereign bodies, but I think that the level of polarization among these nations today is much greater than it has been in the past.

Let me now point to a potential source of trouble that is difficult to analyze: For the first time in Western Europe there are two parties out of power (one in Germany and one in Great Britain) that have programs of military security and foreign policy that in many respects are at variance with the consensus of the nations of the Atlantic Alliance. Of course, one can always say that parties out of power change when they come to power—and this often is the case. But in my opinion the variance here is so great that even if there is movement closer to the center, some basic military and political differences will remain. Three years ago I wouldn't have thought that the Labour party (because of its movement to the Left) or the German Socialist party would come to power; but it is still possible that within the next five years those parties will come into power. This very possibility is a symbol, in a way, of the differences between the United States and Western Europe, both in their approach to the Soviet Union and in general policy.

Polarization also exists within the Soviet empire—that is, within the "Soviet alliance." Never before have we seen both the population and the communist elites of Eastern European countries fighting for greater independence from the Soviet Union; nor have the differences between the Soviet Union and almost all Eastern European countries been so great. I am speaking, of course, about the whole area, not about specific countries; and the situation is new precisely because, despite the occurrence of rebellions, uprisings, and unionism such as Solidarity in Poland, there has never before been such a combination of public dissatisfaction and dissatisfaction of the elite with relations with the Soviet Union.

We also see a new situation in the arms race, particularly with regard to the use of space. Both the concept of defensive versus offensive weapons and the philosophy of arms deployment are of crucial importance and great complexity. The question of verification may very well be the stumbling block that makes impossible a comprehensive arms agreement. In this age of missiles, nobody can know whether a warhead is nuclear or conventional; hence there must be some verification of the destruction, production, and deployment of weapons—verification that is impossible in space (that is, by means of satellites).

The arms control talks of the 1960s and 1970s represented gradual steps—very minimal steps in many respects—in the effort to move forward the idea of arms control. The SALT type of arms control agreement has completely lost its constituency, on both the Right and the Left in the United States. The Right was always against it, and the Left has become disillusioned with it because during the time it lasted, the number of warheads in the arsenals of the great powers nearly tripled. So what we are now facing is a struggle, a negotiation for an agreement with the Soviet Union that will become comprehensive, that must become comprehensive—an agreement that will have to take into consideration all types of weapons and other countries, not only the Soviet Union and the United States, but, for example, England, France, and China as well. This is a very difficult proposition, and we have clearly entered a period of arms control and arms race quite different from that of the past.

In speaking about the changing world, I would now like to concentrate on one point—namely, on the correlation of forces. The term itself originated in the Soviet Union, and its meaning is much broader than that of military balance. It includes economic equilibrium, social stability, and even psychological balance. I think it is important to speak in such terms—that is, in terms that go beyond the military question within the correlation of forces—not only because this perspective is valuable in itself but also because it reflects the way in which the Soviet leaders themselves analyze the West. This is the first question they ask themselves when they are deciding on long-term or middle-range strategies: What is the correlation of forces?

The general conclusion, in my opinion, should be that the correlation of forces in the 1980s, in comparison especially to the early 1970s, a ten-year difference, has shifted dramatically against the Soviet Union. Yet no real change has occurred in military balance over the past five or six years. Every step we have taken has also been taken by the Soviet Union—and vice versa. So the military balance, as such, is not different. Nevertheless, the man in the street would say otherwise— and he would be right in a sense, because the military balance has changed dramatically in a psychological way. The image of power, and of who holds that power, has changed. But the actual military balance has not.

What has changed in the military realm, however, is the direction in which the military balance is moving. The present trend started in the late 1970s under President Carter and sped up under President Reagan. It is now headed either toward a new arms race that neither superpower could win or toward a comprehensive arms control agreement that will be equitable, symmetrical, and just for both countries, one that will provide for common security instead of security for individual nations.

With regard to nonmilitary factors, there is no doubt that the Soviet Union currently faces many dilemmas and crises. The crises are not solely economic but have social, political, cultural, ideological, and psychological dimensions as well. Indeed, given the increased difficulties in the Soviet Union along all such dimensions (relative to the past), we would have to describe the crisis as systemic.

The Soviet Union's crisis can also be viewed from a completely different perspective—namely, in comparison to other countries, both democratic and nondemocratic. Until the early 1970s, the gap between the Soviet Union and its adversaries had closed (for instance, its GNP had improved significantly relative to other countries, especially the United States). But this relative improvement has ceased, and there is no sign that the Soviet Union's weakening will be reversed. Evidence of this crisis can be seen clearly in the realm of technology as well as in the military field. In short, the gap, far from being closed, is now actually widening.

A change in Soviet foreign policy is also evident. Over the past six or seven years, the Soviets have lost the initiative in the international arena. They have been reactive in their policy, reacting to what other countries did or wanted to do. They clearly have been and still are in a period of retrenchment in which they cannot expand as they had done in the 1970s. They will have to continue to concentrate on fewer targets of opportunities for gaining influence and power than they had in the 1970s.

In my opinion, the Soviets' foreign policy has no central concept. Those who think that detente with Western Europe is a substitute for detente with the United States are, I believe, in great error. In the Soviet Union the distinction is not whether detente—good relations with the United States—should exist or be restored, and whether one should concentrate on the Western Europeans as the other partner for detente; rather, the issue is how to use Western Europe in reaching detente with the United States. At a time when the relations between the United States and the Soviet Union are poor, Western Europe provides a target of opportunity that the Soviet Union used very clumsily in the last German elections but one probably being employed now in a much more imaginative way: pressure on the United States to make concessions to the Soviet Union in arms control negotiations.

Soviet policy is fraught with many dilemmas that show no sign of being resolved. The dilemma in the Soviets' internal situation is that they are weaker than before but still have high aspirations, and in their relations with Third World countries the Soviets are unclear in their goals and very dissatisfied with the present situation.

To illustrate the problems in Soviet foreign policy one need only mention the situation in Africa, where more so-called national liberation movements are fighting against the Soviets and Soviet friends than against the United States or Western Europe and their friends. This situation represents a major change.

A major change is also under way in Eastern Europe. At present, this region could best be described, I believe, as the "Greater Eastern European Co-Stagnation Sphere." The economic, political, and military situation there has clearly entered a period of decline.

Of course, the most obvious symbol of this decline is Poland. And it is rightly so considered—not only because of its importance as the larger and most strategically located country (and with the largest army) in the Warsaw Pact, but also because its stability has not been restored. (In other words, the unrest in this Eastern European country did not, after it was quashed, lead to normalization as had happened in Hungary in 1956 and in Czechoslovakia after 1968.) Indeed, the Polish situation has not been resolved. By the same token, one should not mistake the apathy and fatigue of the Polish workers for signs that Poland has stabilized. It has not.

The central dilemma is one between cohesion and viability—between stability and orthodoxy. Let me say a few words on this question of stability and orthodoxy. The Soviet Union has learned from the Polish example. In its hopes to bring about political orthodoxy in Eastern Europe, it is pursuing, I would say, a very hard line in Eastern Europe. But the Soviet Union also wants the Eastern European nations of its empire to be stable. And to be stable those nations must have closer relations with Western Europe. They must not only open up trade relations but also acquire credit. Hence the clash of two different Soviet desires: the desire for political orthodoxy so as not to encourage a situation akin to Solidarity, and the desire for social and political stability, which requires Western help.

There is no way in which this dilemma can be resolved. I think that Gorbachev made a short-run decision for orthodoxy, for a hard policy. But what will happen in the longer run cannot be foreseen. As the Soviet Union itself cannot pay for development in Eastern Europe, its policy will continue along the same lines as before—and the stability of Eastern Europe, which is based on the performance of the regimes involved, not on nationalism or tradition, will be endangered. Moreover, the social instability in Eastern Europe will lead to political instability.

We must now return to our discussion of correlation of forces and military balance. A major element in the change related to the former is the movement of the center of gravity of economic and military matters to Asia. This is an extremely important trend, a trend visible along many dimensions. Inside the Soviet Union, the question pertains to Siberia. The Soviet Union cannot survive as a global economic and military power if the development of Siberia is not achieved, regardless of the cost. From a military point of view, it is clear that the arms race in the Pacific has grown relative to the situation in Europe. Consider, for example, the following questions: "When you speak about global parity with the United States, do you speak about parity only in the global sense (meaning that disparities within areas are not important so long as parity is achieved overall)? Or do you see the necessity of parity within every area itself?" Until three years ago the Soviet military would have answered that global parity is essential and that regional parity would be required only in Europe. Two years ago the military would have specified two areas—the Western Pacific in addition to Europe. In short, Soviet military expenditures in the Pacific are greater now and, in fact, are increasing more rapidly than expenditures relative to the central theater in Europe.

The movement of the aforementioned center of gravity toward Asia can also be seen in the fact that Japan, which until recently had been primarily interested in economic questions and was "only" a great economic power, has decided to become a great political power as well. Indeed, Japan is currently strengthening its political ties with various countries, and its political influence has grown immensely in many areas—especially the Middle East and Brazil. Needless to say, this development is regarded by the Soviet Union as a major blow to its position in Asia.

A related phenomenon is China's modernization. I cannot predict whether the Chinese will achieve all they want to achieve. I must simply say that what is happening in China is potentially the third most important event of the twentieth century following World War I and the development of nuclear weapons. The modernization of 1,300,000,000 Chinese over the next forty or fifty years is a very unlikely scenario. However, it is possible—given a good agricultural base that would provide food for the cities—that some regions near Shanghai, Beijing, and Canton will develop modern industry and, consequently, corporate arrangements with Japan, West Germany, and the United States. Therefore, even if China fulfills only 10 percent of its goals, we will see another Japan on the globe.

Another element in the change of the correlation of forces concerns the movement of continental Europe away from the notion of One Europe—that is, away from the idea of a unified Western Europe. This can be seen in the relative economic decline of Western Europe, where the whole bureaucratic structure of major industrial organizations—so perfectly suited to the second industrial revolution—has proved quite unsuitable for the third industrial revolution. Hence the gap between the United States and Japan on the one hand and Western Europe on the other will likely increase.

One can see in Western Europe a growing difference in the approach to the Soviet Union displayed by that region and the United States. In some respects, Europeans judge the Soviets by the behavior they display within their region. They therefore view the Soviet Union as a very troublesome neighbor. But the United States, which views the Soviet Union from a global perspective—and in a more ideological way than does Western Europe—views the Soviet Union as an adversary.

Major changes in the Middle East are contributing, as well, to the change in the correlation of forces. The Arab-Israeli conflict there, which has been central to the conflict in the Middle East, has declined in relative importance; at the same time, the conflict within the Arab world—the Muslim world—has increased in importance. It is also there that the Soviet influence has reached a new low—the lowest point ever, in fact.

Finally, we come to the change in the United States. The decade of the late 1960s and 1970s was a terrible one for this country. It was a decade of the Vietnam War, a decade of retreat from its leadership role, a decade of neo-isolationism (or at least a lack of activism) in the international arena. And Watergate, which represented a major crisis— and ultimately a victory—for the democratic institutions of the United States, left a scar of disunity and doubt in the United States that has healed at last ...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• Preface
• Introduction
• 1 The Soviet Union in a Changing World
• 2 East-West Relations: A European Perspective
• 3 "Gorbachevism"—Simply Old Wine in a New Bottle?
• 4 Implications of Leadership and Social Change for Soviet Policies
• 5 Soviet Economic Trends, with Special Emphasis on Investment and Energy Policies
• 6 Economic Reforms in China in Light of Soviet and Eastern European Experiences
• 7 Economic Relations Between the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and Their Implications for East-West Relations
• 8 Continuity in the Pattern of Russo-Soviet External Behavior
• 9 The Military Factor in Soviet Foreign Policy
• 10 The U.S.-Soviet Rivalry in East Asia
• 11 Soviet Policies Toward Korea
• 12 Japan and the Development of Siberia
• A. Summary of Conference Proceedings
• B. Program and Conference Participants
• C. Profiles of the Rapporteurs