In the rhetoric of the Information Age, communication and information are converging toward synonymous meanings. Consider organizational structures like information systems/communication systems, which executives speak of managing without differentiation. Or, information technology/communication technology, typically used interchangeably by engineers. Indeed, managerial professionals speak of communication flows as functionally equivalent to information flows, all the while disregarding the semantic differences. Similarly, in the technical press, one reads of global information/world communication, and communications flows/information flows, where journalists freely exchange information and communication; and, in the world of international politics, United Nations diplomats have long debated the relationship between the capitalist West and the less developed countries, as part of a New World Communication Order, or New World Information Order.
On the streets, Americans implicitly assume some connection between the two concepts when engaging in ordinary discourse. The questions, âDid you receive the message sent to you?â and, âDo you understand what I said?â both require an understanding of communication and information, as concepts, in order to make sense of them. Similarly, the statements, âHe will give a lectureâ and âSay that againâ have meaning only if the receiver understands some connection between communication and information. As for more technical usages, phrases such as information retrieval, data transmission, signal interference, and electronic media, assume an explicit-to-implicit relationship between the two concepts; and, access, interface, compatibility, and fidelity, terms used commonly in technical jargon, combine the two concepts within their meanings. (Ruben, 1992b)
The purpose of this article is to explore the links between conceptualizations of information and conceptualizations of communication, and propose some research directions which may advance our understanding of these closely related phenomena.
Previous Adaptations and Investigations
As words, communication and information took on meanings which approximate mordern use in the eighteenth century. By the end of the nineteenth century, common meanings of the two words were indistinguishable from some current usages. However, in the early decades of the twentieth century, scientists and engineers writing in technical journals began to adapt the two words to new technological developments in electronics. The sense of communication as a transmission of electronic signals, and information as a quantity, derive from this period. (See Schement, J.R., âAn Etymological Exploration of the Links Between Information and Communicationâ in this volume.) Furthermore, as American society shifted to one heavily dependent on the production, distribution, and consumption of information, individuals found themselves compelled to adapt these old words to new meanings. In the face of novel circumstances, Americans invented the terms illustrated at the beginning of this article.
At the same time, scientists and scholars began to grapple with diverse phenomena and label them communication and/or information. For example, in 1949, Claude Shannon published his mathematical theory of communication, in which he sought to explain the transmission of an electrical signal from one point to another. Shannon proposed that the measure of information is the logarithmic function which expresses the choice of one message (pattern of signals) from the set of all possible messages (Shannon & Weaver, 1949, p. 32). At about the same time, Norbert Wiener visualized information as part of the process of any systemâs adjustment to the outer world. He posited that, in a system, information counters entropy, and postulated that a system decays when it can no longer process information from the environment or communicate information within the system (Wiener, 1950; Wiener, 1961, pp. 26-27, 31). In the 1950s, Robert M. Hayes, a founder of information studies, saw a hierarchical connection between information and data, and suggested that information resulted from processed data (Hayes, 1969). In effect, Shannon, Wiener, Hayes, and their contemporaries, considered information and communication as general concepts applicable to diverse situations, even though their definitions did not always harmonize, so that by the second half of the twentieth century, other scholars had also begun to adapt conceptualizations of communication and information, either explicitly or implicitly (Bertalanffy, 1968, p. Ill; Boulding, 1956, p. 14; Dewey, 1926, p. 332; Hoskovsky, 1968, p. 331; Machlup, 1958, p. 187; Machlup, 1962, p. 53; Mackay, 1952, p. 54; Mayo, 1933, p. 190; McLuhan, 1964, p. 59; Mumford, 1934/ 1962, p. 299; Miller, 1965, p. 872; Pierce, 1961, p. 72; Price, 1963, p. 200; Rapoport, 1966, p. 77; Ruben, 1972, p. 82; Smith, 1966, p. 323). Thus, economists like John Hirshleifer, Donald Lamberton, Meheroo Jussawalla, and Fritz Machlup, successfully brought information into economics, defining it there as consisting of those events which reduce uncertainty in making a decision, thus, adapting its meaning to conform with traditional economic perspectives (Hirshleifer, 1973; Jussawalla, 1988; Lamberton, 1971; Machlup, 1962; Machlup & Mansfield, 1983c). Machlup further argued for a view of information encompassing both the telling of something and the something that is told (significantly, Machlupâs view of information does not distinguish it from communication) (Machlup & Mansfield, 1983b).
Today, in the social sciences, the resulting literatures cross the boundaries of communication, computer science, economics, information studies, sociology, and psychology (Anderson, 1959; Artandi, 1973; Ashby, 1964; Borgman & Schement, 1990; Boulding, 1984; Farradane, 1976; Fox, 1983; Krippendorff, 1977; Lancaster & Gillespie, 1970; Mackay, 1952; Nitecki, 1985; Otten, 1975; Pierce, 1961; Pratt, 1977; Rapoport, 1966; Repo, 1989; Ruben, 1992b; Ruben & Kim, 1975; Schroder, Driver, & Streufert, 1967; Shannon & Weaver, 1949; Yovitz, 1975). Consequently, certain interpretations dominate in some social sciences, while the associated definitions do not necessarily conform to usages in other disciplines. Farther afield, in the laboratory, unanimity is equally elusive. Cellular biologists describe DNA as a âlibraryâ containing information (Dawkins, 1976; Machlup & Mansfield, 1983a), while a few physicists contend that the fundamental elements of the universe consist of binary bits of information (Campbell, 1982; Fredkin & Toffoli, 1982; Simon, 1969; Wright, 1989). So, clearly, information and communication contain utility for researchers as concepts. But, though the concepts fascinate many social, biological, and physical scientists, no interdisciplinary agreement on basic premises has emerged, and no unified theory appears imminent.
Definitions of information
As twentieth century scholars have become sensitive to the significance of information as a concept valuable for the construction of their theories (see Schement, J. R., âAn Etymological Exploration âŚâ), they have sometimes approached information more as an enigma than as a concept open to systematic investigation. For example, Norbert Wiener, the founder of cybernetics, responded with a puzzle: âInformation is information, not matter or energy. No materialism which does not admit this can survive at the present day,â and further speculated, âThe fact that one finds so many different meanings for the word âinformationâ has led some to suggest that it is an irreducible term.ââ (Wiener, 1961, p. 5, 7) The Marxist physicist, Peter Paul Kirschenmann took Wiener one step further: ââInformationâ has a definite meaning only in a determined systematic way. We must, therefore, describe the contextsââ (Kirschenmann, 1970, p. 17). He went on to state that information receives different meanings according to whether it results from ordinary language, linguistic processes, information theory, or signal theory. He then placed the question of information squarely athwart the whole tradition of Western logic. âThe assumption of only two components of realityâmateriality and spiritualityâis based on a simplification since there is always a remnant which cannot be assigned to either and which cybernetics designates with the word âinformation.â The very foundations of our thoughtâclassical, twovalued logic as corresponding to a metaphysical dualismâare shaken. We must turn to a logic with at least three valuesââ (Kirschenmann, 1970, p. 7). In other words, like energy, information challenges the two ontic elements of Aristotleâs forms. This may explain why some scientists equate information with energy (Fredkin & Toffoli, 1982); but if one follows Wienerâs and Kirschenmannâs supposition, to understand information requires a profound reorientation of our intellectual perspectives and traditions.
In the wake of such daunting challenges, other scholars have set more limited goals (see appendix 1.1). From their efforts, we can distinguish fundamental themes which outline current thinking on the nature of information. The foremost is one which runs strongly through the literature and is sometimes termed information-as-thing. First of all, to imagine information, which is cognitive and ephemeral, as a thing facilitates discussion, whether expressed literally, as in Dienerâs unequivical description:
Information is an entity; but a thing that exists without mass or energyâŚ. Information exists primarily in the societal universe: the domain of human, and societal, interactionâŚ. Some of the properties of information that make it unique, and so difficult to understand, are: (a) as mentioned, it is an intangible entity not made of matter or energy; (b) by corollary, it can be reproduced and shared without loss and may even be enhanced through use; (c) it has veracity or at least a relative truth value; (d) it has a lifecycle and is ephemeral; (e) it must be processed to exist, for members of a society to totally cease to remember an item of information spells its permanent loss; and (f) it exists in two states: subjective [in the mind as âimageâ] and objective [in society in âlanguageâ]. (Diener, 1989, p. 17)
or metaphorically, as in Rubenâs definition.
Information is a coherent collection of data, messages, or cues organized in a particular way that has meaning or use for a particular human system. (Ruben, 1988, p. 19)
(Metaphorically, that is, because, in so far as data and messages constitute âthingsâ as part of a linguistic category, they are not material things.) Nevertheless, it is clear that information can be encoded in material objects like books, disks, letters, and clay tablets. Consequently, some scholars take this fact as their point of departure (Diener, 1989; Fox, 1983; Hayes, 1969; Langefors & Samuelson, 1976; Ruben, 1988; Schramm, 1971). In addition, the development of technologies for storing, retrieving, and manipulating data encourage a perspective that configures information as a t...