This centrality of the process of acting that becomes representative of a larger aesthetic scheme also applies to Diderot, and constitutes a solid basis on which the two dramaturgical theorists can be compared. As we shall see with both, alienation is considered as an issue intrinsic to acting itself. It is described as a process of encountering alterity, of exploring creatively the intervals and dualities between the acting subject and the character, if not the other within the self. To act means to deal with the dramatic figure as someone else and to exploit aesthetically the ruptures of self-consciousness. In this Brecht and Diderot stand out against a majority of acting methods privileging the notion of identification. Both thinkers assume that alienation is immanent to the process of acting itself. Indeed, Brechtâs concept of alienation crystallizes as he develops a more systematic theory of acting. It is no coincidence that the neologism Verfremdung, aesthetic alienation, first appears in 1936 when his theoretical focus was turning to the issue of acting technique. For Brecht, the modernist, the actor also epitomizes most clearly the deceptive implications of mimesis. Whilst other art genres participating in the revolution of modernism may more easily introduce the principles of anti-mimetic abstraction and alienation into their particular modalities of representation, theatre, as Martin Puchner shows, depends, in its endeavour to move away from naturalist realism, on the material of natural life itself: the human actor.2 No matter how abstract an actorâs style of performing, she will always face the audience as another human individual and as part of a live social event. The actor participates in narratives of social encounters, which parallel those of the spectator in real life. How to make âotherâ what seems so similar, what is so easily identified with? How to succeed in shifting an aesthetic ensconced in nature towards a form of representation that estranges, distanciates and prevents lifelike illusion â these are the challenges that permeate Brechtâs theorizing and in this, as we shall see, he is radically different from Diderot.
The Early Years: Silent Astonishment is Better than Comprehension
As early as 1920, Brecht articulates a preference in his journal entries for a kind of acting that does not pretend to replicate nature, but self-consciously displays its artifice. The theatrically conditioned essence of acting is not denied but brought into relief. He describes the acting of Paula Banholzer (âBiâ) as follows:
Eine Königin, das ist eine Königin, ein Erschrecken, das ist ein Erschrecken, und die Bi, das ist die Bi. Sie hat Stil, aber sie erreicht nie die Wirkungen der Natur. [âŠ] Sie imitiert nicht die Natur: Sie spielt! (GBA XXVI, 133)
[A queen is a queen, terror is terror, but Bi remains Bi. She has style, but she never attains the effects of nature. [âŠ] She does not imitate nature: she acts!]
A fundamental structural principle of Brechtâs later theory of alienation becomes apparent here. Nature and aesthetics are recognized as two separate spheres. Moreover, that separation is accentuated in representation. Dramatic character and actor are held at a distance from each other, producing an overt dualism. Bi does not become a queen, but her acting reveals its artificial constitution.3 Whilst appreciating in acting a visible residue of artifice, which later becomes one of the characteristics of the alienation effect, Brecht is already calling for an aesthetic of estrangement at the level of the dramatic text. This demonstrates that even at the beginning of his theoretical development, without the influences of Marxism, Hegelian dialectics, Chinese acting, or Russian formalism, an aesthetic of alienation preoccupies his thinking. In Aus einer Dramaturgie [Excerpts on Dramaturgy], the sensibility of alienation that Brecht propagates is typified by a sense of wonder and astonishment:
Das wichtigste Gesetz fĂŒr den Dichter ist, daĂ er innerhalb seines Stoffes die MerkwĂŒrdigkeiten herausfindet [âŠ]. Auf je mehr Wunder er den Zuschauer hinweist, desto reicher sein Werk. [âŠ] Kommt ein Mann auf die BĂŒhne, der nicht kommen kann, kann es statt eines Fehlers ein Effekt werden, falls sich der Dichter nicht feig darĂŒber ausschweigt, warum er doch kommt oder wenigstens: wie merkwĂŒrdig er (und wir alle) es findet (und finden), daĂ der Mann doch kommt. KĂŒhnheit ist besser als Findigkeit; stummes Staunen besser als Ausreden. (GBA XXI, 71)
[The most important rule for the poet is to figure out the peculiarities within his materials [âŠ]. The more miracles he can show the spectator, the richer his work. [âŠ] If a man appears on the stage, who cannot appear, this can become an effect instead of a mistake, provided the poet does not cowardly remain silent about why he appears nevertheless, or at least: how strange he (and all of us) find it, that this man appears. Audaciousness is better than comprehension; silent astonishment better than explanation.]
Brecht is interested in an effect of estrangement caused by unexpected, peculiar, or seemingly nonsensical stage events that disrupt the flow of the plot and thereby instigate astonishment. The audience is prompted to search for another level of insight. The passage above foreshadows the idea that aesthetic estrangement may sharpen the spectatorâs perception, or that it may provoke inquisitiveness. This is a principle typical of Brechtâs later approach to alienation. But the emphasis here is still more on the all-consuming effect of estrangement, on the deferral of signification rather than on consequential recognition. The spectator must be overwhelmed by a sense of miraculous bewilderment. Similarly, the celebration of an aesthetic of âdas Neue, Starke, Ăberraschende, Fremdeâ [the new, vigorous, surprising and strange] versus the âold theatreâ also features in Ăber das Theater, das wir meinen [The Theatre that We Mean]. Here, too, Brecht rejects an immediate intelligibility of dramatic representation. Chaos, incomprehensibility and strangeness rank higher than transparency:
Einige von uns haben, als sie anfingen, Theater zu machen, wenig Wert auf die VerstĂ€ndlichkeit gelegt. [âŠ] Ja, das Fremde und UnverstĂ€ndliche eines Vorgangs gefiel uns viel besser. Das âChaotischeâ, das unseren einfacheren Verstand reizte, Ordnung hineinzubringen, war unser eigentliches Element. So ist das Motorrad fĂŒr uns nicht das Mittel, möglichst schnell wohin zu kommen, sondern eher das Mittel, nicht an einem Ort zu bleiben und schnell fahren zu können: die StraĂen sind zu kurz. (GBA XXI, 124â25)
[Some of us started to make a kind of theatre in which we gave less value to comprehensibility [âŠ]. Yes, we liked the strange and the incomprehensible in an event much better. The âchaoticâ, which stimulated our simpler mind to create order, this was our real element. Thatâs why the motorbike for us is not a means to get somewhere as fast as possible, but rather a means not to remain in one place and to be able to drive fast: the streets are too short.]
Although the moment of comprehension is not entirely excluded, it is outweighed by a visceral, dazzling and invigorating experience of incomprehension. Emphasis is put on a prolonged form of mediation. Suspension of comprehension promises the quality of thrill. Less rationalizing than in his later theory, Brecht announces a sort of pleasure-principle of alienation. Poetics must be enhanced by those miracles and thrills of the strange that cause a sense of wonder; at times even uncanniness.4 What is striking in this description, in comparison to later definitions that stress a reductive role of alienation that obstructs identification and illusion, is its affective, arousing potential. The spectator is plunged into a sense of wonder. The visceral metaphor of theatre as a fast ride on a motorbike conveys the enjoyment of an exhilarated, almost vertiginous experience.
Closer to the later classical alienation theory of the mid-thirties, in 1922 we find, in conjunction with Brechtâs productions of Baal and Im Dickicht der StĂ€dte, a description of a model of spectatorship that counteracts identification. This indicates how early Brecht thought about innovating spectatorial habits and mechanisms.
Einen groĂen Fehler sonstiger Kunst hoffe ich im âBaalâ und âDickichtâ vermieden zu haben: ihre BemĂŒhung, mitzureiĂen. [âŠ] Die Splendid Isolation des Zuschauers wird nicht angetastet [âŠ], er wird nicht beruhigt dadurch, daĂ er eingeladen wird, mitzuempfinden, sich im Helden zu inkarnieren und, indem er sich gleichzeitig betrachtet, in zwei Exemplaren, unausrottbar und bedeutsam aufzutreten. Es gibt eine höhere Art von Interesse: das am Gleichnis, das am Andern, UnĂŒbersehbaren, Verwunderlichen. (GBA XXVI, 271)
[In Baal and Dickicht I hope I avoided one great mistake of other art works: the attempt to enthral. [âŠ] The âsplendid isolationâ of the spectator is no longer touched [âŠ.], he isnât reassured by being invited to empathize, to incarnate himself into the hero; and by simultaneously looking at himself, in two examples, to appear to himself inextinguishable and significant. There is a higher form of interest: in parable, in the other, the conspicuous, bewildering.]
The structural logic of Brechtâs later theory of alienation is fully developed: the spectator is not drawn out of her critical reserve. Theatre must not exhaust its stimulating effect on the audience by forcing it into an identification with the hero. Instead of locking the spectator into a narcissist Lacanian-like mirror stage of self-importance, her status of autonomy remains protected. An experience of alterity, the conspicuous and the bewildering are posited as the ultimate goals of a new form of art. But these sensibilities of cognitive estrangement seem acknowledged as intrinsic to the aesthetic potential of theatre itself, even if under-explored by other practitioners. The idea of a âhigher form of interestâ implies generalization, as if Brecht thinks of an alternative forgotten dramaturgical tradition that values the effect of the strange and an aesthetic experience of alterity.5
However, despite the fact that these early notes in many respects foreshadow and prepare Brechtâs later theory of alienation by positing a clear interest in a theatrical effect of alienation, they still lack the consistency of the fully-fledged concept, which derives from a clearly structured coherence between political intentions and aesthetic principles. Between 1920 and 1926, as Werner Hecht showed, Brechtâs theoretical reflections are generally marked by an experimental adventurousness and an attitude of protest against the âold theatreâ of the middle-classes that has fallen out of touch with its audiences. The idea of a theatre comparable to the âpalaces of sportâ, a theatre of âfunâ, âriskâ, âthe newâ and an âoptic pre-epicâ already heralds some of the qualities of the later epic theatre of alienation, but it still requires more solid sociological and dramaturgical substructure.6
Social Alienation: âThe Materials Are Monstrous â Our Drama Must Consider Thisâ
From the mid twenties, Brechtâs theory begins to take on firmer shapes, a development that coincides with a new alliance with Marxism and its theoretical concern with social alienation. Brechtâs response is the proposal of a new epic theatre that will âliquidateâ the bourgeois naturalist theatre.7 In 1926 Brecht reads Das Kapital, supposedly prompted by his work on a play concerned with the wheat exchange market, Joe Fleischhacker, which, as he claims in 1935, made further study into such obscure economic practices inevitable, prompting him to study Marx.
FĂŒr ein bestimmtes TheaterstĂŒck brauchte ich als Hintergrund die Weizenbörse Chicagos. Ich dachte, durch einige Umfragen bei Spezialisten und Praktikern mir rasch die nötigen Kenntnisse verschaffen zu können. Die Sache kam anders. Niemand, weder einige bekannte Wirtschaftsschriftsteller noch GeschĂ€ftsleute â einem Makler, der an der Chicagoer Börse ein Leben lang gearbeitet hatte, reiste ich von Berlin nach Wien nach â niemand konnte mir die VorgĂ€nge an der Weizenbörse erklĂ€ren. Ich gewann den Eindruck, daĂ diese VorgĂ€nge schlechthin unerklĂ€rlich, das heiĂt von der Vernunft nicht erfaĂbar, und das heiĂt wieder einfach unvernĂŒnftig waren. Die Art, wie das Getreide der Welt verteilt wurde, war schlechthin unbegreiflich. Spekulanten war dieser Getreidemarkt ein einziger Sumpf. Das geplante Drama wurde nicht geschrieben, statt dessen begann ich Marx zu lesen, und da, jetzt erst, las ich Marx. (GBA XXII.i, 138â39)
[For a particular play I needed Chicagoâs wheat exchange market as background. I believed I could quickly gather the necessary knowledge by making some enquiries with specialists and practitioners. Things turned out differently. Nobody, neither some well-known writers on economics nor businessmen â I followed one particular trader, who had worked at the Chicago exchange market for his whole life, all the way from Berlin to Vienna â but nobody could explain to me the workings of the wheat exchange market. I got the impression that these processes were simply unexplainable, that i...