Revival: Ethical Principles in Theory and Practice (1930)

An Essay in Moral Philosophy

Hans Driesch

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2018
• ISBN:
  9781351343527
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Filosofía
• Subtopic: Historia y teoría filosóficas

Almost all the existing modern systems of Ethics deal with formal definitions, and at bottom repeat more or less the same thing about them in slightly different words. In this work these are a side issue, and therefore are treated briefly. Their treatment in Section I is based upon the author's theoretical works the Theory of Order and the Theory of Reality, but will be intelligible to those who are not acquainted with those works. The chief concern is moral teaching – that is, the practical element.

II
THE DOCTRINE OF DUTIES

1
WE HAVE NO DUTIES TOWARDS THE NON-LIVING

No moral obligations exist towards the non-living as such.

We will make this proposition the beginning of our attempt at setting up a moral theory based upon applied ethics. Its definitive nature is clear immediately once the nature of the concept “ought to be” has been intuited. This concept always refers to something which in turn is referred to some totality, and which (1) forms part of the contents of some conscious entity, and (2) is realized with certainty only within the realm of the living.

It is true that a certain hypothetical element attaches even to this our negative proposition, since we cannot know with complete certainty that that which we call non-living is not a part of some living totality which is supra-personal and unknown to us.

But we are not obliged to assert that this our proposition is an axiom. It is designed merely to set a limit to our task.

If we insist upon casting it in an axiomatic form we must say that if there is something non-living in the strict sense, then no moral obligation exists towards it as such.

Careful note must be made of the words “as such”.

By these words we wish to make it clear that our proposition does not settle anything about our attitude towards the non-living in so far as the latter stands in some relation or other to the non-non-living. A statue is non-living, but a twofold relation subsists between it and the living: it is the work of men, and it acts upon men in a cheering or an edifying manner. A tract of country, too, although it is not the work of men, can be in an active relation to men; thus deposits of coal and of iron ore may be of economic value, although at the given moment they may be inert.

Such things, then, are not “non-living as such”, and our proposition is very far from expressing ethical indifference towards them. It might even be doubted whether there is anything “non-living as such” in the strictest sense—quite apart from the question which has already been raised whether that which we consider nonliving is so in fact in and for itself.

2
DUTIES TOWARDS “MY” PERSON

It has for long been the custom to speak of a man’s duties towards himself and of his duties towards others, where his attitude towards living entities comes into question. Probably the word “duty” was here understood, not in our narrower sense, which limits this concept so as to exclude community in the life of another entity, but merely as an abbreviated form of “it ought to be” in general.

It is certain that this traditional classification of duties is roughly correct. But it must be defined more narrowly, and the classification must be carried farther.

For the words “towards myself” we must substitute “towards my psycho-physical person”; for by I we mean simply the pure point of reference of conscious experience and nothing farther. If we make this verbal change we recognize immediately that it is possible to undertake a division of the person, and hence of my duties towards it, in so far as I am dealing with my person. For I am dealing, first, with that unique natural fact which is called my body; and, secondly, there is my soul.

With respect to that which is “mine” it is certain that a careful distinction must be made between these two. It remains to be seen later whether this is necessary with respect to “others” also.

A. DUTIES TOWARDS MY BODY

We will proceed, then, to speak of the duties towards my body.

If the question of duty arises here at all, it does so in our sense; for the concept of a sharing in life, in sensation, or in suffering becomes meaningless where “I” (to use the popular term) am the only person concerned.

First, then, my body lives, and, secondly, it is the instrument of my soul. (The meaning of this may be interpreted at will.)

Thus it is possible to speak of duties towards the body as a living entity in general, and of duties towards it as an instrument of the soul.

(a) MY BODY AS BARE LIVING ENTITY. THE FIRST POINT OF DICHOTOMY

Here, at the very outset of our detailed consideration, we are faced by one of the greatest of all difficulties. This is the point where great and fundamental contradictions can arise between the two distinct sources of our knowledge in matters that concern moral theory: between the immediate data of instinct, based upon intuition, and those which depend upon reflection within the region of the metaphysics of the supra-personal—a metaphysics which is hypothetical in a double sense.

My body lives. Ought it to live? Is there any axiom which relates to the life of my body?

It thus appears that we are here confronted by the question of questions within the region of particular Ethics and moral theory. This question will recur in each section of this book in a new form:—

Are there axioms within the region of applied ethics? That is, Are there data which, being intuited in a single instance, are intuited to be definitive?

There is an instinct which causes me to avert or to avoid harm and danger threatening my body, even when “I” am unhappy in my soul. But this instinct is no more than an innate “tendency” or “impulse”. Essentially after all this impulse is no more than a desire; its note is not “it ought to be”, but “I wish”.

We do not know at all, then, whether my body “ought” to live or not.

Furthermore, anyone who considers these problems has at once to consider certain relations which refer him beyond the mere object “my body” and put him into contact with “my soul” as the object of ethical consideration.

For if my body “ought” not to live, then surely my soul ought to contribute to the cessation of its life, and this fact would be manifested to me as will and deed, both being a part of my consciousness. To put it in popular language: “I” would have to will the cessation of the life of my body.

The question, then, is: What ought I to will, in the ethical sense, with respect to my body as living entity? It is this that we now have to discuss.

This, then, is our first question. Two answers are possible, which depend upon our metaphysical convictions, and two answers have as a matter of historical fact been given. Thus at the very beginning of our discussion we meet that which we propose, in the course of our study, to call the point of dichotomy. Unfortunately it will continually recur as we proceed in our investigations.

If the realization, on earth and in matter, of an entelechy is evil, and if it is the case that it were better if it did not take place, then my body as living entity ought not to be. If on the other hand this realization is part of the world-plan, then it ought to be. This is a fundamental question; it stands above feelings of sentimental pity. Even the body of the supporter of a family ought not to be as a living entity if (for example) its death contributed magically to the salvation of all mankind and of creatures generally.

We will now assume that the love of life was given the psycho-physical person because life on earth is part of the world-plan. This of course also applies to “my” life.

On this assumption I “ought” not to kill myself. The question thus never arises which is more just ethically—immediate and violent suicides, or self-destruction by means of starvation.

However, our ethical assertion is based upon a mere assumption; and we may say already at this place that the question whether in certain circumstances I may suffer myself to be killed voluntarily will be separately discussed at a later point.

It might here be said that one possibility has been neglected: in itself it may be morally indifferent whether my body lives or does not live, and the only question which arises may be whether I live “for” some other person. But this is not one of the questions which deal with the so-called “duties towards myself” in the strictest sense. The only question to be investigated is whether my body, taken simply as living body in itself, would be better alive or dead. The whole of this investigation is of the highest class metaphysically; and it must be allowed that it rests upon the consideration of magical possibilities.

The only possible decision is here hypothetical, and it is reached through the assumption that the love of life which has been implanted in me must have its source in some highest principle, since no other source could be possible. Its existence, then, must be conformable to this highest source. Thus we possess an instinct, but nevertheless are a little doubtful of the metaphysical value of that which it tells us. However, we have made up our minds, although the decision which we have reached is no more than hypothetical; and we must stick to our decision for everything that is to follow in the course of our theory. This much follows from our principle of the validity ef all axioms and pseudo-axioms (p. 65).

(b) MY BODY AS INSTRUMENT OF THE SOUL

The question whether my body as such ought to live has now been hypothetically answered in the affirmative; in other words, the discipline of death (as we may call it for short) has been rejected by postulate. It is only at this point that the question about the moral position of the body as an instrument of the soul has any meaning. Here, too, although we are dealing with the body, the whole problem is approached once more from the point of view of my soul and of my volition and activity as ego; and this is done even more emphatically than at the point where the only question at issue was the life of my body.

We are not yet asking how I ought to use the body as an instrument for the execution of actions: this is a moral question which concerns my soul alone; but we are asking what I ought to will with respect to the instrument in general if I am to be a man of “good will”.

I have reached the hypothetical decision that my body as living entity ought to exist, although I am well aware that there are many Indians whose answer would be in a different sense. Once this decision has been made, some further conclusions are reached about my obligations towards the body as instrument in general, provided at least that at the same time we concentrate our attention upon the empirical datum which is called the life of a psychophysical person of my species.

If I will and ought to live, then I must do so in the world with which circumstance has surrounded me, and I must live in it as an acting entity. For in man even the simplest bodily functions are, at least in part, actions which are willed or not willed. I act with my body for instrument. Even the care of the instrument itself requires the instrumentality of the instrument. It is with this that we are here concerned.

My duty towards my instrument is, then, to employ the instrument in such a way that it remains an instrument fit for use.

This follows from the assumption that “I ought to live”; for life is a component of the surrounding world.

This conclusion is also reached in another way through instinct. I have not only an impulse after life: I have also been endowed with an impulse after health, which definitely carries a note of pleasure. If, as we are assuming, it conforms with the plan of the source which is its origin, then it tells us: “Your body ought to be fit as an instrument—that is, it ought to be healthy.”

It should be fit for action. The question arises, What actions? For of actions there are many.

At this point, however, we are not yet concerned with the various directions in which the body as instrument may be trained. The only demand at this point is that the body shall not be sick—that is, that one or the other part of it shall be fit to be used as instrument as occasion may demand, and that its efficiency may be increased if necessary.

B. DUTIES TOWARDS MY SOUL

We now come to the duties towards my soul.

What ought to be the nature of my soul purely as such, or, to put it more strictly, what must be the nature of my soul, in order that I shall be able to describe it as good?

When we were speaking of the body we were unable to avoid completely any reference to the soul; for every act by which the body is influenced is carried out through the soul in so far as such an act can be willed at all,

Here, however, we are dealing with the soul alone. I am contemplating it from the ethical point of view: what do I wish the nature of my soul to be?

(a) MY SOUL AS ACTING ENTITY IN GENERAL

Here once more we reach those two contradictory systems of metaphysics, both of which are hypothetical and indemonstrable: once more we have reached the point of dichotomy. Either my soul ought to be without any wish, and ought not to possess that state which I experienced consciously as will or volition; it ought to be wholly meek and submissive and utterly patient. Or else my soul ought to be active and ought to be preserved in a state where it is fit for action.

The first must be the position of those who consider that life, although it ought not to be destroyed actively, is a punishment to be endured in silence and by each man for himself. The less he wills, the more quickly will a man reach the appointed end of his punishment, and the more salvation for others will he effect thereby. Thus once more indifference to everyday sympathy is a sign of the most intense participation in suffering.

The second position has on its side not only intellectual but also certain “instinctive” reasons, and hence we will decide in favour of the second: there is an impulse after action, and there is pleasure at the completed action. It is to be noted carefully that in the first instance there is merely impulse after action in general and pleasure at the completed action in general. We are not yet concerned with any further particulars.

My instinct tells me, then, that the attitude of my soul ought not to be quietistic.

This is the right place at which to establish a close relation between an understanding of phenomenology in general and psychology on the one hand, and Concrete Ethics and moral doctrine on the other. Such an understanding is to extend to all the individual propositions of moral doctrine, both those which have been and those which remain to be discussed: and this place is peculiarly fitted for such a discussion, since the danger of misunderstanding is greatest at this place.

The case is, then, that “I” have intuition of, and consciously possess, an indeterminate something: but I do not possess myself as acting, or even as becoming, entity. If I intuit ethically, I intuit under the form of “it ought to be”, and that is all.

Hence also I do not “cause” my soul to be in a state of volition or non-volition, to be active or quietistic: I merely intuit that it ought to be the one or the other. Now it is an empirical rule that when I have intuited an “I ought” referring to my soul, then my soul often, but not always, afterwards conforms with that of which it has intuited that it ought to be. To this extent I may, in a certain measure, take pleasure in an ethical intuition with regard to my soul. For, metaphysically speaking, the real foundation of my soul intuits itself, at least in part, when I am intuiting; and thus in a certain manner this self-intuition denotes a turn towards the good in my soul. Unfortunately it denotes no more than a turn, since an intuition of the good is one faculty and a capacity for doing it another, as we knew, although perhaps the two faculties are not wholly disconnected.

I intuit, then, that my soul ought to be fit for action, and I hope that now it has the power to act.

We are here speaking only of action in general, and not of action in particular. Now I intuit that empirically there are different possibilities of particularized action; perhaps, then, it will prove possible to say a little more without necessarily entering upon particularities of action as such.

(b) MY SOUL AS ...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Dedication
• PREFACE
• I. PROLEGOMENA
• II. THE DOCTRINE OF DUTIES
• III. ENLIGHTENMENT
• IV. RELIGION AS THE AIM OF ENLIGHTENMENT
• INDEX