Routledge Revivals: Peacebuilding and National Ownership in Timor-Leste (2013)

Sukehiro Hasegawa

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2018
• ISBN:
  9781351060134
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Philosophy
• Subtopic: Philosophy History & Theory

Originally published in 2013, Peacebuilding and National Ownership in Timor-Leste is an insightful, analytical presentation of developments that took place in Timor-Leste from July 2002 to September 2006. It reflects an intimate knowledge of events during this period and provides a detailed focus on the Timorese people and their leaders who struggled to lay a foundation for a free, peaceful and democratic nation. The book's central theme is that of the commitment of national leaders to national interest, rather than the establishment of perfect institutional mechanisms that determines the success of a post-conflict country in achieving its stability.

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II
First acts of national governance (2002–2004)

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Launching of the first constitutional government

The restoration of Timor-Leste’s political independence on 20 May 2002 marked the beginning of a genuine national self-rule. It built the foundations for an independent nation, based on the principles of democracy, where the people hold sovereign power to determine their own destiny. The Timorese people had acquired freedom to govern themselves. The leaders appeared most willing to promote a broad-based, participatory democracy and to heed their citizens’ concerns. Yet, there was an expectation that the people would not only be freed from any further oppression, but also from poverty. The Timorese leaders would later find out that this was a tall order.

Pleased with the appearance of democratic spirit in Timor-Leste, international donors started to provide funding for programmes designed to strengthen the institutional capacities for governance. In particular, they supported the government, the judiciary, the parliament and the office of the President. The government took up office under the leadership of Prime Minister Alkatiri in May 2002. The national institutions took on responsibility for the conduct of its affairs with substantive assistance from the United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET), other UN agencies, the World Bank, the IMF and other multilateral aid agencies.

The Timorese responded to the offer of external support with respect towards the international community. For example, they demonstrated their commitment to the principles of democratic governance by incorporating internationally accepted norms of human and civil rights. Further-more, they heeded the advice of international experts and began to make some tangible progress in building the institutions of governance.

However, the Timorese leaders soon discovered differences among their values, interests and aspirations. The reconciliation of these differences would prove more difficult than fighting together against foreign occupation. They started to discover that their old mindset had been nurtured during a long period of foreign colonialism and occupation. This old mentality had become detrimental to accepting democratic governance.

Among the state institutions, the government was the most active and assertive. The ministers displayed their dedication to work even in a resource-starved environment. Yet, they suffered from a lack of technical and administrative capacity in their departments and ministries. This impeded implementation of their policies and programmes. Decision-making and management capacity remained weak, particularly at middle and senior management levels. Furthermore, the operational capacity at lower levels was very limited. The capacity limitations also made it difficult for the ministers to empower officials to make decisions at appropriately lower levels. Additionally, in many cases, their tendency to comply fully with the wishes of the Prime Minister resulted in delayed decision-making and implementation of programmes.

Alkatiri appoints diverse ministers for his government

To start governing a fragile country, still dominated by international institutions, Mari Alkatiri formed a tightly controlled cabinet in May 2002. It consisted of loyalists and technocrats. Alkatiri also paid due attention to the need for gender balance.

The appointment of José Ramos-Horta was one expected by both the Timorese society and the international community. He had been very active in pursuing diplomatic recognition at the United Nations and elsewhere, during the struggle for independence. When a Nobel Peace Prize was bestowed on him in 1996, Ramos-Horta had gained international recognition.

He was a cosmopolitan statesman who thought in terms of universal values and principles. These were rare qualities to find on a remote island in the Indonesian archipelago. Ramos-Horta was fully acquainted with the norms and standards developed at the United Nations. He was also up to speed with other forms of emerging global governance. He was cognisant of the principal needs for the Timorese people: the right of self-determination, protection from political persecution and other human rights that all people are entitled to.

His commitment to this international principle was demonstrated in an international incident in 2002 when a boat carrying Sri Lankan asylum seekers appeared near the shore of Timor-Leste in 2002 en route to Australia. While Prime Minister Alkatiri and Interior Minister Lobato were unsure how to deal with the situation, Ramos-Horta made it clear that Timor-Leste should take them onshore and house them in temporary accommodation. Since then, he repeatedly showed his determination to stand up for human rights and other universal values.

Ramos-Horta was senior to the other ministers in ranking. His official title was: “Senior Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation”. Yet he was not as close to the Prime Minister as were Maria Boivida and Ana Pessoa. These two ladies were part of the core of the Alkatiri cabinet: Maria Boivida as the Minister of Finance and Planning, and Ana Pessoa as the Minister of Justice. Boivida was loyal to Alkatiri; she followed his instructions diligently. Ana Pessoa was also loyal, but she was strong-willed and independent-minded. Many diplomats found her sometimes rigid and uncompromising. However, we all respected her for her straightforwardness. Nobody questioned her integrity.

Among the cabinet members, there were ministers with excellent technical competence. Estanislau da Silva, the Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, had studied engineering in Portugal. Additionally, Da Silva had spent more than ten years in Australia during his exile from 1975 to 1999. His interest in natural sciences and agriculture was evident in 2005, during a visit to an experimental rice farm in a rural district of Manatutu. In May 2007, he became the interim Prime Minister for three months when José Ramos-Horta was elected President.

Rui Araujo was another high-performing professional as the Minister of Health. He was respected in the international community. We met in Geneva in 2004 during a joint meeting of the executive boards of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and the United Nations Fund for Population Activities (UNFPA). I asked him to join me in presenting on Timor-Leste’s engagement in national development. He later became Deputy Prime Minister of the interim government in 2006.

The Minister of Defence, Rodrigues, spoke English fluently but insisted on speaking Portuguese. He liked being considered a professor and enjoyed conceptualizing subject matters in an abstract form. The senior members of the Alkatiri Government were intelligent and educated. Most of the members had been abroad before the restoration of independence, so they were comfortable collaborating with one another. They formed a group around Mari Alkatiri, the Prime Minister, who was their dominant leader.

Mari Alkatiri was a man of intellect and reason with a strong will. He believed in tight governmental control in all segments of the society and economy. He was aware of the need for foreign investment, but was also careful about its adverse impact. He felt that national independence and interest should be protected at all costs. For this reason, he was not in favour of borrowing funds from the World Bank. I respected his strong spirit of independence, which made him reluctant to borrow from foreign sources. However, I also understood that there was a place for pragmatism. Therefore, I advised him that strict discipline was admirable, but it was also necessary to activate the economy. People needed gainful employment. I emphasized that job creation had to be the government’s key goal. He should achieve tangible economic recovery and growth, lest people would start to turn on him.

Ramos-Horta, by contrast, was more open to adopting a liberal economic policy, such as borrowing funds from the World Bank in order to stimulate the economy. He was a Keynesian at heart: ready to borrow money; ready to undertake massive public works, such that the government could create jobs for the people who needed income. Mari Alkatiri, on the other hand, was fearful. If too much money were injected into the economy too hastily, from his perspective, it would be a waste.

To secure adequate financial resources, the Alkatiri Government endeavoured to establish a regulatory and technical framework with Australia, to develop oil and natural gas resources in the Timor Gap area. On 20 May 2002, the government signed the Timor Sea Treaty with Australia, which would provide Timor-Leste with 90 per cent of the revenues from the Bayu-Undan field. A “Memorandum of Understanding” was also signed on the same day, which provided a 31 December 2002 deadline of an International Unitization Agreement. This agreement promised the efficient taxation, regulation and administration of the gas and oil field. In addition, Timor-Leste initiated technical discussions with Australia regarding the exploitation of the reserves in the Joint Petroleum Development Area.

The understanding was that this venture would not prejudice its position on the maritime boundary negotiations. This was specifically created to overcome the differences between the two governments on the ownership of oil and natural gas resources located in the Timor Sea. While Australia considered the location to be within the extended area of the continental shelf adjacent to Australia, Timor-Leste insisted that it was within the area of its exclusive economic zone.

International recognition and assistance for financial management

The President and the government acted together swiftly to establish the country’s status in the international community, in order to secure assistance for financial management. During the first few months after the launch of the first constitutional government, the President concentrated his attention on foreign affairs, with trips as an Observer to the 3^rd African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) Summit in Fiji in July 2002, and the 4th CPLP (Comunidade dos Passes de Lingua Portuguesa, Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries) Heads of State and Government Summit in Brazil.

On 27 September 2002, Timor-Leste was admitted as the 191^st member of the United Nations. The ceremony, which President Gusmão attended along with Prime Minister Alkatiri and Minister for Foreign Affairs José Ramos-Horta, marked the formal realization of their aspiration for independence as a sovereign nation.

In the same year, Timor-Leste became a member of the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank and CPLP. The country established diplomatic relations with nearly all Member States of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Timor-Leste started to participate in ASEAN meetings as an invited Observer.

As the first act of national governance, the government wanted to strengthen the core administrative structures critical to Timor-Leste’s viability and political stability. The development of the East Timor Police Service (ETPS) received first priority because of the importance of law enforcement and maintenance of security.¹

The government further recognized the need to provide people with basic social services, such as schools and health centres. For this purpose, it started the annual budgeting process in order to secure a minimum amount of resources. However, the government had neither the experience nor expertise to undertake proper budgeting of financial resources. Given the need for funds and technical expertise, it decided to accept the assistance of Bretton Woods Institutions when the preparation of the 2003–2004 national budgets took place.

UNMISET and UNDP recognized Bretton Woods Institutions’ specialized expertise. At the same time we were sensitive to what we regarded as the short-sightedness of the IMF and World Bank staff. They seemed to take our cooperation for granted and dictate their terms to us. On 12 August 2003, UNMISET received a four-man delegation from the IMF’s monetary and financial systems department, led by Mr Cheek Sung Lee. He discussed the status of advisory services provided by five joint IMF and UN experts to the Banking and Payment Authority of Timor-Leste. The delegation included Mr Luis Quintaneiro, Banking and Payments Authority (BPA) General Manager; Mr C. Ake Lonnberg, IMF Senior Economist; and Mr Cadim A. Al-Eyd, IMF Senior Resident Representative based in Timor-Leste. Contrary to my earlier expectation, Mr Cheek Sung Lee was polite and appreciative of the support extended by the United Nations to the cost-sharing agreement in support of the Government of Timor-Leste. Instead of making demands, he gently expressed his hopes that the cost-sharing arrangement would continue until the end of the UNMISET mandate.

Also, he said that a similar arrangement could be made to fill the BPA’s critical need to continue functioning as a central bank of the country and to manage the monetary policies and operational responsibilities. I acknowledged that with the assistance of the IMF and the United Nations, the monetary policies and operations of the new country had started without any major problems. However, concerning the cost-sharing funds, I had to inform him that there was no firm assurance for any resources beyond May 2004.

The Security Council wanted to reduce the funding of capacity-building tasks. Furthermore, it sought to transfer this to agencies with voluntary funding as much as possible. The end of the UNMISET mandate period was considered the suitable time for transition to a sustainable framework. Noting this point, I told the IMF delegation about the need to explore alternative means of securing funds, should any of the international advisory posts be absolutely required.

I pointed out to the IMF delegations the need to adopt a new approach for institutional capacity-building. The current arrangement was designed to simply fill the gap for technical expertise by foreign experts. The IMF delegation leader listened and said that he agreed to shift the approach towards building national capacity. He indicated that the two posts of the Deputy General Manager for Payments and the Director of Administration could be taken over by Timorese. He felt, however, that the positions of General Manager and Chief Accountant still needed to be filled by international experts appointed by the IME Furthermore, to counteract my suggestion, he said that the funds needed to be secured to meet the short-term assignments to undertake training and coaching activities. Concerning the appointment of any advisors, Mr Lee gave an assurance that candidates would be presented to UNMISET for concurrence before IMF recruited them.

In conclusion, I suggested that IMF finalize the cost-sharing arrangements for the remaining UNMISET mandate period with the Director of Administration and the Civilian Support Group. They should take into account the need to obtain the approval of UNMISET for recruitment of any individual experts and to increase the activities for national institution capacity-building.

National parliament finds its task highly technical and problematic

The parliament passed its first piece of legislation, the Publication of Acts Bill, on 28 June 2002. Subsequently, it enacted additional legislation including the Judicial Magistrates Statutes, the Citizenship Bill, the Passport Law and the Law on the Maritime Borders of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste. Yet, the National Parliament moved rather slowly, as it faced the difficulty of dealing with highly technical pieces of legislation. Neither the committees nor the plenary made any aggressive move to take the opportunity to call on outside technical experts. Although there was an admittedly small pool of individuals in Timor-Leste who were knowledgeable of the bills currently under consideration, only government ministers and their international advisors addressed the plenary.

An example of the lack of technical expertise was seen in the amount of time it took for consideration of a bill on maritime boundaries. The review stretched over two weeks of at times intense debate. At one point, a proposal was drafted to eliminate a provision that defined Timor-Leste’s continental shelf. The clause was a standard component of most countries’ legal framework for maritime boundaries. Despite this fact, and considering that its elimination would be seriously problematic, many members took it to be indicative of extra-territorial claims by the Timorese Government. The plenary spent well over an hour negotiating the proposal, and it was defeated in a closed vote.

The lack of technical expertise was also hampering the work of the Standing Committee on Constitutional Rights, Freedom and Guarantees. The Committee considered the bills on judicial magistrate, amnesty and pardon. The Committee Chair, Vicente Guterres of União Democrática Cristã/Partido Democrata Cristã (UDC/PDC), expressed the view that the committee members were not able to properly evaluate the bills and offer amendments, due to their inexperience in dealing with such issues. They had no library or access to documents or comparative legislation. This was a continuing constraint, especially as many of the bills were to lay the foundation for critical areas such as commerci...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Original Title Page
• Original Copyright Page
• Endorsements
• Table of Contents
• Acknowledgements
• List of Abbreviations and Acronyms
• Map of Timor-Leste
• Introduction
• I The beginning of a peacebuilding mission in Timor-Leste
• II First acts of national governance (2002–2004)
• III Growing tensions in Timorese society
• IV Internal conflicts, confrontations and clashes in 2006
• V Transitional justice: Primacy of truth or justice for reconciliation and peace
• VI Premature withdrawal of peacekeepers and transition to a sustainable development framework
• VII UN Mission Management
• VIII Legacy of UN peacebuilding in Timor-Leste
• Appendix I: Chronology
• Appendix II: Government ministers and senior officials of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste