(Re)Generating Inclusive Cities

Poverty and Planning in Urban North America

Dan Zuberi,Ariel Judith Taylor

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2017
• ISBN:
  9781315463711
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Architecture
• Subtopic: Urban Planning & Landscaping

As suburban expansion declines, cities have become essential economic, cultural and social hubs of global connectivity. This book is about urban revitalization across North America, in cities including San Francisco, Toronto, Boston, Vancouver, New York and Seattle. Infrastructure projects including the High Line and Big Dig are explored alongside urban neighborhood creation and regeneration projects such as Hunters Point in San Francisco and Regent Park in Toronto. Today, these urban regeneration projects have evolved in the context of unprecedented neoliberal public policy and soaring real estate prices. Consequently, they make a complex contribution to urban inequality and poverty trends in many of these cities, including the suburbanization of immigrant settlement and rising inequality.

(Re)Generating Inclusive Cities wrestles with challenging but important questions of urban planning, including who benefits and who loses with these urban regeneration schemes, and what policy tools can be used to mitigate harm? We propose a new way forward for understanding and promoting better urban design practices in order to build more socially just and inclusive cities and to ultimately improve the quality of urban life for all.

1
Mega-projects From the Big Dig to the High Line

Regenerating the City

The history of mega-project development in North America is intimately bound up in processes of state-led industrialization and the postwar urban economy. Between the 1950s and late 1970s, mega-project development was capital-intensive, but also fiscally and ideologically sustained by a Keynesian welfare state. In this context, major infrastructure projects were conceptualized to provide not only improved critical public services (e.g., hospitals or freeways), but also socioeconomic benefits (including both housing and employment) that were considered part and parcel of a prevailing modernizing and democratic spirit (Lehrer & Laidley 2008, 788). However, many mega-projects of this era also boast legacies of massive price tags, severe environmental degradation, and flawed design. Criticized on both the left and the right, mega-projects of the North American postwar era were often either socially disruptive, regressive and displacing, or unwarranted governmental interventions in the market and the unjustifiable confiscation of private property (Orueta & Fainstein 2008, 759).

By the late 1970s and early 1980s, state-sponsored mega-projects were increasingly argued to be fiscally irresponsible. In the context of growing economic instability globally, public–private partnerships began to emerge as a market-based solution to contain unsustainable costs and other risks associated with mega-project development initiatives. In the United States, the federal Urban Development Action Grant program provided cities sizable funds to “help stimulate economic development activity needed to aid in economic recovery” (Young 1984, 112). The program required substantial private sector investment, promoted public consultation, and awarded funds on a discretionary basis, promoting competition between cities (see Young 1984). The entrepreneurialism associated with programs like the Urban Development Action Grant came to define what some scholars have called the neoliberalization of the post-federal era in American cities (Clarke & Gaile 1992; Brenner & Theodore 2002; Jonas & McCarthy 2010). This new urban landscape was guided by principles of free market competition, consumerism and creative entrepreneurialism as cities increasingly fought to attract both talent and capital in a global marketplace.

The global recession and political turmoil of the late 1980s led to the prioritization of national over regional economic planning and helped to produce a “chilly climate” in cities across North America (Clarke & Gaile 1992, 188). Forced to find alternative sources of funding, local officials increasingly turned to private investors and foreign direct investment for financing of mega-projects creating a more politicized, less transparent planning processes. States facilitated the legal, economic and political parameters necessary for mega-project development, while at the same time encouraging decentralized political control and strategies of market-led growth. In short, the mega-projects of late-twentieth-century North America “profoundly reworked the institutional infrastructure upon which Fordist-Keynesian capitalism was grounded” (Brenner & Theodore 2002, 349). At the same time, that cities experienced powerful fiscal constraints, public–private partnership models transformed the governance regimes of urban communities, limiting accountability and subsequently exacerbating tensions between public and private interests.

Public–private mega-project developments flourished in the late 1980s to include vast complexes of mixed-use designed to promote cities within an increasingly competitive global economy. These large-scale and concentrated mega-projects became “integrated into the international property and financial market and/or global socio-cultural networks” in order for cities to “actively reposition themselves within the global economy” (Lehrer & Laidley 2008, 798). However, mega-project developments have a well-documented history of social and economic exclusion, which has led some authors to argue that “displacement is intrinsic to mega-project development” (Gellert & Lynch 2003, 15).

Jonas and McCarthy argue that rather than managing the socioeconomic consequences of mega-project development, cities are increasingly promoting “growth first” or “growth at all costs” rather than fulfilling their democratic obligations to citizens (2010, 33–34). Moreover, flexible labor markets, the rise in precarious working conditions and low-paid jobs work to exacerbate problems of affordable urban housing (Kadi & Musterd 2014, 249), a phenomenon scholars note is no longer isolated to the United States. Even traditionally social democratic cities of Western Europe and Canada now struggle to balance rising real estate and luxury markets with historical commitments to equity and social security (Orueta & Fainstein 2008; Fainstein 2008).

Critics of public–private mega-project developments argue that limited accountability and a lack of public participation produce negative impacts and costly correctives. In other words, by conflating private with public interests, neoliberal planning processes work to support the interests of private capital above and beyond those of public citizens. According to Bornstein:

[W]hile benefits from such projects are likely to accrue at a municipal or regional level, residents in nearby areas incur many disamenti-ties, whether through displacement or to accommodate the facilities, increased traffic, noise and air pollution, or a shift to non-residential uses in the area. For all these reasons, the literature identifies mega-projects as a factor increasing spatial and socio-economic polarization in contemporary cities.

(Bornstein 2007, 3)

Since the 1980s, mega-project planners and promoters have responded to community critiques of ‘old’ mega-projects by designing more inclusive planning processes, and taking measures to mitigate the most damaging social and environmental impacts of earlier schemes.

Proposed new freeway or transit projects that bisect existing urban communities or sensitive ecological habitats are now often built underground to minimize disruption on the surface, a process Altshuler and Luberoff (2003) term “do no harm planning”. Massive land redevelopment schemes also commonly eschew the concentration of single land uses in favor of a combination of public housing, private market housing, institutions and parks, facilities that appeal to a wide range of constituencies. New city building strategies, such as community development partnerships and community benefiting agreements, have been employed in an attempt to have mega-projects better meet the concerns of local residents and low-income households (Altshuler & Luberoff 2003; Fainstein 2008; Lehrer & Laidley 2008; Siemiatycki 2013, 172–173).

Given these developments, we interrogate and explore the ‘actually existing’ consequences of mega-project development in the context of neoliberal urban planning. We first draw on the experiences of two iconic mega-projects located in the Northeastern United State that taken together epitomize the ideological and functional implications of the new urban economy. In Boston, MA, the Central Artery Tunnel project—popularly referred to as the Big Dig—transformed the city’s downtown core over its 15 years of construction at a cost of $14.6 billion. In New York City, the opening of the High Line pedestrian promenade has repositioned the city, and its West Chelsea neighborhood, as a global leader in sustainable restoration and design. However, despite both projects’ relative success, we ask how low-income and other marginalized communities have been uniquely impacted? We argue that both projects reveal important social-spatial consequences associated with the neoliberal city, but also maintain that important alternatives do exist. We examine efforts to accommodate broader community consultation and participation in mega-project developments on both sides of the U.S.–Canada border, in San Francisco, CA, and Montreal, Québec. These cases provide potentially important counter-examples to the dominant trend of sweeping neoliberal regeneration, particularly in areas where low-income communities reside.

Boston, MA: The Big Dig

Boston’s Central Artery Tunnel Project, or ‘Big Dig’, was conceived and promoted as the solution to significant traffic congestion along the city’s interstate running through the downtown core. Chronic congestion along the elevated six-lane highway had long been problematic. While in 1959 approximately 75,000 vehicles per day traversed this 1.5-mile stretch of road, by 1990, more than 190,000 vehicles a day utilized this route. City planners projected escalating traffic jams and commuters routinely complained of long waits and poor air quality (Fein 2012, 48). Moreover, the 40-foot-high walls supporting the congested expressway effectively cut off the city from the waterfront, an area where homelessness and blight had long been present (Robinson 2008). In short, both policymakers, along with the city’s business community, promoted a mega-project development solution including a new artery route and tunnel under Boston Harbor. Official planning began in 1982 and construction in 1991. However, increasingly burdened by a number of timely and expensive setbacks, the project would not be completed until 2007.

Substantively Boston’s Big Dig included a number of infrastructure projects and roadway redevelopments. In addition to rerouting the elevated central artery (Interstate 93) into a new 3.5-mile (5.6 km) tunnel, plans for a second tunnel connecting Instate 90 to Logan International Airport, as well as a new bridge crossing the Charles River, were also pursued. Finally, the newly accessible waterfront space, created by leveling the elevated express-way and rerouting traffic underground, was to become flagship green-space allocated for public use. However, to qualify for federal financial assistance, the project quickly ballooned in scope resulting in heightened bureaucracy, unanticipated costs and growing opposition (Fein 2012; Bearfield & Dubnick 2007; Bushouse 2002). Now complete, we examine the Big Dig’s legacy for those residents of Boston most directly impacted by this mega-project development, particularly those now adjacent to the downtown core. By emphasizing the New Urbanist design principles and the social-spatial reorganization created by the Big Dig, we highlight how actually existing neoliberal regeneration can, despite notable efforts at consultation and mitigation, rapidly gentrify low-income areas, producing substantial challenges for pre-existing urban communities.

Beginning in the early 1980s, Boston enjoyed substantial economic prosperity, with the number of wage and salary jobs increasing by nearly 10 percent. However, Boston was and remains a commuter city and, as such, upwards of 60 percent of jobs during this period were filled by non-city residents (those residing in the suburbs who worked, but did not live, downtown) (Hellman et al. 1997, 116). In short, the economic benefits of growth to Boston residents during this period should not be overstated, but it does help to explain the economic and political will behind Boston’s highway regeneration. However, while annual wages rose sharply over the decade, by 1989, the state of Massachusetts entered a severe economic recession. Between 1988 and 1992, the total number of wage and salary jobs in Boston declined by 12 percent, most notably from the city’s construction and manufacturing industries (Hellman et al. 1997, 117). Significantly, it was within the context of economic stagnation that in 1984, proponents of Boston’s Central Artery/Tunnel Project—otherwise known as the Big Dig—sought federal assistance for project financing.

To meet the requirements for federal assistance, the Big Dig was significantly expanded to increase both the main tunnel’s capacity and coverage. After initially being vetoed by President Reagan in 1987, Congress later approved funding for the project and ground was broken in 1991. With an initial price tag of $2.8 billion USD, subsequent projections estimated costs associated with the Big Dig to run upwards of $14 billion USD (Bushouse 2002, 54). While in the 1980s, the Boston’s unemployment rate was just under 5 percent, by 1991, it had risen to 8.6 percent despite significant population decline (Hellman et al. 1997, 117). According to some, the Big Dig, and the associated cleanup of the Boston Harbor, contributed to reversing this trend (Hellman et al. 1997 1997, 118). However, in 1997 responsibility for and oversight of the project were transferred from the Massachusetts Highway Department and Governor’s Office to the Massachusetts Turnpike Authority (MTA), who in turn partnered in a joint venture. The project’s privatization in turn led to a steep decline in wages and salaried employment in Boston during the same period, in addition to significantly reducing independent oversight and public accountability (Bearfield & Dubnick 2007).

By transferring ownership to the Massachusetts Turnpike Authority, the project became effectively insolated from government oversight, which in turn contributed to ballooning costs and construction shortcuts. Fein (2012) documents how conflicts over the provision of financial responsibility, project management and accountability plagued the project’s development and contributed to its mounting price tag. A major leak in 2004 caused a backup in traffic spanning nearly 10 miles and raised important questions about the project’s safety. Two years later, 12 tons of concrete collapsed from the tunnel’s ceiling killing one motorist and injuring countless others. Fein concludes, “the structure of public–private collaboration and consequent limitations on oversight appeared to be at the root of the Big Dig’s predicament” (Fein 2012, 160).

Jennings (2004) too argues that the privatization process had spill over affects in downtown communities impacted by the Big Dig. Despite affecting predominantly non-white neighborhoods, there was “relatively little participation on the part of people of color in terms of holding business contracts of significant size or jobs in the labor pool” as well as providing “relatively few decentralized capital investments for neighborhoods” (Jennings 2004, 19). All this raises questions about the legacy of the Big Dig for communities in Boston, particularly those areas subject to processes of gentrification. As newly accessible waterfront and increasingly manicured green spaces replaced the formerly elevated expressway, lower-income populations suddenly faced new pressures of dislocation.

By relocating an elevated roadway underground, the Big Dig served to open up prime urban real estate to both public and private use. Subsequent land-use projects such as the Rose F. Kennedy Greenway—a 15-acre green throughway linking several downtown neighborhoods and consisting of landscaped gardens, public fountains and art projects—transformed long-established and predominately immigrant communities such as Boston’s North End and Roxbury neighborhoods. Celebrated as an achievement in heightened accessibility and green urban design, steeply rising housing costs and accompanying shifts in demographic trends in residency suggest not all Bostonians have benefited or benefited equally. ...