Heidegger and Proust
In his 1946 essay entitled âBrief liber den âHumanismusââ (translated into English as âLetter on Humanismâ), Martin Heidegger answers questions that his French colleague Jean Beaufret had asked him, including one particular question which constitutes the philosophical core of the âLetterâ: âComment redonner un sens au mot âhumanismeâ?â1 Implicit in this formulation, as Heidegger reads it, are two fundamental ideas: 1. that the word âhumanismâ has a meaning and a conceptual value worthy of preservation; 2. that this word, or concept, through a certain evolution in the history of ideas, has lost its original meaning. Whatever one might think of Heideggerâs essay â with its somewhat convoluted argument based upon a reinterpretation of the vexed transition from Greek to Roman thought, and its poetic style which displeased many philosophers â there remains, at its foundation, something of interest to the interpretive reader of texts, namely, its dialogical character: the essay would not have existed without Beaufretâs questions. Heideggerâs lengthy answer is no simple embroidery on his French interlocutorâs theoretical and methodological concerns, but rather an attempt to bring into the light the philosophical potential underlying Beaufretâs inquiry.
The reader of Heidegger will not have forgotten that, towards the end of the essay, when the topic of ethics is broached â Beaufret had written: âCe que je cherche Ă faire, depuis longtemps dĂ©jĂ , câest prĂ©ciser le rapport de lâontologie avec une Ă©thique possibleâ (âLetterâ, 231) â Heidegger, in order to demonstrate that ontology must precede any possible ethics, has recourse to etymology. He affirms that the Greek word ethos means âdwellingâ, or more precisely, âthe open region in which man dwellsâ (âLetterâ, 233). In the same way that, with the passage of time and the fall of primordial thought outside itself into the narrow and purely technical domain of philosophy, there is, according to Heidegger, a loss of conceptual acuity and an intellectual decline; in the same way, in the evolution towards the creation of a sub-field within philosophy called âethicsâ, there is also considerable loss â loss of the initial meaning of the word ethos, whose resonance one finds in a rereading, or corrected reading, of one of Heraclitusâs fragments, ethos anthropoi daimon. Thisfragment, traditionally translated as âA manâs character is his daimonâ, becomes, in Heideggerâs reinterpretation: âThe (familiar) abode is for man the open region for the presencing of god (the unfamiliar one)â (âLetterâ, 233â34). In the Heideggerian reflection on Being, it is thus evident that the question âWho are we?â implies a second, no less important question: âWhere are we?â â i.e., âWhat is, and where is, our dwelling?â The question of oneâs dwelling or abode, of oneâs place in the historical itinerary of thought, emerges when the thinker reverses course and moves back through time to discover, underneath the accumulations and accretions of past reflection, the first meaning, surprising in its simplicity and familiarity, of the term ethos. We should not forget that, for Heidegger, Being is difficult of access not because it is situated far from us, but rather that, in a paradoxical sense, it is too close to be recognized or apprehended easily: âDas Sein ist das NĂ€chsteâ (âBriefâ, 331).
If I have allowed myself this short excursion into Heideggerian territory, it is because I think that certain ideas I have highlighted here resonate with and emerge within Proustâs writings. Just as Heidegger took Jean Beaufretâs questioning seriously, in the same way, in the context of a colloquium organized around the theme âThe Strange M. Proustâ, one should also attempt to answer those questions its organizer has posed, and which, in my view, also presuppose a backwards movement through time and a certain textual labour which includes an etymological dimension and the difficulty of translation from German to French and to English.2 This textual labour has as its point of departure and its point of arrival the entire question of dwelling as such, and of the familiar in its dialectical relation with the strange and the unfamiliar.
In the short description of his colloquium which was sent as a flyer to speakers and participants before the event, AndrĂ© BenhaĂŻm reminded us of the fundamental strangeness, or Ă©trangetĂ©, of Proustâs work â âa strangeness that was forgotten or occulted by public and institutional recognitionâ (âune Ă©trangetĂ© qui a Ă©tĂ© oubliĂ©e ou occultĂ©e par la reconnaissance publique et institutionnelleâ). Therefore, to translate what I have just said about Heidegger into Proustian terms, and to respond proleptically to AndrĂ© BenhaĂŻmâs question, I would say that one must move backwards through time and reach that point which lies before the accumulation of critical knowledge about A la recherche du temps perdu and before the construction of the myths that surround and obfuscate the person Marcel Proust, in order to find that initial strangeness which permeates the novel. In this return to the sources of Proustian creativity which implies an uncovering of the fundamental strangeness of Proustâs text, it seems to me that the reader necessarily inscribes him- or herself in a certain Heideggerian modality of interpretation, not only in the temporal movement of a return to origins as such, but also, more concretely, in a problematizing of the question of dwelling â an ethical question, says Heidegger, a question concerning the notion of ethos. But in the case of Proust, this inquiry must be made in relation to the movement of subjective dispossession which accompanies those moments, so numerous in the Recherche, in which one is expelled from oneâs dwelling and thrown into the world, into the cold and the strangeness of a place which both resembles and does not resemble the familiar world of home. I am alluding here to a fundamental and foundational Unheimlichkeit in Proust.
Freud and Proust
To pronounce the word Unheimlichkeit (in English, âuncanninessâ, or in the overabundant French translation, inquiĂ©tante Ă©trangetĂ©, âdisquieting strangenessâ), is to refer, of course, to Freud and to his 1919 essay entitled âDas Unheimlicheâ.3 I am therefore obliged to take a second excursion, this time in the territory of psychoanalytical theory, before confronting, more or less head-on, the fictional landscape of Marcel Proust. The essay âDas Unheimlicheâ, which for a long time was considered to be an interesting and somewhat curious pendant to the brilliant revolutionary text Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920), began to engage the interest of literary critics and theoreticians in the 1970s and 1980s. Without entering into the detail of the debates which arose from the close reading of Freudâs short meditation on the uncanny, I will simply mention here the important studies of HĂ©lĂšne Cixous (âFiction and its Phantomsâ) and of Sarah Kofman (The Childhood of Art).4 Both Cixous and Kofman were interested in the jerky pace of âDas Unheimlicheâ, and both critics brought to light the âsymptomaticâ qualities of an essay in which form and substance mirrored (uncannily) the intellectual uncertainty and anxiety of its author, precisely where Freud was analysing these same themes in a variety of texts he chose to illustrate the phenomenon of Unheimlichkeit, especially the bizarre and unsettling tale of E. T. A. Hoffmann entitled âThe Sandmanâ (1817). For the modest purposes of my own essay, I would like to limit myself to two aspects of âDas Unheimlicheâ: 1. the importance of the return to etymological sources and to the semantic field of the words heimlich and unheimlich in the first part of the essay, a meditation on language and its connotative potential which unleashes Freudâs interpretive reading; 2. the question of translation considered both in its literal sense (how does one ârenderâ a word or a text originally written in one language in another) and in its etymological sense (traducere, translate, ĂŒbertragen: to carry or transport something, for example, a meaning, from one place to another; traverse a territory, go beyond established borders to create meaning where that meaning did not yet exist). In the development that follows, I shall leave aside the question of territory and territoriality as such, along with the problem of intellectual fields, and the ways in which literary criticism and psychoanalysis divide the domain of Unheimlichkeit among themselves: I have studied this elsewhere, and it is ein weites Feld.5
Although Freudâs essay is complicated and tortuous in its analytical meanderings, its initial thematic statement could hardly be clearer: âthe uncanny is that species of the frightening that goes back to what was once well known and had long been familiar. How this can be â under what conditions the familiar can become uncanny and frightening â will emerge in what followsâ (The Uncanny, 124). Especially interesting in the formulation of this theme is its temporal or narrative dimension. At first, there was the familiar (the dwelling place, das Heim). But this familiar place, through a historical movement that lends itself to narration, becomes its opposite (the unfamiliar or disquieting, das Unheimliche). One moves, therefore, from domestic cosiness towards that which is hidden, secret, terrifying, according to the logic of translation, or Ăbertragung. In the conclusion to the first section of his essay, Freud writes: âHeimlich thus becomes increasingly ambivalent, until itfinally merges with its antonym unheimlichâ (The Uncanny, 134). That which is truly disquieting inhabits language before emerging in literary texts through terrifying effects (like those of E. T. A. Hoffmann, with his DoppelgĂ€nger, his automata, and his mad protagonists). It is disquieting that a word can signify its opposite, even if this fact of signifying-its-opposite comes to the surface only in the differential spacing of narration.
We find this very movement in the Proustian context in the passage from âNoms de pays: le nomâ to âNoms de pays: le paysâ, whereby an act of referential verification by the protagonist shows that the same signifier, Balbec, can point both to a mythical territory lost in the fog of the FinistĂšre and to a quite prosaic place where one finds the intersection of two tramway lines.6 But for Proust, this kind of play with opposites, with linguistic and geographical antonyms, has considerable (or extensive) consequences: if one allows the signifier âBalbecâ to resonate freely, one can ascertain a curious acoustic resemblance between the imaginary Norman site of the Recherche and the real ancient city of BAALBEK, now situated in Lebanon, whose name comes from Baal, Phoenician god of the sun (the Greeks called this city Heliopolis, city of the sun). Here one finds a development which is strangely parallel to that which Freud evokes in his reflections on the movement from the familiar to the non-familiar. In Proustâs case, there is an amalgam between the exotic Orient (Baal, god of the rising sun) and of the Occident (the FinistĂšre, the setting sun, the limit of European civilization, which seems familiar to us, but can one speak of familiarity if a word like âBalbecâ can point to opposing referents?). Thus narrative movement, whether Proustian or Freudian, seems inscribed in the pathway which leads from the known to the unknown, from domestic to foreign territory. One should add that in the case of the Recherche, the narrative leads initially from a known area (the Paris of the Champs-ElysĂ©es and of Gilberte) to an unknown and disquieting Normandy (Balbec, the Grand-HĂŽtel, Albertine and her friends); but the story later leads its reader towards the narratorâs meditations on his room at the Grand-HĂŽtel, a place that is, at first, disquieting (with its ceiling too low, its furniture askew), then familiar, thanks to the anaesthetizing force of Habit.7 What Proust adds to Freud, therefore, is a reflection, via John Ruskin, on what one could call the labour of Habit.8 This labour opens up a narration which moves in the opposite direction to that proposed by Freud in his analysis of Unheimlichkeit: namely, a narration of the passage from the foreign and the disquieting to the domestic and the familiar.
But herein lies a problem, which I shall develop briefly in a focused reading of the conclusion of the Venice episode in Albertine disparue: can one affirm that Proust is merely adding to Freudâs insights while remaining within the territory that Freud explored? Does this voyage en sens inverse constitute in itself Proustâs only contribution or minor correction to the pathway traced by the psychoanalyst between das Heimliche and das Unheimliche? Or could one say that this narrative scheme, even in its complicated Proustian form, is a vast simplification, even an error of interpretation, and that, in fact, the unheimlich as such, as disquieting strangeness, inhabits the heimlich from within? In other words, perhaps the familiarity of the external world is not a factual state, but a construction elaborated by the thinkingsubject whose function is to mask the fundamental Unheimlichkeit in which he or she lives, the dispossessing and disquieting strangeness which, from the beginning of all possible narration, will have dislocated the universe of things and people, providing them with their (strange) initial movement, their state of dizziness and of chaos that pre-exists narrative order as such. The reader of Proust will have recognized, in my paraphrase, a sentence from the sixth paragraph of the novel: âPeut-ĂȘtre lâimmobilitĂ© des choses autour de nous leur est-elle imposĂ©e par notre certitude que ce sont elles et non pas dâautres, par lâimmobilitĂ© de notre pensĂ©e en face dâelles.â [âPerhaps the immobility of the things that surround us is forced upon them by our conviction that they are themselves and not anything else, by the immobility of our conception of them.â] (I, 6; 1, 6) This Overture of the Recherche is truly strange: an Overture in which a man who sleeps imagines not only that he is a church or a string quartet â that is, things or aesthetic objects â but even an abstraction: âla rivalitĂ© de François Ier et de Charles Quintâ [âthe rivalry between François I and Charles Vâ] (I, 4; 1, 3). The novel begins strangely, perhaps because strangeness is not simply or essentially part of a larger developmental process, but rather the very locus of the text and of its performativity. In order to see the unfolding or textualization of Unheimlichkeit, of disquieting strangeness in its Proustian specificity, I turn now to the examinat...