Frameworks of the European Union's Policy Process

Competition and Complementarity across the Theoretical Divide

Nikolaos Zahariadis

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2017
• ISBN:
  9781351566766
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politik & Internationale Beziehungen
• Subtopic: Politik

The book advances the state of the European Union's policy theory by taking stock of seven promising frameworks of the policy process, systematically comparing their limitations and strengths, and offering a strategy to develop robust research agendas. Frameworks may constitute competing policy explanations depending on assumptions they make about EU institutional and issue complexity. The frameworks include detailed analyses of multi-level governance, advocacy coalitions, punctuated equilibrium, multiple streams, policy learning, normative power Europe, and constructivism. Besides generating a fertile dialogue that transcends the narrow confines of EU policy, contributions highlight the value of intellectual pluralism and the need for clear and rigorous explanations of the policy process. This book was published as a special issue of the Journal of European Public Policy.

Building better theoretical frameworks of the European Union’s policy process

Nikolaos Zahariadis

ABSTRACT We aim to build better frameworks of the European Union’s policy process by taking stock of promising theoretical lenses, assessing their strengths and limitations, and developing robust research agendas. Frameworks may constitute competing policy explanations depending on assumptions they make about institutional and issue complexity. Points of competition and complementarity are identified, leading to a research agenda that specifies which lenses to use and when.

INTRODUCTION

In the last 20 years or so, analysts have developed increasingly sophisticated simplifications (frameworks or lenses) of the European Union (EU) policy process, seeking explanatory insight and predictive capability. Contributors to the project assess seven promising frameworks of the EU policy process, taking stock of their strengths and limitations. Key assumptions, variables and their underlying logic are clarified and explored. To develop robust research agendas and build better frameworks, a foundation is laid based on differentiations between issue and institutional complexity.

The contributions have considerable value-added for EU studies. First, this is the first systematic analysis of different frameworks of the EU policy process. Second, the contributors speak to each other and to theoretical developments in the broader field of policy studies, generating a fertile dialogue that transcends the narrow confines of EU policy. Third, contributions highlight the value of intellectual pluralism in policy studies. Choice is viewed as a menu of alternative explanations and methodologies with different trade-offs and not as a right or wrong answer to a given problem. Fourth, the proposed research strategy helps scholars think more clearly and rigorously about ways to develop and systematically compare explanations of the policy process.

GOOD FRAMEWORKS AND THEORIES

Frameworks structure diagnostic and prescriptive modes of inquiry, helping to systematically organize distinct ways of thinking about public policy. Theories identify particular elements of importance within each framework that are relevant to a class of questions and specify processes and consequences. Frameworks and theories are hierarchically nested (Ostrom 2007). Each lens may contain several theories, and some lenses are more fully developed than others.

Frameworks help make sense of the policy process. Good frameworks make their assumptions explicit, identify important variables, and clarify the causal logic connecting variables to outcomes, helping analysts anticipate problems, limitations, and consequences. Better frameworks use their panoply of tools to pursue the twin goals of explanation and prediction with equal rigor. In practice, one tends to dominate the other. A medical analogy may fruitfully explain the difference between the two. We know the course of illness when one catches a cold. We can specify the cycle of fever following coughing and sneezing, which in turn is followed by physical weakness and aches. We even have remedies to address the problem. But we still deal with symptoms, not causes. Predictive capability is very high, but explanation remains rudimentary. There is a range of chronic illnesses that have been diagnosed and treated with little hope of finding a cure. Explanation aims at causality. It seeks a deeper understanding of why things work in order to isolate causes from symptoms and develop treatments that address causes rather than alleviate symptoms. In social science, human limitations and the lack of experimental control force us to lower expectations regarding causality and prediction (Simon 1983). We strive to develop knowledge that helps us understand public policy and allows us to address, and dare to hope of one day solving, major social problems. But what is the best way of developing such knowledge?

COMPETING OR COMPLEMENTARY FRAMEWORKS?

Zero-sum intellectual pluralism is the norm in policy studies, fuelling rancorous debates about theoretical hegemony, methodological standards, and disciplinary identity. Analysts are typically more interested in maintaining theoretical orthodoxy or methodological purity than uncovering more compelling answers to real-world problems. We part ways with such efforts. Paraphrasing Dryzek and Leonard’s (1988: 1258) commentary on disciplinary history in political science, we begin with the observation that (positive-sum) pluralism is the essence rather than an obstacle to progress in policy studies. It helps provide a platform to a conversation between frameworks and invites analysts to cross boundaries to better assess the benefits and limitations of different lenses. We do not aim to build bridges per se, just better frameworks.

So far the architecture of policy knowledge has mostly followed a vertical approach where analysis focuses on a single framework explaining a particular case or event. Scholars identify a flaw or limitation in a particular lens and propose empirically verifiable ways to overcome limitations. But they invariably engage in debates within a particular lens. For example, a proponent of principal–agent approaches might identify the conditions under which the European Commission might succeed in ‘imposing’ its preferences on members of the Council in matters of competition policy. Another proponent of principal–agent approaches might relax one of those conditions to investigate whether they also apply to problems of taxation policy, where the Commission is theorized to hold less sway. These vertical pillars of cumulation have important but limited value because they tell us a lot about a narrow class of problems but not much about policy in general.

Our project closes this gap by taking an explicitly horizontal approach, which involves a menu of alternative lenses. Each framework makes its own assumptions and generates its own empirical evidence about when it is likely to be useful and why. The aim is to help scholars make good analytical choices, addressing new and old problems in historically contingent environments. But not all frameworks are competing explanations of the same event. Some give complementary answers but only in certain areas.

Ever since Allison’s (1971) classic study of the Cuban Missile Crisis, it has been apparent that the ability to apply different perspectives has significant merit. First, understanding different theoretical frameworks forces the analyst to clarify his/her own assumptions. Under what conditions is a particular framework applicable? Are the assumptions descriptively realistic? Do they make sense in this particular case? Second, an explicitly comparative approach encourages the development of competing hypotheses and therefore exposes the strengths and weaknesses of various lenses. Every lens identifies particular variables of significance and specifies the logic that connects them. But lenses cannot and do not explain every EU policy in every instant. Empirically identifying the range of cases a particular lens explains relative to others is a useful exercise because it tells us what to expect, and more importantly it indicates where and how to push the limits of each lens to gain more predictive or explanatory power.

The project has two principal aims. First, we take stock of promising theoretical frameworks of the EU policy process, specify their strengths, and assess their limitations. There have been numerous attempts to create systematic ways to study EU policy, especially since the creation of the Journal of European Public Policy in the mid-1990s. Despite movement, however, there has not been much movement forward. Frameworks dedicated to explaining EU policy remain for the most part theoretically underdeveloped and empirically incomplete. Our list is not exhaustive, but it contains the more promising frameworks to date: multi-level governance; advocacy coalitions; punctuated equilibrium; multiple streams; policy learning; normative power Europe; and constructivism. Selection was based on the range of assumptions each framework makes, the number of articles and/or books that have used the lens, ability to speak to the broader policy literature, and the potential scholars claim it has in explaining EU policy. We did not include principal–agent approaches largely because there are very good reviews already in print (e.g., Kassim and Menon 2003; Pollack 2007). The list will not satisfy everyone, but it lays the foundations for a more systematic approach to the study EU policy. Judgment is not passed on the value of any lens; that is for the reader to decide based on information derived from the second objective.

Second, we use the information presented to develop robust research agendas. To what extent are frameworks competing or complementary explanations of similar policy choices? Familiarity with lenses and their limitations will help scholars build more accurate ‘arrows in their quiver’, so to speak, which they can use to address social problems. This is easier said than done.

In one of the first attempts to explain policy choice from a variety of perspectives, Graham Allison argued that lenses can provide both competing and complementary explanations. At one level, each perspective answers the same question. It contains a different logic of explanation and assigns different weight to relevant factors. Assessing the explanatory power of each perspective enables the analyst not only to gain a better grasp of how and why particular EU policy-makers make the decisions they do, but it also sheds light into predicting what kind of decisions other policy makers are likely to make in the future. At another level, however, different lenses answer different questions. As Allison (1971: 251) claims:

Spectacles magnify one set of factors rather than another and thus not only lead analysts to produce different explanations of problems that appear, in their summary questions, to be the same, but also influence the character of the analyst’s puzzle, the evidence he assumes to be relevant, the concepts he uses to examine the evidence, and what he takes to be an explanation.

The point behind competing versus complementary perspectives is far from trivial. Most analysts who systematically assess the explanatory power of different perspectives tend to view perspectives as competing. But analyses are often pitched at different levels (Peterson 2001). We pitch ours at the same level and still find points of competition and complementarity. Carefully specifying assumptions and identifying the conditions under which each perspective yields important insight are crucial steps in understanding the complexity of making policy (Zahariadis 1998).

INSTITUTIONAL AND ISSUE COMPLEXITY

EU policy-making is very messy because it is characterized by heavy doses of complexity. This is not to say that national policy-making is not messy, but rather the complexity of the EU renders policy-making difficult to understand. EU institutions now have to deal with 27 national systems, each with its own traditions, institutions, styles, values, and timetables. Differences need to be addressed and somehow reconciled in order for policy to be made. Given the complexity of EU rules, procedures, and jurisdictional boundaries, what is surprising is not the rightfulness (or not) of EU decisions but the fact that any decisions are made at all.

Frameworks may be categorized according to how they deal with complexity. Each lens paints a slightly different picture of the EU policy process based on assumptions about institutional and issue complexity. Some frameworks, such as constructivism, assume higher issue complexity, while others, such as principal–agent approaches, may posit higher institutional complexity. At one level, therefore, both constructivists and delegation theorists seek to explain Europe’s recent financial crisis. At another level, however, constructivists ask whether the crisis exposes rifts in national ways of making policy, while competence delegation scholars focus more closely on compliance and enforcement mechanisms. For constructivists the problem may be an issue of diverse European identities, but for analysts using principal–agent approaches it is fundamentally a problem of flawed institutional design.

Complexity refers to the nature of interaction among distinct units or parts of a system. Interaction takes place horizontally (across EU institutions) and vertically (between EU and national and sub-national actors). Highly complex systems are characterized by free-flowing information across many units with planned or unexpected feedback loops which are not immediately comprehensible (Zahariadis 2003). Complexity has two dimensions: issue and institutional. Issue complexity refers to the amount and nature of informational linkages and may be operationalized as the degree of information overload. How much information is needed for an issue to be properly understood? How many links are made across issues? How much and what type of information do we need to have before we can start tackling a particular problem? As the number of links increases, the number of potential participants to the process also increases. This phenomenon gives rise to two implications. First, decisions are harder to arrive at when the number of participants rises. Agreement is difficult to achieve not simply because more people now need to agree but also because decision-makers will more likely contest the frames of the debate. Second, the direction of policy change becomes more unpredictable as links connect different types of information and point to potentially different solutions. Issue boundaries fluctuate, activating participants with different goals, raising the prospect of political conflict, and increasing the marginal elements of competing coalitions. As issue linkages increase, actor strategies change (McKibben 2010) and temporal valuation of the process is sharpened. Advocates for the EU status quo have incentives to elongate the process in hopes of paralysis, shifting attention, or policy fatigue. Issue complexity is obviously a politically contestable concept whose value varies across actors, solutions, and problems.

Institutional complexity refers to a multitude of rules governing close interactions among a high number of structurally differentiated units across different organizational levels. It contains such design features as branching, cycling, asynchrony, multi-directionality, and overlap that provide ample opportunities for frames of success and failure to jump across sub-systemic boundaries. An interesting feature of complexity is the notion of feedback. Negative feedback in a system means that an increase in one variable produces a decrease in another. This kind of feedback tends to perpetuate the status quo. As disturbances occur – and they are certain to occur – negative feedback returns the system to equilibrium. Predator–prey relationships are a good example of negative feedback mechanisms. Positive feedback promotes self-reinforcing behavior leading further away from the status quo. Not only does it alter the balance of power within institutions but it also entrenches ideas that continue to reproduce policies long after problems have been addressed, discarded, or forgotten. Different institutions, and often different units within institutions, have different capacities and channels to receive and process information signals, leading to variable trajectories of positive or negative feedback (Jones and Baumgartner 2005). Although they are distinct dimensions, issue and institutional complexities also feed off each other.

Complexity has four implications for the study of EU policy. First, increasing complexity raises cost because more actors are involved and in different, potentially contradictory ways. Although expertise and competence affect EU agency autonomy (Wonka and Rittberger 2010), more autonomous agencies naturally place more demands on resources. Moreover, different organizational needs lead to shifts in cost from producing and collecting to tracking and standardizing relevant information. Second, complexity begets complexity. It is politically less contentious to add new or more bureaucratic structures, protocols, rules, or fail-safe systems than it is to remove or reduce existing structures. Reducing or significantly modifying existing structures yields political opposition from disaffected actors. Although it is monetarily costlier, it is politically more expedient to simply add new or more rules onto the existing ones especially if costs are widely distributed through national budgets. Third, higher complexity gives rise to political conflict. More information and unanticipated feedbacks create overlapping and nested institutional jurisdictions that raise the specter of power struggles for control of agendas and resources. Venue-shopping, contested policy frames, and strategic inconsistency complicate, and may hinder, co-operation (Alter and Meunier 2006). Fourth, complexity safeguards diversity. If ‘united in diversity’ is a key EU aim, citizens and their national leaders have incentives to sustain complex processes in the hope of saving national idiosyncrasies and values from the homogenizing pressures of economies of scale. In other words, complexity of issues and institutions is as much a utilitarian instrument of EU governance as it is a strategic tool of identity construction.

WHICH WAY FORWARD?

Contributions take stock of promising theoretical frameworks of the EU policy process. Each author articulates the unit and level of analysis, specifies assumptions regarding institutional and issue complexity, elaborates on ...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• Citation Information
• 1. Building better theoretical frameworks of the European Union’s policy process
• 2. Twenty years of multi-level governance: ‘Where Does It Come From? What Is It? Where Is It Going?’
• 3. Advocacy coalitions: influencing the policy process in the EU
• 4. Punctuated equilibrium theory and the European Union
• 5. Ambiguity, multiple streams, and EU policy
• 6. Constructivism and public policy approaches in the EU: from ideas to power games
• 7. A normative power Europe framework of transnational policy formation
• 8. Learning in the European Union: theoretical lenses and meta-theory
• Index