Security In Northeast Asia

Approaching The Pacific Century

Stephen P Gibert

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2020
• ISBN:
  9781000311129
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Asian Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

This book presents to the reader a comprehensive and integrated discussion of the Northeast Asian-Western Pacific region and its relationships to United States and world security concerns and international political stability.

CHAPTER 1
The Northeast Asian Arena

Stephen P. Gibert

A decade ago it was considered a bit eccentric to remark that political and economic influence and power in world affairs was shifting away from Europe and that a “Pacific Century” lay ahead. Now hardly a day goes by when some public figure does not proclaim the beginning of an Asian-Pacific era and speculates what this portends for America’s future security and economic well-being.

In this particular case, the claims of importance for the Pacific Basin nations are not exaggerated; no duo of countries are equal in importance to the American future—and indeed that of the entire world—than China and Japan. China’s immense population (three times that of the Soviet Union, four times that of the United States, sixteen times that of Germany and eighteen times that of France) guarantees that it will be among the handful of states which will shape the destiny of the next century. Furthermore, China is currently engaged in a very ambitious modernization effort which, if successful, will lift it from the ranks of the Third World nations to that of an industrial power. With a four-thousand-mile border with the USSR, China also serves to compel the Soviet government not only to maintain large military forces in its Far Eastern military district but always to consider its Asian frontier when formulating policy toward NATO in the West.

Since the exchange of diplomatic relations in 1979 between Washington and Beijing, security cooperation between China, Japan, and the United States has added to Moscow’s concerns and, at the same time, improved China’s international bargaining power. China has emerged as a key participant in the “Iron Triangle” with the Soviet Union and the United States. Presently, however, China is seeking good relations with the Soviet Union and the United States in order to concentrate on internal economic development. Emphasizing its desire for peace, the PRC has given the lowest priority in its ‘Tour Modernizations” to military defense. Although China claims to be pursuing a policy of “equidistance” between the Soviet Union and the United States, in fact Beijing is clearly “tilting” toward Washington. In addition, America’s trade and cultural relations with China are growing and becoming important to both countries, thus adding to stability in the region.

Japan, like China, will be one of the several most important nations of the twenty-first century. Indeed, although Japan’s economy is still much smaller than the American economy, in many ways Japan may already be the leading economic power in the world. It is difficult to compare the gross national product of various nations with any degree of confidence—especially between capitalist countries and the statist economy of the USSR. But, to the extent that it can be measured, it is generally thought that Japan may have surpassed the Soviet Union in total productivity. With about half the GNP of the United States, Japan enjoys about equal GNP per capita with America and perhaps about twice that of the Soviet Union.

Whatever the case, Japan is the economic miracle of the era since the Second World War. With a high savings rate, low unemployment, advanced technology and a skilled and educated workforce, Japan is the envy of the rest of the world. While the usual perception of Japan is that of a large producer of heavy industrial goods, Japan is also a leader in the service sector. Seven of the world’s eight largest banks, three of the five top insurance companies and the world’s largest securities firm are all Japanese. Paradoxically, the only danger looming on the horizon results from Japanese success; that is, the growing resentment among the Europeans, and especially the Americans, of Japan’s enormous surplus in trade. While there are many reasons for this situation, undoubtedly the policies of the Japanese government and the cultural propensities of the Japanese people have played a significant role in the hugely favorable trade balance which Tokyo has enjoyed. And, of course, the fact that Japan has not had to devote significant resources to defense has been an important element Currently, for example, although the United States has only about twice Japan’s GNP, the U.S. spends about twenty-one times as much as Japan on defense.

At present it appears that Japan and the United States are on a collision course, both with regard to trade and “fair” security burden-sharing. Given the enormous stakes involved, it must be assumed, however, that Tokyo and Washington will cooperate to solve both the economic and the security problems which divide the two countries. If so, the Japanese-American relationship will powerfully shape world politics in the twenty-first century. Already today the two nations collectively account for one-third of the world’s total production, are the two largest sources of investment capital in the world, consume about half of the oil imported by the industrialized nations, have the largest communities of scientists and engineers, and utilize one-third of the world’s production of raw materials. With only about eight percent of the world’s population, Japan and the U.S. are the largest producers of semiconductors, computers, steel, automobiles, and many other kinds of machinery and heavy industrial products and share leadership in many areas of emerging technology.

But Japan, unfortunately, is in essence a military protectorate of the United States, with insufficient armed forces even to protect Japan itself, to say nothing of a security role in world affairs. While no one—and certainly not the East Asian countries—desires a return of Japanese militarism, some improvement in Japanese armed forces would add substantially to deterring Soviet adventurism. Since it cannot be imagined that the United States will continue indefinitely to provide Japan with the security Tokyo should provide for itself, probably by the end of the twentieth century Japan will be forced to become a stronger military power if it wishes to avoid possible coercion by other states.

The remaining three countries in the area which are associated in one way or another with the United States—the Republic of South Korea, the Philippines, and Taiwan—are not to be compared with the two giants, China and Japan. Nevertheless, each is important to the United States, albeit in somewhat different ways.

The United States, along with the Soviet Union, was responsible for the division of Korea along the 38th parallel in 1945, thus creating a situation which led to war in 1950. Undoubtedly failure to deter this conflict resulted from North Korean doubts that the U.S. would assist South Korea in the event of war. To remove such uncertainty in the future, in 1954 Korea and the United States signed a Mutual Defense Treaty and American military forces have remained in South Korea ever since. While periodically there have been reassessments of the U.S. commitment to the Republic of Korea, not until 1977 did the American government decide to remove all U.S. forces from Korea. President Carter, however, did not follow through on this plan, allegedly because a new intelligence report revealed that North Korean forces were stronger than previously estimated. More likely, the Carter Administration realized that the issue was not solely South Korean security; rather Korea was a critical link in Japan’s defense and in containing the Soviet Union in East Asia.

The Korean peninsula is one of the most heavily armed regions of the world, with large and hostile forces facing each other across the demilitarization zone. Thus the U.S. security treaty with Korea certainly involves substantial fears that America will be drawn into another Asian conflict. But Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines are essential links in U.S. strategy, which contemplates confronting the Soviet Union with war in the East should the USSR attack NATO in the West. The Reagan Administration especially, through the strengthening of the U.S. Navy and the adoption of a so-called “Maritime Strategy,” and its corollary, “horizontal escalation,” has linked Asian security to the security of Western Europe. This approach intends to deny the USSR the choice of limiting a NATO-Warsaw Pact war to the European theater and thus, hopefully, contribute to deterring conflict in both Europe and Asia. Not all Asians—and especially the Japanese—are happy with this strategic concept. Naturally they would prefer not to be drawn into a NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict. From a geopolitical point of view, however, it makes sense. It also enhances the military value of both Korea and Japan to the United States and makes it more likely the U.S. will continue to bear the risks and burdens involved.

In addition to Korean-American security relations, the economic dimension is becoming increasingly important. The Republic of Korea is one of the very few Third World nations which is joining the ranks of the industrialized states. The “little dragons” of East Asia—South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore—are all developing quite rapidly and all have become major trading nations. The United States is Korea’s largest export market and Korea now is beginning to compete successfully with Japan in the automobile, shipbuilding, television, and other heavy industries. Unfortunately, however, the growing U.S. trade deficit has begun to adversely affect America’s relations with Korea and the other newly-industrializing countries. This situation could certainly jeopardize future cooperation between the two countries.

Finally, the present moves in Korea toward a more democratic society are absolutely necessary if Seoul wishes to continue to enjoy priority in U.S. security concerns; the United States is less and less comfortable with close alliances with military dictatorships. In South Korea itself there appears to be a growing anti-American sentiment, fueled by the belief that the United States has been insufficiently critical of authoritarian rule. But all signs point to the strengthening of democratic forces in Korea which should assist in keeping intact the presently close relations between Seoul and Washington. Very encouraging was President Chun Doo Hwan’s willing departure from office in February 1988 in favor of the leadership elected in December 1987.

The Republic of the Philippines has been a key ally of the United States ever since it received independence on the Fourth of July, 1946. The United States has stationed military forces in the Philippines since that date and the Clark Air Force Base and the Subic Bay Naval Base are among the most important U.S. military installations in the world The immensity of the Pacific Ocean makes it vital for the United States to have forward bases if it is to be a major power in East Asia. The Clark and Subic bases in the Philippines provide this in the southern part of the Western Pacific and the Yokosuka, Sasebo, and Okinawa bases in Japan furnish the forward deployment facilities in the northern sector of the Western Pacific Ocean.

The primary purposes of the Clark and Subic bases in the Philippines are to hold at risk the large Soviet base at Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam and to guard the sea lines of communication leading from the Persian Gulf area to Japan and Korea. There are no satisfactory substitutes for the bases in the Philippines should Manila decide it no longer wished to retain the present security arrangements. Therefore, good relations between the Philippines and the United States are vital. The U.S. role in removing Marcos from power in the Philippines certainly improved America’s image in the eyes not only of the Filipinos, but around the world as well. President Aquino’s hold on authority is very shaky, however, and it is clear that many military leaders would like to see her deposed. Even if it risks alienating the military, however, the U.S. should stand firmly behind democracy in the Philippines. The trend throughout East Asia is toward democracy and the U.S. must be a part of this movement if it is to retain long-term influence in the region. The U.S. should also assist the Philippine government in its struggle against a growing communist insurgency. Such assistance might help to reconcile the military to the Aquino regime.

The third of the trio of small nations in East Asia in which the U.S. has important interests is the Republic of China on the island of Taiwan. After President Carter’s decision in December 1978 to transfer U.S. diplomatic relations from Taiwan to the People’s Republic of China, it looked as if Taiwan would be almost completely excluded from international affairs. But the Taiwan Relations Act in 1979 placed Washington-Taipei relations on a firm, if less formal, basis. Accordingly, Taiwan still receives substantial American military equipment and has emerged, as has South Korea, as one of the newly industrializing nations, with a booming, export-driven economy. As in the case of Korea and Japan, however, Taiwan’s large trade surplus with the United States is an increasing source of tension between the two countries. Unlike Japan, South Korea and Taiwan have made strong efforts to reduce their favorable balances of trade although there remain some problems to be resolved. And also unlike Japan, Taiwan and Korea contribute their “fair share” to the mutual defense burden. But the trade issue is still very worrisome; Taiwan and Korea, with their small populations, simply cannot absorb sufficient American imports to offset their exports to the U.S. market.

Taiwan remains an issue in PRC-American relations. Beijing has always used U.S. support for Taipei as an excuse to belabor Washington whenever the PRC wished to place some distance between itself and the United States. Most analysts do not think it likely that the PRC will force a genuine confrontation over American policies toward Taiwan. PRC leaders have stated frequently, however, that China would take military action against Taiwan should Taipei declare itself an independent state, no longer part of China. Such a development is very unlikely in the near future, but as native Taiwanese gain more and more power in Taiwan politics, a decision to establish a Republic of Taiwan might become a possibility. This, in turn, could lead to a serious crisis in Asia and would confront the U.S. with very difficult policy choices.

Finally, American-Taiwan relations are likely to remain close providing the gradual moves toward a more democratic polity in the island country continue. Very welcome to the U.S. government was the July 1987 decision by Taipei to lift martial law, which had been effect since 1949. Nevertheless, the transition from an essentially one-party authoritarian state, dominated by Chinese with close ties to the mainland, to a more democratic nation, with power fully shared with native Taiwanese, will be difficult indeed. But distinctions between “Mainlanders” and Taiwanese are already disappearing as intermarriage occurs and new generations are born, so friction between the two groups is no longer significant. Other changes conducive to democracy are now underway; their continuation should help ensure an acceptable political future for Taiwan whether or not eventual unification with mainland China occurs.

American stakes in this dynamic region of the world ate enormous and growing. This is not to say that the United States, as a global superpower, can turn its back on Europe or terminate its NATO commitments; just as a strong posture in East Asia contributes to deterring a Soviet attack on NATO, so a strong NATO contributes to Chinese and Japanese security. But priorities change; a Euro-centered U.S. stance is no longer either necessary or desirable. America is now challenged to fashion a more global approach to world affairs, thus enhancing both its economic well-being and its national security as the “Pacific Century” begins.

CHAPTER 2
The Sino-Soviet-U.S. Triangle

Harold C. Hinton

By any standard—political, economic, or strategic—the East Asia/Western Pacific region is one of the most important in the world. For well known reasons, to be sure, its indigenous industrial giant, Japan, lacks projectible military power, and partly for that reason it is far from exercising a level of influence on regional or global international politics commensurate with its economic weight. The assets that Japan lacks are possessed, actually or potentially, by three other powers whose interests and policies overlap and interact in the region: the United States, the Soviet Union, and the People’s Republic of China. These powers are sometimes referred to collectively as the Iron Triangle.

The Anatomy of the Iron Triangle

Although it is sometimes denied on one ground or another, the two super-powers and China appear to constitute a genuine and meaningful strategic triangle, one in which any significant change in one of three relationships directly affects the other two.

Of these three relationships, the one between the superpowers has been the centerpiece of international politics since World War II. Its essential nature is that of a protracted confrontation arising largely from internal Soviet compulsions—the felt need of the Soviet elite for external triumphs, which cannot be achieved without strenuous effort, to enhance the domestic power and legitimacy of the most authoritarian of the world’s major political systems. The United States is the only nation that has, even potentially, the power and determination to contain the Soviet outward thrust on a global scale. At a regional level, in East Asia and the Western Pacific, China also possesses, or at any rate may come to possess, significant capabilities for coping with Soviet expansionism.

Since 1969, when it achieved approximate strategic parity with the United States (in addition to conventional superiority in Eurasia), the Soviet Union has been engaged in one of its recurrent drives for ultimate “hegemony” in the East Asia/Western Pacific region. Moscow was also stimulated by the American intention (implied in the Nixon Doctrine) to withdraw militarily form the East Asian mainland and was provoked by a clash engineered by Chinese troops on the Sino-Soviet border (on March 2,1969).

In broad terms, China has tried since 1950 to play the role of balancing or swing power with respect to the superpowers, at least in the East Asian arena; it is clearly too weak to stand alone of its hopes to achieve its leaders ambitious goals for eventual power and influence in that arena. On the other hand, it has also been too weak so far to attain its objectives even by “tilting” toward one superpower or the other. Unlike the superpowers, it possesses no alliance system worthy of the name.

China nevertheless possesses what amounts to a minimum nuclear deterrent against the Soviet Union, even if not necessarily against the United States. It is strong enough to affect the regional balance between the superpowers by either supporting (as it did in the early 1950s) or opposing (as it has since about 1960) Soviet domination of the East Asian mainland. China objects strongly to the post-1969 Soviet drive for ultimate regional “hegemony.” As an offshore power, the United States needs at least the passive cooperation of China if it is to fend off such domination. This it has received. China not only is helpful in this connection but also “ties down” laige Soviet forces that otherwise could be redeployed against other areas of great strategic impo...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Series Page
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• Preface
• 1. The Northeast Asian Arena
• Part I Diplomacy and Power: The Great Powers
• Part II Diplomacy and Power: The Lesser Powers
• Part III The Military Arena
• Part IV Toward the Future
• About the Editor
• Index