African Peace Militaries

War, Peace and Democratic Governance

David Francis

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2017
• ISBN:
  9781134819720
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Política y relaciones internacionales
• Subtopic: Paz y desarrollo global

This book provides a critical understanding of the emerging role of African militaries in peacetime democratic Africa.

This book departs from the dominant perspective which simply presents the military as an 'enemy' of democracy because of the history and legacy of unending military coup d'états and interventions in civilian politics. In the context of Africa, the military has been blamed or largely held responsible for instigating wars, armed conflicts, political violence, poverty and underdevelopment due to bad governance and mismanagement of the state. Drawing from diverse case studies across Africa, including Nigeria, Rwanda, Uganda, Ethiopia and Egypt, this volume presents the argument that though the military has played a negative, and sometimes, destructive role in undermining constitutional rule and the overthrow of democratic civilian governments, the same military, now operating in a changed global environment, is making effort to support the development of democracy and democratic consolidation as well as remain subjected to civilian democratic oversight and control. Notwithstanding, the real challenge for this emerging trend of African peace militaries is the extent to which they are able to fulfil, on a predictable and consistent basis, their constitutional mandate to defend the people against 'elected autocrats' in Africa who try to use the military to perpetuate themselves in power.

This work fills a critical gap in the literature and will be of much interest to students of African security and politics, peace and conflict studies, security studies and IR in general.

1 African militaries in war, peace and support for democratic development

David J. Francis

Introduction

Across Africa, it will be an understatement to say that the military and democracy do not simply go together because of the long history of constant military interventions in civilian democratic politics and constitutional rule. It is like putting a lion and a sheep together in a demarcated jungle. Based on this dominant perception about the military in Africa, this seminal book has two primary objectives. First, to provide a critical understanding of the emerging role of the military in peacetime democratic societies in Africa. Second, to examine the role and contribution of the military to the development of democracy and democratic consolidation. This original contribution fills a critical gap in the literature and our understanding of the role of African militaries in wars and armed conflicts, political violence, politics and governance, peace and security, poverty and underdevelopment in Africa’s post-colonial states. The armed forces have been blamed or partly held responsible for most of the problems of the crisis of state formation and nation building in post-independent Africa. In simple terms, the military is perceived as a source of insecurity and a threat to long-term peace, stability, democratic governance and sustainable development in Africa’s weak and fragile states. The post-colonial history of Africa is replete with the intervention of the military in domestic politics through coups d’état that overthrow constitutional rule and democratic governance. The African militaries themselves, as a legitimate state-governing institution, have been politicised, co-opted, subverted and privatised by the ruling and governing elites to serve their strategic vested interests, often based on the worst forms of neo-patrimonial governance, political ethnicity and prebendal politics. The involvement of African militaries in the politics of decline and bad governance has created and/or instigated fundamental grievances that have fuelled political violence, instability, wars and armed conflicts, in some cases hastening the failure and collapse of the state. In effect, the militaries have had significant impact on the post-colonial state, state-society relations, peace, security and development and, in particular, the international iconic image of the ‘hopeless continent’ (The Economist, 2000).

Military interventions in civilian politics and governance of the state have been one of the dominant images of post-colonial Africa. Since the 1960s, the international media have paraded countless military juntas taking over control of the state through coups d’état and counter coups to the extent that they became the familiar picture of politics and the phenomenon of the so-called ‘African Strongman’. Since 1958 when the guns of the first military coup d’état were fired in Sudan, we have seen the military overthrow civilian governments, whether democratically elected or one-party civilian dictatorships. In general, post-colonial Africa has been a hot bed for military coups. The prevailing external (Cold War Politics), and in particular, the general socio-political, economic and underdevelopment conditions predisposed the continent to military interventions. Between 1958–2012, there have been an estimated 655 successful, attempted, plotted and alleged coups in 39 countries in Africa (Barka and Ncube, 2012). The West African sub-region has seen the most incidents of military coups and the assault of the so-called Praetorian Guard, totalling 104 successful and unsuccessful coups between 1960–2010. Central Africa counts for 35; East Africa, 48; Southern Africa 16 (Barka and Ncube, 2012).

By all indications, Africa seems to be the region with the most incidents and longest duration of military intervention in civilian politics and governance of the state. Table 1.1 illustrates the dominance and duration of military governance in some selected countries in Africa.

However, it is important to put this into perspective because no region of the world has been spared the scourge of military intervention in civilian politics and governance of the state. From 876 BCE, when the military commander, Zimri, assassinated King Elah and usurped the Kingship of Israel, the spectre of military coups and interventions has been in all regions of the world, including regions that we now describe as Western Liberal Democracies. Important examples include Oliver Cromwell’s overthrow of King Charles I and claiming leadership of the Commonwealth of England, Scotland and Ireland in 1649 as well as the military dictatorships in Greece, Spain and Portugal in the 1970s and 1980s. The failed military coup on 15 July 2016 against the democratically elected government of President Erdogan in Turkey demonstrates that military intervention in civilian politics is not a typically African phenomenon.

Table 1.1 Military and non-military rule in Africa

	Military rule in years: 1958–2016	Non-military rule in years: 1958–2016
North Africa
Libya	42	16
Sudan	50	8
West Africa
Nigeria	29	29
Sierra Leone	6	52
Liberia	10	48
Guinea	10	48
The Gambia	23	56
Mali	11	47
Togo	16	42
Niger	16	42
Côte d’Ivoire	1	57
Guinea Bissau	15	43
Horn, East and Central Africa
Central African Republic	27	31
Somalia	22	36
Uganda	25	33

Source: BBC Timeline www­.bb­c.c­o.u­k/n­ews­/wo­rld­-af­ric­a-1­331­571­9, Conflict Trends in Africa (Marshall); Coups d’Etat in Africa: 1946–2004 www­.­sys­­t­em­ic­p­eac­­e­.o­rg­/­afr­­i­ca­/A­C­PPA­­n­ne­x2­b­.pd­­f­.

Nevertheless, military intervention in civilian politics has been a continuous phenomenon in Africa. In fact, there are three broad classifications of military coups and intervention in civilian politics. Phase One between 1959–1980s, marks the Cold War politics as represented by the East (Socialist/Communist) and West (Capitalist) ideological hostilities and confrontations which actively supported military interventions and coups in pursuit of their strategic Cold War political, military, security/defence and economic/commercial interests. This phase is regarded as the height of military interventions in Africa as witnessed by a plethora of coups and counter coups. Phase Two between 1990s and 2000s, marks the relative decline of military coups as rebel civil wars replaced military coups as the means to secure state power and access to its patrimonial resources. Military coups during this period were largely driven by the post-Cold War strategic imperatives; the limits of the newly introduced democratisation processes and the neopatrimonial interest of the ruling and governing elites in some of the weak, failed or collapsed states in Africa. The Third Phase between 2008 and 2012 marks the resurgence of military coups and intervention in civilian politics in countries such as Mauritania in August 2008; Guinea in December 2008; Niger in February 2010 and Mali in March 2012. This resurgence is happening against the background of three important developments including the lack of domestic and international appetite for military rule; decrease in wars and armed conflicts as well as the rebel civil war phenomenon; and the proscription by the Africa Union in its Constitutive Act of military intervention and coups in Africa.

But is military intervention in civilian politics a never-ending phenomenon in Africa? (Barka and Ncube, 2012). Though internal and external factors (Cold War politics, military and security; commercial/financial interests of Multinational Corporations (MNCs) have coalesced to cause, instigate and fuel military coups and interventions in Africa, it is important to recognise that every coup or military intervention is motivated by different causes, origins and effects. As long as there is poor, if not, outright bad governance over a period of time which creates fundamental grievances and marginalisation of large segments of the country and society from the economic and political processes of the state, then military coups, or rebel civil wars, may be inevitable in Africa. It is therefore not surprising that military rule and governance of the state has been blamed for most of the problems faced by the post-colonial states including widespread poverty; underdevelopment; wars and armed conflicts; insecurity and political instability; state fragility and collapse; poor economic growth; depressing socio-development indicators; bad governance and failure of democratic consolidation. It is arguable whether all these problems can simply be blamed on the military. For instance, the military are part and parcel of the polity and a product of the society. In effect, the motivations for intervention in civilian politics are largely products of the society in which the military have emerged as part of the nature of domestic politics based, sometimes, on the worst forms of neo-patrimonial governance (Francis, 2006; Bayart, 2009; Reno, 1998). Equally, there are countries in Africa that have not suffered from military rule such as Tanzania, Zambia, Malawi, Zimbabwe, Eritrea, but still share all or most of the depressing socio-economic and development indicators as well as political/governance misrule that are often blamed on military rule in Africa. What is more, there are a few examples of ‘progressive’ military rule that tried to promote accountable, disciplined and anti-corruption governance such as Captain Thomas Sankara’s Burkina Faso and General Muhamadu Buhari’s Nigeria in the 1980s.

To be clear, this book is not about understanding why and how the military in Africa intervenes in civilian politics and governance or to determine the predictability and/or prevention of military coups or reduce their occurrence. There is a vast scholarly literature explaining the motivations, causes and consequences of coups and military intervention on the state, political stability, governance, economic development and militarisation of societies (Jackman, 1978; Wells, 1974; Coleman and Brice, Jr, 1962; Collier and Hoeffler, 2005a; Johnson et al., 1984). Notwithstanding, the conceptual interpretations of military coups in post-independence Africa have focused on six broad explanations. First, that military coups are motivated by the problems and challenges of modernisation of the newly independent states. Second, cultural pluralism and, in particular, the dominance of one of two ethnic groups instigate or cause military coups (Jackman, 1978). Third, that the introduction of multi-party democracy and its divisive politics in an environment lacking democratic culture and viable democratic institutions as well as the ‘Third Term’ bid to change the Constitution to extend term limits of staying in power, all create the propensity for coups as in Niger in 2010. Fourth, poor economic governance, ineffective political and economic management of the state leading to poor standard of living, high unemployment, weak economic growth and depressing socio-development indicators, negative effects of the neo-liberal Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) and the end of Cold War rent resources to puppet regimes create the conditions for military coups (Johnson et al., 1984; Barka and Ncube, 2012). Fifth, that the military, as part of the ruling and governing elites, has a self-interest to secure and has access to state power and its neopatrimonial resources through coups. This political economy analysis argues that the military are simply motivated by ‘greed’ and thus see a correlation between high military spending and high risk of coups (Collier and Hoeffler, 2005b). Sixth, that external and structural factors such as colonial legacies, Cold War politics and economic and commercial interests of MNCs instigate support for military coups (Luckham et al., 2001; Souare, 2006; Stockwell, 1978; Agee, 1975).

The role of external actors such as former colonial masters, foreign powers and MNCs in pursuit of strategic geopolitical, military, security, economic and financial interests played a significant role in causing military coups in Africa’s new states, thereby creating a contagion effect and a kind of esprit de corps mentality amongst the armed forces in Africa. According to declassified US documents, the US and Belgian governments actively supported the military overthrow of the new government of Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba of Congo in 1961 and the overthrow of Ghana’s first President Kwame Nkrumah in 1966. In the case of Congo, declassified documents of the Senate Foreign...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title page
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• List of illustrations
• Notes on contributors
• List of abbreviations
• Map of Africa
• 1 African militaries in war, peace and support for democratic development
• 2 The military in Nigeria: war, peace and support for democratic development
• 3 The Rwanda Defence Force: from genocide to peace and democratic consolidation
• 4 The military in Uganda: war, peace and support for democratic consolidation
• 5 Military response to Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria: implications for peace, security and democracy in the Lake Chad Basin
• 6 African solutions to Western problems: Western-sponsored training programmes for African militaries – impact on peace and democratic consolidation
• 7 African standby force: challenges and opportunities for support of democracy in Africa
• 8 African militaries, security sector reform and peace dividends: a case study of Ethiopia’s post-1998 defence reform experience and impact on democratic development
• 9 Egypt: the military in war, peace and democratic development
• Index